A comparative study of divorce among Muslims and

non-Muslims in Malaysia with special reference

to the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur by Kamarudin, Z.B.
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DIVORCE
AMONG MUSLIMS AND NON-MUSLIMS IN
MALAYSIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF
KUALA LUMPUR
(LOiDQN)
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DIVORCE AMONG MUSLIMS AND
NON-MUSLIMS IN MALAYSIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR
by
ZALEHA BT KAMARUDIN
FACULTY OF LAWS
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
A Thesis Presented for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
University of London
November 1993
A CKNO WLED GEMENTS
I wish to convey my sincere thanks first of all to the International
Islamic University of Malaysia and the Public Service Department,
Malaysia, which, under its Staff Development Scheme, provided most
of the funds which made this research financially possible.
My gratitude is also due to all those who so kindly provided me with
information and other assistance during the field work in the High
Court and Sharia Court in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, as
well as during my stay in London.
To my supervisor, Professor MDA Freeman, I owe a special word of
thanks. I gratefully acknowledge the debt I owe him for the invaluable
intellectual guidance and moral support, beyond the bounds of his
responsibility, which he so willingly and cheerfully provided during the
gestation of this thesis. A number of people have read and commented
on all or part of my thesis. I am indebted in particular to Elaine
Genders, Convener of the Research Methods Seminar at the Faculty
of Laws, University College London, M.S Mohamed Said, Adah
Othman, Dr.Paul L.Mills and N.A.Aryee.
I would like to express my special gratitude to Dr.Zubair Hassan of
the Statistics Department at International Islamic University and
Dr.Angelo Marini for their expert help with the statistics in chapter 4.
Last but not least, I thank my husband and our three little children,
for sharing the ups and downs of my research. They stoically bore with
me the burdens of undertaking research at this level. To them I
dedicate this thesis.
London, October, 1993
111
ABSTRACT
The subject of this thesis is a comparison of the law, practice and
procedure relating to divorce among Muslims and non-Muslims in
Malaysia. This study analyses divorce in the predominantly urban
society of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur against the
background of changes in the social structure, the family and social
norms, with the aim of clarifying of how and why contemporary divorce
needs to be rethought and reformed.
Structurally, the thesis is divided into three parts. Part 1, consisting of
three chapters, is introductory, and covers the historical and legal
background necessary for the proper appreciation of the topics
discussed later.
Part 2 is an analysis of divorce statistics for Muslims and non-Muslims
in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and an identification of
factors related to it. The discussion of statistical trends and social
influences is placed in a smaller context to permit the statistical
information analysed in the present study to be refined at the local
level.
Part 3, the concluding part, consists of two chapters, and deals with
reforms that have taken place in other countries that could serve as
models for the reform of divorce laws in Malaysia. Among the areas
that are touched are legal reforms to protect women, grounds for
divorce under Islamic law and civil law, and also the setting up of
family courts and systems of conciliation.
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INTRODUCTION
1. BACKGROUND
The Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur,' the capital city of Malaysia,
represents a window on a predominantly urban Malaysian society. In
this melting pot, various ethnic groups viz, the Malays, Chinese and
Indians are mixed, yet, reaffirm their individual identities. 2 Kuala
Lumpur, like the rest of Malaysia, had a very complex legal framework
as far as the laws of marriage and divorce 3 were concerned. Each
individual ethnic group was governed by a mixture of personal or
customary and statutory laws, the roots of which lie in the pages of
history. 4 These differences brought into its train great problenis in
Malaysian society. Thus, the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act,
1976 (Act 164) for non-Muslims was introduced with a view to
providing a solution to this malady.
Muslims in Malaysia are governed by Sharia law in all matters relating
to the family. However, each of the constituent states of the country
is empowered to enact its own legislation on family law. Muslims in
Kuala Lumpur were previously governed by the Administration of
Hereafter abbreviated as Kuala Lumpur.
2 Malaysia serves as a good example of a multiracial country with little ethnic integration. For
further discussion on this point, see Chapter 1.
Divorce in the context of this thesis is defined as the formal dissolution of a marnage by a court
of law. The reasons which compel a couple to end their union formally, via the courts, are
dependant on the nature of the divorce laws.
For historical development of divorce laws see Part 1.
Hereafter abbreviated as LRA..
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Muslim law of Selangor 6, but with the separation of Kuala Lumpur
from Selangor, a new law was needed. Thus, the Islamic Family Law
(Federal Territory) 1984, (Act 303) was enacted and introduced in
1987 to simplify and to a certain extent improve the administration of
family law in Kuala Lumpur. It is timely to investigate the implications
brought by this legislation, to see whether it has solved the problems
that it set out to answer, or whether it has given rise to new ones
instead.
This study sets out to compare the administration of family law among
the various ethnic groups in Malaysia. It also describes divorce in a
predominantly urban society of Kuala Lumpur in the light of changes
in the social structure of the city, and in family and social norms. It
is intended to increase our understanding of how and why
contemporary Malaysian divorce needs to be rethought and reformed.
2. OBJECTIVES
Few studies have been conducted on divorce in Malaysia, and those
studies have concentrated on the sociological nature of divorce without
examining the role of law and its effects on divorce patterns. 8 On the
other hand, the study of Malaysian family law has always been
concerned with its rules and principles but not the social impact of
these rules. It seems self-evident that an examination of statutory law
without a contemporaneous evaluation of the same law in action would
offer no foundation for constructive reform. A study of divorce,
therefore, will not be meaningful without a dual examination of its
social and legal aspects. The present study focuses on the Malaysian
6 Act A 206 P.U. (A) 44(74.
Hereafter abbreviated as IFLA.
8 In attempting to understand the relationship between law and social structure, it is obviously
necessazy to go beyond the legal rules and to examine the law in operation.
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Law of divorce in action in the city of Kuala Lumpur. This study is an
attempt to build a bridge linking the sociological aspects of divorce to
the laws relating to it.
With the introduction of the LRA in 1982 and IFLA in 1987, the law
relating to divorce in Malaysia has undergone a revolutionary change.
These modern pieces of legislation have had many legal and social
implications in Malaysian society. This study intends to examine closely
and evaluate the law and current divorce practice in Malaysia and
contribute to the understanding of the reasons for differences in the
divorce patterns between the Muslims and non-Muslims in the urban
society of Kuala Lumpur. Due to the historical character of the
development of divorce laws in Malaysia, specifically in Kuala Lumpur,
this study has to be made against the backdrop of former and present
divorce laws. It focuses on the significant changes in divorce patterns
in Kuala Lumpur both before and after LRA and IFLA had been in
force. Extensive analysis of divorce trends and differentials in Kuala
Lumpur are made with a view to discovering how changes in the law
have affected these patterns of divorce.
It is highly appropriate to examine the precise consequences of the
LRA ten years after it has been in force to determine its reception,
implementation and effect on the non-Muslim populations in Malaysia.
It is also necessary to study, from the sociological point of view,
whether the persons involved who have been brought up with Asian
personal laws in keeping with their culture and customs, could be
trained and compelled to accept and adopt a whole new set of alien
concepts influenced by western patterns in relation to their
matrimonial practices.
This study has been further prompted by the lack of recent research
in this field in Malaysia especially on the basis of comparative analysis.
Therefore, I will attempt to investigate divorce behaviour and find out
3
to what extent the results of research carried out by other sociologists
are similar to the Malaysian divorce scene. An objective observer may
contend that there is no basis for comparison when considering the
different social and cultural values between a relatively conservative
Asian society like Malaysia and western society. Hence, the comparison
is only made within Malaysian society itself. It involves the comparison
of the divorce laws of Chinese, Indians and Malays. This exploration
thus seeks to understand divorce within the larger framework of the
Malaysian system. It is hoped that the research findings presented in
this thesis will enrich general knowledge in this field and further
improve the formulation of future policy alternatives in Malaysia.
3. ANALYSIS OF STUDIES ON DIVORCE IN MALAYSIA.
Some of the most profound social changes among the three major
ethnic groups (Malays, Chinese, and Indians) in Peninsular Malaysia
arose after independence in 1957g. These occurred mainly in the
patterns of marriage and divorce among the Malay population. Most
of the studies in these areas were, on the one hand, macro-
demographic studies (Smith, 1961, Palmore and Marzuki, 1970, Jones,
1980 and 1981, Lee Kok Huat, et.al 1985, Hassan, 1984, Tan 1987) and
on the other, anthropological case studies (Djamour, 1965, Swift, 1958,
Badur, 1963, Firth, 1966, Downs 1967, Strange 1976, Kutchiba et. al,
1970, and Wilder, 1982).
There have also been similar studies, mainly in the form of graduation
exercises, in partial fulfilment for the degree of Bachelor of Economics
at the University of Malaya (Abdullah, 1980, Che Mat 1980, Mat
Peninsular Malaysia at that time was called the Federation of Malaya. Malaysia was formed in
1963 comprising the Federation of Malaya, the other two Borneo States of Sabah and Sarawak,
and Singapore. Since then the Federation of Malaya has been called Peninsular Malaysia or West
Malaysia. In 1965, Singapore left Malaysia to become a separate independant republic; Malaysia,
90-91 Official Year Book, VoLZ8, Department of Information Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur,
Publication Division, pp.16-21.
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Saman, 1980, Ibrahim 1980, and Karim, 1980) and also in the form of
project papers submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of
Bachelor of Law. The project papers, which were mostly written in
Malay, concentrated on Malay Muslim divorce (Hj. Haron, 1976,
Mahmood, 1982, Abas, 1981, Wan Ibrahim, 1981, Katar, 1983, and
Mahmud, 1984). There were only a few written on divorce and its
relation to Adat law (Muhammad Wahi, 1977, Johen, 1978 and Ewon,
1979). Divorce among non-Muslims is not a popular area of study
amongst the law students; so far, there is only one (Tong, 1985). There
is only one Masters thesis written on Muslim divorce (Md. Nor, 1978),
and this focused on marriage and divorce according to the four Sunni
Schools of thought in Islam, that is Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanafi and
Hanbali.
Project papers on divorce from the Islamic Academy at the University
of Malaya were mostly socio-legal studies concentrating on Muslim
divorce (Ismail, 1986, Abdul Hamid, 1987, Bahrun, 1989, Bahari, 1990,
Hj. Bujang, 1990, Zainal, 1990, Mohamed, 1991, Syed Abdul Rahman,
1991, Husin, 1992 and Mat Said, 1992)
Most of the macro-demographic studies emphasised the differentials in
age at marriage and fertility among the three major ethnic groups.
Some of them also examined rural urban differences and the extent to
which divorce correlates with age at marriage and some other social
and economic factors. Among them, however, Jones (1980, and 1981)
and Sidhu and Jones (1981) provide an excellent explanation of ethnic
as well as regional differences, the dynamics of change and some of the
common factors which have affected the changes in patterns of
marriage and divorce over the last three decades.
As far as Malay marriage and divorce are concerned, macro-
demographic studies which relate to the three main ethnic groups and
which separate the approach into rural and urban subdivisions are of
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relatively limited value. This is not only because the Malay population
is large enough to merit a separate study of its own,'° but also
because the laws and customs governing Malay marriage and divorce
differ from State to State. Apart from that, each State has different
levels of social and economic development. For example, the State of
Kelantan in the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia, with its history of
geographical isolation, separate dialect, and the strongest degree of
Islamic religiosity (Roff, 1974) is different from the rest of the
country, particularly Negeri Sembilan and Johor on the west coast.
Negeri Sembilan has a strong Minangkabau influence, while Johor is
heavily influenced by Javanese and Buginese customs (Swift, 1958,
Badur, 1963, and Chan and Jones, 1983).
Some states, particularly the two east coast States of Kelantan and
Trengganu, have lagged very far behind in economic and social
development. As recently as in 1975, the age at first marriage among
women was the lowest in Peninsular Malaysia and the divorce rate was
the highest not only in Malaysia but also in the world (Mahmood,
1982, Jones, 1980, Jones, 1981 and Hassan, 1984).
Most of the research done on divorce in Malaysia concentrates
increasingly on the social aspects of divorce. It seeks to answer
questions such as who divorced and why, the main causes and signs of
stress in dissolved marriages, and the differences between these
marriages and those that did not end in divorce. Such questions
reflected not only a broadening of historical enquiry, but also current
concerns about marriage and divorce, the family, and the status of
women in modern society. Answers to them usually demanded intensive
investigation of judicial and other legal records, and for this reason
' Of the total 8.8 million in Peninsular Malaysia in 1980, the Malays accounted for 53 percent; 1980
Population and Housing Census of Malaysia: General Report of the Population Census, edited
by Khoo Teik Hual, Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur, Government Pnnter, 1983.
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much of the recent work cited above on the history of divorce is
restricted in terms of location and time frame.
This research goes beyond the ambit explored in the above works. It
focuses on the comparative nature of Malaysian family law. In view of
the diversity of customs and socio-economic conditions, there is a need
to do a comparative study in this area among the Muslim and the non-
Muslim populations in Malaysia through the socio-legal perspective.
4. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
Structurally, I have divided the main text of this thesis into three
parts. Part 1 begins with an examination of the laws, procedures and
attitudes of Malaysian society to divorce. It traces the development of
divorce laws from early colonial times to 1990, drawing upon a wide
range of divorce laws, statistics, divorce records, newspapers and
journals, essays, legal and sociological studies, exploration and
exposition of the causes of divorce.
Chapter 1 of Part 1 is a general appraisal of Malay, Chinese and
Hindu customary divorces and associated problems which leads
inexorably to an examination of the reasons why LRA was mooted.
Divorce clauses under the LRA and their implications are further
analysed in Chapter 2. Muslim divorces are dealt with in Chapter 3 of
this part. Except for Chapter 3 which deals specifically on IFLA, Part
1 is generally national in scope since the law applicable to non-
Muslims in Kuala Lumpur is the same as that of other States in
Malaysia.
Part II is an analysis of divorce statistics for Muslims and non-Muslims
in Kuala Lumpur and an identification of factors related to it. The
discussion of statistical trends and social influences is placed in a
smaller context in Chapter 4. A case-study such as this is desirable
7
because it permits the statistical information to be refined at the local
level, rather than confining it entirely to aggregated national data.
Finally, Part III deals with reforms that have taken place in other
countries that could serve as model for the reform of divorce laws in
Malaysia. This part is divided into two chapters: Chapter 5 discusses
the policies relating to family life and Chapter 6 the proposals towards
reform of divorce laws in Malaysia.
5. METHODOLOGY
This research project called for two kinds of information. First, there
was a need for up-to-date data on the divorce laws in Malaysia, and
secondly, we needed data that would link divorce to a set of correlates
and help to explain discernible patterns in the divorce process. The
analysis of the information so collected had to test the strength of
relationships posited in theories already available and, if possible,
provide avenues to new explanations.
Various methods have been resorted to in the process of collecting this
information. Besides library research, official statistics have been
obtained from the High Court Registry, Sharia Court, Department of
Religious Affairs, Islamic Centre, Statistics Department and National
Registration Department to determine the rate of divorce.
Books for basic reading were obtained from the law library of the
University of Malaya, International Islamic University, Pustaka
Peringatan Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian National Board of Family
Development, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University College
London, London School of Economics and Political Sciences, School
of Oriental and African Studies, and University of London. As the
above libraries do not hold many of the reports, seminar papers which
are in the main unpublished, I have had to keep abreast of recent
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developments through the mass media in order to track down these
materials. The National Board of Family Development Library's press
cuttings on divorce were useful as developments in the area of divorce
are fast-moving and ever-changing.
As many observers have pointed out, in divorce law, there is a wide
gap between the "law according to the books" and "law in action". In
an attempt to ascertain not only what the law says but also what it
does, I undertook extensive interviews with experts involved in the
administration of divorce. Interviews were conducted either on an
informal or formal basis but with no set format. This was intended to
give the flexibility and freedom to field questions as they came to
mind. However, some pertinent questions were prepared prior to the
interviews as answers to them needed to be obtained.
The High Court and Sharia Court judges dealing with divorce cases
were interviewed to ascertain their attitudes and experiences in dealing
with divorce cases. A number of senior lawyers were also contacted
since lawyers are usually the first members of the legal system that
prospective parties to divorce suits meet, and often remain in contact
with the party throughout the action for divorce. The various processes
and proceedings stipulated by the courts in regard to cases for divorce
from the time of the filing of the petition to the time of the
pronouncement of the decree of divorce, including efforts for
reconciliation, were also discussed with the lawyers and valuable
suggestions were also noted. For observation of court proceedings, I
have attended a number of court hearings in both the Civil" and
Sharia Courts.
Apart from this, all other possible means of collecting material have
been utilised. These include case-study of divorce records in the High
' Including one in the chamber of Judicial Commissioner Rahmah Hussein in [kcembcr, 1992.
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Court and Sharia Court in Kuala Lumpur. The case-study method is
essentially chosen to discover the divorce trends and patterns in the
selected area and also factors which are associated with divorce
propensities among the Muslims and non-Muslims. Each divorce case
in Kuala Lumpur has a file in the judicial court. These files are
consigned to the record room of the court in bundles according to year
and category. Each file normally consists of divorce petition, the
answer to the petition if the cause is defended, the marriage
certificate, and other related papers.
A survey form was used to expedite the perusal of data.' 2
 The survey
method was used, even though it is tedious, because it is scientific and
systematic. To reduce errors, sampling was carried out for 1980-1990
because of the large number of files except 1975-1979. The sampling
was made systematically to cut out bias. Much time, energy and
patience were however needed to locate, segregate and to go through
the individual case files for random sampling. In my selection criteria,
files with even numbers (after renumbering) were selected after setting
aside files relating to other family matters. Data were coded and
reduced to measurement so that dominant patterns and statistically
significant variations could be identified. The statistics compiled are
from petitions to which decrees absolute have been granted. Analysis
is not done based on petition filed, as apart from the time lag between
petition being filed, there are some petitions which are not granted.
There are circumstances where a petition may be withdrawn on account
of reconciliation or death or because it is judged not to satisfy the
necessary legal conditions.
Some of the information on the divorce records refers to the position
at the time the petition is filed and is not updated when the decree is
12 See Sample in Appendix III.
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granted, in particular occupation of both parties which is referred to
in the marriage certificate.'3
As to accuracy of information, much of the information is supplied by
the petitioner to fulfill the legal requirements for filing a petition.
Certain of the items of information are usually taken from the
marriage certificate, but others are extracted from statements by the
petitioner in affidavits. Since the information is required for a legal
process it may be presumed that the quality of data is good. To ensure
accuracy, editing checks are carried out to detect clerical, and coding
errors.
The use of divorce records permitted penetration beyond the
generalisations to the realities of family life and investigation of the
characteristics of marital breakdown. However, it is absolutely
imperative to retain the distinction between divorce and marital
breakdown, and to remember that the irate of divorce is not a guide to
the extent of marital unhappiness, or marital breakdown. It is obvious
that not all cases of adultery, desertion or incompatibility come before
the divorce courts. Many unhappy marriages simply endure, separation
being continuously accepted, others end in desertion, or some form of
formally or informally agreed upon separation.
Divorce is as much a guide to marital breakdown as nuptiality rates
are a guide to the extent of 4, facto marital cohabitation in society at
any given time. Both marriage and divorce are primarily legal
procedures, recording a social event. There is no way of knowing
whether a rise in divorce rates betokens an increase in the dissolution
of marriages or whether it is simply the result of a growing proportion
of de facto dissolutions going through the legal formalities of divorce.
13 The occupation of a person refers to the kind of work performed by the person at his/her place
of employment. Occupations have been classified here accordmg to the classification method used
by the Statistics Department.
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Once this critical distinction between divorce and marital breakdown
is made, it becomes clear that divorces are a consequence of marital
breakdown. Evidence from divorce records is exploited to shed some
light on those areas of family life which are generally obscure and
under-researched.
The reasons for choosing Ku ala Lumpur were almost all practical. First
of all, funds were limited so that the more grandiose plan of covering
the whole of Malaysia was simply not feasible. Kuala Lumpur was
chosen primarily because the sources were conveniently located and
because the divorce records are comparatively more organised and up
to date. These obvious practical advantages aside, Kuala Lumpur had
other clear merits as the loci of a case study; it offers the largest
single sample of divorces for analysis. Secondly, the society and law
chosen for study, that is IFLA and LRA was one that I had worked
with previously, and this existing knowledge allowed for quite detailed
research designing before field work began. Thirdly, because I am
already familiar with the language, culture, and history of the area, I
could more easily maintain the probing quality of the work. However,
Kuala Lumpur should not be regarded as in any way typical of other
Malaysian cities, and it should certainly not be thought of as
representative of non-urban Malaysia.
The time span of sixteen years of divorces studied would reflect the
divorce trends and patterns under the former laws and the present law.
The study is restricted to divorce per se and does not cover post-
divorce settlements. Cross-national comparisons of divorce rates of
other countries are also not included, the reason being simply that
such comparisons are usually superficial at best, and misleading at
worst, because divorce rates depend so much on divorce legislation
which varies from country to country, and even within countries.
Beyond this, the extent of divorce is heavily influenced by demographic
12
and social structures and processes. For these reasons, the study is
confined to the Malaysian divorce experience.
In this study, the sources structured the potential results. An
explanation of the records used in this study and some further points
should be made here. First, a condition of access to the trial records
was the protection of the privacy of the individual parties. Any study
of marital dissolution in a jurisdiction where divorce is legally highly
restricted must acknowledge that those marriages that were dissolved
through the formal or legal process represent only a fraction of the
marriages that actually ended through human behaviour rather than
death, extra-legal or quasi-legal processes.
The aim of this study is not to establish the differences between the
divorced and the non-divorced populations and to draw conclusions as
to the causes of or proneness to divorce, but rather to explain the
quantitative and qualitative variations and changes in the incidence of
divorce.
6. PROBLEMS
Generally speaking, statistical documentation in Malaysia is woefully
inadequate. The absence of comprehensive official data on divorce in
Malaysia, specifically in Kuala Lumpur constitutes a serious deficiency.
Many divorce records of previous years were either misplaced or
untraceable due to shifting of court premises and the flood in 1971. It
seemed important, therefore, to construct the pattern, even if this had
to be estimated by piecing together whatever data could be obtained
from the divorce records. A great deal of work over a period of years
will be needed before the divorce statistics programme can reach the
stage of development already attained in United Kingdom and United
States.
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In view of the foregoing, it seems that studies of the type undertaken
here have to surmount great difficulties, particularly in the matter of
data collection which is a mountainous task that involves time, energy
and money. Unless and until people are better enlightened, they will
not bother to give any assistance. Likewise, the Courts and the
Statistics Department should collect and maintain primary data
concerning divorce.
Each of the primary sources used in this study has inherent strengths
and weaknesses. Legislative debates and law reports reveal the ideas
and the parameters of discussion of divorce and family in two of the
most important institutions of the period - Parliament and the Courts.
The ideas that circulated within those institutions demand examination
because the institutions themselves were powerful and authoritative,
not because the ideas were in any way necessarily representative of the
society or elements of the society.
The files of judicial divorces present their own problems. This
material was produced through a complex procedure in which the
demands of the judicial system, the views of the lawyers, and the
actions of the parties all played a significant role. The files cannot be
taken to represent fully the views of the parties, since the articulation
of their attitudes and knowledge was being filtered through counsel
and was potentially highly structured in response to the requirements
of the judicial process. Although I have used divorce files extensively,
caution is exercised in assessing the extent to which the parties were
able or willing to expose their marriage to public examination. The
divorce records themselves allow only a limited view of the individuals'
social characteristics since they only provide information relevant to
the granting of the divorce. Information which is interesting from
sociological point of view is unfortunately not included. As a result,
details like education and income are not stated. The duration of the
marriage was revealed only incidentally, by subtracting the age at
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marriage from age at divorce. This of course is not the most accurate
way of assessing the real duration of the marriage since it limits it to
de jure duration. Occupations, although recorded, were occupations
when the couples got married and not necessarily the same occupations
at the time of divorce. Although this was taken as indicator of social
class, it need not be conclusive. The age of the parties was always
revealed, since it was fundamental to the divorce process. Place of
marriage was revealed through the marriage certificate but the clue to
the ethnic origin would lie in the person's name.
Another difficulty in determining the exact rate of Muslim divorce is
that although some of the marriages are registered in Kuala Lumpur,
it is likely that some may have migrated after marriage and possibly
got divorced elsewhere. This situation rendered it dificult to find out
the exact number of marriages and divorces that occured in the area
of study. No attempt was made to estimate them as there would be
many divorces registered in Kuala Lumpur due to in-migration
subsequent to marriages contracted elsewhere outside Kuala Lumpur.
The difficulties of interpretation of data are compounded when we
seek to generalize using case studies at any level,(for example from
small groups to national) that differ in the quality and character of
their data, employ different methodologies or criteria of evaluation,
and that produce divergent conclusions.
Another great handicap was the absence of any sociological study on
divorce in Malaysia from which guidelines could be followed. Studies
elsewhere could not be depended upon much since they have been in
entirely different socio-cultural set-ups.
Much of sociological and anthropological researches in Malaysia so far
has been on rural areas. Not much research has been done on urban
social institutions and their various aspects. This may be due to the
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fact that Malaysia is still predominantly rural. Yet, we have to inquire
into the impact of urban way of life on institutions like marriage and
divorce.
It would hardly be possible to attempt a complete survey of the trends
of these studies in this thesis, since considerable background knowledge
is needed of the peculiar characteristics of the Malay, Indian and
Chinese family system and of the special concepts employed.
Nevertheless, some of the more important aspects are discussed.
16
PART ONE
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DIVORCE LAW
Family law is one aspect of the law that treats Malaysians differently
according to their race, religion and custom. It is not the intention of
the legislature to segregate them according to their creed. The present
situation came about as a result of history and the development of
Malaysian society.
Malaysia has always been under the influence of various religions and
races 1 . Prior to the English occupation, there was no uniform system
of law, domestic or otherwise in Malaysia, although a Malay Legal
Code existed since the fifteenth century. Malay customary law mixed
with Hindu law and Muslim law were also in existence but these were
mainly confined to the Malays. 2 The Chinese and Indian customary
laws were introduced with the large scale immigration of Chinese and
Indian labourers to assist in the economic development of the then
Malaya. Nevertheless, in many cases, the judges had to take local
customs into consideration.3
Although Islam is, constitutionally, its official religion, other religions
are permitted. 4 Each individual ethnic group was governed by a
mixture of personal or customary and civil law. Islamic law applies to
Muslims, the Malay Adat to certain sections of the Malay people,
For further details see Ibrahim, Ahmad bin Mohamed and Joned, Ahilemah bt, The Malaysian
Legal System, Kuala Lumpur, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1987, pp.7-32.
2	 Ibid,p.3.
See, for example the case of Rahmah bt Ta'at v Laton bt Malim Sultan (1926) 6 F.M.S.L.R 128.
The Malaysian Constitution, Article 3(1).
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Hindu law to those who are Hindu by religion and Chinese law to the
ethnic Chinese. However, the substance of the personal laws was
confined to family law only. The limitation of the personal laws to such
a narrow field was a heritage of colonial legal policy. Therefore, in
terms of divorce, the Chinese and Hindus could divorce according to
their own law or customs. The civil law on divorce, 5
 that is the
Divorce Ordinance, 19526 which was applicable only to monogamous
marriages, did not apply then to Chinese or to most Hindu marriages
which are by nature polygamous. These differences brought about great
problems in Malaysian society. Thus, the Law Reform (Marriage and
Divorce) Act, 1976 was introduced with a view to providing a solution
to this malady.
In the case of Re Ding Do Ca deceased, 7 Thomson L.P said,
"The whole question of personal law in this countFy particularly
as regards questions of marriage, divorce and succession, calls
for the attention of the legislature. As regards persons professing
Islam the position is tolerably clear. But as regards persons of
Chinese race, the law the courts are administering is probably
different from any law which exists or ever existed in China -
The same sort of position may well arise in relation to persons
professing the Hindu religion by reason of the enactment in
India of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955."
As for the Muslims, in all matters relating to the family, they are
governed by Muslim law. 8
 Although the then Lord President stated
The Malaysian kgislation regarding marriage and divorce was greatly influenced by British
common law as the colonial administration drew the law from British models, Hooker, M.B. The
Personal Laws of Malaysia-An Introduction, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1976, p.xxx.
6 No.74 of 1952.
[1966] 2 M.LJ 220.
8 The Federal Constitution provides that the Muslim personal and family law and Malay custom are
matters within the legislative and executive competence and jurisdiction of the states.Thc Muslim
law applied in Malaysia is modified by Malay custom Ibrahim, Ahmad bin Mohamed, Islamic Law
in Malaya. Singapore, Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 1965, p. 147.
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that the position as regards persons professing Islam is tolerably
clear, 9 there were also defects in the administration of the Islamic
family law in Malaysia. Islamic family law is felt to be inadequate to
serve the present needs.'° As Islamic law falls within the purview of
the State authorities, each state in Malaysia had its own law for the
administration of the Islamic family law. Each state had its own
system of courts for the administration of the Islamic law and for the
most part the law was administered at the state level in the state
gadhi's courts. The provisions on divorce in the various enactments
were somewhat similar as they were all based on the Hukum Shara'.12
Although the enactments followed the same pattern and had much in
common, there were sometimes important differences between them.
Differences in administrative procedures exist and these gave rise to
the diversity and complexity that became the feature of Muslim family
law in Malaysia.'3 Furthermore it contains numerous loopholes and
weaknesses which are taken advantage of in certain quarters. The
differences enabled the stricter provisions of one State enactment to
be circumvented by moving to another State which did not have a
similar provision.'4
See note 7.
Ibrahim, Ahmad bin Mohamed, "Recent Legislation on Islamic Law in Malaysia", Law Semmar,
International Islamic University, Petaling Jaya, July, 1986.
Art.74(2), Federal Constitution, The State List or List II, 9th Schedule.
12 Abdul Rahman, Sheikh Ghazali bin, Perlaksanaaan Amalan dan Permasalahan Undang-Undang
Keluarga Islam - Pengalaman Wilayah Persekutuan, Kursus Perkahwman. Kekeluargaan dan
Jabatan Agama Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, 1989.
13 In some instances, the administrative machinezy was deficient and consequently was unable to
resolve some of the matrimonial problems even though procedures were provided for in Islam.
In other instances, adequate rules were not being enforced thus resulting in hardship for women
to seek relief in the Qadhis courts. This in turn gave rise to misconceptions about the wisdom and
justice of Muslim law, Siraj, Mehrun, Development in Muslim Family Law, Seminar on Family
y, Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, January 1987.
14 Some States required the consent of the first wife before a subsequent marriage could be
solemnised. Men who could not or would not get this consent would many in another state that
did not have this requirement, see Siraj, 1987 see also STAR, August 15, 1990.
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The high divorce rate among Muslims in the country was particularly
alarming and this led to the demand by various organisations for a
revision of the law, to consolidate and improve its provisions, thereby
making them more or less uniform among the States. There is a need
to update and streamline the laws and to provide for greater
uniformity between the states.
An attempt had been made by the Federal Government to draw up a
model law for the administration of the Islamic family law. 15 In
drafting the law, the committee relied on the LRA, but necessary
modifications were made to bring the law into line with the teachings
of Islam. There was also some borrowing from legislation in Singapore,
Egypt, India and Pakistan. The draft was then submitted to the
Conference of Rulers and when it was approved in principle it was sent
to the individual states for their comments and adoption.' 6 In Kuala
Lumpur, a committee was set up to consider the legislation. The
legislation produced by this committee was enacted as the Islamic
Family law (Federal Territory) Act, 1984 (Act 303).17 Although the
original intention was to have uniformity of the law among the various
states, this has unfortunately not been possible. There are in fact
differences between the laws.'8
In any study of Malaysian divorce law as it is today, some knowledge
of the history of the subject is desirable. The Malaysians' divorce
See Ibrahim, Ahmad bin Mohamed, Recent Legislation on Islamic Law in Malaysia, Law Seminar,
International Islamic University, Petaling Jaya, July, 1986.
16 Among the earliest states to consider the draft were Kedah, Kelantan and Kuala Lumpur. As a
result the Islamic Family Law Enactment 1983, Kelantan (No.1 of 1983), Islamic Family Law
(Federal Territory) Act, 1984 (Act 303), Islamic Family Law Enactment, 1979(Kedah) No.1 of
1984 were enacted. This has been followed by other States, Negeri Sembilan by the Islamic Family
Law Enactment 1983 (No.7 of 1983), Malacca Islamic Family Law Enactment 1983 (No.8) of 1983,
Perak Islamic Family Law 1984 (No.3 of 1984), Penang, Islamic Family Law Enactment 1985
(No.2 of 1985), Administration of Islamic Family Law (Trengganu) Enactment 1986.
17 Herein abbreviated as IFLA.
18 The Kedah legislation, although the first to be passed by the State legislature, was published after
the legislation in Kelantan and Kuala Lumpur which has been followed in other States.
20
customs vary to such a degree that it is very difficult to make any
general statement about them. Therefore, it is proposed in this part to
examine the two sets of laws that prevail in the regulation of divorce
in the multi-cultural society of Kuala Lumpur.
Chapter 1 emphasizes the history of the major ethnic group in Kuala
Lumpur, and also attempts to discuss the former laws relating to
customary divorce among Malaysian non-Muslims and how conflicts
have arisen out of the application of these laws. The discussion on
these conflicts is intended to provide the necessary background to
Chapter 2. Chapter 2 will examine the LRA which imposes a uniform
set of marriage and divorce laws on all non-Muslims in Malaysia. The
study will be made against the backdrop of the former and present
divorce laws of Malaysia with the view to investigating the changes that
have taken place since the present law came into force. Chapter 3 will
be a discussion of Islamic divorce. This chapter is divided into several
sub-sections. The first section is a brief review of the Islamic law on
divorce, and serves as preface to a detailed study of its implementation
in the distinctive cultural setting of Kuala Lumpur. In a subsequent
sub-heading of that chapter, an attempt will be made to explain the
various forms of Muslim divorce and the law as practised in Kuala
Lumpur.
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CHAPTER 1
DIVORCE IN THE CONTEXT OF MALAYSIAN SOCIETY
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Divorce, or the dissolution of marriage, as a recognised institution of
family law, is in any society a natural corollary of the theory and
practice of marriage, for it pre-supposes marriage. Marriage is a
psycho-physical relationship of such intimacy that law can only register
its beginning and its end and is powerless to effect its satisfactory
continuance. Law may on the other hand, check hasty divorce and
prevent injustice in marital dissolution. 19 Voltaire expresses their
sequential order thus:
"Divorce is an institution only a few weeks later in origin than
marriage. "20
Lord Westbury said in Shaw v Gould,2'
"Marriage is the very foundation of civil society and no part of
the laws and institutions of a country can be of more vital
importance to its subjects than those which regulate the manner
and conditions of forming, and if necessary, of dissolving the
marriage contract. If this is true, and it seems to be more true
now when so many of the other props of civilisation have been
weakened, it follows that any legal doctrine which may operate
to render uncertain the status of divorced persons, and which
19 Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, Vol V, edited by Seligman, E.R.A and Johnson, A, New York,
1951, p.183.
20 Voltaire, quoted in Alvarez, A, Life After Mamage: Love in an A ge of Divorce, New York. Simon
and Schuster, 1981.
21 (1868) L.R 3, at p35.
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may, therefore, prejudice the stability of a later marriage by
either party, is a social ... and that calls for the intervention of
the law reformer. Divorce, since it disintegrates the family unity,
is, of course, a social evil in itself, but it is a necessary evil. It
is better to wreck the family than to wreck the future happiness
of the parties by binding them to a companionship that has
become odious. Membership of a family founded on antagonism
can bring little profit even to the children, but though divorce
is unavoidable, we can at least do our best to ensure that there
is no uncertainty in the status of the members of the family
after the decree absolute."
It is a paradox freely accepted that the possibility of dissolution of
marriage is essential to its permanence. The family is the basic unit of
human society and the foundation of a family is laid through marriage.
Therefore, if marriage is not stable enough society may be in danger.
It is also very well said that "none should divide whom God has
united", but serious temperamental disharmonies or some contagious
or incurable diseases or some acts of infidelity by either of the spouses
might develop a strong and serious aversion to each other, thus making
the marriage burdensome. This tense situation is individually
intolerable and socially catastrophic. When wedlock has degenerated
into deadlock and when the relationship between the spouses is too
bad to be cured, its dissolution is preferable to its continuance in the
interest of the parties and for the welfare of society in general. This
is because it is undeniable that divorce is primarily designed to relieve
the hardships imposed in individual cases.
Society should be constituted of peaceful and dutiful families. Where
peace and duty no longer exist, the family unity must be lawfully and
peacefully broken so that its elements may seek peace in new unities
and try other sources of harmony in other spheres. 22 It is
incontrovertible that the dissolution of marriage has far-reaching
Abdul Hakim, A1-Khalifa, Islamic Ideology: The Fundamental Beliefs, Lahore, Sh. Muhammad
Ashraf, 1965.
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consequences and disintegrates family unity, but it has to be tolerated
for the avoidance of greater evils.
Westermarck writes that:
"It is a widespread idea that divorce is the enemy of marriage,
and, if made easy, might prove destructive to the very
institution of the family. This view I cannot share. I look upon
divorce as the necessary remedy for a misfortune and as a
means of preserving the dignity of marriage by putting an end
to unions which are a disgrace to its name. "23
The emergence of the industrial era, the assertions of individualism,
the passion for freedom and liberty, the change in the cultural and
social climate, and the women's liberation movement, have all
contributed in moulding the attitudes of western society towards
divorce. The revolution that has taken place in the recent past in this
branch of the law is a striking example of how the law is keeping pace
with the needs and aspirations of modern society.24
There are a number of interpretations of the relationship between
divorce and marriage breakdown. Some see divorce as little more than
the death certificates of marriages that have already ended. Others
argue that the very availability of divorce is responsible for the
supposed tendency of modern couples to terminate their marriage
readily when they experience difficulties. As far as the extent of
marriage breakdown, some commentators claim that a rising divorce
rate reflects a rising rate of marriage breakdown while others argue
that this merely reflects the extent of marriage breakdown more
Westermarck, E., A Short History of Marriage, London, Mac Milan, 1926, p.308.
24 Hussein, Si., Marriage Breakdown: Comparative View, International Islamic University Law
Journal, Vol.!, No.!, 1989, p.21.
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accurately since an increasing proportion of broken marriages is now
being dissolved legally.25
The family unit was seen as the basis of social stability, and there was
a widespread fear that too liberal an approach to divorce would bring
about social disintegration and moral collapse. The possibility of
divorce also raises other important issues such as female and male
roles and relationships within the family and society, sexuality, the
place of children, and religion. Because it is the focal point of many
perspectives, divorce can be studied from many points of view: legal,
familial, social, economic, demographic, political and religious. In
addition, it is inseparable from the other broad issues which have
already been mentioned here. In the final analysis, the resort to
divorce and the rate of divorce must be the results of complex
interplay of factors such as the legal availability of divorce, 26 its social
availability27, social attitudes towards divorce, the material conditions
of family life, and the frequency of marital disharmony serious enough
to warrant one spouse's petitioning for divorce.
Divorce is a consequence of marital instability and a form of family
disorganisation. It is, of course, as pointed out by William Goode, only
one of many indications of marital instability in a society. 28 Goode
has summarised a number of variables related to divorce proclivity
which are, among others, urban background, marriage at a very young
age, short acquaintanceship before marriage, short or no engagement,
marital unhappiness of parents, non-attendance at church, mixed
religious faith, disapproval by kin and friends of the couple,
Phillips, R., Putting Asunder A History of Divorce in Western Society. Cambridge University
Press, 1988, p. xn.
Whether the law is permissive or restrictive.
27 Whether it can be obtained easily, in terms of availability, expense and procedure.
Goode, WJ, World Revolution and Family Patterns, New York, The Free Press, 1970, p.137.
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dissimilarity of background, and different definitions by spouses of
each other's mutual roles.29
In the continuing debate on social and moral stability in modern
Malaysia, the family unit is consistently a prominent focus. Despite the
wealth of other institutions which create and reinforce values and
behavioral norms - schools, work, churches, mosques, peer groups, the
mass media-the family is still regarded as the fundamental focus and
agent of socialisation. If children become involved in what is
considered anti-social behaviour, the cause is often sought in their
family background, particularly in what are called "broken homes."3°
The following sub-section will discuss divorce in the Malaysian context
with emphasis on Kuala Lumpur.
1.2 THE RESEARCH AREA
Kuala Lumpur was originally an obscure settlement at the junction of
the Kiang and Gombak rivers. It emerged after the 1850s to become
a thriving community of Chinese tin miners. 3 ' The continuing demand
for tin in the second half of the nineteenth century made Kuala
Lumpur the busiest and most populated centre in Selangor. As a result
of its strategic and economic importance, it became the scene of some
of the fiercest fighting during the Selangor Civil War. 32 The war was
effectively ended when the British took over the state in 1874. They
soon realised that Kuala Lumpur would make the ideal centre for the
Goode, WJ., Family Disorganization, in Contemporary Social Problems, edited by Robert Merton
and Robert Nisbet, New York, Harcourt and Brace, 1961. p. 425.
3° Ibid,p.15.
31 Although there was also Malay presence symbohsed by the existence of a fort on Bukit Nanas.
32 The long sequence of battles and sieges from 1867-1873 had its origin in economics, political and
strategic circumstances; for further details see Middlebrook, S.M. and Gullick, "Yap Ah Loy, 1837-
1885" J.M.B.R.A.S. Vol 24, 21, 1951, pp.6-7.
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new administration, and moved there from Kiang in 1880. This
overshadowed the authority of Yap Ah Loy, the "Kapitan China"33
who had been the virtual ruler of Kuala Lumpur for the previous
decade, and led to the rapid modernisation of the town. His influence
was so profound that Gullick writes, "Kuala Lumpur in 1880 was Yap
Ah Loy's Kuala Lumpur".34
Kuala Lumpur grew as the state's administrative capital and was the
natural choice as capital of the newly formed Federated Malay States
in 1886, which enhanced its growth still further. It became the capital
of the new Federation of Malaya established in 1948 following the
Japanese Occupation and Malayan Union, and naturally of the new
nation on the achievement of independence in 1957. It was to correct
the anomaly of the situation where the federal capital was sited on the
territory of a member state of that federation that cession of Kuala
Lumpur from Selangor was negotiated in 1974.
Records showed that on 1st day of February 1974, Kuala Lumpur was
ceded to the Federal Government of Malaysia by the state of Selangor.
It was established as a Federal Territory with the passing of an Act35
by Parliament in 1973,36 upon the allocation of land totalling
Due to lack of an official supervision from the British,, the Chinese organised themselves into
small clans with headman or "captain" to act as a representative of the community to the
government as well as an arbiter of justice, in common with customs in China; Buxbaum, D.C.,
Chinese Family Law in a Common Law Setting, in Famil y law and Customary law in Asia,
Netherlands, The Hague, 1968, pp. 151-2.
Gullick, J.M, "Kuala Lumpur, 1880-1895", J.M.B.R.A.S., Vol xxvii, pp.4-8. For further details, see
Middlebrooke, 1951, pp.12-127.
This Act is cited as the Constitution (Amendment) (No.2) Act, 1973, was presented and read for
the first time in the Dewan Rakyat (House of Commons) on 9th July, 1973 and was enacted and
published in the Government Gazzette on 19th July, 1973.
Section 2 of the Act provides that, except in respect of Part 1 and the Schedule, the Act shall
come into force on the date of the publication of the Act in the Gazzette. Section 3 however
provides that Part 1 and the Schedule shall come into force on the 1st day of February, 1974, that
is on the establishment of the Federal Territory.
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approximately 243,65 square kilometres from the state of Selangor37
were declared as belonging to the Federal Government. The Yang
DiPertuan Agong ( King) was declared as its Head, but the execution
of these responsibilities remained the task of the Datuk Bandar (Lord
Mayor).38
Before the passing of the Constitution (Amendment) (No.2) Act, there
had been an agreement in principle between the Federal Government
and the Government of Selangor that Federal Territory be established
and that the area which constituted the Federal Territory would cease
to form part of the State of Selangor. Since then, the Legislative
Assembly of Selangor has already passed an Enactment adopting the
provisions contained in the Constitution (Amendment) (No.2) Act,
1973. Thus pursuant to Article 2 of the Federal Constitution, the
Legislative Assembly of Selangor consented to the passing of the Act
and the Conference of Rulers also gave their consent to the
establishment of the Federal Territory and the alteration of the State
of Selangor.39
The necessary provisions to give legal effect to the establishment of
the Federal Territory are contained in Part 1 and the schedule of the
above mentioned Act. It is also provided that the Federation shall
exercise sovereignty over the Federal Territory and all power and
Information Malaysia. 1990-1991 Yearbook, Kuala I.aunpur, Benta Publishing Sdn. Bhd., 1990
p.726.
Sub-section 2 of Section 6 states that "where any such law in force m the Federal Territory any
power or function is vested in the Rules of the State of Selangor or m any authority of the State,
that power or function m relation to the Federal Territory shall be vested in and exercised or
performed by the Yang DiPertuan Agong or the Minister responsible for the Federal Territory
or such other person or authonties as the Yang DiPertuan Agong may direct.
In part 2 of the Act, it is provided that the Federal Territory shall cease to form part of the state
of Selangor and the Ruler of the state of Selangor shall relinquish and cease to exercise any
sovereignty over the Federal Territory and all power and jurisdiction of the Ruler and the
Legislative Assembly of the state of Selangor shall come to an end; Section 3, Constitution
(Amendment)(No.2) Act, 1973.
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jurisdiction in or in respect of the Federal Territory shall be vested in
the Federation.4°
More important however, in respect of the legal effect of the present
existing state laws of Selangor, is Section 6 of the Act. Subsection (1)
of Section 6 states that:
"Without prejudice to the provisions of the sub-section and
subject to the following provisions of this section, state laws
existing and in force in the Federal Territory shall continue to
be in force there in until repealed, amended or replaced by laws
passed by Parliament."
In terms of administration, up until the Cabinet reorganization of 20th
May 1987, Kuala Lumpur was under the control of a separate Ministry
of the Federal Territory. However, since that date the Ministry has
been abolished and the affairs of Kuala Lumpur placed under the
control of a new division of the Prime Minister's Department,
responsible to a Deputy Minister in that Department. 4 ' The day to
day administration of Kuala Lumpur continues to be carried out from
the City Hall of Kuala Lumpur.42
A separate system for the administration of Muslim law was set-up on
the 1st. February 1974 in Kuala Lumpur, even though the law applied
is that of the State of Selangor. As provided under section 5 of the
1952 Enactment, a "Majlis Ugama Islam and Adat Istiadat Melayu,
Wilayah Persekutuan" (Council of Religion and Malay Custom, Federal
Territory) was set-up, consisting of a President and not less than seven
members all of whom with the exception of the President, are
appointed by the Yang DiPertuan Agong for such period as deemed fit.
Section 4, Constitution (Amendment) (No.2) Act, 1973.
41 Federal Territoiy Development Division.
42 Information Malaysia, 1990.
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The main role of the Council is to aid and advise the Yang DiPertuan
Agong on all matters relating to Islam and Malay custom. The
"Majlis", being the chief authority on all matters relating to Islam and
Malay custom, is empowered to take notice of and act upon all written
laws in force in Kuala Lumpur, the Hukum Shara', and any Malay
customary laws.
The day to day running and the administration of Islamic affairs in
Kuala Lumpur is the concern of the Religious Affairs Department, a
body which is set-up by the "Majlis". Another body concerned with the
administration of Muslim law in Kuala Lumpur is the Legal
Committee. 43 The main role of the Legal Committee is to consider
any request to the Majlis on any ruling on any question of law.
1.3 SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE SOCIETY
Malaysia, with its complexity of peoples and culture, is a melting pot
of several important traditions, stemming from the Malay Archipelago
as well as from China, India, the Middle East, and the West. Malay
culture is indigenous to the area. It is strongly marked by pre-Islamic
Indian and early Islamic influence. Indian contact with the Malay
Peninsular extended over a period from about the 4th century to the
late 14th century, exerting a profound influence upon religion. Islam,
introduced to Malacca in the 15th century, soon became the dominant
religion of the Malays. The introduction of western cultural influences
in the 19th century affected many aspects of Malay life, especially in
technology, law, social organisation, and the economy. Contemporary
Malay culture is thus mult faceted, consisting of many strands -
animistic, early Hindu, early and modern Islamic, and, especially in the
Section 40 (1) of the Enactment provides that there shall be a Legal Committee of the Maihs
consisting of the Mufti, not more than two members of the Majlis, and not less than two other fit
and proper persons who may be members of the Majlis or not. The Mufti, who shall be the
Chairman of the Legal Committee, is appointed by the Yang DiPertuan Agong.
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cities, western. The collective pattern thus established is distinct from
other cultures and recognisably Malay.
Unlike the early Chinese traders who settled in Malacca and Penang
and were partially assimilated, the Chinese who emigrated to the Malay
Peninsular in the late 19th and 20th centuries in large numbers were
usually transients who established self-contained communities. The
Chinese immigrants themselves, moreover, did not form a homogenous
group. Their culture in Malaysia today is inherited from the culture
and civilisation in prerevolutionary China, with modifications brought
about by local circumstances and environment.
The Indians are either immigrants or descendants of immigrants, most
of whom originally came as labourers to work in the coffee and rubber
plantations. Like the Chinese, they too, until World War II, were
mainly transients, living in closed communities and remaining virtually
unassimilated.
The communities of Malaysia have all been affected by past British
colonial rule and present western modernising influences. Western
influences have been greatest in the areas of educational and cultural
institutions. Traditions and cultural institutions have been least
affected in the rural area while the cities have been the focus of the
most rapid cultural changes.
The major migrant groups of Chinese and Indians are today found
physically intermingled with the Malays of the Peninsular Malaysia.
However, the most salient feature of the multiethnic society is that
colonialism of almost a hundred years has contributed greatly to a
situation in which, until the recent development plan periods (1971-
1975 and 1976-1980), each ethnic group has remained almost entirely
culturally distinct from the others. In short, the Chinese and Indians
have managed to preserve their own social and cultural identities
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within a new common environment and this has been made possible
through a network of overlapping cleavages in the society in the form
of each group's own social institutions, religious institutions and
educational system. This view is supported by Freedman:
"The Chinese and Indians who arrived in Malaya have
remained Chinese and Indians, not only in the eyes of census-
takers but also in culture, social organisation and political
status. In contrast, the "Indonesian" immigrants have found
their way into that part of the population which British policy
regarded as enjoying primary occupation and political
rights.
In tracing the beginnings of plural society, Nagata says,
"Little opportunity or encouragement was offered by the
colonial masters for members of the three groups to interact
socially, and indeed their separation was preserved and
enshrined in the deliberate colonial policy of maintaining a
division of labour along ethnic lines... In the political realm,
many traditional Malay institutions were preserved by the
practice of indirect rule. Each of the Sultans and Rajahs
(Kings)... retained his formal position and title within his own
state over matters of Islamic religion and Malay culture. The
creation of a Malaysian Civil Service abrogated most of the
Sultan's real power, but not from the Malays since the latter
played an important role in this bureaucracy through a series
of preferential quotas... Although it is often said in Malaysian
society that the Ma lays are in the ascendant politically, that the
Chinese dominate commercial life and the Indians constitute
the rural proletariat, this statement must immediately be
qualified for there are numerous exceptions in every case.
Nevertheless this popular stereotypical model of Malaysian society is
commonly observable and it forms the basis of many interethnic
attitudes, perceptions and behaviour. Each of the major groups is
subdivided into subgroupings that have important differences in dialect
" Freedman, Maurice, "The Growth of a Plural Society in Malaya", Pacific Affairs, Vol.33, No.2,
1960 p.159.
Nagata, Judith, "Perceptions of Social Inequality in Malaysia," in Contribution to Asian Studies,
Vol VII, 1975, p.118.
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and custom but each also shows internal solidarity in confrontation
with the others. Only at the highest level of government and
professions, is there extensive, effective contact between members of
the three racial groups and even then, it is largely on the common
grounds of the adopted British culture. Within each of the major
ethnic societies of Malaysia, this westernised elite remains aloof from
the more traditionally united ethnic communities that make up most of
the urban and virtually all of the rural population.46
According to the 1980 census report, the population tends to be
concentrated in the rural rather than urban areas. The predominant
race in Peninsular Malaysia are the Malays, who are randomly
distributed around the country but are mainly found in the rural areas.
The next race of major importance are the Chinese who tend to be
concentrated in the more developed states on the West Coast of
Peninsular Malaysia. Their presence is minimal in the largely rural or
agricultural states such as Kelantan, Trengganu and Penis.
The Indians make up the smallest majority group in the country. The
Chinese tend to be concentrated in certain states for historical or
economic reasons. They are mainly found in Johore, Selangor, Perak,
Kedah, Penang and in urban areas such as Kuala Lumpur.47
The population of Kuala Lumpur today is estimated at nearly one
million, with an increase of about 4 percent per year.48
Ginsburg, Norton and Chester, Roberts, Mala ya, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1958
pp.225-6.
'	 Ibid, p.69.
Malaysia 1980. Official Year Book. Vol 20, Kuala Lumpur, Government Printers, 1984, p.71.
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TABLE 1.1
Composition of the population of Kuala Lumpur
Malay	 320,000
Chinese	 507,487
Indian	 140,166
Others	 9,409
Total	 977,102
Kuala Lumpur's society is made up of various ethnic groups, the most
dominant being the Chinese (52 percent), followed by the Malays (33
percent), Indians (14 percent) and Others (1 percent).49
For all three of the major communities, the family has been the basis
of their traditional social organisation, although there were differences
among their original forms. Social and economic changes have involved
profound alteration affecting, again somewhat differently, all three
family systems. The situation for Chinese and Indians is further
complicated by their removal from the parent culture and their
reestablishment in alien surroundings.
1.4 THE MALAYS
A Malay is defined by the Constitution as;
"A person who professes Islam, habitually speaks Malay,
conforms to Malay customs and was born before Merdeka
Day, 5° in the Federation or born of parents, one of whom was
born in the Federation or was on Merdeka Day domiciled in
the Federation; or is the issue of such a person. "51
Ibid.
Malaysia received its independence in August 1957. The day in which it received its independence
is called the Merdeka day.
51 Article 160 (2) of the Federal Constitution.
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The origin of the Malays has not been well documented and is the
subject of controversy. 52 However, it has been postulated that they
originated from the mainland of South Asia. Evidence suggests that a
migration from the area now known as the Southern Chinese province
of Yunan, took place around 2000 B.0 into the coastal region of the
Peninsular and beyond the Indonesian archipelago. By the first century
A.D. these migrants had developed an agricultural way of life with
domesticated animals. They brought with them their customs and
traditions which are still observed, although much modified and their
roots lost in antiquity.53
Other immigrations into Peninsular Malaysia from the Indonesian
Archipelago also helped to increase the diversity of the Malays. One
important migrant group were the Minangkabau group from Sumatra
who migrated to Malaysia in the fourteenth century into the Malacca
kingdom, finally settling in the present day states of Negeri Sembilan
and Malacca. In the eighteenth century, the Bugis from Celebes
undertook a mass exodus from the island and established themselves
in the present day states of Johor and Selangor.54
These settlers brought with them their customary practices and these
customs still survive today, albeit in a modified form. This is especially
pronounced in the matriarchal system of Adat Perpatih still to be
found in the states of Negeri Sembilan and Malacca.55
Therefore, in addition to local born Malays, the Malay population
comprises a mixture of immigrant groups from Indonesia,
52 Ginsburg, 1958, p. 192.
Andaya, Barbara Watson, and Andaya, Leonard Y., A Histor y of Malaysia, New York St.Martin's
Press, 1982, pp 7-36.
The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., Vol 11, Encyclopedia Britannica, 1980 p.366.
For further details see Chapter 3.
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Minangkabau, Acheh, Mandiling, Rawa, Kerinci, Batak, Bugis and
Javanese. There are also Arabs who form a small but very influential
group in trade and religion. These groups have different cultures and
customs. For example, apart from the differences in dress and
language, there are also distinctions along occupational lines.56
Traditional Malay society organises itself under the patronage system
which is analogous to the medieval feudal systems found in Europe in
the middle ages. However, there are important differences, the main
ones being the interdependence of the rakyat (common people) with
the Ruler and the relative autonomy given to individuals. Subjects pay
taxes to their Sultan or ruler on agricultural produce, use of the river
as a means of communication and the right to engage in trade. In
return, the Sultan will guarantee freedom to engage in economic
activities and protection from enemies. The delegation of power is via
a single step approach where the Sultan's edicts are carried out on a
local level by a Penghulu (village chief) who is an informal figure and
very much part of the local community.57
This pattern was protected and even confirmed by the colonial policy
which safeguarded and confirmed the pre-colonial Malay aristocracy
(royalty). Birthright determined social rank in the aristocracy and this
was the only form of rigidity in Malay society. It was from this group
that the civil service and the Malay political leaders were derived.
Thus, with a numerical majority in the country, and their political
leaders reaffirming their hereditary rights, the Malay sphere of power
was in politics with wide grass roots support.58
Gulhck., J.M., Indigenous Political Systems of Western Mala ya, New York, Humanities Press, 1965,
p.25.
Ibid.
Nagata, 1975, p.121-2.
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Until the mid 1970's Malay society was rural and agriculturally based.
The reliance on subsistence cultivation of rice and other food crops on
a small scale reflected the general tendency of the Malays to shun
commercialisation of their economy. The accumulation and show of
wealth as evidenced in a capitalist economy were alien to the Malays.
Instead, great value and emphasis was laid upon co-operation,
consensus and community harmony rather than confrontation and
competition.
As a result, the participation of the Malays in estate agriculture,
mining, lumbering and extraction of natural resources under colonial
economic interests was relatively small. Mistaken for laziness, this
attitude indirectly brought about the immigration of Chinese and
Indian labour which subsequently led to the emergence of an
economically powerful ethnic group after independence. As Freedman
puts it,
"Western and Chinese enterprise turned the country into a hive
of economic activity, but Ma lays took no conspicuous part in
it. They refused generally to sell their labour in mines and
estates. But even so, their role was by no means unimportant;
the peasantry adapted itself to producing cash crops (especially
rubber and coconuts) on smaliholdings. Also, by taking
advantage of the limited educational opportunities offered, some
peasants' sons were able to move into the lower ranks of the
civil service and something of a rudimentary Malay middle class
emerged on the basis of administration.
With independence in 1957, and the transition of the economy from
subsistence to a consumer economy, more and more Malays have
migrated to urban areas. With relatively few changes, they have
brought with them the culture and traditions of the "kampongs"
(villages), mirroring the rural communities from which they originate.
The coffee shops and prayer houses which are the focus of social
Freedman, 1960, p.161.
37
interaction have been transplanted to the city where they serve exactly
the same function except to a bigger community.
One of the changes which has taken place is the establishment of the
nuclear rather than the extended family as the basic social unit in the
city. Another is that of the need to adapt to the density of urban life
and interact with many unfamiliar people. On the whole, however,
Malay communities have not changed perceptibly beyond the early
twentieth century patterns of social interaction, even though technically
advanced.
1.4.1 The Malay Family
The primary social unit of Malay society is that of the family. Often,
this is the extended family rather than nuclear family as found in the
West. Malay society is unusual in that there is almost a complete lack
of formal structure binding the Malays together. The only substantial
social organisation is that of the village, often made up of closely
related individuals on an extended family basis. The interaction
manifested is that of small close knit communities in which
organisation, administration and other social and cultural activities are
regulated on a communal basis.
The family is a basic component of a loosely-structured kinship system.
A complex series of linkages based on blood, marriage and other
putative relationships brings together a number of individuals into a
common universe of kinship containing various categories and groups
of kinsmen. The Malay kinship is governed by two adat. that is Adat
Perpatih and Adat Temenggung.
Adat or custom is an indispensable institution in Malay sociological
analysis. It represents the formal and conscious beliefs of the Malays
from which one could trace cultural and social production of ideas and
relations in the wider society.
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Formerly there are two customary systems of adat in Malay society,
one is patrilineal called the Adat Temenggung and the other is
matrilineal called the Adat Perpatih. 6° The latter is firmly established
in Negeri Sembilan and the Naning district of Malacca. The former is
practised in other parts of the country. Both represent Malay
conceptions of law and the legitimacy of these traditions can be said
to derived from moral principle as well as from custom and long
usage. The tradition of the Temenggung has been described as more
autocratic and less democratic because it places power and authority
solely in the hands of the ruler. The latter tradition centres on the
principle of collective responsibility; the ruler is sovereign but the
authority and power of the ruler is within the limits that have been
laid down in its code.61
The matriarchal Adat Perpatih can be distinguished from the other
Malay customary laws in its traditional statement which is known as
"Perbilangan" or customary saying. 62 It has been handed down from
generation to generation. Originally unwritten, the customary has now
been put into writing. The Adat Perpatih governs land tenure, lineage
and the election of various traditional chiefs. As far as rules relating
to marriage and divorce are concerned, this community follows Islamic
law. 63
Adat Temenggung comprises of six main groups. The digests dealing
with Adat Temenggung are fundamentally based on Malacca law.64
The Malacca Laws, although entitled "Risalat Hukum Kanun" (A Tract
60 The adat law is still very much alive at present in Negeri Sembilan and Naning.
61 Wilkinson RJ., Law: Introductory Sketch in Papers on Malay Subjects, Kuala Lumpur, 1908, p.2.
62 Mrnnatur, J. "The Nature of Malay Customary Law", No. 2, Mal.L.R. Singapore, 1964, p.331.
63 For further details, see Hooker, M.B. Adat Laws in Modem Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford
University Press, 1972.
64 Winstedt, R.O., The Malays: A Cultural History, 6th edn., London, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1961, p.99.
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on Customary Law) are actually a digest "grafting the Islamic law of
the new Sultanate (of Malacca) on to the earlier law of the Hindu
court."65
The important parts of these laws are rules relating to marriage,
divorce, inheritance and succession. In respect of the first two aspects
of law, rules of Islamic family law are widely used. Islamic law,
however, does not fully apply in matters relating to inheritance 66
 and
succession. 67
 It has been shown that these Adat are really the off-
shoot of the other. Taylor in his Malay Family law states that:
"The Adat Temenggung is a derivative from the basic tribal
organisation in Sumatra (the Adat Per yatih) which as a result
of the Hindu monarchia influence of Palembang was shorn of
its tribal organisation, its exogamous system and its matrilineal
law of property. "68
However, when one speaks of Malay adat, one is more inclined to
think of Adat Perpatih than of Adat Temenggung. Wilkinson wrote in
1908;
"The difference between adat peryatih and adat temenggung is
visible in these days of British administration. Whenever a
miscarriage of justice occurs in Perak, Pahang and Selangor,
the Ma lays take it very calmly; but in the Negri Sembilan the
whole population is excited by any non-recognition of the local
adat. "69
65 See Au, Haji Mohd. Din bin, Two Forces in Malay Society", Intisari, Vol. I,No.3, at p. 15, where
he says in regard to the inheritance of Malay holdings in the "Islamic-cum-Temenggung States";
Take away the Hukum Shara' and the residual adat which is Temenggung would be beyond
recognition ... At present the amalgamation of Islam and the Adat Temengung is so complete
that it is well nigh impossible to separate one from the other." ibid. pp.19-20.
Tiiah v Mat Ali (1890) 4 Ky. 124.
67 In the Goods of Abdullah (1835) 2 Ky. Ecc.8.
Taylor, E.N. "Malay Family Law," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
 - Malaysian Branch, 15
(1937), 1-78.
Wilkinson, 1908, at pp. 19-20.
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Malay customary law is either enforced by the Sharia Court as Islamic
Law, or by the Adat Court in Negeri Semibilan as Adat Perpatih.
Customary law consists of Malay customs and traditions which in the
course of time have acquired the stature of law. It can be enforced by
the chiefs and elders. In that it is the living law at a given time in a
given place, customary law can be adapted to changing social needs,
and is therefore not suited to codification. This, the so-called Malay
Law Codes on Digests should not be taken to represent the customary
law of a certain state; a more accurate picture would be given by the
decisions of local tribal chiefs. In this respect, it bears resemblance to
English Common law, which is also based on decisions or case law.7°
Family structure under the Adat Perpatih, is explained in the following
sayings:
"The world has its kings,
The luak has its chief,
The tribe has its headman,
The family has its elders. "71
The matrilineal system of Negeri Sembilan and Northern Malacca is
composed of traditionally corporate groups of increasing inclusiveness
viewed from the smallest unit, the family. A family is normally
composed of parents and their children. A group of families,
interlinked by descent from a common female ancestor constitute the
group called "perut" (lineage). A group of "perut", filiated to each
other by actual or putative descent, constitutes a "suku" (clan). There
are twelve-named clans 72 but about only four or five may be found in
Ibrahim, 1987, p33.
Wilkinson, 1908, p.10. In dealing with Malay customary law, the niles of Adat Per patih could be
gleaned from their traditional sayings. The sayings are handed from generation to generation so
that the ignorance of law cannot be an honest or valid excuse.
Anak Acheh
Anak Melaka
Batu Belang
Batu Hampar
Biduanda orWaris
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any village. District and State traditional political and administrative
organisation was based on this larger kinship structure.
These factors therefore have varying normative and moral influences
on the behaviour and organisation of a family group, being a small unit
within a whole corporate system, without, however, impinging on the
basic autonomy of the family. More often than not, extended family
type has greater influence on the running of its component family
units, thus affecting the internal process of decision-making, for
example in marriage and divorce. It is therefore useful to be aware of
the larger frame of kinship structure in any evaluation of a family
system to understand fully some of the background factors affecting its
organisation and function.73
The family as a unit runs its own affairs, although on certain occasions
mainly during life crises or family ceremonies such as birth, marriage
and death, come together to lament the loss, to find solace and to
comfort each other, or to provide material support in ceremonies or
gatherings. All these events help to renew kinship ties and reinforce
kinship solidarity.
The Malay family therefore has a reciprocal kinship or moral
obligation with other groups of kinsmen. This network affects the
family in varying degrees depending very much on various factors of
closeness or remoteness, in terms of descent, residence and generation
status. The closer the link, the greater the degree of influence.
Mungkal
Paya Kumboh
Sri Lemak
Sri Melenggang
Tanah Datar
Tiga Batu
Tiga Nenek.
For further details, see Hooker, 1992.
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The marriage system under the Adat Perpatih is a system of exogamy
within their tribes. This means that the preference is for a person to
marry outside the clan but within the tribes. 74 It is also matrilocal,
that is, it is compulsory for a husband to live in the wife's place, if not
with the wife's family. 75 It is said;
"Warder of the wife is the husband,
Warder of the husband his wife's family. "76
The husband among his wife's relations is naturally expected to observe
the customs of their family;
"When you enter a byre, low;
when you enter a goat's pen, bleat;
Follow the customs of your wife's family.
When you tread the soil of a country and live beneath its sky,
Follow the customs of that country."77
It is said that if the wife's relations exercise some control over him, it
seems to be justified for two reasons. The well-being of the family is
mainly their concern, and it is their responsibility to see that the
husband of their sister or niece contributes to that well-being. Further,
they have taken upon themselves a good deal of responsibility for him.
For further details on marriage within tribe see Selat, Nordin bin, Sistem Sosial Adat Perpatih,
Kuala Lumpur, Utusan Melayu Berhad, Jabatan Penerbitan, 1976, pp.124-6.
Haji Mohamad, Abdul Rahman bin, Dasar-Dasar Adat Perpatch, Kuala Lumpur, Pustaka Antara,
1964, p.39.
76 Kunci bini Iaki Kunci semenda tempat semenda. The translation quoted is that of Caldecott, A,
"Jelebu Customaiy Songs and Sayings", J.M.B.R.A.S. Vol. 78, 1918, p.3-41.
Masuk kandang kerbau, menguak;
Masuk kandang kambing, membebek
Bagaimana adat tempat semenda, dipakai
Bagai buini dipijak, langit dijunjung
Bagaimana adat negeri itu dipakai, Ibid, p.8.
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For the adat stipulates;
"to unravel disputes,
to pick up the fallen and search for the lost, to pay debts and
receive dues, is the business of a man's wife's family. "78
However, contrary to popular belief, the husband is not under his
wife's influence in Adat Perpatih society. His high position in the
family is guaranteed to him under the adat. He has his own "province",
his sphere of influence and power within the four corners of his house,
and he also has a cherished place in his own family and clan. His
importance in the home is acknowledged in the saying:
Slaves can offend against the masters,
Pupils against their teachers,
Children against parents,
Wives against husbands.79
This clearly indicates that wives are expected to be obedient and
faithful to their husbands. In his capacity as uncle or brother, he may
be the manager of the family and it is not unlikely that he is or he
becomes an elder or chief in his clan.
The prohibitions of marriage include not only the prohibitions of
Hukum Shara' but also the prohibitions of Adat Perpatih. 8° Thus,
while the children of brothers of the same father may intermarry in
Ibid.
Salah hamba kepada tuan,
Salah murid kepada guru
Salah anak kepada bapa
Salah bini kepada laki
Caldecott, 1918, p.30.
80 All, 1968, p.44.
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Islam, marriage between parallel cousins 81 through the same
grandmother is not allowed in custom. Thus, the scope of marriage
prohibition is enlarged by prohibiting intra-tribal marriage due to the
presence of common female blood. Custom is insistent that the parties
to the marriage should be of the same generation. Thus marriage is
arranged preferably between cross-cousins.82
In a customary marriage, it is forbidden to take another wife within
the same tribe, and is considered incestuous. 83 Custom thus reduces
the incidence of polygamy and encourages monogamy.TM
It is stated in the customary sayings that;
Two familiar spirits in one household
Two ladders to one sugar palm85
Sprouts without seed86
Are offences against morals
Custom looks for signs of guilt,
When custom declares the offence proved,
It is not a peccadillo to be mildly corrected
Nor can recourse be had to religious law
for this crime of taking two brides when a man has been given one.87
81 Parallel cousins are first cousins whose related parents are of the same sex, for example mother's
daughter or son and mother's sister's son or daughter. Sometimes the term otho-cousin is used
instead; Mitchell, G.D., A New Dictionar y of Sociology, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979,
p.129.
82 Cross cousins are the children of siblings of the opposite sex. Thus, an individual's mother's
brother's children and his father's sister's children would both be his own cross .cousins; Mitchell,
1979, p.46.
83 Haji Mohamad, 1964, p39.
Ali, Hj.Mohd. Din bin, Malay Customaiy Law in Famil y Law in Asia: A Contemporary Legal
Perspective edited by David Buxbaum, the Netherlands, the Hague, 1968, p 198.
These two lines accordmg to Mmnatur signify a man's union with another woman of the same clan
as his wife during the wife's life, Mmnatur, 1976, p.31.
A euphemism for bastards; see Minnatur, Joseph, The Nature of Customaiy Law in Famil y Law
and Customary Law in Asia, edited by David Buxbaum, Netherlands, the Hague, 1968, p32.
87 Pelesit dua sekampung
Enau sebatang dua sigai
Mata tumbuh tiada berbemh
Sumbang kepada tabiat
Adat menuju kepada tanda
Bila "sah" kata adat tiang,
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Islam on the other hand allows plurality of wives and marriage is
understood as being only a legal contract, which also does not insist on
such meticulous rituals to validate a marriage. However, the Perpatih
tradition had made it an institution whose rules do more than merely
bring individual parties to a lawful union. Marriage is the institution
through which the whole host of relations and tribal organisations are
bound into a cohesive whole.88
The Adat Temenggung, which is said to have originated from
Palembang, is patrilineal in character. 89 The marriage system is a
system of endogamy although, like the marriage system under Adat
Perpatih. it is very much influenced by Islam. The marriage
prohibitions, in fact, follow fully the prohibition of Hukum Shara'.
In both Malay societies that practice Adat Perpatih and Adat
Temenggung, the position of primary authority in a family falls on the
man. The father is head of the household. The woman may manage the
actual running of the household but the Malays' image of their society
is such that the husband is regarded as the primary authority. Not only
do they maintain that this should be so, but also seem to believe it is
so.
It has to be pointed out that even in Malay rural life the nuclear
family of husband, wife and children is the most important unit. As
Swift stated;
Janggal tak boleh dipatuh lagi,
Salah tak boleh dihukum, laitu suatu diben, dua diambil.;
Selat, 1976, p.122.
Ali, 1963, p.26.
Ibid, 1963, p.16.
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"Husbands attempt to build their own house as soon as possible
after the birth of their first child and to establish their own
family of procreation as an independent unit. "90
The Malay family, which forms the main social structural nucleus, is
not only a household but a society of man and wife or parents and
children in which there are normative determinants of behaviour.
Although, there is a distinction between the lives of the peasants and
the urban dwellers, the majority of the Malays live a rural existence.
In the customary peasant Malay family, the men and women participate
in productive work. Raymond Firth, in a landmark study on Malay
peasant life in Kelantan, stated that one of the remarkable features he
saw was the freedom of women, especially in economic matters. He
wrote:
"Not only do they exercise an important influence on the
control of the family finances, commonly acting as bankers for
their husbands, but they also engage in independent enterprises
which increase the family supply of cash... From the material
of our census, it was clear that at least 25 per cent of the adult
women of this community have some definite occupation which
yields a regular income. And if casual or intermittent work be
also taken into consideration-such as selling husband's fish,
• . .probably some 50 per cent of the adult women are gainfully
employed from time to time. "91
Generally, women show a greater degree of independence and
autonomy. Most women gradually assume a position of equality with
their husbands. This, however is not true in all instances. While women
in Kelantan may have enjoyed more economic freedom and even
controlled the market place, women elsewhere have been restricted in
terms of what they can do in public. Swift observed that women in
9° Swift, 1963, p279.
91 Fwth, Raymond, Malay
 Fisherman: Their Peasant Economy, Hamden Connecticut, Archon Books,
1968, p.80.
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Negeri Sembilan often worked in the rice fields but her main work is
first of all the ordinary domestic duties of the household. The same
writer also recorded that the husband wishes to retain control of the
financial side of the household management and what is more, going
to the shops or the market exposes a women to too free a contact with
the public.92
The traditional Malay family conformed more to the norm of extended
family whereby two or more family units, together with other kin
members, lived together as a domestic or household unit. However,
internal developments within the family, economic ability, conflict of
interests and optimum residential capacity have split the family and
thus a new domestic, autonomous and independent family unit
develops. Recent studies have shown the increasing prevalence of the
nuclear family, which has been observed since after the Second World
War when individual and familial geographical mobility was
necessitated by economic and political conditions. Urbanisation,
industrial and educational development, have pushed and attracted
younger families into urban areas.
Industrial and general economic development have exposed young men
and women to wider sections of the population as a "field of choice".
According to traditional norms of close agricultural societies, selection
was more or less set within the general organisation of the family,
kinship or community at large. Marriage was regulated by religious
teachings. While this remains true now, the "field of choice" depends
on individual contacts and preference. At the present time, marriage
is increasingly based on romantic love and customs are not fully
Swift, M.G., "Men and Women in Malay Society" in Women in the New Asia: The Changing
Social Roles of Men and Women in Southeai Asia, edited by Ward, B.E, New York. UNESCO,
1963, p.277.
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adhered to in every case. But the Malays are, compared with the
Chinese, believed to be more traditional in this respect.93
The traditional function of marriage brokers in the arrangement of
marriage has almost died out except in the rural setting. While no
general data are available on the current general pattern of spouse
selection, the present situation has affected the age at marriage, which
has risen from seventeen to twenty years. The delay in marriage is
closely related to the current family structure. High mobility and
higher cost of maintenance have encouraged the formation of nuclear
families, living away from parents and free from kinship constraints.
This will eventually force households to be founded on conjugal
relations rather than on kinship linkages, especially when the married
partners are strangers to each other prior to marriage.94
The urban setting greatly stresses the need for greater social mobility,
higher attainment and comfortable living. The strong family constraint
which was once highly regarded does not operate anymore. As a
response to the general pattern of development, the erosion of
traditional values and the radical change occuring in the family, a kind
of socio-cultural reaction has emerged. Materialistic affluence has led
to the breakdown of a more familiar pattern of social relations,
aspirations and beliefs.
1.4.2 Divorce Among the MaLays
It has been a common practice amongst Malay parents to arrange an
early marriage for their children whenever the opportunity arises,
especially for a mature girl. There is no doubt that in doing so they
sincerely wish to see that the marriage is successful and long lasting.
Aziz, Norlaily, Culture and Fertility - The Case of Malaysia, Research Notes and Discussions
Paper No.19, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1980, p32.
The Malays tend to marry early; Taylor, 1973, p.1.
( LONDON
In other words, a marriage once it is celebrated, is intended to be
final. This primary notion is perhaps most clearly expressed in the first
marriage ceremony, which is usually elaborate, because a second
marriage is not normal, particularly for a girl. A customary marriage
ceremony is very elaborate and incurs a lot of expense and takes much
time to go through. But the readiness of the parents and guardians to
shoulder these responsibilities in spite of their awareness of the heavy
material involvement, indicates their wishes clearly. In practice
however, not all the parents have their wishes fulfilled as divorce from
time to time occurs in the society.95
It is believed that incompatibility between the two spouses and their
inability to adjust to each other's temperament is one of the major
factors. Childlessness can also be listed as another reason for divorce,
especially when it is accompanied by other factors. These are, for
instance (a) if there is a permanent quarrel due to incompatibility; (b)
if there is no strong reason to keep the couple together; (c) if there
is a definite pull on one of the couples to separate; or (d) if the wife
wishes to return to her own home, particularly when she is of the kind
that has a strong attachment to her parents and is married to a person
who normally resides in another state or district. In all these
circumstances, it means that childlessness can be used as a good excuse
for divorce.96
It is also not unusual to note that apart from the above mentioned
reasons which can be taken as a general indication of grounds for
divorce there are other factors which can easily cause a broken home.
For example, if a husband is deeply attracted to another woman and
Haji Hassan, Abdul Jalil bin, The Influence of the Shafi'i School of Muslini Law on Marriage and
Divorce in the Malay Peninsular, with Special Reference to the State of Trengganu, Ph. D Thesis,
University of St. Andrews, 1969, p.255.
Firth, Rosemaiy, Housekeeping Among Malay Peasants, London School of Economics,
Monographs and Social Anthropology, London, The Athlone Press, 1966, p.36-37.
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does not want to have the additional responsibilities of a polygamous
marriage, or if he is willing to do so, but the first wife refuses to share
him with the second, he divorces her and embarks on a new marriage.
On the other hand, if the wife is attracted to another man and wants
a divorce, she creates serious difficulties which finally force her
husband to release her. Such circumstances often occur when a woman
is forced by her guardian for the benefit of the latter to marry a
person against her wishes, for example when a young girl is given away
in marriage to a wealthy old man.
Among the Malays, the actual divorce takes place by the actions of the
parties and the question for the qadhi is not whether they ought to be
divorced but whether they have actually brought about a divorce. The
qadhi therefore, is in substance a registering official with certain
powers of investigation rather than a judge. He has only quasi-judicial
powers.97
Divorce in Rembau is necessarily of the same nature as marriage is
that it is based on Islamic forms, its validity depends on registration,
and questions of property are governed by adat. There are three rules
which are common to all kinds of divorce. Firstly, religious law
requires the woman to observe 'iddah. 98
 Secondly, the adat confers on
the woman in every case an absolute right and duty to take custody of
all the children, both Sons and daughters, because they are of her
tribe. Thirdly, following the divorce, the man invariably returns to his
own tribe and family until he marries again.
Taylor, 1937, p.6.
A period of purification, normally one hundred days, and in evely case this period runs from the
date of the padhi's certificate e en though the husband has already been absent for many months.
Under the Muslim law the period of 'iddah generally consists of three periods of purity after
menstruation but it would appear that according to the Malay custom, the period of 'iddah on
divorce is three months and ten days Kempe, J.E and Winstedt R.O, " A Malay Legal Miscellany
(1952) JMBRAS, Part 1, p.4.
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The husband, can effect a divorce simply by pronouncing talag in the
presence of two witnesses and leaving the house. If he is away from
home, he may give talag by letter to the wife or her nearest male
relation. Such a divorce may be revocable or irrevocable, and in either
case it must be reported to the qadhi within seven days. At any time
within iddah, the husband may return to his wife (this act is called
ruju') - otherwise the divorce automatically becomes absolute on
completion of 'iddah.99
Malay custom however, to some extent helps to protect the woman who
is forced to return to her husband against her will. According to the
Ninety-Nine Laws of Perak, the law applicable in the case of a woman
who was divorced and whose husband wanted her back within three
months and ten days was that if she was unwilling she might be forced
to return to her husband, but the husband must give her settlements
in cash. If he was forcibly rejected, the woman must pay the amount
of the marriage settlement.'°°
There are three kinds of divorce which are open to a woman; "tebus
talak", "pasah nikah" and "talak gugor". The former, divorce by
redemption, can be granted by the husband at the wife's request if she
pays him a sum of money.
"Pasah nikah" can be given to deserted wife. According to Parr and
Mackray'° 1
 a woman in this situation is entitled to this in
compensation for the lack of conjugal rights (Nafkah batin), even if
she has been provided with sufficient maintenance. The qadhi however,
Under the Muslim Law, a husband who has repudiated his wife m a revocable manner has a right
to take her back as long as she is still in her period of provided the mamage has not in
the mean time became illicit for any other reason.
'°° The Ninety-Nine Laws of Perak, edited and translated by Rigby,J., Kuala Lumpur, 1908, p.48.
101 Parr, C.W.C. and Macbay, WA, Rembau - Its History, Constitution and Customs, J.S.B.R.A.S.,
56, 1910, 1-157.
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denies this, claiming that the sole grounds for "pasah" are lack of
maintenance, acting as proof that the husband may not have ceased to
visit his wife for the purpose of conjugal relations.
"Talak gugor" on the other hand, can be used only for the dissolution
of the special form of marriage called "nikah taklik". At the
celebration of such a marriage the bridegroom adds to the usual
formula the words;
"If I shall be absent from my wife for six months ashore and
a year over the sea, without being heard of or sending word,
provisional (or irrevocable) divorce shall come to pass of
itself. "102
This phrase is usually employed at the marriage of a Rembau woman
to a man from another State but may also be used where the
bridegroom is a local man. On proof that the clause was read and that
the specified period has elapsed, the gadhi will grant a certificate of
divorce in accordance with the stipulation.'°3
Jones writing in 1981 stated that Malay marriages were very unstable.
The study by Smith in 1961 found, using the 1947 and 1957 census
data, that divorce was common among the Malays but not among the
Chinese or Indians. In 1970, Jones found that the Malay-Muslim
population is perhaps the most dramatic feature of nuptiality in
Malaysia. According to his study, the Malays, especially those living in
the east coast states-Kelantan and Trengganu, have been characterised
by one of the highest rate of divorce anywhere in the world. In
Kelantan, the state with the highest rates of divorce, it was found that
the two main causes of divorces among the Malays are early marriages
102 
"Talak gugor" appears to be covered by "cerai taklik" in Negeri Sembilan; see Negen Sembilan,
Marriage, Divorce and Reconciliation Rules No3 of 1963, where the period given was four
months.
103 Taylor, E.N., The Qistomary Law of Rembau, m Readin gs in Malay Adat Laws edited by M.B
Hooker, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1970, pp.' 14-5.
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and economic difficulties.'° 4
 Che Hassan stated that Kelantan lagged
very far behind in economic and social development because Kelantan
was formerly ruled by the Pan Malayan Islamic Party, the opposition
party which was in power in Kelantan from 1959 to 1978. Due to this,
the Federal Government, under the Alliance Party, withheld support
for development projects for Kelantan during those periods, thus
leaving Kelantan far behind economically and socially.
Studies made by Jones also found that the highest divorce rates in
Peninsular Malaysia are found in those states which are most backward
economically and educationally, where the influence of Islam is
generally held to be strongest. However, he found that divorce amongst
Malays is culturally rather than religiously determined. The highest
divorce rates are found in those states which are poorest, most rural
and least educated, and where age at marriage is lowest. High divorce
rates are also found where marriages are most strictly arranged by
parents, where the rate of polygamy was highest, the law of divorce,
left most loopholes and where the administration of those laws was
loosest.'05
The ease with which divorce can be granted is said to be one of the
factors responsible for high rate of divorce. Among Malays, the
tradition of high divorce rates may pre-date the coming of Islam.
Tsubouchi notes that the kinship structure of Malay society readily
allows for divorce. In support, he cites the Jakun proto-Malays,
104 See Mahmood, Nik Ramlah bt Nik, Socio-legal Study of Divorce in Kelantan, Academic Exercise,
Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, 1982, p. 124; see also Hassan, Che Hashim bin, Marriage
and Divorce in Kelantan, Malaysia, M.A Thesis, Department of Demography, Australia National
University, Canberra, 1984, p.78.
105 Jones, G.W, "Malay Marriage and Divorce in Peninsular Malaysia: Three Decades of Change"
Population and Development Review, 7, (1981) 263.
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"Whose kinship structure is almost identical to that of the
Malays but who have not been influence by Islam, (and among
whom) divorce is quite common, though not as common as in
Malay society. "106
However, the study of Jones in 1981 showed that divorce rates of
Malays have declined over the last two decades. The reasons for this
are not very clear, but Jones cited modernisation and westernisation
as being widely held as reasons for the decline. He stated that rising
age at marriage in itself is undoubtedly a major reason for declining
divorce rates. Couples are more mature at the time of marriage and,
with the swing toward self-arranged marriages, have a greater stake in
the success of the marriage. Spouses have been becoming progressively
not only older but also better educated, and more likely to stress the
husband-wife relationship bond than other bonds to kinsfolk, which are
important in Malay tradition. Polygamy, a frequent cause of divorce
amongst Malays, is becoming less common.'° 7 There also appears to
be increasing shame in the Malay community about high divorce rates
and their effects on wives and children. Westernisation and Islamic
reform movements are said to have greatly accelerated the change of
the family in modern Malaysia.108
1.5 THE CHINESE
Evidence from archaeological traces have served to confirm that the
view that contact between the inhabitants of Peninsular Malaysia and
the Chinese took place from as early as the 4th. century A.D. when
Chinese pilgrims, travellers and good-will missions visited the Malay
106 Tsubouchi, Yoshihiro, Islam and Divorce among the Malay Peasants in Southeast Asia in Nature,
Society and Development edited by Shinichi Ichiniura, Honolulu, University Press of Hawan, 1976,
p.28.
107 Jones, 1981, p.270-271.
Ibid. see also Hassan, 1984; see also Haji Abdul Aziz, Hj. Wan Mohammad bin, Suatu
Pengamatan Umum Terhadap Isu Kekeluargaan: Kajian Kes di Kuala Lumpur, Seminar Tata cara
Kekeluargaan, Institut Sains Komputer, Umversiti Teknologi Malaysia, Sept., 1990.
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and Indonesian archipelagos. Chinese contact with Southeast Asia was
relatively slight until the Sung dynasty (960-1127 A.D). With the
establishment of the Malacca Sultanate, the influence of China and the
success of her traders increased. The first king, Parameswara, obtained
Chinese support and "protection" as a counter-weight to Thai pressure
on his emerging state. After the death of Parameswara, Chinese
interest in overseas adventurism declined but a small group of Chinese
traders became permanently established in Malacca. Their influence
and numbers were much inferior to those of the Indian traders, mostly
Muslim Tamils, whose role was progressively heightened with the
spread of Islam to the local population.
It was only around the mid-fourteenth century that they were known
to have established a settlement in Temasik or Old Singapore. In the
fifteenth century, a Chinese delegation led by the famed Admiral
Cheng Ho visited the Malacca kingdom and established diplomatic
relations with the kingdom. This resulted in the establishment of the
first permanent Chinese settlement in Malaysia which prospered even
under colonization by the Portuguese, Dutch and the English. The
descendants of this small settlement are known as the Baba and are
still found in Malacca today.109
The presence of Chinese traders persisted from this time, and small
merchant communities grew. By 1750, the Chinese population in
Malacca had reached 2,161 persons. A visitor to Trengganu in 1838
noted that the Chinese appeared to be mixed Hokkien and Hakka,
most of them speaking Malay in preference to their own dialect. Many
had married Malay women.'1°
109 Purcell, Victor, "Chinese Settlement in Malacca". J.M.B.R.A.S. XX, Part 1 (1947) pp.115-'25.
110 Ryan, NJ. The Making of Modern Malaya: A History from Earliest Times to Independence,
Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1965, pp.104-5.
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The next record of Chinese immigration was in the 19th. century when
British colonial policy instituted mass migration in order to fill the
demands of the burgeoning industry in Malaysia. The vacancies in the
tin mining industries as well as in the agricultural sector such as
pepper growing meant that a large number of Chinese migrant workers
were rapidly wanted and absorbed. Motivated by commercial pressures,
the British placed no restrictions and even encouraged the emigration
of vast numbers of workers from mainland China despite the reluctance
of the Chinese government to allow this.'1'
Despite official discouragement from their government, thousands of
Chinese had managed to arrive in Peninsular Malaysia by the 1850's.
The majority of them obtained employment as labourers in the tin
mines of Perak, sugar cane plantations and pepper and gambier farms
in Johor.U2 By this time, the immigration of Chinese labourers had
become a well-organised operation and the recruitment of migrant
workers became a specialised skill. Potential immigrants were targeted
from the economically depressed provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien
by an appointed agent also known as Kheh Thau. The Kheh Thau often
carried out his recruitment in his village especially of persons known
to him as it would put a more personal and tfavourable viewpoint on
the transmigration experience. He would often accompany his sin kekh
(new charges) to their final destination in Peninsular Malaysia before
handing them over to his client.113
Until 1877, there were practically no laws which were applicable to the
Chinese migrant workers, consistent with the colonial government's
Purcell, Victor, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, London, Oxford University Press, 1951, pp.248-
256.
112 Campbell, P.C., Chinese Coohe Emi gration to Countnes Withm the Bntish Em pire, London, P.S.
King and Son, 1923, pp2-25.
113 Blythe, W.I.,"I-hstorical Sketch of Chinese Labour in Malaya", J.M.B.R.A.S. XX, Part 1 (June
1947) pp.47-125.
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policy that the internal affairs of the Chinese should not be interfered
with. The responsibility for the administration of a community would
often be given to an appointed headman or "Captain" who acted as a
link between government and the community, and used the customs of
China as a basis for the administration of the laws and regulations of
the community."4
Another attempt to translocate Chinese culture in Malaysia was via the
formation of associations meant for the benefit of its members. These
associations, set up along the lines of clan, locality, language and
business interests have persisted to the present day even though the
establishment of a formal court system rendered the system invalid.
However, this situation was changed after the British colonial
government introduced the Chinese Immigration Ordinance on 23
March 1877." The Colonial government also appointed Chinese
Affairs Officers to supervise and bring some order to the Chinese
communities. Improvements brought about by this change included
official recognition of various Chinese customs and practices including
that of succession. The Secretary for Chinese Affairs was bound by the
Secretary of Chinese Affairs Enactment 1899 which directed him to
take into account Chinese law and customs when settling cases and to
appoint assessors to assist him if necessary." 6
 These changes,
although beneficial, restricted the smooth running of Chinese law. The
Buxbaum, 1968, p-i51-152; see also Hooker, M.B. The Personal Laws of Malaysia: An
Introduction, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1976 p.124, see also Ibrahim, 1987, pp.14-
16.
115 Under this Ordinance, a Chinese Protectorate Office under the charge of a Protector of Clunese
Immigrants was set up in 1887.
116 Purcell, 1948.
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associations were later used for criminal activities. This process was
described in the following manner:"7
"The history of government of the Chinese by the British in
Malaya may be described as a transition from indirect to direct
rule. This is made clear in the legal history of the Straits
Settlements. The process was from rule by Chinese custom,
administered by Chinese headmen, to rule by English criminal
law side by side with Chinese custom administered by British
judges, then, as the law was interpreted, to rule by the law of
England, taking account of Chinese custom. The interpretation
of the law meant progressive restriction in the operation of the
custom of the Chinese. At the same time, a body of statute law
was growing up in the colony itself which was further to restrict
this custom."
The Aliens Ordinance was replaced in 1953 with the more
comprehensive Immigration Ordinance which served to exercise a
tighter control on the immigration of foreigners to Malaysia."8
This Ordinance was subsequently replaced by the Immigration
Ordinance, 1959 which came into force on 1st. May 1959. The principal
objectives were to safeguard the employment and livelihood of
residents and,
"To bring about a more balanced and assimilated Malayan
population whose ties and loyalty are to this country alone
without which the foundation of a true Malayan nation cannot
be laid. "119
Chinese society in Malaysia was characterised by the relative
uniformity of its class origins. Even though from a geographically
limited area, the Chinese migrant workers were sufficiently different
to be able to distinguish them from their speech. There are nine major
Ibid., p. 143.
118 Malaya, Federation of Malaya Annual Report, 1953,Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, 1959.
119 The Straits Times, November 3, 1959.
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linguistic groups with a few minor ones, all originating from different
areas. The predominant group is the Hokkiens who are the natives of
Amoy followed by the Cantonese. The third biggest group are the
Hakka who came from northwestern Guandong and southwestern
Fujian followed by the Teochew. The other, much smaller dialect
groups are the Kwongsai from Guangxi province, the Hokchiu from
Fuzhou, the Hokchia from the immediate area of Fuzchou and the
Henghua from Fujian. However, it is the first five groups which
constitute the bulk of the Chinese population.'2°
Most were peasants from poor rural villages in a very small region of
China. Therefore, a real community spirit had already been established
at the grass roots level. The reasons why the immigrant workers should
be derived from such a limited area is unknown but according to
Purcell, poverty in central Fujian and eastern Guandong was possibly
a driving factor.
Malaysian Chinese have come to be organised into small communities
along the lines of common place of origin in China and common
dialect. The ties are often even stronger as the majority of residents
in a South China village would often be members of the same kin
group. These ties, which play such an important role in China, seem
to play an even more crucial role in Malaysia as a means of
reaffirming their cultural and historical roots.'2'
This is further strengthened by the well-organised social groupings
which are often related to their economic activities. These "kongsi
gelap" (secret societies) had their own systems of internal
Purcell, 1948, p.25O.
121 Ibid. pp. 192-193.
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regulations.' 22 These institutions represent an attempt to transplant
Chinese systems of regulatory affairs into a new environment, which
served to reinforce the ethnic consciousness of the Chinese and to
support them in their bid to assert themselves amidst the indigenous
people of their new homeland. Even after the establishment of the
formal court system in the colony and the outlawing of secret societies
the tradition of internal regulations persisted within the Chinese
communities.'23
The social cohesiveness which is the direct result of these various
activities has led Purcell to remark that the Chinese in Malaysia are,
"More ethnologically exact than in any other country in
Southeast Asia because since large scale immigration from
China began over half a century ago, there has been no
miscegenation of any importance. Before then, it was
comparatively small. "124
1.5.1 The Chinese Family
Until the beginning of the present century, the ideal Chinese family
was patriarchal, patrilineal, patrilocal, and extended. It is located
within the broader social organisational form of clan, and integrated
within a system of ethico-religious belief centering around ancestor
worship. 125
 A man's duty was first and above all to his parents and
a married woman's duty was primarily towards her parents-in-law. The
essence of marriage was a social arrangement between two families and
the main family function was perpetuation of lineage. As only males
122 Comber, Leon, The Traditional Mysteries of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, Singapore,
Eastern Universities Press Ltd., 1961, p.56-9.
123 Hooker, 1976, p. 124-5.
124 Purcell, 1948, p319.
125 Yeb, Kuo Hwa, Chmese Mamage Patterns in Singapore, Ph.D Thesis, New York University,
University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1969, pp.3-4.
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could carry on the family line, there was tremendous pressure for a
male heir. The importance of an extended family of kith and kin,
connected by blood marriage or friendship, made it possible for the
formation and maintenance of formal associations meant for mutual
benefit.'26
Marriage within the clan was prohibited. Also prohibited were
marriages which violated the generation - age order, marriages with
persons of exceedingly low social status and those resulting from
adultery. In the past too, polygamous marriages and mistresses were
corn mon.
Considerations of marriage arrangements took into account the social
standing of the family, moral prestige, the man's integrity and ability,
the woman's willingness to serve her parents-in-law, the capacity to
bear children, economic advantage, together with astrological and
calendrical compatibility rather than any preference the subjects
themselves might have had.' 27 Marriages usually took place at a
somewhat later age than in many other traditional societies, notably
those in India. Males were often some years older than the wives.
Another disincentive which possibly worked to delay marriages was
their cost. While both sides incurred expense, the weight was born
much more by the groom's family. The "contract" was usually regarded
as being much to the advantage of the family of the groom since,
although the "bride-price" might be substantial, it was never adequate
compensation to the bride's family for the loss of their daughter on
whom wealth had been spent and who would subsequently "belong" to
the other family.
' Ibid p.7-8.
127 Id.
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Within Chinese marriages, fertility was usually high. Until the wife had
produced a child, preferably a son, she was not really accepted into the
husband's family but as the number of her off-spring grew, so did her
prestige and value. The strong need to have sons is to serve their
parents in life and to honour them in death. The Chinese believe that
no ancestor can exist without having living, preferably male
descendants. The daughters acquired were usually perceived as a
burden.'28
The traditional Chinese family unit must be viewed as sociological
phenomenon providing stable, supportive conditions for marriage,
frequent child-bearing and secure nurturing.' 29 However, migration
to Malaysia undoubtedly disrupted this balance. The major obstacle to
reasserting the traditional structures and values of the Chinese family
in the first decade of the Chinese influx was the acute shortage of
eligible wives. In 1823, it was recorded that only 361 Chinese women
lived in Malaya, however, in 1850, this figure had grown to 2,239.'°
Data for Peninsular Malaysia is deficient but a male to female ratio of
at least 10:1 may be assumed for the end of the ninteenth century. By
1911, the ratio had decreased to 5:1. The census of 1931 showed a
further improved situation, the sex ratio was then 2:1. A sign that
increasing stability was becoming characteristic of the Chinese
community showed in the proportion locally born-31 percent. In the
1930's although immigration of adult males was severely limited, female
migrants were permitted or even encouraged, and a migrational surplus
of 190,000 Chinese women occured between 1934 and 1938.
' Aziz, 1980, p.25.
129 Wong, A.K. The Modern Chinese Family - Ideology, Revolution and Residues in The Famil y in
, edited by Man Singh Das and Baths, P.D., London, George Allen and Unwin., 1979 p.251.
130 Lebra, J. and Paulson, J. Chinese Women in Southeast Asia, Singapore, Times Publishers, 1980,
p.6-7.
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Nevertheless, in some areas, among some communities and for some
age groups, female shortages persisted until after World War 11.131
The traditional "ideal" rural Chinese family of up to five generations
living together as one economic and social unit, with the wives of the
Sons of each generation included, was extremely difficult to replicate
in Malaysia, for economic reasons quite apart from the length of time
needed to develop such a unit. The other factor was that most Chinese
in Malaysia, as a result of their migration, ceased to be rural peasants
and became urbanised living in towns or mining settlements. The
change in occupation from rural peasant employment to urban
commercial occupations or mining lessened the advantages of a large
extended household, and in most cases the single family or three
generational families became the most common form.132
There is now a wide variation in the degree to which Malaysian
Chinese adhere to the traditional family customs, with the degree of
modification related to such variables as the length of time since
migration, the level and type of education, residence (rural or urban),
social class and income. While many of the traditional ideas have
remained, a profound change has actually occured. The role of two
families in arranging a marriage for their children has largely fallen
away. Mutual attraction by the couple is now the commonly accepted
basis for the match. Young Chinese now have much more freedom than
was traditionally the case. Rarely, however, do the young Chinese,
females particularly, aspire to the degree of independence accepted in
western countries.
131 Ooi, Jin Bee, Peninsular Malaysia, London, Longmans, 1976, pp.116-118.
132 Aziz, 1980, pp.146-8.
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It is not clear how widely the "ideal" described in the previous
discussions was actually practised. Evidence provided by Palmore,'33
suggested that even in China, the simple conjugal family was the most
common. In Peninsular Malaysia, the majority of the Chinese
population during the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries
consisted of immigrants who were young single men or married men
who left their families behind with the idea of ultimately returning
home or of later bringing their families to Malaysia. Hence, Palmore
suggested that extended family participation would be limited by
availability of appropriate marriage partners as well as relatives, many
of whom remained in China.
Today, male authority has also declined and with economic
independence, women are gaining recognition as individuals. Marriage
is becoming not just a social arrangement and is based more on
romantic love. Family ties are also not so strong and many Chinese
couples now live on their own.134
1.5.2 Divorce Among the Chinese
The migrant Chinese workers who had settled permanently in Malaysia
brought with them their culture and customs as well as their laws.
Originally, these were the same as they had practised in China but as
the newer generations grew up in Malaysia and adapted themselves to
local conditions, so too, Chinese laws and customs changed. Hence,
early attempts to adjudicate divorce among the Chinese were difficult
and controversial.
133 Palmore, J.A and Marzuki, A, "Marriage Patterns and Cumulative Fertility in West Malaysia,
1966-1967", Demography, 1970, Vol. 6, No. 64, p.383.
134 Tan,Poo Chang, The Study
 on Marriage and Marital Dissolution in Peninsular Malaysia, The
Divorced Men and Women, A Final Report submitied to The National Planning and
Development Board and United Nations Fund for Population Activities, Kuala Lumpur, 1987 p.47.
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In Dorothy Yee Yeng Nam v Lee Fah Kooi,' 35 Thomson C.J. said:
"In the Straits Settlements, however, whatever may be the
position as regards other races, the only conclusion that can be
drawn from the Six Widow's case,' 36 which is the classical
case on the subject, is that as regards Chinese the question of
personal law is based on race. The courts in effect have given
judicial recognition to certain customs prevalent or thought to
be prevalent among persons of Chinese race irrespective of their
domicile or religion. They have thus set up what might be
called a sort of common law as affecting persons of Chinese
race and it would seem that the case is the same in those
portions of the present Federation, which were not formerly part
of Straits Settlements or, perhaps more accurately which were
part of the former Federated Malay States. '137
There is, however, a difference between the Colony and the Federated
Malay States in matters relating to Chinese custom, on the basis
whereby the law is generally administered in two jurisdictions. In the
Colony the early settlers were deemed to have brought with them the
Common Law of England and all that it implied. Then there were the
three Charters of Justice in 1807, 1826 and 1855, which specifically
provided that the administration of justice was to be adapted as far as
circumstances would permit to the religious manners and customs of
the several classes of litigants. As a result of these Charters, the
English rules of law have been modified in the case of persons of alien
race and custom. In the Federated Malay States there were no
Charters of Justice, and the Common Law was not introduced until the
passing of the Civil Law Enactment No.3 of 1937.138
'3 [19561 M.LJ. 257.
' Choo Ang
 Chee v Neo Chan Neo (1908) 12 S.S.L.R. 120 (popularly known as "The Six Widows
Case") Re Ding Do Ca [1966] 2 M.LJ. 220.
'3 Ibid., p.263.
' For further details, see Hooker, 1976, pp.1-4.
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The former Perak Order in Council,' 39 declared the Chinese laws and
customs set out in the Order to be the law in the State of Perak, and
this was also adopted in other states, on the grounds that the Order
was declaratory of the laws and customs of the Chinese. The Perak
Order in Council was repealed on the 1st January, 1930 when the
Distribution Enactment, 1929, came into force. It was held in Woon
Ngee Yew v Ng Yoon Thai,' 4° that with the introduction of the English
common law by the Civil Law Enactment, 1937, the courts could act on
the wide principle laid down by Sir Peter Benson Maxwell in Reg v
Willans' 4 ' where he said:
"But where the law of the place is inapplicable to the parties,
by reason of peculiarities of religious opinion and usages, then
from a sort of moral necessity, the validity of the marriage
depends on whether it was performed according to the rites of
their religion."
Therefore, the determination of whether the courts were empowered
to grant divorces depended upon whether the couple were married
under custom or Ordinance. The only essential legal requirements of
a Chinese customary marriage is that the marriage must be consensual,
proven by long continued cohabitation and repute of marriage. The
requirements of a ceremony and formal contract are deemed evidential
only and not essential. This was held in Re Lee Siew Kow' 42 which
followed the principle in the Singapore case of Re Yeow Klan Kee's
Estate. 143 It is interesting to note that the sole requirement for a
' No. 23 of 1893.
' [1941] M.LJ. 37 at p.45.
'' (1858) 3 Kyshe 16, at p.32.
142 [1952] M.LJ. 184.
[1949] M.LJ. 171.
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valid customary marriage is mere consensus. Parties to a customary
marriage can dissolve their marriage without recourse to the courts.
If a Chinese couple were to contract a civil marriage, which provided
that their marriage was a monogamous one, its solemnisation created
a status which carried with it the obligations which the law imposed on
parties having such status. If they entered into a marriage under the
Civil Marriage Ordinance, such a marriage could only be dissolved
under and in accordance with the Divorce Ordinance.' 44 Hence, they
are not entitled to divorce each other through customary law.
However, in Chan Bee Neo v Ee Siok Choo t45, it was held that section
1(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance which provided that the
Ordinance did not apply to "marriage by Mohamedan law or custom,
native law or custom, Chinese law or custom or other law or custom
repugnant to English law" by necessary implication recognised Chinese
customary law relating to divorce and matrimonial causes ; and
therefore the court had the power to apply the Chinese customary law
in such cases.
This was subsequently upheld in Lieu Kui Tze v Lee Shak Lian'46
where the High Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to grant divorces
to persons married according to Chinese custom. According to Chinese
customary law, divorce could be obtained by mutual consent. When
petitions were presented on other grounds the judge was empowered
to call in the assistance of one or more suitable persons as assessors
to decide whether such grounds were recognised by Chinese custom.
'" Soon Hal San v Won Sue Fong [1961] M.LJ.221.
[1947] S.C.R. 1.
' [1953] S.C.R. 85.
68
Furthermore, in Chien Mau Ong v Wong Suok Ing' 47 it was held that
the High Court had jurisdiction to grant a decree of judicial separation
where the parties were married according to Chinese custom.
The courts in the Borneo States have also differentiated between the
customs of the various Chinese groups (Hakka, Foochow and Henghua)
and have thereby upheld certain ancient customs. In Sarawak
particularly, where there is a much more numerous Chinese community
than in Sabah, there were a number of cases where the courts had the
power to make a decree of judicial separation, with due consideration
being taken of local custom. In Chong Foong v Chan Hwe Seng'48
Briggs J. said:'49
"Now cases such as this must be governed to some extent by
custom. Not however, custom which is outdated, outmoded and
is not in line with modern Chinese thought. Custom is always
changing, never more quickly perhaps than today among the
expatriate Chinese people. I find as proved in this case that the
petitioner was not treated as the wife of the respondent would
have expected to be treated, that is, she was treated by the
parents of the respondents as a menial rather than a wife of the
son of the house; that the respondent knew of this, and may
have resented the position; but that he was under the
domination of his mother to such extent that he did not stand
up for his wife, and behave towards her as a husband should
behave towards a wife. Rather he acquiesced in the treatment
of his wife accorded to her by his mother."
The criteria upon which the court determines Chinese "customary law"
seem to be the customs of the Chinese people living in the Borneo
States at the time of the decision. For example, the courts upheld as
"within the modern Hakka custom," a divorce by a wife who had
deserted her husband, where the husband has failed to get her back,
147 [1956] S.C.R. 97.
' [1959] S.C.R. 33.
Ibid., at p35.
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there is no hope of reconciliation and the husband cannot support the
children adequately.'5°
The courts in the Borneo Territories have jurisdiction over questions
of divorce of a customary marriage' 5 ' and unlike the Malay States,
a court procedure is required to effect such a divorce although a
mutual petition for divorce will suffice. There are a few cases'52
which indicate that Chinese customary marriages can only be dissolved
by Chinese custom and not under the Divorce Ordinance, 1952.
In the past, marriage under customary law for the Chinese was
primarily polygamous. The courts recognised such polygamous unions
as long as they were consensual. There was no legal requirement to
register such marriages. Under English law, the concept of marriage
has laid emphasis on its Christian nature. In Hyde v Hyde' 53, Lord
Penzance dealing with a Mormon marriage in Utah where polygamy
was then lawful, held that such a marriage did not entitle the parties
to remedies or relief under the matrimonial law of England. Lord
Penzance held that marriage as understood in Christendom should be
defined as the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to
the exclusion of all others.
The conception of the marriage bond among the Chinese as far as
secondary wives are concerned was something very different. In
Imperial China, divorce of a Tsai (Principal wife) under traditional
Lo Slew Ying
 v Chon Fay (1959) S.C.R.1.
Liu Kui Tze v Lee Shak Lian [19531 SCR 55.
152 Wong Chu Ming v KIio Liang H,ong [19521 SCR 1; Soo Hal San v Won g Sue Fong [1961] MU
221.
153 (1886) L.R.1 P&D 130.
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Chinese law was somewhat restricted.' 54 On the other hand, the
secondary wife had practically no status.' 55 She could be dismissed
and left destitute. Her position was a little better if she had borne a
son, as then apparently, she could not be divorced without cause
Although still infreqnent today, divorce is more usual and accepted in
Malaysia. It appears to be more common than official statistics suggest.
Many couples are divorced by "custom"; that is the marriage is
recognised as broken by the families of the parties concerned but not
necessarily officially registered. A similar "customary" situation may
exist with regard to marriage, particularly remarriage after a divorce.
It is now not unusual in Malaysia for widows to remarry. The
possibility of adding other wives to the marriage has decreased, due
mainly to economic constraints but the traditional practice of keeping
a "concubine", in a separate house persists particularly among more
affluent males.'56
Both marriage and divorce seem to have been regarded primarily as
private matters, only coming within the jurisdiction of the courts in
case of abuse. Divorce was recognised, but it was at the instigation of
the husband, who was entitled to divorce his wife. However, divorce
was very rare traditionally. The possibility of taking other wives meant
that divorce of the first or even later wives was seldom necessary.
The courts in Malays a seem to permit divorce of a secondary wife
providing there is the necessary intent.' 57
 However, the problems
which arise from polygamy have included the recognition of secondary
154 Freedman, M., "Colonial law and Chinese Society", Journal of the Ro yal Anthropological Institute,
80, 1952 p.109.
155 Valk, Marc Van Der, Outline of Modem Chinese Family Law, Peking, Henri Vetch, 1939, pp. 23.
' Aziz, 1980, p.43.
In the Estates of Sm Slew Guan decd [1932] M.LJ. 95.
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wives married under Chinese customary law. In Cheang Thye Pin v Tan
Ah Loy,' 58 it was held by the Privy Council that a secondary wife was
entitled upon a partial intestacy to share in the estate of the deceased
husband.
Divorce of primary wives by mutual consent was an accepted practice
in Malaysia. This clearly contradicts the traditional Chinese customary
law which gave the wife almost no opportunity for divorce. While the
court has assumed a substantial burden in determining what modern
custom is, it has retained a flexible position so as to permit itself to
be responsive to social change.
On the general principle of divorce, the courts have held that Chinese
may only divorce according to custom so long as they marry under
custom. If they marry under the provisions of any Ordinance, then the
grounds of divorce must be as determined by the Ordinance. 159 The
courts will not allow a woman to divorce her husband unilaterally.'60
However, there was still the difficulty of deciding how the Chinese
customary laws should be applied.'6 ' In the case of Woon Ngee Yew v
Ng loon Thai' 62, Murray-Ansley J. after referring to textbooks on
Manchurian Codes said,
158 (1920) A.C. 369.
' Soo Hai San v Wong Sue Fong [1961] M.LJ. 221.
160 Cheng Ee Mun v Look Chun Henj and Anor [1962] M.LJ. 411.
161 it is said that Chinese Customary Law in this country is, to some extent, quite different from that
practised in China, the country of its ongin In Re Tan Sob Sim dec (1951) M.LJ. 21.
162 [1941] M.LJ. 37.
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"... whatever the position as regards divorce may have been in
China it by no means follows that the custom of China as it
existed under the Manchu dynasty is suitable for the Chinese
population of Perak today. "163
The learned judge in this case underlined the necessity of obtaining
evidence of local practices from expert witnesses. 164 The judge also
stressed that allowances must be made for changes in local customs in
comparison to those in Imperial China. On subsequent appeal to the
Court of Appeal, Terrel, J. stated that in determining questions of
Chinese custom in Malaysia it is permissible to look for findings of
other Supreme Courts in Malaysia, but special weight must be given to
evidence indicating that some particular custom differs in different
parts of the country. He also asserted in strong terms that:
"The customs of the Chinese in Malaya are not based on those
of Republican China,... The present customs are no doubt
derived from the customs prevailing in the time of the Manchus,
but have been adopted in Malaya with considerable
modifications, ... The customs of Imperial China have
accordingly a certain historical interest but nothing more. "165
Mc.Elwaine C.J. went even further to suggest that local Chinese custom
may differ in different parts of Malaya. 166 The case ultimately turned
on expert evidence of Chinese divorce custom in Perak. Translations
of both the Imperial and Republican Chinese laws were referred to but
none was regarded as more than useful background material.
163 Ibid., p. 33-34.
'	 Id.
165 
Ibid. p.39-40.
166 Ibid., at 37.
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In Mary Ng v Ooi Gim Teong' 67 there was nothing to show that the
expert witness was testifying on the custom of the Chinese in West
Malaysia. From the judgement, it seems that he was restating Chinese
custom as recorded in the Ta Ching Lu Li (Laws of the Ching
Dynasty). This law was restated by Maurice Freedman' 68 and Vermier
Chiu. 169
 But neither of these authors was directing their attention to
Malaysia.
In fact, Freedman, after field research in Singapore in 1949, concluded
that;
"... the dissolution of marriage, Li-Hun, is common enough in
Singapore and is recognised to be so... Li-Hun normally refers
to a signed agreement between spouses to end their relationship.
Chhut-chhe. the unilateral repudiation of a primary wife, has
little relevance to Singapore and exists mainly in the minds of
those sophisticates who are aware of its status in traditional
Chinese law."
Since the social custom of the Singapore Chinese does not, as a matter
of common knowledge, differ radically from that of Malaysian Chinese,
this testimony speaks strongly against accepting for the Malaysian
Chinese the tenets of traditional Chinese law.
A further point for discussion is the status of the expert witness.
Although qualified to testify on classical Chinese Law, the expert
witness does not seem to be especially qualified to speak on West
Malaysian Chinese custom. In the absence of comprehensive
sociological surveys, the usual assistance a judge gets is from Chinese
text and people learned in them. Neither of these sources accurately
167 [1972] 2 M.LJ. 18.
168 Freedman, 1952, p. 97.
169 Chiu, Vermier Y., Marriage Laws and Customs of China, Institute of Advanced Chinese Studies
and Research, New Asia College, Chinese Umversity of Hong Kong, 1966 pp.75-107.
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state the practice of calling up prominent people in the local Chinese
community to describe local Chinese practices. It can be seen from
Woon Ngee Yew's case 17° that this does not seem to guarantee
sounder results.
The term "Chinese custom" is far too general to describe any but the
widest possible agreed forms of customary behaviour in Chinese
society. Chinese customs differ from community to community. This is
exemplified in the following cases. In Loh Chat big v Lau Ing Hat'7'
the court applied the Foochow custom that the failure of the husband
to maintain the wife was a ground for granting divorce; but it held that
the fact that the husband was below normal intelligence was not a valid
reason for divorce by that custom. This was upheld in Ling Han Liang
v Ling Ming Sieng' 72 where the parties were married according to
Foochow custom. The petitioner alleged that the respondent left the
matrimonial home without reasonable cause and he prayed for a decree
of restitution of conjugal rights. The wife in her defence alleged that
the husband had committed adultery and had failed to provide his wife
with proper maintenance and therefore the petitioner had failed to
discharge the onus of establishing that the wife had deserted him
without reasonable cause.
In Siew Moi Jea v Lu Ing Hut' 73, the court was prepared to apply
Henghua customary rules for divorce under which a divorce would be
granted if the petitioner could prove that the respondent maltreated
her and in addition that he failed to maintain her for a year or more.
It was held however that the petitioner and the respondent had come
Woon Ngee Yew v Ng Yoon Thai [1941] M.LJ. 37.
171 [1959] S.C.R. 13.
[1966] 1 M.LJ. 169.
'	 [1959] S.C.R. 16.
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to a settlement under which she had received a sum of money as
expenses and they had signed an agreement, which was binding
according to custom. Moreover she did not satisfy the court that the
respondent had failed to maintain her and support her adequately and
therefore her petition was dismissed.
However, this contrasted strongly with the case of Kong Nyat Moi v
Leong Sing Chiang' 74 where the wife applied for divorce alleging
cruelty, desertion and failure to maintain. The respondent opposed the
application for divorce, denied all allegations and stated that he
wanted the wife to return to him. The witnesses were unable to assist
the court as to what specifically constitutes Khek customary rules for
divorce. They could only say that if both parties agreed to mutual
divorce it might be granted. It was held on the fact that the petitioner
had failed to satisfy the court that she was entitled to divorce on good
grounds according to the customary law of her community, and
therefore the petition was dismissed.
Even though Chinese customary law varies according to the sub-ethnic
origin of the parties concerned, all customary laws stem from an
original, agreed upon and settled series of codes which are regarded
as typical and representative of all Chinese customary laws. Under
Chinese customary law, with regard to divorce, it is generally agreed
that there are only two ways in which divorce may be granted, that is
by mutual separation or via unilateral repudiation of the wife by the
husband.
Divorce by mutual consent or agreement between the wife and husband
is a more simple and less contentious procedure than unilateral
divorce. In theory, divorce by mutual consent may be either contained
in a deed or agreement of divorce, including inter alia a declaration
174 [1965] 1 M.LJ. 73.
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that the husband and wife respectively are free to contract any other
lawful marriage with any other man or woman, or may appear as a
newspaper notice of the declaration of their marriage.'75
The other method of divorce, unilateral repudiation of the wife by the
husband, has its roots in long-standing and ingrained ideas of the
superiority of man over woman which have given the husband the
exclusive right to dissolve a marriage. A trite Chinese expression
illustrates the position:
"When the husband beckons her to come, she has to come,
when he waves her away, she has to go away. "176
In principle, a i.j (principal wife) and a (secondary wife) are for
the purpose of divorce in the same position even though there have
been differing views that unilateral repudiation occurs more frequently
in second marriages. According to Hooker, the customs in China and
in Malaysia and Singapore are more or less similar where a Chinese
husband can divorce his secondary wife if she disobeys the orders of
the principal wife or if she violates the rules of the family, or for
immorality or disobedience to her husband. The prevailing custom
amongst Chinese is for the husband to inform his clansmen or his
relations that he has divorced his secondary wife. A public declaration,
it is believed, is essential to the validity of divorce.'77
Lee Siow Mong, the prominent expert on Chinese customs in Malasya
states that there are seven grounds of divorce by unilateral
repudiation, namely:-
Ibrahim, Ahmad bin Mohamed, Family Law in Malaysia and Sin gapore, 2nd Edition, Singapore,
Malaysian Law Journal Pte. Ltd. 1984, p.114.
176 Chiu, 1966, p.59.
' Hooker, 1976, p.134, Re Lee Gee Chong decd [1965] MU 102; Re Sim Siew Guan decd [1932]
MU 95, Wong
 Ngee Yew and Others v Ng Yoon Thai and Others [1941] M.LJ. 37.
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(a) inability to bear a son or barrenness'78
(b) immorality
(c) disrespect to husband's parents
(d) loqu acity.'79
(e) theft or some serious offence against property
(f) jealousy'80
(g) malignant disease
Against the above grounds for divorce stand three reasons for
non-divorce which serve to constrain the husband from frivolously
exercising his exclusive right to divorce his wife. These three grounds
cover the following situations
(a)	 if the wife has kept three years mourning for either of the
husband's parents
(b) if the husband having once been poor is now rich and
(c) if the wife has no home to go to.'8'
These three reasons which nullify the grounds of divorce are according
to Lee Siow Mong the greatest protection for Chinese woman. There
are however three grounds on whach a divorce is imperative
notwithstanding the above three exceplions. They are182
178 The inability to give birth to a son is inevitably related to Chinese belief of "the interrupted
continuation of the patrilineal lineage"; see Chiu, 1966, p.62.
179 Loquacity or talkativeness is synonymous to quarrelsome conduct, carrying tales, lies and generally
talking when one should be silent, thereby causing disharmony in the home; see Le.e Siow Mong,
Chinese Customary Marriage and Divorce [1972] M U iii.
Jealousy ranges from jealousy in love matters to jealousy in the wealth or well-being of other
people, and action or behaviour arising out of such jealous)r, ibid.
181 See also Valk, 1939, p22.
182 Id.
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(a) adultery
(b) assaulting the husband's parents and
(c) desertion
It is interesting to note that the ground of adultery and desertion are
also grounds for modern divorce legislation. The most unsatisfactory
element in the concept of unilateral divorce lies in the fact that a
woman has no right to divorce the husband, notwithstanding the
injustices and wrongs committed by him against her. This fact is well
illustrated in the case of Cheng Ee Mun v Look Chung Heng,' 83 where
it was held that according to Chinese custom a married woman could
not divorce her husband unilaterally.
Desertion is a valid reason for the dissolution of marriages under both
Chinese customary law and English law. In Tan Sui Ing v Goh Tiew
Liong 184 the petitioner asked for the dissolution of her marriage on
the grounds of desertion, cruelty, lack of maintenance and on the
general ground that the circumstances which had arisen made it just
and reasonable that the marriage should be dissolved. The evidence of
the Foochow Chinese headman in Sibu was that a marriage contracted
under Foochow Chinese custom could be dissolved if;
(a) there was an absolute desertion by one party or the other for at
least two years
(b) there was absolute failure on the part of the husband to
maintain the wife or children for at least two years or
(c) the parties were incompatible and found it impossible to live
reasonably together as man and wife despite genuine
efforts to resolve their differences.
183 [1962] M.LJ. 411.
184 [1964] M.LJ. 406.
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On the facts, it was held that the husband had failed to maintain his
wife and children for more than two years and therefore the wife was
entitled to a decree for dissolution of the marriage and the custody of
the children.
In Low Wan Kwong v Lau King Ting'85 the petitioner applied for an
order of dissolution of marriage on the grounds (a) that the
respondent had left the matrimonial home without the petitioner's
consent or knowledge and with the intention of never again cohabiting
with the petitioner and (b) that the petitioner and the respondent were
incompatible and found it impossible despite genuine efforts to live
together as man and wife. The parties had married under Foochow
custom. It was held that on the evidence the petitioner had failed to
prove that the respondent had deserted him and that even if the
respondent had been guilty of desertion, the petition was presented
prematurely as it was presented less than half a year after the
desertion.
It was clear on the authority of Tan Sui Ing v Goh Tiew Liong,(supra)
that where desertion was alleged against the respondent, it had to be
for a period of at least two years before a petition can be presented.
It was also held that on the evidence the petitioner had not proved the
second ground alleged against the respondent and in any event the
period for which this ground could be canvassed (according to the
expert evidence) was two years. As the respondent in this case was
living apart from the petitioner and not without sufficient reason, she
was entitled to maintenance for herself and the children.
This was upheld in Lee Yung Kiang v Ling Yun Tie 186 where both
Chinese customary and English law were utilised to settle the dispute.
' [1975] 1 M.LJ. 217.
' [1965] 2 M.LJ. 87.
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The petitioner left his family in Sibu and went to work in Kuching but
took no steps to set up a matrimonial home there. Subsequently the
wife also left the family house and went to work in Sibu without the
petitioner's consent. The petitioner then applied for the dissolution of
the marriage on the ground of desertion and asked the court for the
custody of the children. The respondent denied desertion and claimed
maintenance and the custody of the children. The parties were both of
the Foochow community. Lee Hun Hoe C.J. applied the English rules
as to desertion and held that on the facts the petitioner failed to
establish that the respondent had the intention to desert and therefore
the petition was dismissed. The learned judge also gave custody of the
son to the petitioner and the daughters to the respondent and ordered
the petitioner to pay maintenance for the respondent and the
daughters.
As to the procedure of Chinese customary divorce, it was observed by
Shaw, C.J., in Re Sim Slew Guan, and Terrell, J. in Re Lee Choon Guan,
that the principal points on divorce are that there must be an intention
to divorce and that it must not be kept secret, and it should be
publicised. A man may divorce either his primary or secondary wife
unilaterally; provided she was guilty of the above-mentioned crimes by
declaring publicly to his clansmen or relatives that he had divorced
her.
This was also found to be the case in Woon Ngee Yew v Ng Yoon
Thai'87 where it was held that there was sufficient evidence that the
deceased had divorced his wife according to Chinese custom, when he
refused to return to her and informed various friends and relatives that
he had done so; and that these facts were sufficient to constitute a
divorce of a secondary wife according to the custom among Chinese as
recognised in Perak.
187 [1941] M.LJ. 37.
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In Chinese customary law, divorce, like marriage, depended upon
intent. Ceremony was deemed evidential, not essential and so no
ceremony of divorce was required for it to be absolute. This was held
to be so in Law Ah Lui v Choa Eng Wan' 88 and in Re Lee Choon
Gua n 189
However, a distinction was made between customary Chinese law and
customary Chinese practice in Wong Chu Ming v Kho Lieng Hiang.'9°
In that case, it was held that any Chinese customary practice whereby
divorce could be effected by a joint declaration or advertisement in a
newspaper without any court process did not apply in Sarawak where
all non-native divorces could only be granted by and in accordance
with the recognised procedure of the High Court.
It has been suggested, as in Khoo Hooi Leong v Khoo Chong Yeok19'
that a secondary wife cannot be divorced by her husband if she has
borne him a son during the marriage. However, the judgement in Mary
Ng v Ooi Kim Teong 192 upheld the view that under Chinese customary
law a husband could divorce even his principal wife unilaterally for
cause, even if she had borne him a son, provided the divorce was
publicised. On the facts of the case it was held that the respondent was
entitled to divorce his wife because of her disrespectful and
disobedient behaviour to him and his mother and that in fact he had
done so in accordance with the Chinese custom by announcing the fact
to a family gathering, making it known to the wife's solicitors and
making it known publicly in a local Chinese newspaper.
'	 [1935] S.S.L.R. 116.
189 [1935] M.LJ. 78.
190 [1952] S.C.R. 1.
191 [1930] A.C. 346 at 353.
192 [1972] 2 M.LJ. 18.
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The exclusive right of the husband unilaterally to divorce his wife is,
besides being an archaic practice, also non- protective of the rights and
status of the Chinese woman even though in practice the seven grounds
for divorce 193 are not usually evoked.
The vulnerability of a Chinese wife is further highlighted by the fact
that the consequences of a customary divorce do not favour her in
many instances. Unilateral divorce by the husband puts an end to the
wife's relationship with the husband's family, the children remain the
man's property and she is not entitled to any maintenance. In a divorce
by mutual consent, maintenance may not be included in the terms of
the deed at all. This may be a form of inducement to the man to agree
to the divorce in cases where the wife desires a divorce from her
husband but the latter is not wholly agreeable to it. In conservative
Chinese communities, traditional public opinion has always considered
divorces as sad, tragic and to be frowned upon. The requirement that
a divorce must be made known has an adverse effect on the wife.
A further disadvantage of Chinese customary divorce is reflected by the
inapplicability of some of the grounds of divorce to the modern day
context. As a point of illustration, the inability to bear a son is
scientifically proven as never the fault of a female. Without doubt,
some of the grounds are frivolous and according to Azmi J., it would
amount to giving "thousands of Chinese husbands a gun in their
hands."94
As discussed, Malaysian courts administering Chinese customary law
constantly face the difficult task of deciding whether a particular
custom is valid for the local Chinese community. Much depends on
what the expert witnesses produce in the case. The complexity of
'93 See p.80.
194 Per Mohd. Azmi J. in Mary N v Ooi Gmi Teong
 [19721 2 M.LJ. 18 p.2O.
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communal Chinese customs has caused much confusion and
inconsistency in the application of the law with regard to divorce. One
solution is to say that the moment a custom is proved to have existed
in China, then the burden falls on its opponents to prove that it does
not exist in West Malaysia. This seems to be in Murray-Aynsley J's
mind when he said,
"I think that the effect of the previous law and custom of
China is this; if the authorities have shown that divorce did not
exist in China, then I think that Courts here would be reluctant
to admit that such a custom had originated in Malaya. But
when it has been shown that divorce existed in China, then the
Courts will only require slight evidence that the custom has
continued. "195
Kenneth Wee is of the opinion that there is the danger of assuming
classical Chinese writings to be descriptive of local Chinese practices.
He commented that this erroneous assumption was in fact made to the
disadvantage of the wife concerned in the case of Mary Ng v Ooi Kim
Teong. One wonders if this technical approach serves the purposes of
justice. According to him, this approach ignores the conclusion of
anthropological evidence that profound changes took place when the
Chinese migrated to the Malayan peninsula, and that the local Chinese
cannot be understood simply as a branch of society in China.'96
A case in point was Thia Whee Kiang v Kueh Eng Seng 197 where the
trial judge had granted a dissolution of marriage on the grounds that
there was no possibility of a reconciliation. On appeal the order was
set aside and Williams C.J. said a married women should not be
deprived of her status except on good grounds supported by acceptable
195 Won& Ngee Yew v Ng Yoon Thai [1941] M.LJ. p.37.
Wee, Kenneth, Chinese Law and Malayan Society: A Comment on Mary Ng v Ooi Gim Teon,
M.L.R., Vol.15, 1973, p.113.
' [1955] S.C.R. 75.
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evidence. This was in contrast with the judgement given in Lo Siew
Ying v Chong Foy' 98 where the court granted a divorce according to
modern Hakka custom. Evidence was given by a former Registrar of
Chinese Marriages that it would be within Hakka custom to grant a
divorce to a wife who has deserted her husband and where he had
failed to get her back provided the separation was considered to be
final. In other words, where there was no possibility of reconciliation.
If there was a reason for the wife to leave her husband, it would
strengthen the case in her favour. One important factor was whether
the husband could support the wife; if the husband could not support
the wife and the children adequately and provide them with education
then the wife was justified in asking for a divorce from her husband.
Due to this conflict, Williams C.J. stated that it would be greatly in
the interests of the Chinese community if questions relating to Chinese
divorce, judicial separation and the like were regulated by Ordinance,
rather than by Chinese custom, as an Ordinance would make for
greater certainty in law.
The foregoing judicial decisions show that the courts, while using the
words "Chinese custom" as a general term, have in fact made
judgments on the basis of somewhat localised rules. Hooker pointed
out that this point emerges clearly if a comparison is made between
the various Orders in Council (Perak Orders 23/1893 and 26/1895) and
Reports on Chinese custom (Straits Settlements 1926). But the courts
have sometimes been misled into regarding "expert evidence", or that
body of laws known as the Ta Tsing Lu Li as representing a body of
regulation common to all Chinese. 199According to Lee Siow Mong,
there has been some misunderstanding, especially among the Chinese,
in that the law of the Manchu Dynasty (Ching Dynasty) was mentioned
in court and it would appear that Manchu law had been made
198 [1959] S.C.R. 1.
199 Hooker, 1976, p. 129.
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applicable to the Chinese in Malaysia. He further stated that the
General Code of Laws of the Ching Dynasty was in fact based on, (if
not an actual replication) of the law of the previous Chinese Dynasties
ending with the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) just before the conquest of
the "Manchus". He proposed that the remedy for the local situation
seemed to be that all the Chinese who were married according to
Chinese custom should avail themselves of the protection given by the
law relating to civil marriages, and get themselves registered instead
of having to face a similar problem in the future. He even suggested
that the Government should enact a law to make it compulsory for all
customary marriages to be registered and thereby put an end to all
these squabbles on whether a Chinese couple married according to
custom had in fact contracted a valid marriage, or when the Chinese
husband came to divorce his wife whether he could in fact do so, and,
if he could, whether he had done it in the proper way. Such a law
according to Lee Siow Mong would benefit both man and woman and
put family life on a proper footing in contemporary society.20°
A survey carried out by the 1926 Marriage Committee found that there
is practically unanimous opposition among Chinese residents born in
China to any divorce legislation, which is shared by many Chinese born
in the Colony. Chinese ladies of Penang were the only group in favour
of divorce as a means of obtaining the prohibition of concubinage. This
showed that even though the attempt at law reform was
well-intentioned, it was not welcomed by prospective norm-addressees
who construed it as an attack upon their culture.
Kenneth Wee has suggested that one way to avoid further
complications, is to codify local Chinese custom after an exhaustive
survey, or abolish it and lay down new norms to govern Chinese
200 Lee Siow Mong, [1972], p.m.
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customary marriages. 20' Whether the LRA managed to settle the
above complications will be discussed in the following chapter.
1.6 THE INDIANS
The term "Indian" is applied to people of ethnic groups that are
indigenous to the Indian sub-continent and the surrounding states such
as Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 202 Contacts with Indians began as trading
contacts in ancient times but it was not until the seventh century when
the Hindu Sri Vijaya kingdom was established in Sumatra that there
was formal contact with Indian religion and culture.203
The first Indian settlements were started upon the establishment of
Malacca sultanate and led to frequent and direct contact between the
two cultures. 204 This relationship persisted through the Portuguese
and Dutch occupation of Malacca. However, with the airival of the
British, this two way traffic of contact and trade became a one way
flow of migrants from India to Malaysia. Initially, the migrants were
of a transient nature as they were convicts brought in by the East India
Company to labour in the construction of public works. 205 Convict
immigration was rather controversial and in 1860, was finally
prohibited due to adverse public sentiment, and the remaining convicts
were repatriated in 1873.206
201 LRA, Section 4 & 8.
202 See Appendix III.
203 Hall, D.G.E, A History of South-East Asia, London, Mac Milan, 4th ed, 1981 pp.47-73.
Kennedy, J., A History of Malaya, A.D. 1400-1959, London, Mac Milan, 1970, pp.6-17.
205 These convicts who were often merely petty criminals were usually repatriated to India after
completing their sentences but a few chose to stay and seek employment in Malaysia.
206 Straits Settlements, Annual Re port on the Administration of the Straits Settlements, 1860-1961,
p28.
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With demand for workers in the new rubber estates, the kangany207
system was introduced in the late nineteenth century and flourished
until it was replaced by an organised system of recruited immigration.
As well as assisted immigration, there has always been a system of
independent immigration involving people who came to Malaysia of
their own free will and were attracted by prospects for trade and
employment. They were often of financial means. Since the
introduction of the Immigration Act, 1953 and 1959, the quality and
quantity of Indian immigration have been tightly controlled.
The Indians who came to Malaysia were mainly from the Tamil
speaking region of South India but a minority was made up of North
Indians. In 1931, the Southern Indians accounted for 93 percent of the
total Indian population and by 1947, they made up 90 percent of
Indians in Malaysia. 208
 There is a close correlation between the
ethnic subgroups with their occupation and distribution in Malaysia.
The South Indian Tamil speakers were mainly unskilled labourers who
were employed in the private sector on rubber estates. They also found
employment in the public works department of the government.209
The mainly business community of the North Indians as well as the
Sikhs, Chettiars and South Indian Muslims are to be found in urban
areas, namely Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Penang. The Ceylonese
207 Variously spelt as "kankan" which derives from a Tamil word for foremen or supervisor of
workers. It was similar to the Chinese method of employing an agent who recruited labourers for
their employers; for further details on the method of migration see Sandhu, K.S, Indians in
Malaya, Some Aspects of their Immigration and Settlement, 1786-1956. London, Cambndge
University Press, 1969, PP. 21-30.
208 Ginsburg, 1958, p319.
209 Asaratnam, Smnapah, Indians in Malaysia and Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press,
1979, pp. 33-39.
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Tamils were mainly found in urban areas as well though some could be
found as subordinate staff in estates.21°
The present Indian population in Peninsular Malaysia comprises mainly
Tamils and Telegus (83.4 percent), Malayalis, Punjabis and Others
about 12.5 percent and Ceylon Tamils about 3 percent. Over 80
percent are Hindus, 8 percent Christians (mostly Roman Catholic) and
about 7 percent are Muslims.21'
The discussion in the following section will focus on the marriage and
divorce customs of the Hindu Tamils since they comprise almost four-
fifths of the Indian population in Malaysia.
1.6.1 The Indian Family
The ideal type of family desired in the Indian society is the "filial-
fraternal" joint-family (except among Nayars who are a sub-group of
the Malayalee sub-community). Such a family type contributed to the
economic, social and religious well-being of the individual.
Relations between members of the family were governed by the rules
of rank, age and sex. Thus, relations between parents and children
were one of authority and submission while that of husband and wife
were based on subordination. These rules were later extended to the
societal level where authority and submission according to age and
male superordination were emphasised.
Each member of the family had a distinct role to play. It was the duty
of the father to look after the economic well-being and other general
210 Ampalanavar, Rajeswary. The Indian Minority and Political Change in Mala ya, 1945-1957, Kuala
Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1981, p.2.
211 Ramasamy, R and Damel, J.R , Indians in Peninsular Malaysia: A Study and Bibliography, Kuala
Lumpur, University of Malaya Press, 1984, p.5.
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welfare of the family. When sons grew up, they were expected to
cooperate on all family matters and also contribute to the family purse.
At the death of the father, the eldest son took over the
responsibilities.212
The woman's role was largely confined to domestic chores and
attending to the needs of the children. A woman's contact with the
outside world was very restricted. Thus, a woman's world revolved very
much around her natal family before marriage and her husband and
children after marriage.
Although all classes and categories of Hindu society cherished these
ideals, there appeared in practice to have been variations. These ideals
were the values of Hinduism and Hindu culture and as such were
emphasised more by the upper classes and castes than among the lower
classes and castes. The economic status of the lower classes made many
of these values impractical. For instance, as agricultural labourers, the
commoners were not able to maintain large families and keep up with
the values of the joint-family system. Hence, they usually maintained
smaller, nuclear families. The sons gained more independence and they
soon broke away from their parents and set up their own families.
Again, unlike the women of the upper classes, the lower class women
had to work in the fields to add to the income of the family. This
appeared to have given them some degree of equality of status with
their husbands. Moreover, unlike the women of the upper classes,
lower class women had an opportunity to mix with the outside world.
Furthermore, divorce, separation, and remarriage, although
theoretically not possible, were also not altogether absent among the
lower classes. This clearly shows the different patterns that may persist
in the husband-wife relationship and child up-bringing between the two
212 Mandelbaum, D.G, Society in India: Continuity and Change, Vol.!, Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1970, pp.33-41.
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levels of the Hindu/Indian society. But whenever a lower class family
moved upward in the economic ladder, it usually followed the life-style
of the upper classes on these matters.213
On arrival in the then Malaya, the Indians reconstructed their social
organisation on a modified scale to suit the local conditions. Coupled
with other migration factors, there followed a process of adaption and
adjustment. There were, however, many obstacles that stood in the way
of the reconstruction of a healthy family structure.
First, until the 1920's the migration of Indians was predominantly a
male phenomenon. For example in 1901, there were only 171 women
to every 1000 Indian males in Malaya. 214
 Religious taboos and
cultural barriers prevented Indian men marrying outside the Indian
community. Even those who had already married left their wives behind
with their families in their native villages as a result of family norms,
ignorance and fear of uncertainties in the new land. Moreover, until
World War II, most Indians never considered their stay in Malaya as
permanent. Many of them who went back to India to get married did
not bring back their wives. Though the situation was much better in
the middle urban class Indian community, the male-female ratio among
the estate workers in particular improved only from the 1930's when
the workers began to arrive together with their families.
Secondly, the movement of Indians in this period was transitory in
nature. While the attitude of the Indians, especially among the estate
workers, was one reason, the policy of the employers towards the
workers also greatly contributed to this. For example, during the
Depression years of 1929-1932, some 373000 Indians were repatriated
213 Gough, K. The Social Structure of a Tanjore Village, in Village India, Studies in the little
Community, edited by Marriot M., Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1955, p.51.
214 Sandhu, 1969, p.185.
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as a result of the sharp drop in the price of rubber in the international
market.215
Thirdly, during the Japanese Occupation in Malaya (1941-1945), the
plantation workers suffered owing to famine, starvation and disease.
Although all the communities suffered in this period, the estate
community became highly vulnerable. The worst blow the community
experienced was when about 85000 young men, mostly from the estates,
were taken under forced recruitment to serve in the various Japanese
projects, especially in the notorious Siamese Death Railway. 216
 Social
life was thus disrupted and disorganisation set in.
Fourthly, when in the 1950's and 1960's, many estates were
subdivided, 217
 and estate lands were converted for industries and for
housing, the estate workers were hard hit by retrenchment and were
forced to seek other employment.
Fifthly, low incomes and lack of motivation led many workers to send
their children to work as domestic or factory workers at a very young
age.
Finally, the human factor also retarded the growth of a healthy family
structure in most of the working class families. This human factor
included lack of education, poor planning and attitudinal problems
inherited from the past, environmental factors, certain social habits
such as alcoholism, lack of guidance, inadequate medical care, poor
amenities and, lastly neglect. These affected Indian welfare and a
vicious circle was generated.
215 Ibid, p.182.
216 It was estimated that about half never returned; ibid. p.184.
217 Aziz, Ungku Abdul,(ed) Subdivisions of Estates m Mala ya, 1951-1960, Kuala Lunipur, University
of Malaya, 1962, p.19.
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It was against this background that the family structure had grown in
Malaysia - while the working class community was most affected, the
urban middle class and business class Indians had a smoother transfer
of the institution of the family and their traditional social organisation.
But overall, the Indian family structure underwent certain changes.
Among the upper classes, the traditional joint-family system, with few
exceptions, was replaced by extended and nuclear families because
about 85 percent were found to be in employment. 218
 Occupational
mobility and the desire of working sons to have separate and
independent homes also supported the growth of such nuclear families.
The Indian family continued to be subjected to change under the
influence of modernisation. There is now a greater tendency among the
younger generation to set up their own families away from their
parents as soon as they are spouses. They also demand more freedom
in the choice of mates. Such changing attitudes have given rise to more
nuclear families. However, these emerging patterns in the Indian family
structure seem largely a phenomenon of the westernised groups.
Among the lower and traditional sections the three-generation pattern
continues to be dominant. Again, even though changes are taking place
in family types, kinship ties based on the traditional values of socio-
religious obligations continue to be observed.
Another significant change is seen in age at marriage. While the age
at first marriage for males and females respectively was 18-24 and 16-
20 a few decades ago, boys now marry between the ages of 24-32 and
girls between 18-26. Here too, factors such as the emphasis on higher
education, the burden of supporting the family, and the chances of
getting a suitable spouse, tend to influence the marriagable age for
both males and females. In this regard, a distinction may be made
218	
1981, p.162.
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between the lower classes and the upper classes. The former tend to
remain predominantly culture-bound and thus desire early marriages
for boys and girls (since unmarried girls are still considered a burden
on the part of the parents). The latter emphasise higher education and
career for both the sexes, and hence, the delay in arranging marriages.
There is also a marked difference in the attitude towards educating
girls among the modernised Indians. In traditional society, the upper
classes usually frowned upon sending women to work and hence
discouraged higher education for them. Now, however, both education
and career are greatly stressed. In fact, among the educated youth
there is greater preference to marry working girls.219
1.6.2 Divorce Among the Indians
Indian attitude towards divorce is in many ways closely connected with
the past cultural heritage and belief system of the Indian/Hindu
society. Indian marriage practices and customs in India itself have been
shaped over a thousand years by religion and caste, and may vary also
according to language, region and, locality. Hindu law which is based
on customs can be divided into three categories, namely local customs,
class customs and family customs.22°
There were attempts amongst Hindus to fix the ancient customs and
tradition in a systematic form. Nibandhas or commentaries are
accepted as authoritative expositions of Hindu law in the different
provinces. The different commentaries have given rise to several
schools of Hindu law but, in principle there are only two schools
namely the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga schools. It is said that the Code
of Manu was the earliest attempt at the compilation of the then
219 Ibid.
220 Sarkar, R.N., Hindu Law, Calcutta, 1935, pp 5-6.
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prevalent customs in India. 22' These customs were later imported into
Peninsular Malaysia with the immigration of Indian labour in the first
half of the century, and have in turn undergone changes with the
influence of the present environment.
Marriage was considered necessary for the procreation and
perpetuation of the family. According to Hinduism, it was also one of
the fourfold stages in the ideal scheme of the life of an individual-
except for those who renounced worldly life. 222 Many of these values
continue to be stressed by the Malaysian Indians. In Indian society,
marriage is not a matter of the individual but that of the family.
Marriage is seen as a sacrament, a holy union, and is complete only on
the performance of certain rites. In this sense, it is irrevocable. In the
Hindu view of life, marriage is seen as a duty especially for a male.
Hindu religion also demands that a girl should be married off as soon
as she reaches the age of puberty. Although child marriages are
common in India, there is little evidence of this phenomenon among
the Indians in Peninsular Malaysia. 223 This is partly because teenage
girls can seek employment within the estates, and are thus a source of
income to their parents. Nevertheless, marriage is desired before any
possibility of suspicion regarding the virginity of a girl presents
itself. 224
 As a result, there is social pressure 10 marry off girls in
their late teens or early twenties.225
Khetarpal S.P.,, Codification of Hmdu Law in David Buxbaum (ed) Family Law and Customary
Law in Asia, Netherlands, The Hague, 1968, p.2l2.
222 See Kapadia, K.M., Marriage and Family in India, Bombay, Oxford Umversity Press, 3rd edn,
1966, p.167.
Asaratnam, 1970, p.66.
In the Indian society, virginity was and still is a woman's honour. So, she had to guard it and must
not conduct herself in any manner that may lead to suspicion. If she broke this rule, it would not
only endanger her chances of marrying but also bnng disgrace to the family, see Kapadia, 1966,
p.140.
Asaratnam, 1970, p.67.
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Polyandry is not practised among the Indian groups that migrated to
Peninsular Malaysia. The ideal form of marria ge in the Hindu
scriptures is monogamy, and includes the ideal of the wife being
devoted to the husband alone. On the other hand, polygamy is not
uncommon. It appears in certain situations, as when a wife is unable
to bear a son. It may also reflect a desire to get daughters married off
before they are too old.
The aims of Hindu marriage according to the law of Manu are chiefly
three, that is dharma (practice of religion), proja (progeny) and rii
(sexual pleasure). The foremost purpose of a Hindu marriage is to
practice dharma. Although ancient Hindu writers have specified the
duties of husbands and wives very clearly, Pothen commented that in
succeeding times, Hindu society seems to have conveniently forgotten
the importance of the duties of the husbands toward the wife. On the
other hand, the wife's duties toward her husband have been over-
emphasised in each generation to the extent that husbands were lifted
to the exalted position of gods and wives degraded to the status of
mere slaves to their husbands.226
As to the second reason, that is proja, it is considered essential for
continuing the lineage, and for propitiating the souls of ancestors.227
Hence, it is the duty of the responsible parents to see that their
children are married and settled happily when they are of the right
age. As such, marriages are still mainly arranged by parents. Even
when love is involved, marriage must have the approval of the parents
and the ceremony itself must be conducted according to tradition. Only
such marriages are regarded as respectable by the community.
226 Pothen, S., Divorce: Its Causes and Se quences in Hindu Society, New Delhi, Shakti Book, 1986,
pp.32-35.
227 In particular, the son is essential in performing funeral rites for his parents see Kapadia, 1966,
p.167.
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For most Tamils in Peninsular Malaysia, the initiative for marriages
comes from the prospective groom's, although there are a few
communities where the reverse is true. Where marriages are arranged,
many families still resort to the horoscope 228
 to determine the most
auspicious time for marriage.229
The authority and control exercised by the joint family and caste
regulations were so rigid that they hardly allowed any flexibility to suit
individual tastes, interests and expectations. All inter-personal
relationships including those between husband and wife were strictly
regimented to well-established patterns. Moreover, when a woman
joined the traditional family as a newly-wedded wife, she became such
an integral part of the whole that the question of severing herself from
it even in the eventuality of her husband's death became impossible.
Although marriage was equally binding on both husband and wife
theoretically, in practical life, the burden of maintaining the marital
bond fell upon women. An ideal woman was expected to completely
surrender her entire life to the service of her husband alone, while
losing her identity.23°
According to the Law of Manu, marriage is considered indissoluble,
and is regarded as a sacrament. Manu advanced the extreme view that
the wife's marital tie and duty did not come to an end even if the
husband were to sell or abandon her. 23 ' However, some Hindu writers
228 Horoscope matching essentially matches the partners for compatibility on vanous characteristics,
and is usually an important part of the marriage procedure.
Murugesu, R., Some Aspects of Marriage Practices Among Tamil-Speaking People: Case-Study
of Midlands Estates, Klang, Graduation Exercise, Faculty of Economics and Administration,
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1980, p.36.
° Pothen, 1086, pp. 38-9.
Altekar, A.S., The Position of Woman in Hmdu Civilisation: From Prehistoric Times to the
Present Day, Varanasi, Motilal Banarsidas, 1962, 3 rd. ed. p 83.
97
mentioned certain extra ordinary circumstances under which a
separation was made possible:
(a) concealment of the defects of the bride by her father or
kinsmen
(b) concealment of defects in the husband.
The code of Manu gave the husband the exclusive right of repudiation
while the wife had no such right for any reason. However, divorce is
permitted under certain well-defined circumstances, that is impotence,
insanity or affliction with an incurable or contagious disease. 232
 A
wife's resentment of a husband cannot by itself dissolve her marriage
against his will. But for mutual enmity, divorce may be obtained.233
On the other hand, the ideal of a wife devoted entirely to her husband
requires her to accept her husband's failings (such as drinking, cruelty,
adultery) as legitimate. Murugesu's study indicates that the males were
more tolerant of such failings among husbands than among wives.234
The Dharma school and Artha school differ with regard to the
indissolubility of marriage. Whereas the Dharma school considered
marriage as a sacrament, the Artha school regarded is as a contract.
This is pointed out in the Artha laws. 235
 If marriage is viewed as a
contract, it can be terminated, but if it is considered a sacrament, it
becomes indissoluble.236
232 Choudhaiy, J.N., Divorce in Indian Society, Jaipur, Printwell Publishers, 1988, p.2.
Kapadia, 1966, p.184.
Murugesu, 1980.
Pothen, 1986, p.37.
' See Kapadia, 1966, p.168.
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In spite of the possibility of severing the marriage ties, a true Hindu,
according to Pothen, rarely dissolved his marriage. 237
 Marriage
remained an eternal bond. Ordinary Hindus believe that when they get
married, the parties are bound to each other, not only until death, but
even after death, in the other world. 238
 This idea enables the spouse
to overcome incompatibility in spite of differences, difficulties and
problems. Thus, marriage came to be looked upon as the highest ideal
and value of human life, 239
 and Hindu men and particularly women
were taught to make sacrifices in order to sustain the marital
bond.24°
There are divergent views on the question of divorce in ancient Indian
texts. According to Narada,
"There are five grounds on which a woman may take another
husband, if her first husband has perished, or died naturally, or
gone abroad; or if he is impotent, or has lost his estate. "241
The third stage did not begin until the second quarter of the present
century. In this stage, with the theories of individual liberty, sex
equality and women's emancipation holding sway, divorce is considered
as a remedy for inconvenient marriages. Since the 1960s, the Hindu
attribute to divorce has changed considerably, as is substantiated by
available data concerning the large number of such cases.242
Ibid. p. 35.
Such is the effect of the "mantras" recited at the time of mamage; see Venkatacharlu v
Rangacharyule 14 Mad 316.
Decided cases have recognised its sacramental character, see v Nand Ram, 11 All 194 F.B
208 "Hindu marriage is not a civil contract as in other systems, but is sacrament." 12 All 126; see
also Binda v Kaulsalya, 11 Bombay 274.
210 Pothen, 1986, p38.
241 Narada, quoted by Khetarpal, 1968, p.212.
242 Pothen, 1986, p.41.
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Divorce was completely unknown among the high caste Hindus but it
was prevalent among those belonging to the lower sections of
society. 243 The 9th century A.D. was a turning point in Indian history,
and was marked by significant changes in social life. In the medieval
period there was a marked dominance of religious influence, on
marriage and divorce. Divorce was not allowed in the higher castes,
however, women of lower castes were free to divorce and remarry. In
India, divorce was impossible for Brahmans until 1955. On the other
hand, lower castes and the outcaste, as well as tribal groups, have
long permitted divorce.The situation in respect of divorce slightly
changed in the 19th and 20th centuries owing to the pressures of
various movements and organisations. Certain laws were also adopted
during the period of British rule which provided freedom and privileges
to women. Divorce was made possible, although in a limited respect.
Kautilya also stated that divorce may be obtained only in the case of
mutual enmity and hatred between the husband and the wife. Neither
the husband nor the wife could dissolve the marriage against the
wishes of the other. Kautilya permitted the woman to abandon her
husband if he was of bad character, or was abroad, or had become a
traitor to the King or was likely to endanger her life or had fallen
from his caste, or had lost his virility. He also stresses that marriages
performed according to Brahma, Daiva, Arsha and Prajapatya forms
could not be dissolved at all.244
Divorce is almost a new concept among the Hindus, for the
characteristic quality of Hindu marriage was that it was a union for
life. The Hindu woman has been asked to put up with all sorts of
Mukheqee, lila, Social Status of North Indian Woman, Agra, Shiv Lal Agarwala and Co. 1972,
p. 29; see also Jiva Magan v Bai Jetthi (1941) Born. L.R. 538; see also Thangamonal v Gangay
Ammal (1946) 1 M.LJ 279.
Prabhu, P.H, Hindu Social Organization, Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 4th.edn., 1963, pp. 193-5.
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repressions and suppressions in the name of the honour of the family
and for the good of the children. Pothen commented that the ancient
Hindu writers seemed to be biased as they stressed strict fidelity and
devotion by the woman, whereas a man could marry again in the life
time of a wife. Through centuries, Hindu women were suppressed,
fettered, and ill treated and any attempt to change the nature of Hindu
marriage was violently opposed.245
Modern education has inculcated in the Indian woman a sense of her
own identity, which, in turn, has undermined her capacity to perpetuate
her marriage at the cost of her self-respect. The ideals and values
relating to the Hindu marriage are changing rapidly and it is no more
viewed as an eternal bond predestined by the gods.246
In Malaysia, where the local Indian community, far removed from
original Indian traditional society and its forms of social control as
well as experiencing the gradual erosion of certain traditional familial
and moral values as a result of Malaysian conditions of living, is faced
with a serious social problem. Divorce and remarriage in this group
has taken the form of desertion and unapproved unions with other
women and men. Jam believes that this practice might have started
even before the Japanese Occupation period. 247
 This has resulted in
the breaking up of families with the usual undesirable consequences on
the general welfare of the families and the upbringing of the children.
When migration from India to Malaysia occurs, the presumption is that
the family has adopted the law of the people among whom it has
settled. This is generally considered to be the case if it is shown that
2 Pothen, 1986, pp.6-7.
Ibid.
Jam, R.K. South Indians on the Plantation Frontier in Malaya. Kuala Lumpur, University Malaya
Press, 1970, p.275.
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the migrants have definitely cut themselves off from their former
environment. One could say, at least in the matter of the Hindu joint
family, that the development of Hindu law in Malaysia was but a
continuation and adaptation of Hindu law in India. 248
 The Malaysian
Hindus are governed by the two principal schools of laws as stated
above.249
An important problem for Hindus in Malaysia concerns the
determining of the particular school of law to which they belong.250
It is stated in the case of Nagammal v Suppiah 25' that there is no
uniform law applicable to Indian Hindus in Malaysia. Each has to be
decided according to its own merits. This stems from the great
diversity of Indian Hindu customary practices.252
Hindu religious rites and usages represent a diversity which is contrary
to the apparent uniformity of Chinese customs. This is not surprising
as the Indian immigrants who came to Malaya between 1931 and 1940
were from both North and South (75 percent of whom came from the
South India). There were different ethno-linguistic groups among
immigrants from the south who mostly comprised of estate labourers,
likewise among immigrants from the north who comprised mainly the
commercial and professional classes.253
Sarkar, 1935, pp.19-20.
Letchumanan Chettiarv Palamappa Chettiar [1978] M.LJ. 120; see also Arunasalam Chettiar and
Ors v Palaniappa Chettiar [1974] 2 M.L.J 133.
Derrett J.D., "Private International law and Personal Laws", I.C.L.Q. Vol 14. (1965), p.1374.
' (1940) 9 M.LJ. 119.
252 Wu Mm Aun, Malaysian Legal System, Petaling Jaya, Longman Malaysian Bhd, 1990, p.101.
Sandhu, 1969, pp.236-242.
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The caste system, with its various sub-castes, accounted for further
sub-divisions and the bewildering variety of religious opinions, usages
and rites among local Hindus. This hardly favoured judicial notice
being taken of anything except perhaps their diversity. Thus, unlike the
attitude taken by the courts regarding the "common law" characteristic
of Chinese race, no such uniformity was judicially recognised as
applying to Hindus and each case would appear to have been decided
on its own merits. Furthermore, this contributed indirectly to
uncertainty regarding the extent to which the Hindus have carried over
their personal law and customs into Malaysia.
Hindu customary marriages are recognised in Malaysian courts even
though Hindu marriage ceremonies vary according to local, family or
caste usage. However, because the courts do not have judicial
knowledge of what constitutes a valid Hindu marriage according to
these varying religious rites and ceremonies, expert evidence must be
adduced where circumstances require it to show those ceremonies
which will constitute a valid Hindu marriage. In Paramesuari v
Ayadurai 254
 the court accepted the evidence of the priest who
performed the marriage ceremony between the petitioner and the
respondent and also expert evidence on the traditional features of a
marriage between Ceylon Tamil Hindus. The marriage in that case was
solemnised according to the expert witness and the priest who
performed the marriage. As there was proof of the respondent's
subsequent marriage to another woman it was held that the petitioner
was entitled to a decree of dissolution of her marriage.
This initial uncertainty over the requirements of a valid Hindu
customary marriage reflects the situation of Hindu customary divorce.
There are very few decided cases in Malaysia dealing with Hindu
divorce. This mirrors the fact that pristine Hindu law does not allow
[1959] M.LJ. 195.
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divorce under any circumstances. This may be related to the fact that
although it is a popular belief that a Hindu husband can marry any
number of wives even during the lifetime of one or more wives,
monogamy is recommended by the sacred texts.255
The dearth of decided cases which question the validity of Hindu
divorces could bear testimony to this. On the other hand, we cannot
unconditionally accept that Hindu marriage is wholly indissoluble as
local Hindus are beset by numerous varieties of religious opinions and
customs.
With the exception of the case of Harbajan Singh v p• p 256 which
seems to confine the remedy of divorce to Sikhs, and even then only
to Sikhs living in Selangor, the position of divorce under customary law
amongst the Hindus in Peninsular Malaysia is vague. Divorce is
recognised as a variant of Hindu law by usage and custom. A divorce
by mutual consent, if evidenced by writing, sets the woman free to
contract another formal and valid marriage. As Chinese and Hindu
marriages were not normally monogamous, they could not be dissolved
by order of the court as the court had jurisdiction only where the
marriage was monogamous. There were no provisions for registration
of Hindu marriages. Therefore Hindus could dissolve their marriage
without recourse to the court. This applied only where the marriage
had been contracted according to Hindu custom. If the parties chose
voluntarily to contract a marriage under any law which provided that
their marriage was a monogamous one, its solemnisation created a
status which carried with it the obligations which the law imposed on
parties having such status. If they entered into a marriage under the
See Raghavachaviar, N.R, Hindu Law: Principles and Precedents, Vol.! 7th. edn., Madras, Madras
Law Journal Office, 1980, p33.
[1952] M.LJ. 83.
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Civil Marriage Ordinance, such a marriage could only be dissolved
under and in accordance with the Divorce Ordinance.257
For Indians, monogamy was accepted as the customary rule for some
sub-groups while others were allowed polygamous unions. As a result,
Hindu marriages cannot be dissolved by order of court as the court has
jurisdiction only where the marriage is monogamous. Hindus can thus
resort to their particular customs if they desire a dissolution of their
marriage. However, in the case of Ceylonese Tamil Hindus married
under the religious traditions of their caste, the parties are parties to
a binding marriage contract which is monogamous in its nature. This
was so held in Parameswari v Ayadurai 258 where the petitioner was
therefore entitled to a decree of dissolution of her marriage by the
High Court.
There are no specific rules governing the grounds and form of Hindu
customary divorce in Malaysia. This situation came about largely from
various religious usages and rites among the local Hindus. Divorce
consequently among the different ethno-linguistic groups will also be
variations of Hindu law by usage or custom. The small number of cases
decided on the point and the difficulty in locating Hindu custom
experts from the various castes and sects has to some extent hindered
the attempt to study the possible various modes of Hindu divorce.
Notwithstanding this, it is interesting to note that the enforcement of
the LRA has abolished polygamy among those Hindus who practise it
since Hindus in India are no longer polygamous by virtue of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955. The compulsory registration of marriage and
divorce have brought about a more efficient and proper administration
of these two areas of matrimonial extremities.
Soo Hai San v Wong Sue Fong [1961] MU 195.
258 [1959] M.LJ 195.
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It is interesting to note that Hindu law presents a marked contrast to
Chinese law as it developed in Malaysia. This might seem rather
strange because from the point of view of the dominant English law
both Chinese and Hindu laws were "customary" and so prima facie
susceptible to similar treatment by the courts. There are at least two
reasons why this did not occur. First, and probably most important,
Hindu law, unlike Chinese law in Malaysia, has been formulated by the
courts upon the basis of authoritative texts. The courts had access to
the great Indian treatises of the 19th century and referred to them
constantly. Therefore, the development of Hindu law in Malaysia was
simply a continuation and adaptation of Hindu law in India. The case
with Chinese law was completely different. There were no texts to fall
back on because it was realised that the laws of Imperial China were
inappropriate for regulating the affairs of the Chinese immigrant in
Malaysia. In the event, therefore, Chinese law is a much more original
creation in Malaysia than Hindu law although this is not to deny the
existence of some local characteristics in the development of Hindu
law.
Secondly the activities of the Indian and Chinese immigrant
communities differed. A significant proportion of the Indian
Community was involved in business, particularly money-lending, which
was regulated in accordance with their own laws rather than by English
commercial law. Furthermore, these regulations were tied firmly to
major institutions of Hindu law, most notably the joint family.259
On the other hand, we cannot say as yet why one society develops the
pattern of divorce rather than separation or taking on a additional wife
or concubine. Its primary difference is that it permits both partners to
remarry. In societies without divorce, it is ordinarily only the man who
is permitted to enter a new union. Thus in western nations such as
Hooker, 1976, pp. 147-8.
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Brazil, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, the public attitudes opposing a wife's
entering an unsanctioned public union are very strong while the
husband is usually permitted to have a mistress outside the household.
Viewing these alternatives, it seems false to speak of divorce as a
"more extreme" solution than other patterns. We do not at present
know whether the introduction of a concubine into a Chinese
household creates more unhappiness than a divorce might have done.
And whatever the answer might be, the judgement as to its desirability
would still remain a matter of personal or social evaluation.
1.7 CONCLUSION
Since all three of the communal groups in Malaysia examined in this
chapter have evolved from cultures predominantly of the rural peasant
type, the traditional values to be found among Malaysians relating to
the formation, building and functioning of families have important
similarities. All three, until quite recently, were based on the extended
family, working as a corporate group within a wider kinship system,
marshalling strong family ties and sentiment and providing a high
degree of social and economic security, solidarity and mutual
assistance.
However, there are considerable variations among the three major
ethnic groups in Peninsular Malaysia. The Malays married earliest both
in 1947 and 1974, but their median age at marriage increased more
than any other group, nearly five years for Malay females. At the other
extreme, Chinese males had a median age at marriage of 27 years, a
level which has increased by only two years since 1947. Indian females,
with a long cultural tradition of very early marriages, have all but
forsaken this custom in Malaysia, marrying at age 22 on the average,
a postponement of nearly 5 years since 1947. This mean age (17.1
years), represents a departure from even earlier marriage
characteristics of the first decade of Indian presence in Malaysia. By
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contrast Indian males' age at first marriage has declined slightly. In
this case, the trend is in response to a marked drop between 1957-
1970, in the stock of potential bridegrooms relative to the number of
eligible young women. This "marriage squeeze" also affected Malays in
a similar but less extreme way. 26° In this community, the increasing
shortage of potential bridegrooms implied that the Malay traditions of
a wide age difference between husbands and wives and virtually
universal female marriage should have been maintained by the
intensification of two other Malay traditions, relatively wide-spread
polygamy and easy divorce. In fact, neither of these "escape valves"
were increased but instead, declined dramatically, the necesary
adjustment occuring in a narrowing of the distance in age between
spouses and a marked rise in female age at marriage. The median age
at marriage not only did not decline, as it did among males with the
same problem, but actually increased by about two years over the
period. This is evidence not merely of an adjustment to demographic
realities but, particularly the parallel increase in the median age for
male marriage, to fundamental changes in norms. Although the ethnic
differences in median age at marriage persist, the changes have
contributed toward a convergence over the last thirty years and a
Malaysian perception of suitable conditions for marriage seem to be
emerging.
The mechanisms and motivations behind these changes in the marrying
behaviour of Peninsular Malaysia have been very thoroughly analysed
and studies by Palmore and Ariffin26 ' and Jones262
 point in similar
directions. Changes in the availability of education to young Malaysians
has been related to the changing attitudes. This has resulted in a
° Jones, 1980, p.7.
' Palmore, 1970, p.32.
262 Jones, 1980.
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dramatic improvement opport1nities for those Malays who had
previously suffered considerable educational deprivation.263
The rapidly growing industrial base in Malaysia has created thousands
of jobs; in some notable instances, as in the electronic component and
textile industries, more for females than for males. 264 But increases
in most employment sectors have occurred, for both sexes, and more
particularly for Malays due to vigorous implementation of the New
Economic Policy since the early 1970's.
While many of these jobs provide only minimum incomes, they are
frequently the cause of internal migration, living away from home and
parents, and the adaptation to new, frequently urban environments.
The social and economic changes involved are usually jolting,
particularly to those brought up in rural, traditional systems. But they
certainly provide an alternative to the previous patterns of teenage,
arranged marriage and the raising of a large family.
Although these changes are essentially part of a wider process of
modernisation associated with a development transition, from which all
Malaysians are benefiting, Malays are particularly involved in the
emergence of a "middle class" of salary and wage-earners working in
government and in commerce. Since "middle-class" lifestyles discourage
early marriage, a significant proportion of the decline in divorce among
Malays will be related to this development trend.
Ibid., p.11.
Hing Al Yun, and Talib, Rokiah bi., (eds) Women and Employment in Mala ysia, Department of
Anthropology and Sociology, University of Malaya, 1986, pp.7-16.
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CHAPTER 2
STATUTORY DIVORCE AMONG NON-MUSLIMS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, 19761, which came into
force on March 1, 1982 has introduced a quiet social revolution for the
non-Muslims. It ushered in a new era of non-Muslim matrimonial
relationships by replacing many outmoded concepts with new ones and
extended existing provisions. In the words of Datuk Athi Nahappan, it
is an Act that,
"...virtually affects matrimonial relationships of most non-
Muslim marriages, who constitute about one half of the total
population of the country. "2
This Act provides for monogamous marriage 3
 and consolidates the law
relating to divorce. It is the first single Act of Parliament that
embraces marriage, divorce and related matters. Its provisions are
applicable generally to all non-Muslim persons domiciled in Malaysia
with the exception of any native of the States of East Malaysia, and to
any aborigine of West Malaysia whose marriage and divorce is
governed by native customary law or aboriginal custom. As stated in
the explanatory note to the Bill, the LRA has:
Hereafter abbreviated as LRA.
2 Parliamentary Debate (Dewan Negara) 6thJanuary 1976, p.2298.
The law relating to divorce and matnmonial causes in relation to monogamous marriage before
LRA is the Divorce Ordinance, 1952, No.74 of 1952.
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"Replaced the hitherto heterogeneous personal laws applicable
heretofore to persons of different ethnic origins comprising the
majority of the non-Muslim population of Malaysia with a
diversity of customs and usages observed by them.
In matters of divorce, the LRA has brought Malaysia in line with the
law in England and most European countries that recognises
irretrievable breakdown of marriage as the sole ground for dissolution
of marriage. 5
 It goes on to provide that in its inquiry into whether
there has been an irretrievable breakdown the court shall have regard
to one or more specified factual situations (formerly known as grounds
for divorce).6
At present, the LRA has been in operation for about ten years and it
is timely to investigate the implications of its divorce provisions. In
discussing the LRA, this chapter is divided into four sections. It begins
with a historical review of how the LRA was mooted and continues
with the second section that compares and contrasts the differences
between the former statutory laws and the present law relating to
divorce in Malaysia. A general study of the more controversial and
main provisions incidental to divorce under the LRA will accordingly
be made in the third section. The criticisms and the shortcomings of
the LRA will be dealt with in the fourth section of this chapter.
2.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE LAW REFORM
(MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE) ACT 1976.
"... marriage and divorce first in Malaya and now in Malaysia
have been dominated by male chauvinistic thinking and all the
odds have been stacked against the women and the wives in
this country. The present laws on marriage and divorce are so
Ibrahim, Ahmad bm Mohamed, Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Bill, [1975] J.M.C.L. 354.
See LRA, section 53.
6 See LRA, section 54(1).
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blatantly unfair to the women that our judges have torn thei,
hair with rage but they are unable to put right the injustice
against women of this country in matters of marriage and
divorce. "
The above quotation reflects the inadequacies of the previous law in
dealing with divorce. To understand the compelling reasons behind the
need to reform the laws of marriage and divorce, one will need to look
back at the conditions prevalent in Malaysian society before the LRA
was first mooted.
As discussed in the previous chapter, Malaysia had a very complex
legal framework as far as the laws of marriage and divorce were
concerned. As Malaysian society consists of different ethnic groups,
marriage and divorce were governed by a mixture of personal or
customary and statutory laws. Non-Muslims customary marriages among
the different ethnic and the religious groups differed sharply, with each
couple marrying according to their religious or customary rites. More
importantly, registration of the marriage was not compulsory, and it
was up to the couple to register their marriage. Before 1982, there
were three statutes which provided for the registration of marriages.
They were:
(a) The Civil Marriage Ordinance, 1952.
(b) The Christian Marriage Ordinance,1956 and
(c) The Registration of Marriage Ordinance, 1952.
There was also no uniformity with regard to registration under the
above Ordinances although the legal implications of doing so under
each Ordinance differ. It was not uncommon for a couple to register
their marriage under the Civil Marriage Ordinance, 1952 and then
undergo a religious marriage later on, thus having both a legalised
registered marriage and a customary and religious marriage.
Dr.Tan Chee Koon, Parliamentary Debate (Dewan Rakyat) 5th.November, 1975.
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Customary or religious marriage was generally recognised by the courts
except when one or both parties wished to have a divorce. This was
because customary or religious marriages, being potentially polygamous,
were not recognised for the purposes of matrimonial relief by virtue
of the provisions of the Divorce Ordinance, 1952. To authorise the
court to make any decree of dissolution of marriage, the marriage
between the parties had to be contracted under a law providing for or
in contemplation of which the marriage is monogamous.8
Therefore, couples who had entered into potentially polygamous
customary or religious marriages could not resort to the courts to
dissolve their marriage unless they had registered their marriages
under the Civil Marriage Ordinance, 1952, or the Christian Marriage
Ordinance, 1956. It did not help if they had registered their marriage
under the Registration of Marriages Ordinance, 1952 which only
provided for proof of such a marriage. A couple who had entered into
a customary or religious marriage which was potentially polygamous
might dissolve their marriage by way of customary divorce. This type
of divorce, with the legal sanctions provided by the courts was
however, difficult to enforce. The dilemma these couples faced is
perhaps best summed up by Datuk Athi Nahappan, the then Deputy
Minister of Law in his opening speech in the Dewan Negara (Upper
House) on Law Reform ( Marriage and Divorce) Bill;
8 Section 4(i)(a), Divorce Ordinance, 1952. Mehrun Siraj believes that the introduction of monogamy
under LRA had brought with it certain disadvantages. One setback was the case of a wife who was
ill, insane or unable to have children. Previously, her husband could take another wife without
having to divorce her. Today, he may be forced to divorce her should he wish to have children
Siraj, Mehrun, Women and Family Law, Seminar on Women and Girls, Penang, September, 1988.
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"The Buddhists, Hindus and Sikhs have long been living under
a legal vacuum without proper and adequate matrimonial
reliefs. Once married, they are not able to have their marriage
dissolved by the court, even if it has hopelessly broken down.
They ore not able to have a decree of nullity or judicial
separation when they are justifiable grounds for such relief."9
Apart from the uncertainty and unsatisfactory condition of the law
concerning customary or religious marriages and divorces, most
Malaysians, especially non-Muslim women, were also unhappy that
polygamy was still recognised although it had long been abolished in
the countries where it originated.'0
 All marriages were potentially
polygamous unless they were registered under the Civil Marriage
Ordinance, 1952, where it is expressly provided that a person who has
married according to the said Ordinance was rendered incapable of
contracting another marriage in the lifetime of his spouse without first
dissolving the first marriage." Even registering a marriage under the
Christian Ordinance, 1956 did not prevent a Christian Chinese man
from contracting a subsequent customary marriage. This is illustrated
by the case of Re Ding Do Ca, deceased.'2 In this case, the deceased,
a Chinese man had in 1923 married a woman under the Christian
Marriage Enactment (which was then replaced by the Christian
Marriage Ordinance, 1956). Subsequently, in 1937, he went through a
Chinese customary marriage with another woman. The issue in this
case was whether the deceased, a Chinese Christian, who had married
under the Christian Marriage Enactment, could contract a polygamous
marriage according to Chinese customs. The Federal Court held that
he could do so. Thompson, L.P observed that there is nothing in the
Christian Marriage Enactment (or the Christian Marriage Ordinance,
Parliamentaxy Debate, 1976, p.2301.
10 In both China and India, polygamous marriages were abohshed for many years but they coutmued
in Malaysia until the LRA came into force, Wu Mm Aun, 1990, p.101.
' Section 4(1) and 4(2) of Civil Marriage Ordinance, 1952.
12 [1966] 2 M.LJ 220.
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1956) that renders a party who has married under it, incapable during
its continuance of contracting a polygamous marriage. Therefore, mere
registration of a marriage did not protect women with husbands of
polygamous tendencies. Only registration under the Civil Marriage
Ordinance 1952 did.
However, it had been held earlier by the then Court of Appeal in the
case of Re Loh Toh Met' 3 that a Chinese Christian could elect as a
Christian whether to contract a monogamous marriage or to form a
valid polygamous marriage union or unions in accordance with his
personal law.
Due to this unsatisfactory state of affairs and the need to review the
laws of marriage and divorce, His Majesty The Yang DiPertuan Agong,
in 1970, appointed a five member Royal Commission under the
Chairmanship of Tan Sri H.T Ong, the then Chief Justice of Malaya on
the non-Muslim marriages and divorce laws, with the following terms
of reference:-
a. To study and examine existing laws relating to marriage and
divorce (other than Muslim marriages) and to determine the
feasibility of a reform, if any is considered necessary, in
particular, in the light of the resolution of the United Nations
Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage
and registration of marriages.
b. To receive and consider representations that might be submitted
from any racial or religious group affected or likely to be
affected by the changes or reform of the existing marriage and
divorce laws, and to prepare and submit a report to the
13 Re Loh Toh Met, decd [1961] M.LJ 234.
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government and recommend changes or reform if any to be made
to such laws.14
First, the Royal Commission sought to consolidate the laws relating to
marriage and divorce and placed all matters pertaining to marriage,
divorce and matters incidental thereto under one single Act of
Parliament. The Commission also felt that the public was in favour of
the abolition of polygamy. Therefore, it recommended that all
marriages should be monogamous and proper provisions be made for
the compulsory registration of marriages. Secondly, the Commission
recommended that the minimum age for marriage should be eighteen
years, except where a female was under the minimum but above the
age of sixteen, special dispensation may be obtained from the proper
authority.15
The Commission further incorporated new developments in English
divorce law'6
 into the draft bill. It encouraged the introduction of
divorce provisions existing in England then, which were based on the
"no-fault" principle or irretrievable breakdown of a marriage as the
sole ground for divorce. Certain innovations, like divorce by mutual
consent among non-Christians were also introduced in the draft bill.'7
The report of the Royal Commission and the draft bill underwent
further transformation in 1973 when both the Dewan Negara (Upper
House) and Dewan Rakyat (Lower House) appointed a Joint Select
Committee to study the report of the Royal Commission and make
recommendations thereto. The Committee invited members of the
14 See report of the Malaysian Royal Commission on Non-Muslim Marriage and Divorce Laws, Kuala
Lumpur, Government Printer, 1971, p.1.
' Ibid. pp.12-15.
16 Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1970, The Divorce Reform Act of 1969 and the
recommendation of the English Law's Comnussion Report on Nullity of Marriage; Hooker, 1976,
p.15.
17 A detailed discussion on this matter is made in pp.136-112.
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public to send in their representations on the Bill in view of the major
social and religious implications involved. The original draft Bill was
then redrafted to contain the recommendations of the Committee.
Among other things, the Committee introduced another ground for
divorce, namely the case of conversion to Islam. It also recommended
that divorce by mutual consent be extended to Christians.'8
The Royal Commission completed its report in 1971 to which a Bill
known as the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Bill 1972 was
annexed. The Bill was introduced to the Dewan Rakyat (Lower House)
on 4th. December 1972. In May 1973 both the Dewan Negara (Upper
House) and the Dewan Rakyat, Parliament was dissolved and the Bill
lapsed. The original Bill was then re-drafted to contain the
recommendations of the Joint Select Committee and was reintroduced
in the Dewan Rakyat on 8th July 1975. It became law with the Royal
Assent on the 6th December 1976 and was published in the Gazette on
the 11th December 1976. It was not however brought into force until
the 1st March 1982.19 Before that it had been amended by the Law
Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, 1982.20 A gestation period of
twelve years had taken place from the date of the appointment of the
Royal Commission in 1970 to the enforcement of the Act in 1982.
When the LRA was first drafted in 1971 it incorporated the latest
amendments in the family law in England. It was at that stage a very
progressive Act.
18 Sim Ewe Eong, Granting of Decrees under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, 1976,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Law Publisher, 1983, p.50.
19 P.U.(B) 73/82.
Act A498/80.
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2.3 THE FORMER AND THE PRESENT LAW RELATING TO
DIVORCE AND CHANGES IN THE LAW.
Since the coming into force of the LRA, a marriage in Malaysia may
only be dissolved by a court. Section 4(1) of the Act preserves the
validity of any marriage solemnised under any law, religion, custom or
usage prior to 1st March 1982. Section 4(2) deems such a marriage as
registered under the Act. This in actual fact, opens the door of the
courts to persons who have undergone customary or religious marriage
and could not dissolve their marriages under the provisions of the now
repealed Divorce Ordinance, 1952.
The Commission in enacting this provision realised that if parties to
customary marriages had been entitled to resort to the courts for
matrimonial relief, the number of divorce cases applied for would have
been considerably higher. However, divorce carries a degree of social
stigma in Asian society and the prevalent economic inequality between
the sexes may be another factor to be taken into account in
considering the relatively small percentage of divorce actions.
Section 4(3) of the Act provides that every marriage unless void under
the law, religion, custom or usage under which it was solemnised, shall
continue until it is dissolved by:-
(a) by the death of one of the parties or
(b) by the order of a court of competent jurisdiction or
(c) by a decree of nullity made by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Therefore, by virtue of section 4(3) of the Act, a decree of divorce can
only be granted by a court of competent jurisdiction. The same section
also implies that customary divorces are no longer recognised.
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Before the enforcement of the LRA, the law regarding livorce and
matrimonial causes in relation to monogamous marriage in Peninsular
Malaysia was contained in the Divorce Ordinance, 1952,21 which dealt
with nullity of marriage, dissolution of marriage, judicial separation
and restitution of conjugal rights. Section 109 of the LRA has repealed
the Divorce Ordinance, 1952. Besides that, it also repealed a number
of written laws which were previously in force in Malaysia, including
the Civil Marriage Ordinance, 1952, and the Christian Marriage
Ordinance, 1956.22
2.3.1 Jurisdiction of the Court
When a petition for divorce is made, the first question that needs to
be dealt with is whether the court23
 has the jurisdiction ao hear the
petition. The Divorce Ordinance, 1952 confined the provision of relief
only to monogamous marriages and to cases where the parties to the
marriage at the time when the petition is presented are domiciled in
the Federation. The provisions as to domicile in the original ordinance
were found to create hardship, 24
 and were removed by the Divorce
(Amendment) Act 1959 enabling the courts to giant relief
notwithstanding that the husband was not domiciled in the Federation,
provided the wife had been resident for three years immediately
preceding the commencement of proceedings.
The most noteworthy feature in the Divorce Ordinance is that it is
confined to monogamous marriages only. As a result, parties who had
contracted polygamous marriages cannot petition the courts for divorce
21 No. 74 of 1952 (Reprinted 1973).
See section 109, LRA.
By virtue of section 2(1) "court" means the High Court or a Judge thereof, or the Sessions Court
or a President thereof, as the case may be.
24 See Kanmam v Sundarampillai [1957] M.LJ 172; see also Charule y
 v çjy [1960] M.LJ 29.
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and they are left to such remedies as they can obtain under their
personal law or custom and without any means of enforcement.
In the case of Dorothy Yee Yeng Nam v Lee Fah Kooi, 25 it was held that
a Chinese domiciled in Perak could validly enter into a monogamous
form of marriage. Although the Christian Marriage Ordinance, 1940,
of Penang, did not expressly provide that a marriage under it was
monogamous it was a law enabling the parties to enter into a marriage
that they contemplated or intended should be monogamous. Therefore,
a Chinese married under the Ordinance could apply for dissolution of
the marriage under the Divorce Ordinance, 1952.
Section 47 of the LRA provides that the court in all suits and
proceedings in Malaysia should act and give relief on principles which
in the opinion of the court are, as nearly as may be, conformable to
the principles on which the High Court of Justice in England acts and
gives relief in matrimonial proceedings.
An equivalent effect to section 3 of the Divorce Ordinance is given by
Section 47 of the LRA. This is illustrated in the case of Martin v Umi
Kalthom 26 where it was held that where a question of conflict of laws
arose in relation to a matter regarding which the courts' jurisdiction
came from the Divorce Ordinance, such question should be determined
on the same principles as those on which such a question would be
determined by the English courts. In its actual decision in the case
however the court would appear to have gone further and to have
decided the issue in the case as an English court would decide that
particular issue. Thomson C.J said;
[1956] M.LJ. 257.
[1963] M.LJ. 1; see also Ng Kah Ting v Ching Peng Tow [1977] 2 M.LJ 30.
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"In my opinion if this marriage had been solemnised in a
Registry office in London and not in Kuala Lumpur, the
English Divorce Court would hold it to be valid."
The decision in this case was heavily criticised, 27
 and it is doubtful
whether this decision would be followed today.
Section 48(1) of the LRA provides that the court had jurisdiction to
make a decree of dissolution of marriage where:
(a) the marriage between the parties was contracted under a law
providing that or in contemplation of which the marriage was
monogamous and;
(b) the parties to the marriage at the time when the petition was
presented were domiciled in the Federation.28
In general, both these conditions must be satisfied before the court
may proceed to hear the case. The difficulty that may arise from
section 48(1) is that when the petition is presented in court the
husband may not be present in the country, resulting in a failure to
meet the second condition. This means that the court will then have
no jurisdiction to grant a decree of divorce, a situation that is unfair
and harsh to the wife. Solution to this difficulty is found in section 49
which stipulated that the court had jurisdiction where the wife had
been deserted by the husband or the husband had been banished or
excluded from the Federation under any written law relating to
banishment or exclusion and the husband was immediately before the
desertion, banishment or exclusion domiciled in the Federation or if
the wife were resident in the Federation and had been ordinarily
27 See Ibrahim, 1984, see also judgement of Shankar J. in Re Divorce Petition No 18, 20 and 24,
[1984] 2 M.LJ 158.
Divorce Ordinance, 1952, section 4 (1).
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resident for a period of three years immediately preceding the
commencement of the proceedings.29
Accordingly, the wife has only to satisfy either one of the two
conditions stated above. Thus, section 49 enabled the wife to petition
the court for divorce even though the husband was not domiciled or
resident in Malaysia at the time of the petition. In the case of Levene
v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 30 quoted with approval by Ong C.J.
in Mahon v Mahon 31 where Viscount Cave L.C. defined the word
"reside" as:
"To dwell permanently or for a considerable time, to have one's
settled or usual abode, to live in or at a particular place."
This definition would then prevent those who only make brief and
transient visits to Malaysia for the primary purpose of obtaining
divorces.
The most important change made in England has been the abolition of
the Common law rule that a woman acquires the domicile of her
husband on marriage. The Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act,
1973, section 1 abolished the wife's dependent domicile and provides
for a married woman's domicile to be ascertained independently.
However, the situation in Malaysia is different. One of the most
glaring flaws in the LRA flowed from the wife's inability to acquire a
separate domicile, and was that, even though she had always been
resident in Malaysia, she could not obtain relief in Malaysia if her
husband was domiciled abroad. However, two statutory basis of
Ibid., section 49.
3° [1928] All E.R.Rep. 746.
31 [1971] 2 M.LJ 266.
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jurisdiction were introduced to meet these kinds of cases, and a wife
was able to petition32:
(a) if her husband had deserted her and had been deported and
before the desertion or deportation he had been domiciled in
Malaysia, or
(b) if she had been ordinarily resident in Malaysia for two years
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition.
Under the section 49 of the LRA, a foreign wife of a man who has
ceased to be of Malaysian domicile for reasons other than those set
out in Section 49(1) (a) of the Act, cannot file for divorce. The court
can pronounce a decree of divorce only if the husband was domiciled
in Malaysia when the petition was presented.33
Had domicile retained its original meaning of a person's home, this
might have been a satisfactory principle, but a technical meaning that
it acquired produced many anomalies.
In the recent case of Melvin Lee Campbell v Amy Anak Edward
Sumek, 34 a joint petition for divorce was made. According to Section
48(1) of the LRA, a court could grant a decree of divorce only if both
parties were domiciled in Malaysia. The issue before the court was
whether the petitioner was domiciled in Malaysia at the time of
presentation of the petition. It was held in this case that there were
two elements involved in determining the domicile of choice and these
are the factors of residence and the requisite intention to reside
permanently for an indeterminate period in the country where it was
alleged that the petitioner has adopted the domicile of choice. It was
also held that the provision of Section 48(1)(c) required that the court
32 LRA, Section 49(a) and (b).
LRA, Section 48(c).
[1988] 2 M.L.J 338.
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must be satisfied that at the time when the petition was presented the
domicile of both the petitioner and the respondent was Malaysia. The
burden of proving the abandonment of his domicile of origin and the
acquisition of a domicile of choice in Malaysia fell squarely on the
petitioner. It was held that the petitioner had not succeeded in showing
that at the time of the presentation of the joint petition, his domicile
was in Malaysia. Therefore the court had no jurisdiction to entertain
the joint petition.
A man habitually resident in Malaysia but domiciled abroad could not
obtain a divorce in Malaysia unless he decided to change his domicile
and therefore qualified himself to be considered under Section 48(c).
A woman in this position could do so if she could bring herself to
within one of the statutory exceptions. 35
 It is recommended that
jurisdiction should be extended to enable either spouse (not only the
wife) to petition if he or she has been habitually resident in Malaysia
for two years.36
In Malaysia, the courts are still adopting the old concept of domicile,
that is before the passing of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings
Act, 1973 as it was stated in the Civil Law Act 1956, that the court in
Malaysia has to apply the common law of England on the 7th day of
April, 1956. As the amendment in England took place after 1956,
the Malaysian law relating to domicile is therefore out of date. It is
submitted that the present application of section 48 and Section 49 of
the LRA is unfair to both parties of the marriage. Accordingly, section
49 should be amended by extending sub-paragraph (a) to cover a
greater number of situations than just desertion and deportation and
LRA, Section 49 (a) or (b).
Kamarudin, Zaleha bt., The Concept of Domicile and Its Implications on the Court's Junsdiction
Relating to Matrimonial Matters in England and Malaysia, International Islamic University Law
Journal, Vol.1, No.2, 1989, p.109.
' Civil Law Act 1956, Section 3 and Section 5.
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the requirement of a residential qualification to be abolished.38
Another alternative is to leave section 49 in its present form but
introduce a new section in the act to enable wives to have a domicile
of their own. A recommendation to this effect was also made by
Ahmad Ibrahim. 39 This amendment is, in fact, long overdue since it
has been introduced both in the United Kingdom and Singapore.
2.3.2 Time Restriction of Petition
The LRA has been seen by many as a law that readily paves the way
for those who seek to divorce at the slightest excuse possible. The first
indication that this view is a misconception is found in Section 50
which provides that as a general rule, no petition for divorce can be
made to the court unless at least two years have elapsed from the date
of the marriage. 40
 The purpose of this general rule is to curb
impetuous and hasty resort by spouses to divorce.4'
The exceptions to this general rule are cases of exceptional
circumstances or hardship suffered by the petitioner. It is important to
note that even if the circumstances arise, the judge has the discretion
to disallow the petition. In doing so, the judge must consider two
things yj the interest of any child of the marriage, and whether there
is a reasonable probability of a reconciliation between the parties
during the specified period.
Section 6 of the Divorce Ordinance 1952, has a counterpart in the
LRA in Section 50. However, there are two differences. First, the
former provision stipulates that no petition for divorce could be
38 Anantham, K., Reforms of the Law Reform (Mamage and Divorce) Act, 1976, Seminar on Fanuly
Rotazy Club of Subang and Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, 1990.
See Ibrahin Ahmad bm Mohamed, Reform of the Law Reform (Marnage and Divorce) Act, 1976,
7th Malaysian Law Conference, Kuala Lumpur, October, 1983.
Referred to as the "specified period" in LRA, section 50.
4i Report of the Malaysian Royal Commission, 1972, p.14.
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presented in court unless at least three years had elapsed from the
date of the marriage except by leave of the court upon application on
the grounds that the case was one of exceptional hardship suffered by
the petitioner. The court in granting leave was required to have regard
to the interests of the children of the marriage and to the question
whether there was a reasonable probability of a reconciliation between
the parties before the expiration of the said three years. 42 The waiting
period has thus been reduced by a year from three years under Section
6(1) of the Divorce Ordinance, 1952 to only two years under the LRA.
The implication of this is that a petitioner would be able to seek a
divorce without a long delay. Indirectly, this may mean that more
divorces may take place. It is undeniable that divorce is much easier
to obtain than before.
Secondly, the exceptions to this general rule are cases where the
petitioner has suffered exceptional depravity at the hands of the
respondent. Whilst the first difference refers to the duration of the
marriage, the second difference relates to the drafting of the provision.
It is the latter difference that is of particular interest and which has
raised two questions. First, must the hardship suffered by the
petitioner be exceptional under section 50 of the LRA for it to qualify
as an exception? Secondly, must the exceptional circumstances be
suffered by the petitioner, or is the fact that the case is one of
exceptional circumstances sufficient to qualify it as an exception to the
general rule in section 50? These two questions have arisen because
under the Divorce Ordinance 1952, it was clear that the hardship
suffered by the petitioner must be an exceptional one. While the
exceptional hardship must be suffered by the petitioner, the exceptional
depravity, on the other hand, must be on the part of the respondent.43
42 LRA, section 6.
Divorce Ordinance, 1952, section 6.
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Ronald Khoo and Ahmad Ibrahim believe that a better alternative to
section 50 would be an absolute one year bar that would remove the
ambiguity in the present law and at the same time still provide a one
year cooling off period to discourage parties from rushing into a
divorce in the early stages of their married lives.44
2.3.3 Grounds of Divorce
Under the Divorce Ordinance, 1952, the grounds for dissolution of
marriage which applied equally to men and women were adultery,
desertion for a period of at least three years, cruelty and unsoundness
of mind. 45 Generally, these have continued under the LRA with the
same provisions as the Divorce Ordinance 1952. The LRA differs from
the previous Ordinance in that it extends existing provisions and adds
new clauses to the inquiry of the facts leading to the breakdown of the
marriage. The LRA provides for three grounds of divorce, namely:
(a) one party converts to Islam.46
(b) mutual consent.47
(c) irretrievable breakdown of marriage.48
Grounds (a) and (b) are innovations under statutory divorce.
,	 Divorce on the grounds of spouse's conversion to Islam.
Section 51 of the LRA provides that where one party to a marriage has
converted to Islam, the other party who has not converted may petition
for divorce. However, such petition may only be made after three
months have expired from the date of conversion. In such a case, the
court has the power to not oniy grant a decree of divorce but to make
See Khoo, Ronald, and Foo Nyet Ngo, Divorce, Conference on the Reform of Law Reform
(Marnae and Divorce) Act, 197, Kulliyyah of Laws, International Islamic University, Petaling
Jaya, December, 1992, see also Ibrahim, 1983.
Divorce Ordinance, 1952, ss 7,12,13.
LRA, section 51.
LRA. section 52.
LRA, section 53.
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provision for the wife or husband as well as for the support, care and
custody of the children, if any. The court is further vested with the
power to attach any conditions to the decree of divorce as it thinks
fit.49
It is to be noted that section 50, which generally disallows a petition
for divorce to be presented to the court within two years of the
marriage, does not apply to any petition under section 51. Section 51
must be read together with section 3(3). Section 3(3) of the LRA
provides that it shall not apply to Muslims or to any person who is
married under Muslim law. This provision clearly stipulates that
although the LRA does not apply to Muslims, the court has the power
to grant a decree of divorce under section 51, and such decree shall,
notwithstanding any other written law to the contrary, be valid against
the spouse who has so converted to Islam. Difficulties will however
arise from section 51 which gives the non-converting party to a
marriage the right to petition for divorce on the grounds of the other
party's conversion to Islam. If the Act does not apply to Muslims, it
is difficult to see how the court can make a decree of divorce against
a party to whom the Act does not apply or make any other order
against such party.
The cases of Eeswari Visuvalingam v Government of Malaysia 5° and
Pedley v Maflis Ugama Islam Pulau Pinang & Anor5' show how unfairly
the law can operate. It was observed that in the former case, although
the appellant could have petitioned for divorce, she did not do so. This
left the husband, who converted to Islam, without any remedies under
the civil law. He had no right to do so under section 5 1(1) of the LRA
as he was regarded as the party at fault, and he could not do so under
LRA. section 50.
° [1990] 1 M.LJ. 86.
51 Penang Originating Summons No. 31-717-87.
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section 54 of the Act, as, being a Muslim, the Act did not otherwise
apply to him. He could have gone to the Shariah Court, but the
Shariah Court had no jurisdiction as one of the parties was not a
Muslim.
Wan Adnan J. in the case of Pedley v Maflis Ugama Islam Pu/au Pinang
stated that under the law, a non-Muslim marriage is not dissolved upon
one of the parties converting to Islam. It only provides a ground for
the other party who has not converted to petition for divorce.
According to Reddy, the ambiguity surrounding section 51 of the LRA
has made it easier for people to convert to Islam to spite their
partners in order to get out of the marriage and its attendant
responsibilities. It has also made it easier for parties to abrogate their
obligations under civil marriage and marry Muslims. More recently it
appears some parties convert to Islam solely for the purpose of
securing custody of young children, in the mistaken belief that
conversion to Islam renders all the children of the marriage subject to
Islamic law under which the custody of the children is granted to the
Muslim spouse. Reddy suggested that such abuses of religion seem to
be encouraged by the present legal provisions.52
However, a man's debts or other civil liabilities towards others are not
extinguished by his conversion into Islam or any other religion. By
marriage, he incurs obligations, both legal and moral, towards his wife
and children, whose fundamental rights are recognised in clauses (1)
and (2) of Article 8 of the Constitution
No doubt there may be some cases where persons will abuse the law
and perhaps in every case it is necessary to ensure that the conversion
52 Reddy, Rita, Reconciliation and Family Court, Conference on the Reform of Law Reform
(Marriage and Divorce) Act, 1976, Kulliyyah of Laws, International Islamic Umversity, Petaling
Jaya, 1992.
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is a genuine one. However, in Abdul Razak v Aga Mohamed, 53 Lord
Mac Naughten said "No court can test or gauge the sincerity of
religious belief." Therefore even the present position can be abused.
The position under Islamic law in Malaysia is that if a husband or wife
embraces the Islamic faith and the other party does not follow him or
her during the period of iddah, the marriage automatically conies to an
end. However, section 46(2) of IFLA provides that conversion to Islam
by either party to a non-Muslim marriage shall not by itself operate to
dissolve the marriage unless and until so confirmed by the court.
Section 5 1(2) states that:
"The Court upon dissolving the marriage may make provision
for the wife or husband, and for the support, care and custody
of the children of the marriage, if any, and may attach any
conditions to the decree of the dissolution as it thinks fit."
It is also to be noted that the above section states that the orders for
ancillary relief should be made by the court "upon dissolution" of the
marriage. This raises the question whether the applications should be
made simultaneously or the application be made subsequently. In the
case of Letchumy v Ramadason, 54 it was held that a non-converting
spouse must file a petition for dissolution under section 5 if he or she
intends to seek ancillary relief. In that case, the petitioner obtained
her divorce on the grounds of desertion under section 54. On an
application for maintenance, the Court's power to grant maintenance
must stem from section 77. However, section 3(3) precluded the
operation of section 77 to a Muslim. Hence, any spouse intending to
apply for ancillary relief in a case where the other spouse had
converted to Islam, must ensure the application for dissolution is made
under section 51.
(1893) 21 l.A 56, p.64.
' [1984] M.LJ 143.
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The question is what would happen to a spouse to be precluded from
making an application for ancillary relief and custody of the children
if the other spouse converts to Islam subsequent to a decree of
divorce, but before the application for ancillary relief has been made
or is heard. A fairer result would be achieved if section 51(1) covers
both spouses."
Ahmad Ibrahim contends that in a statute which purports to make the
breakdown of marriage the sole grounds for divorce, it seems odd that
section 51 has been included. The provision seems to revive the
outmoded fault principle, in that one of the parties has been given the
right to petition for divorce because of the fault committed by the
other party, in this case, the conversion to Islam. He suggested that a
better approach to the problem would have been to re gard the
conversion of one of the parties to Islam as evidence that the marriage
had broken down.56
The need for this amendment is even more desirable as at present, if
the non-converting party does not apply for dissolution under section
51, the following appears to be the position. Section 3(3), which states
that the Act shall not apply to a Muslim, precludes the converting
spouse from benefitting from Orders for ancillary relief which the
Court may make subsequent upon dissolution under section 51(2).
(b)	 Dissolution by Mutual Consent.
Section 52 of the LRA provides for divorce by mutual consent.57
Although this form of divorce is alien to English divorce law on which
Ronald, Khoo, 1992, Ibrahim, Ahmad bin Mohamed, Dissolution on Ground of Conversion to
Islam, Conference on the Reform of Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, 1976, Kulhyyah of
Laws, International Islamic University, December, 1992.
Ibrahim, Ahmad bin Mohamed, "The Need To Amend Section 51 Of The Law Reform (Marriage
and Divorce) Act, 1976." [1990] M.LJ lviii; see also Ibrahim, 1991
LRA, section 52.
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the Act is based, it is not novel to Malaysia. In the State of Sarawak,
a non-Christian married couple could mutually agree to present a joint
petition for the dissolution of their marriage. It had been the law there
since 1932.58 Section 7 of the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance provided
that two married persons whose marriage was a "registry marriage" and
neither of whom professed Christianity, could mutually agree to
present a joint petition that their marriage be dissolved. This Sarawak-
Style divorce has been introduced to the whole of Malaysia by section
52 of the LRA.
Dissolution by mutual consent following previous Sarawak law is really
not new in West Malaysia. In actual fact, it follows Chinese and Hindu
custom as to marriages not of a monogamous nature where the Courts
previously had no jurisdiction to grant any relief at all as wives
acquired under customary law were generally victims of "one-sided
deals". It normally occurs among non-Christian Chinese for husbands
could always declare to relatives, friends, or publish in newspapers a
declaration of divorce. As regards mutual consent, both husband and
wife may present a joint petition for a decree by the Court.59
As discussed in the previous chapter, most, if not all, customary
marriages could be dissolved by mutual consent. Section 52 provides
for a joint petition for the dissolution of a marriage where the parties
agree by mutual consent. The section goes further to state that;
"The court may, if it thinks fit, make a decree of divorce on
being satisfied that both parties freely consent, and that proper
provision is made for the wife and for the support, care and
custody of the children..."
Section 7 of Matrimonial Causes Ordinance (Cap.94).
Sim Ewe Eong, Law Reform (Marria ge and Divorce) Act 1976, Act 164, edited by Nasser Hamid,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Law Publishers, 1986, p.10.
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Section 52 of the Law Reform Act does not contain such a condition
although it was recommended by the Royal Commission on Non-
Muslim marriage and divorce laws and was in fact included in the
Draft Bill. 60 However, before granting a decree of divorce, the court
will have to be satisfied that four conditions been fulfilled, namely:
(a) at least two years have elapsed from the date of the
marriage.
(b) both the spouses have freely consented.
(c) proper provisions have been made for the wife.
(d) proper safeguards have been made for the support, care and
custody of the children.
In a petition for a dissolution of marriage by mutual consent, the party
who has signed a consent agreement may withdraw the consent before
the decree is issued by the court. In such a case, the court must be
immediately informed and notice must be given to the petitioner.6'
The rationale of section 52 of the LRA is that where a couple mutually
agrees that it is in the best interests that their marriage should be
dissolved, they should be allowed to do so quietly without
recrimination and unnecessary publicity and quarrel. 62
 At first sight
this provision may appear to make divorces extremely easy to obtain.
In reality, however, it is a great deal more difficult than presumed
because section 52 requires that proper provision be made for the wife
and for the support, care and custody of the children of the marriage.
This "proper provision" must be freely agreed to by both parties and
must be accepted by the court as fair and reasonable before the decree
of divorce can be granted.
Clause 49, Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Bill,1972.
61 Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980, Form 5, clause 5.
62 Parliamentary Debate (Dewan Negara) 6th. January 1976 p.23!1.
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This has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of
Sivanesan v Shymala. 63 The parties in this case had filed a joint
petition for dissolution of marriage, supported by a joint affidavit
which provided for the settlement of the matrimonial property and a
waiver by the wife of all future claims for maintenance. The learned
trial judge granted a decree nisi and then adjourned the matter to deal
with the property settlement. Before the decree became absolute, the
husband died. The wife then appealed to set aside the decree nisi. In
allowing the appeal,the Supreme Court held that the learned judge was
wrong in dissolving the marriage before resolving the exact terms or
conditions for the mutual divorce. The court went on to hold that as
the husband had died before the decree could be made absolute, there
would in effect be no divorce and the wife being a widow was entitled
to claim for the properties.64
The learned Chief Justice made one further observation of some
significance. He disagreed with the interpretation of section 52 as
stated in In Re Divorce Petition No. 18,20 and 24 of 198365 and
declared that in a divorce by mutual consent, the parties do not have
to establish irretrievable breakdown of marriage. He refered to the
explanatory statement of the Deputy Minister of Law in the Dewan
Negara on the effect of section 52, of which he stated that this new
provision is not present under the Divorce Ordinance, 1952.
Dissolution of marriage by mutual consent can be used provided that
the consent is freely given; the dissolution is asked for after two years
of marriage and if both parties agree then everything will be done
quietly without unnecessary publicity. The court's power to grant this
remedy is discretionary and it will have to be satisfied that the parties
have freely agreed to this remedy and that consent of one party was
63 [1986] 1 M.LJ 400.
Ibid, p. 401.
65 [1984] 2 M.LJ 158.
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not obtained by fraud or force. The court has the discretion to accept
and grant divorce on the basis that the parties are adults and they can
decide for themselves that their marriage has failed.
Debates in Parliament on the LRA are of great historical interest, but
according to Shanker J. in In Re Divorce Petitions No. 18, 20 and 24 of
1983, (supra) their value in the correct legal interpretation of a statute
remains problematical.66
The present practice is to present a joint petition for dissolution only
when all the terms as to maintenance and arrangements for children
are agreed upon. This would appear to be the intention of the Royal
Commission on Non-Muslim Marriages and Divorce Laws as to clause
53. Clause 53 applies both to divorce by mutual consent and to a
petition by either of the spouses, which enables any agreements or
arrangements to be made upon the dissolution of a marriage to be
subjected to scrutiny by the Court. This ensures the reasonableness of
such agreements and arrangements and secures justice to the weaker
party.
The idea is obviously to make sure that the Court scrutinises all
arrangements and agreements. It therefore emerged that it was the
intention of Parliament that proper arrangements for maintenance and
custody be agreed by the parties and approved by the Court, before a
decree was granted. This view was further fortified by the
recommendations of the Commissions which stated that;
"Section 7 provides that a joint petition may be presented by
both spouses if they mutually agree to a dissolution of their
marriage and that the court may if it thinks fit, dissolve such
marriage on being satisfied that both parties freely consent and
that proper provision is made for the wife and for the support,
!bid,p.162.
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care and custody of the children, if any, of the marriage, and
may attach such conditions to the decree of dissolution as it
may deem fit. "67
The Commission accepted these principles and made the following
recommendations:
(a) that divorce may be granted either "where circumstances have
arisen which make it just and reasonable that the marriage
should be dissolved", or by mutual agreement, with proper
safeguards for the wife and children;
(b) that, before granting a decree the Court is required to inquire
into the facts to satisfy itself that the marriage has irretrievably
broken down;
(c) that attempts or reconciliation be made before the filing of any
petition for divorce and that proceedings in court may be
adjourned at any stage and for such period as the Court thinks
fit, to encourage reconciliation;
(d) that, in order to curb impetuous and hasty resort to divorce no
petition may be presented (except in special circumstances)
unless three years have elapsed since solemnisation of the
marriage;
(e) that before making a decree the Court shall take into
consideration the interests of the child or children of the
marriage and of either party likely to be adversely affected
thereby and that, upon granting a decree, the Court do so upon
such terms and subject to such conditions as it deems fit and just
to both parties.
The Commission especially stressed the vital importance of paragraph
(e) to safeguard the interests of the respondent and the children of the
marriage. Until the court is satisfied that the financial arrangements
67 Report of Malaysian Royal Commission, 1972, p.7.
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are fair and reasonable, or the best that can be made in the
circumstances, the court should not make a decree. 68 The words
"before making a decree" however do not appear in the section and it
is arguable that practitioners have imposed an additional burden on
themselves by assuming that all such arrangements must be agreed and
approved by the Court before granting the decree. On the other hand
the words "and that proper provision" is misleading and would seem
to suggest this is necessary.
According to Noor Farida Ariffin, the position under this section is
unclear. 69
 The problem would arise in situations where the parties
mutually agree to the divorce but are unable to agree on other terms.
It would appear that in these situations the matter has to be referred
to the conciliatory body (unless exemptions apply) and that the petition
be proceeded with under Section 3. Unfortunately, the four facts
indicative of breakdown may have no application at all in cases where
parties mutually consent. She therefore recommended that the
interpretation should be so as to allow parties who mutually consent,
to obtain their divorce and then allow all other proceedings to be
adjourned to Chambers.
Under dissolution by mutual consent, a court cannot grant a decree
nisi under this section although the parties have mutually consented to
the divorce but have yet to reach agreement on questions of
maintenance and custody. 7° On the contrary, all factual issues would
be more clearly presented to the Court which could at the end of the
day adjudicate to arrive at the most satisfactory arrangements. It would
also remove the element of force present in such arrangements where
Ibid, pp.7-8.
Ariffin, Noor Farida bt., Reform of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, 1976, 7th
Malaysian Law Conference, Kuala Lunipur, 1983.
° Sivanesan v Shymala [1986] 1 M.LJ 400.
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parties may well arrive at agreements which they are none too pleased
with solely for the reason of obtaining a divorce by mutual consent.
Variation of such orders is of course only possible if there is a
material change in circumstances and it is therefore imperative that the
parties be allowed to arrive at arrangements that are satisfactory to
themselves.71
f Divorce on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
Under the principles of the Englisg Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, the
sole ground for divorce is irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.
Either the husband or the wife may petition for a divorce on this
ground. 72
 This concept was also incorporated in section 53 of the
LRA, which provides that the court shall enquire into the facts alleged
as causing or leading to the breakdown of the marriage and if satisfied
that the circumstances make it just and reasonable to do so, make a
decree for its dissolution.73
Previously, divorce under the traditional grounds was based on fault or
guilt of one of the parties. Divorce was only granted to the petitioner
if he or she could prove that the respondent had committed a
matrimonial offence.74
Under section 53, to establish irretrievable breakdown the court shall
have regard to one or more of the following facts:
(a)	 that the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner
finds it intolerable to live with the respondent.
71 Ariffin, 1983.
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, Section 1 (2).
3 
LRA, section 53.
See Divorce Ordinance, ss. 7-14.
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(b) that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the
petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the
respondent.
(c) that the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous
period of at least two years immediately preceding the
presentation of the petition.
(d) that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a
continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding
the presentation of the petition.75
Upon presentation of such a petition, the court shall inquire into the
facts alleged as causing or leading to the breakdown of the marriage
and, if it is satisfied that the circumstances make it just and reasonable
to do so, make a decree for its dissolution. Hence, it is mandatory for
the court to inquire into such facts as proof of the irretrievable
breakdown of the marriage. These are stipulated in section 54 and are
similar to the former matrimonial offences such as adultery, cruelty
and desertion as found in the Divorce Ordinance 1952.
Apart from paragraph (d) all the above mentioned "facts" that can be
accepted by the court as establishing irretrievable breakdown of
marriage, prove a fault on the part of the respondent. Thus despite the
attempt to move away from fault, the majority of divorce cases would
still have to resort to the old grounds of adultery, desertion or conduct
which in the past would have come under the grounds of cruelty or
constructive desertion.
(a) The respondent has committed adultery and the p etitioner finds
it intolerable to live with the respondent.
In section 54 (1)(a),the petitioner must not only satisfy the court that
the respondent has committed adultery, as under the previous grounds
" LRA, Section 54(1).
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of adultery, but also that he or she finds it intolerable to live with the
respondent. At one time, the courts were undecided as to whether it
was necessary that when the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with
the respondent it must be of the consequence of the adultery.
In the absence of any local cases on this point, English cases will
invariably be relied upon when the Malaysian court are called upon to
construe section 47 of the LRA. As section 54 of the LRA is in pan
materia with section 1(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 in
England, English cases on this point are relevant.
In the Malaysian case of Shanmugam v Pitchamany and Anor 76 it was
held that the allegation of adultery had to be proved to the satisfaction
of the court beyond reasonable doubt. In this case the evidence
produced by the petitioner had sufficiently established by necessary
inference that adultery must have been committed and therefore a
decree nisi should be granted. The petitioner has not only to prove
that the respondent has committed adultery but also to prove that he
or she finds it intolerable to live with the respondent. The question
that arises is whether the two facts required by section 54 (1)(a) are
severable or independent, or, whether they are interconnected. Is it
sufficient for the petitioner to prove that the respondent has
committed adultery and that she or he finds it intolerable to live with
the respondent? There are two opposing views on this. On the one
hand, in the case of Roper v Roper 77, Faulks J. said;
"I think that common sense tells you that where the finding
that has got to be made is that the respondent has committed
adultery and the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the
respondent, it means, in consequence of the adultery, the
petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent."
76 [1976] 2 M.LJ. 222.
n [1972J3A11E.R668.
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In addition to this view, a Judicial Commisioner, Mr. Sim Ewe Eong,
has expressed the view that under section 54(1)(a), the petitioner has
to satisfy the court that adultery was so offensive and wounding to him
or her that any further married life was unthinkable.78
On the other hand, in Goodrich v Goodrich, 79 Lloyd-Jones J. accepted
the view that the two facts in section 2(1) (a) of the Matrimonial
Causes Act, 1973 are, in the context, independent of one another. This
view was later affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Cleary v Cleary,8°
where it was held that the two facts were separate and unrelated, and
the petitioner was not obliged to show that it was in consequence of
the adultery that he found it intolerable to live with the respondent.81
Except for the House of Lords, the courts in England are bound on
this point by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Cleary v Cleary.
However, that decision is only of persuasive authority to the courts in
Malaysia. Only a decision of the Privy Council with regard to a
provision in a statute in which is in pan materia with a local statutory
provision is binding in the Malaysian courts.82
In Wee Hock Guan v Chia Chit Neo & Anor, 83 Winslow J. referred to
the case of Farnham v Farnham 84 and stated that an allegation of
adultery must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence must
go beyond establishing suspicion and opportunity to commit adultery
and must be such as to satisfy the court that from the nature of things
adultery must have been committed; where the evidence is entirely
Sim Ewe Ong, 1986, p75.
[1971] 2 All E.R 1340
80 [1974] All ER 498.
81 The Court of Appeal in
	 v Carr [1974] 1 All ER 1193 was unhappy on this point, but
reluctantlyaccepted the interpretation of Section 1(2) (a) in Cleary v Cleary [1974] 1 All ER 498.
Khalid Panj an and Ors v P.P. (No.2)[1964] M.LJ. 108.
83 [1964] 1 M.LJ. 217.
84 (1925) 133 L.T. 320.
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circumstantial the court will not draw the inference of guilt unless the
facts relied on are not reasonably capable of any other explanation.
There is no reported decision on finding of adultery under the LRA.
Ronald Khoo believes that although the burden is not as strict as that
required in a criminal case because it is still considered a matrimonial
offence, a high standard of proof is required. Adultery is still regarded
as a matrimonial offence, as reflected in the fact that under section 58
of the Act, the alleged adulterer or adulteress must be made a co-
respondent to the suit unless the court dispenses with such a
requirement on "special grounds". Furthermore, the Act provides that
a co-respondent may be condemned in damages in respect of the
alleged adultery. On the damages that may be awarded, there is
specific provision that it shall not include any exemplary or punitive
element. Hence, any damages must necessarily be compensation for
actual loss suffered arising from and caused by the adultery in
question.
Ronald Khoo has argued that the right to claim damages for adultery
from the co-respondent should be abolished; first because it is not in
keeping with the intention of the Royal Commission and secondly, on
occasions it is found that parties to a marriage may be constrained to
proceed with their divorce application although they have reached
agreement on divorce, maintenance, custody and distribution of
matrimonial assets purely because the co-respondent insists on costs
and damages for having been included in the Divorce Petition.
(b) The respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner
cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.
Section 54(1)(b) states that a divorce can only be granted if it is
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent has behaved in
such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live
with the respondent. The English courts have refused to give a broad
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interpretation to this guideline but have favoured a narrower, more
legalistic approach. First, the respondent must have behaved in such
a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with
him. In this regard it is pertinent to define the meaning and the scope
of the word "behaviour". In Katz v Katz85, Sir George Baker P. said
that:
"Behaviour is something more than a mere state of affairs or
a state of mind... (it) is action or conduct by the one which
affects the other. "86
However, in the case of Thurlow v Thurlow 87, Rees J. held that in
order to establish that the respondent has behaved in such a way that
the petitioner could not reasonably be expected to live with the
respondent, it is not sufficient merely to establish that the marriage
was dead and that it was impossible for the petitioner to cohabit with
the respondent. It has to be shown that it was the respondent's
behaviour which justified a conclusion by the court that the petitioner
could not reasonably be expected to endure cohabitation. For that
purpose, however, "behaviour" included negative conduct.
In Livingstone Stallard v Livingstone Stallard, 88 it was held that the
proper approach was to determine on the question of fact whether the
respondent had behaved in such a way that the particular petitioner
can not reasonably be expected to leave with the respondent, taking
into account the whole of the circumstances and the caracters and
personalities of the parties.89
[1972] 3 All E.R 219.
[1975] 2 All E.R p.979.
[1975] 2 All E.R 979.
[1974] 2 All E.R 766.
This decision was approved in O'Neillv O'Neill [1975] 1 W.LR. 1118, and again endorsed by the
Court of Appeal in Buffery v Buffer y [1988] 2 F.L.R. 365.
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Section 54 (1)(b) of the LRA necessarily poses an objective and
subjective test. This is in contrast to the phrase "the petitioner finds
it intolerable to live with the respondent" in section 54(1)(a). In
determining whether the petitioner can or cannot reasonably be
expected to live with the respondent, the court must take into account
the character, personality, disposition and behaviour of the petitioner,
and the respondent as alleged and established in evidence. If the
petitioner and respondent are equally bad in a similar respect, each
can reasonably be expected to live with each other.
This proposition is also borne out by words of Bagnall J. in Ash v
Ash,:9°
"In order therefore to answer the question whether the petitioner
can or cannot reasonably be expected to live with the
respondent, in my judgement, I have to consider not only the
behaviour of the respondent as alleged and established in
evidence, but the character, personality, disposition and
behaviour of the petitioner. The general question may be
expanded thus: can this petitioner, with his or her faults and
other attributes, good and bad, and having regard to hir or her
behaviour during the marriage, reasonably be expected to live
with this respondent?"
The primary emphasis is on the behaviour of the respondent. It is
insufficient for the petitioner to show that he or she cannot reasonably
be expected to live with the respondent. The petitioner must show that
this situation arose from the respondent's behaviour. Hence, the court
is required to make a value judgement on the behaviour of the
respondent and its effect on the petitioner, and then decide whether
the petitioner has complied with section 54(1)(b). The case in point is
Pheasant v Pheasant. 9' In that case, the husband left the wife and
petitioned for divorce under section 2 (1)(b) of the Divorce Reform
Act 1969 in England (which is in paii materia with section 54(1)(b) of
° [1972] 1 All E.R. 582.
91 [1972] 1 All E.R. 587.
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LRA). He alleged that his wife had not been able to give him "the
spontaneous, demonstrative affection which his nature demanded, and
for which he craved", and that in consequence, it was impossible for
him to live with her any longer. Accordingly, he stated that the
marriage had irretrievably broken down. The husband did not attempt
to establish anything which could be regarded as a serious criticism of
the wife's conduct or behaviour. In evidence, the wife stated that she
welcomed her husband's return and that she did not believe that the
marriage had broken down irretrievably. It was held that the husband
was not entitled to a divorce as there was nothing in the wife's
behaviour which could be regarded as a breach, on her part, of any of
the obligations of the married state or as effectively contributing to the
breakup of the marriage.
The latest case on this point in England is Birch v Birch. 92 It was held
that the test of behaviour was to be subjective and the trial judge in
this case had been incorrect in using an objective test.
For a petition of divorce under section 54 (1)(b), it would be
consistent with the spirit of the LRA for the court to approach each
case more from the point of view of matrimonial obligation than in
terms of the now obsolete idea of matrimonial offence. Unreasonable
behaviour has been interpreted by the courts to mean behaviour which
is severe and gross. Within the Malaysian context, a large number of
cases that fall within this category are those where there have been
continuous and gross acts of abuse and domestic violence.93
In this case, Ormrod, J. preferred the approach used by Pearce, J. in
Lissack v Lissack	 that is whether it was reasonable to expect this
[1992] 1 F.L.R. 564.
Reddy, 1992.
[1950] 2AIIE.R. 233.
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petitioner to put up with the behaviour of this respondent. This
approach is basically quite similar to the propositions above. In
addition, it was held that it was not appropriate for the court to
analyse the degree of gravity of conduct which would be sufficient to
justify dissolution of the marriage. The proper approach was to
determine as a question of fact whether the respondent has behaved
in such a way that the particular petitioner before the court cannot
reasonably be expected to live with him or her, taking into account the
whole of the circumstances including the history of the marriage, and
the character and personality of the parties.
In practice, however, this behavioural fact is very much similar to the
former grounds of cruelty. Under the former law, cruelty in the legal
sense consisted of conduct by one spouse of such character as to have
caused danger to life, limb or health, whether bodily or mentally or so
as to put the other spouse in fear of danger. Physical violence was not
necessary to establish cruelty. In the case of Wong Slew Fong v Wong
Slew Fong ', Gill J. refered to English cases and came to the
conclusion that constant and persistent nagging by a wife without any
justification against a husband resulting in a deterioration of his health
amounts to cruelty.
This is in contrast to the case of Vethaguru v Sivagnanachelvi96, where
the petitioner sought divorce on the grounds of cruelty. He said being
a Hindu he felt hurt by the refusal of the respondent to wear sarees
and cholis suitable to that of a Hindu married woman. He had tried to
restrain her from bobbing her hair to ear length but to no avail. The
respondent had indulged in playing hockey too often and had taken
part in hockey matches out of town. He alleged that the respondent
and the respondent's parents had abused and humiliated him. As a
[1964] M.LJ. 37.
[1981] 2 M.LJ. 204.
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result of all these he had suffered ill-health and a mental breakdown.
The petitioner claimed that the marriage had irretrievably broken
down. The respondent on the other hand had denied all these
allegations. She stated that the root cause of their matrimonial
troubles was her refusal to hand over her pay cheques to the petitioner
after the birth of their child. The petition was dismissed because
according to the judge in order to establish the matrimonial offence of
cruelty it must be shown that the acts and conduct complained were of
grave and weighty nature as to cause danger to the petitioner's health
or a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. The standard of proof
required to establish cruelty is based on the preponderance of evidence
or balance of probabilities. Intention is not a necessary ingredient of
cruelty. The question to be decided is whether the respondent's
conduct is cruel rather than whether the respondent is a cruel person.
Spouses take each other for better or worse and having entered into
matrimony they must accept the ordinary wear and tear of married life.
The facts adduced in this case did not establish that the conduct of the
respondent was of such a grave and weighty nature as to make
cohabitation virtually impossible, the quarrels were of a trivial nature
and largely because of the pay cheques.
In Theresa Tek v Luke Lim, 97 the petitioner sought divorce on the
grounds of cruelty. In support of her case she produced several police
reports and medical certificates. The respondent had not seriously
challenged her allegations of assault but said that he had tried to stop
her from going out late at night. The respondent in turn alleged that
the petitioner had committed adultery with two persons. The petitioner
denied all the allegations. It was held that the petitioner having proved
cruelty against the respondent would be entitled to a decree nisi, but
she had wilfully and deliberately suppressed the fact of her own
[1981] 2 M.LJ. 205.
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adultery. This meant that there was a discretionary bar to the
matrimonial relief which she sought.
In a recent case of Hariram Jayaram v Saraswathy Rajahram 98, Lim
Beng Choon J. held that following the test stated in Katz v Katz and
Pheasant v Pheasant, it must be decided that on the facts of the case,
the respondent has not shown herself to be of such a character and
personality and her behaviour has not been such that the judge can
conclude that the petitioner can reasonably be expected to live with
her.
(c)	 The respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous
period of at least two years immediately preceding the
presentation of the petition.
By section 54(1)(c), the petitioner must prove that there had indeed
been a desertion lasting for a continuous period of at least two years.
Moreover, this period must immediately precede the presentation of
the petition. Desertion is based on the rejection by one spouse of all
the obligations of the marriage. To prove desertion, the petitioner has
to establish four elements, that is;
(a) There was a
	 facto separation.
(b) The respondent possessed the animus deserendi
(c) The deserted spouse did not consent to the separation.
(d) There was no reasonable cause or excuse for the respondent to
leave the petitioner.
In addition to proving that there was a de facto separation, the
petitioner has also to prove that the respondent possessed animus
deserendi or the intention to desert. This intention to desert must be
established by the petitioner. It is also possible in law for a separation
98 [1990] 1 M.LJ 114.
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which began by being based on consensus to acquire the character of
desertion later.99
Desertion under section 54(1)(c) is similar to grounds of desertion
under the Divorce Ordinance, 1952. However, under the previous law,
three years must elapse before the petition can be presented. This
period has been shortened to two years under the LRA. Under the
former law, in order that desertion could constitute a ground for
divorce, the respondent had to have deserted the petitioner without
cause for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the
presentation of the petition. This three years' period had to be
continuous, and two separate periods of less than three years could not
be added so as to give a period of three years in the aggregate.
Moreover the period had to immediately precede the presentation of
the petition. To this second proposition there was one exception, for
if the petitioner had already obtained a judicial separation and the
respondent had been in desertion for a continuous period of three
years, preceding the institution of the earlier proceedings, the
petitioner could rely upon that period of desertion as grounds for
divorce, provided that the decree or order had been in force
continuously and the parties had not resumed cohabitation since it was
granted.100
There could be no desertion unless there was a facto separation
between the spouses. It was not sufficient for this purpose that one of
the spouses had abandoned some of the obligations of matrimony or
refused to perform duties. There must be a rejection of all obligations
of marriage. In a case where both parties continued to live under the
same roof but where one shut himself off from the other, so that they
were living as two units rather than one, there was no
	 facto
Miller v Miller [1948] M.LJ. 183.
Divorce Ordinance, 1952, ss. 7, 12.
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separation sufficient to constitute desertion. This was however,
rebuttable, for as had been stated by Lord Merrivale P. that;
"Desertion is not withdrawal from a place, but from a state of
things. "101
Hence, if there had been a total cessation of cohabitation there could
be desertion just as effectively as if the husband and wife were living
in two separate houses. The correct test to be applied in such a case
was: are the spouses living in two households or in one? Cohabitation
must have entirely ceased. Therefore there could not be desertion if
any matrimonial services were performed even though those were
isolated and intermittent.102
Desertion had to be a continuing offence and the respondent had to
still be in desertion when the petition was presented. If the spouses
resumed cohabitation, there would then be no de facto separation and
therefore no desertion. Lord Merriman P. in Mummery v Mummery103
stated that;
"A resumption of cohabitation must mean resuming a state of
things, that is to say, setting up a matrimonial home togethe,;
and that involves a bilateral intention on the part of both
spouses so to do."
In Saigal v SaigaI 104, the learned judge applied the principles of Perry
v Perry'°5 where sexual intercourse did not amount to condonation
of desertion. By reason of the resumption of normal marital relations
101 Pulford v Pulford [1923] p.18.
102 Naylor v Naylor [1961] 2 All E.R. 129; Hopes v Ho pes [1948] 2 All E.R. 920.
103 [1942] 1 All E.R 553.
104 [1964] M.LJ 429.
105 [1952] M.LJ 203.
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between the parties, each act of cruelty alleged by the husband was
condoned but it was revived by each subsequent act of cruelty. Cruelty
which has been condoned may be revived by subsequent desertion and
therefore in this case the wife's cruelty was revived by her continued
desertion. It had been held in the case of Miller v Miller106 that an
original involuntary separation could be converted into one of
desertion by the formation of an animus deserendi by the respondent
when it was physically impossible for her to join the petationer. Since
all that must be proved is the fact of separation, it was urrelevant for
this purpose that the spouses were forced to live apart and therefore
could not live together even if they wished to do so. Even though there
was 4 facto separation, there would be no desertion unless the guilty
spouse had the intention of remaining permanently separated from the
other.
It was held in Goh Soon Toon v Yuen Yoke Chee'° 7 ithat where a
separation deed was in force it was an absolute answer to a charge of
desertion. In the same way, if the deserted spouse obtained a judicial
separation he could not then allege that the other was in desertion, for
the order itself relieved the petitioner from the duty of cohabiting with
the respondent and therefore effectively put it out of the atter's power
to return. It clearly showed a desire on the petitioner's part not to
have the spouse back. But if the consent to the separation was
withdrawn, desertion would automatically commence provided that the
other conditions were all satisfied. Even though the agreement was
originally intended to last for ever, it could be brought to an end by
its termination.
106 [1948] M.LJ 183.
'° [1950] M.LJ 96.
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In Adelina Loo Soo Chai v Maurice Eng Chuan Gan,'°8 the parties had
entered into a deed of separation, under which the husband undertook
to pay a monthly allowance of one thousand and five hundred
Malaysian Ringgit (RM $1,500) and to provide the wife with a car, and
the wife undertook to look after the children at the matrimonial home.
Subsequently the wife moved out of the house and lived apart from the
children. The husband then stopped paying the monthly allowance. He
alleged that the wife was in breach of the deed of separation as she
had left the children to live in the house with him. He also alleged
that there had been cohabitation between the parties and also the that
the wife had contrary to the deed of separation pledged his credit. The
wife applied for leave to sign a final agreement. It was held that the
application must be dismissed as there were issues which were liable
for trial.
If one spouse had a reasonable cause or excuse for leaving the other
there would be no unjustifiable separation and consequently he would
not be in desertion. Generally the commission of a matrimonial offence
by one spouse, which would entitle the innocent spouse to petition for
divorce or judicial separation, would be a good excuse for his breaking
off cohabitation, for if he or she did not do so he or she would also
run the risk of condoning the offence and thus putting all relief out of
the question.
This was subject to two qualifications. First, if the innocent party had
put it out of his power to complain of the offence by having induced,
connived in or condoned it, then he was no longer entitled to break off
cohabitation because of it. Secondly, the committing of the offence
must have been the cause for his leaving the guilty spouse, so that if
he was ignorant of the matrimonial offence or was indifferent to it and
IfiS [1980] 1 M.L.J 191.
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intended to leave in any event he could not plead the committing of
the offence as a reason for his so doing.109
Conduct which did not in itself amount to a matrimonial offence could
nevertheless be a good excuse for one spouse leaving the other so as
to preclude his or her being in desertion. The conduct must be so
grave as to make married life impossible. It was held that the ordinary
wear and tear of conjugal life did not in itself suffice.° It was held
in Lee Kah Wah v Cheah Paik Yean" following Buchler v Buchler,"2
that the criterion for assessing whether a spouse was justified in
leaving the matrimonial home was that the conduct of the spouse
remaining must exceed such behaviour, vexatious and trying though it
might be, as every spouse bargained to endure when accepting the
other for better or worse.
In Chua Seok Choo v Ooi Chuan Lok,' 13 Ong Hock Sim J. decided that
a solitary instance of assault when the petitioner was with a child was
not conduct of such a grave and weighty character as to make the
respondent guilty of constructive desertion. In another case, Thambyah
v Thambyah, 114 the judge decided that the onus of proof was on the
petitioner and the court had to be satisfied that the grounds had been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. As the petitioner had failed to satisfy
the court, the petition was dismissed.
109 Day v Day [1957] 1 All E.R. 848.
110 Dyson v Dyson [1953] 2 All E.R. 1511.
'' [1964] M.LJ 125.
112 [1947] 1 All E.R 319.
113 [1968] 1 M.LJ 282.
114 [1966] 1 M.LJ 13.
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(d) The parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous
period of at least two years immediately preceding the
presentation of the petition
Section 54(1)(d) is the separation clause or "living apart" clause. This
provision is similar to section 1(2)(e) of the Matrimonial Causes Act,
1973. As was said by Ormrod, J. in Pheasant v Pheasant,115
"Separation is undoubtedly, the best evidence of breakdown,
and the passing of time, the most reliable indication that it is
irretrievable."
The petitioner will have to show that the parties of the marriage have
lived apart for a continuous period of at least two years immediately
preceding the presentation of the petition. This clause is quite
different from section 54(1)(c) because the deserting party may petition
for divorce. Whereas under section 54(1)(c), the petitioner can only be
the deserted party, and not otherwise.
The courts in England imposed a comparatively high standard. The
view taken was that each spouse took the other for better or for worse,
and the duty to cohabit was not lightly to be abandoned. English law
did not relieve the spouses of their marital obligations merely because
of incompatibility of temperament or unhappiness.' 16
 In Santos v
Santos, 117 it was held that to establish that a husband and wife have
lived apart, mere physical separation is insufficient if both the parties
still recognise the marriage as subsisting. Proof of the facts in Section
54(1) is no guarantee that the court will dissolve the marriage. This is
because, as provided by section 54(2),
115 [1972] 1 All E.R 587.
116 Buchler v Buchler [1947] 1 All E.R. 319.
117 [1972] 2 All E.R.246.
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"In considering whether it would be just and reasonable to
make a decree the court will consider all the circumstances,
including the conduct of the parties and how the interests of
any child or children of the marriage or of either party may be
affected if the marriage is dissolved and it may make a decree
nisi subject to such terms and conditions as the Court thinks
fit to attach, but if it should appear to the court that ii would
be wrong to dissolve the marriage, it should dismiss the
petition."
In Hoe Gan Tai v Fong Chee Yan, 118 it was held that the petitioner's
evidence in such cases should normally be accepted in the absence of
contradiction and in the absence of any element of inherent
improbability. There was no uncontradicted evidence in this case not
only of physical violence but of a long continued series of acts carried
out by the husband causing not just a reasonable apprehension of
danger to the appellant's limb and health but actually causing such
danger. The petitioner in this case had therefore proved beyond
reasonable doubt cruelty on the part of her husband and therefore
there should be a decree of dissolution of marriage.
2.4 GENERAL MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT
On a petition for dissolution of marriage it was the duty of the court
to inquire, so far as it reasonably could, into the facts alleged and
whether there had been any connivance or condonation on the part of
the petitioner and whether any collusion existed between the parties.
If the court was satisfied on the evidence:
(a) that the case for the prosecution had been proved;
(b) that where the grounds of petition was adultery, the
petitioner had not in any way been accessory to, or connived
at or condoned the adultery, or where the grounds of the
petition was cruelty;
118 [1970] 1 M.LJ 75.
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(c) the petition was not presented or prosecuted in collusion
with the respondents; the court could pronounce a decree
nisi.
The court was not bound to pronounce a decree and could dismiss the
petition if it found that the petitioner had during the marriage been
guilty of adultery or if in the opinion of the court the petitioner had
been guilty:
(a) of unreasonable delay in presenting or prosecuting the
petition,
(b) of cruelty towards the other party to the marriage;
(c) where the grounds of the petition was adultery or cruelty, of
having without reasonable excuse deserted or having without
reasonable excuse wilfully separated himself or herself from the
other party before the adultery or cruelty complained of; or
(d) where the grounds of the petition were adultery or unsoundness
of mind or desertion, of such wilful neglect or misconduct as
had conduced to the adultery or unsoundness of mind or
desertion.
Collusion, connivance and condonation, which were bars to petition for
divorce under the previous law are no longer recognised under the
LRA. The court's discretion in granting a decree where there were
discretionary bars is completely unfettered though it must be exercised
according to established principles. In Blunt v Blunt," 9 Lord Simon
L.0 laid down that the following five points:
(a) The position and interest of the children of the marriage who in
the long run will probably suffer most from the collapse of the
marriage;
119 [1943] A.C517.
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(b) The interest of the party with whom the petitioner has commited
adultery, with special regard to the prospect of their future
marriage;
(c) The question whether if the marriage is not dissolved, there is
a prospect of reconciliation between the parties;
(d) The interest of the petitioner and in particular the interest that
the petitioner should be able to remarry and live respectably;
(e) The interest of the community at large to be judged by
maintaining a true balance between respect for the binding
sanctity of marriage and the social consideration which makes it
contrary to the public policy to insist on the maintenance of a
union which has utterly broken down.
The principles laid down by Lord Simon were followed by the
Malaysian court in Kathi Rasen v Kathi Rasen' 20. Even though one
party was more to blame than the other the court in the exercise of its
discretion could pronounce a decree on the petition and the cross
petition. The judge in Wong Siew Fong v Wong Siew Fong' 2' also
referred to the words of Lord Simon in Blunt v Blunt, where the
primary consideration is to maintain a true balance between respect for
the binding sanctity of marriage and the social consideration which
makes it contrary to public policy to insist on the maintenance of the
union which had utterly broken down. Hepworth J. in Lee Kah Wah v
Cheah Paik Yean & Anor stated that the fact of this case are very
similar to those in O'Brien v O'Brien. In that case the Court of Appeal
held that the case fell within the words of Lord Simon in Blunt v Blunt,
and that the right order was for the court to exercise its discretion and
pronounce a decree nisi on the ground of adultery and on the cross
petition on the ground of desertion.
' [1960] M.LJ 57.
121 [1964] M.LJ 37.
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As to the interest of "either party" to the marriage, in Mathias v
Mathias, 122 the petitioner wished to remarry and the wife, would, in
all likelihood, be able to find a happy future as another man's wife, so
it was not in the circumstances wrong to dissolve the marriage. It is
interesting to note that the general policy or philosophy of the present
divorce legislation is to dissolve marriages which have irretrievably
broken down as quickly and painlessly as possible.
If at any stage of the proceedings for divorce it appears to the Court
that there is a reasonable possibility of a reconciliation between the
parties to the marriage, it may adjourn the proceedings for such period
as it thinks fit to enable attempts to be made to effect such a
reconciliation. 123 This provision is in pan materia with section 6(2)
of the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973. The main comment that
can be made on this provision is that after the conciliatory body has
certified that it has failed to reconcile the parties,' 24 cases of genuine
reconciliation after a last minute adjournment reconciliation by the
Court will in practice be very rare.
Experience gained in the courts in England and Australia has shown
that reconciliation in the sense of reuniting persons who are estranged
has little chance of success once divorce proceedings have started.'25
But adjourning proceedings may be effective in the sense that although
expert help may not save the marriage at a late stage of divorce
proceedings, it may help parties to resolve issues relating to finance
and custody of children with the minimum possible anxiety to
themselves and their children.
'n [1972]3AIIE.R 1.
123 LRA, section 55(2).
124 LRA, section 106.
' Finlay, H.A. and Johnson A.Bissett, Family Law in Australia, Melbourne, Butterworths, 1972, pp.
593-6.
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However, it is provided under section 78 of the Act that when
determining the amount of maintenance to be paid by a man to his
wife or former wife or by a woman to her husband or former husband,
one of the matters the Court has to have regard to is the degree of
responsibility which the Court apportions to each party for the
breakdown of the marriage. The quantum of maintenance ordered to
be paid is entirely at the discretion of the Court and the
apportionment to each spouse for the said breakdown is merely one of
the factors for the Court to consider to enable it to do justice to both
sides. The declared object of this provision is stated in the explanatory
statement accompanying the Law Reform Bill.
2.5 PROCEDURE'26
The Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules, 1980 gazetted on
February 7, 1980,127 laid down the procedure for obtaining
matrimonial relief under the LRA 1976. To a large extent they are
similar to the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Rules, 1953.128 In
some respects, more detailed provisions have been included in the new
rules. The 1953 Rules will be repealed when these new rules come into
force but they may continue to apply to such extent as may be
necessary to give effect to the transitional provisions and savings in the
LRA, 1976.
A rule worth noting is rule 104 which provides:
"Where no other provision is made by any written law or by
these rules, the present practice in Malaysia shall remain in
force."
126 Personal conversation with Puan Siti Naaishah Hambah, Senior Assistant Registrar, Family and
Property Division, High Court, Kuala Lumpur, in March 1991.
127 PU(A)32/°
' L.N. 136 of 1953.
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The use of the term "present practice" creates some uncertainty as to
what other sources may be referred to. Under the 1953 Rules, the
procedure followed in England would be applied where there is no
provision dealing with the situation. Rule 70 states;
"In any case in which no provision is made by these rules, the
procedure applicable to the Supreme Court in England in such
cases shall be applied as nearly as the case permits."
This reference to the English position will presumably form part of the
"present practice". It can be concluded therefore, that under rule 104,
English rules of procedure may be relied on where there is no
provision here. It is a matter of some concern that rules so necessary
for the enforcement of the LRA should have taken four years to be
passed.
According to the LRA, every decree of divorce by the Court is in the
first instance a decree nisi and it will generally not be made absolute
before the expiration of three months.' 29 The waiting period between
decree nisi and decree absolute is to give the Attorney General time
to show cause against the decree being made absolute. 13° The
abolition of the old bars of divorce ("connivance or condonation on
the part of the petitioner and whether any collusion exists between the
parties")'3 ' make intervention by the Attorney General unusual. In
practice, the period after decree nisi is used for the resolution of
problems relating to determination by the Court of ancillary reliefs
which will involve hearing in chambers normally after decree absolute.
If the decree is not made absolute after three months, the party
against whom the decree nisi was granted may make an application to
' LRA, section 61.
Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980, Rule 50.
131 Repealed Divorce OTdinance, 1952, Section 9(1).
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the Court for an order making the decree absolute or rescinding the
decree nisi.'32
For divorce, a petition following Form 2 should be filed, 133 together
with Form P.22 (Certificate from Conciliatory body); Form 5 (Notice
of Proceedings); Form 6 (Acknowledgment of Service); Form 7
(Affidavit by Petitioner in support of Petition); and Form 4 (where
there are minor children.) For proposed presentation of petition for
divorce within two years of marriage under section 50, Originating
Application' 34 should be filed accompanied by Form 1 (Notice of
Application), and Form 6 (Acknowledgment of Service). For divorce by
Mutual Consent, Form 3 (joint petition) should be filed.' 35 Being a
joint petition it is therefore not intended to be served on any person.
Form 4 (Statement as to arrangements for children) should also be
filed if there are children of the marriage. For decree absolute, Notice
of application in Form 8 should be filed together with Certificate of
making Decree Nisi Absolute (Divorce) under Form 9.
Once a petition has been filed in court with all the necessary
documents, the court will return the sealed copies of the petition to be
served on the respondent, notifying him of the divorce action. Only
after there is evidence of service in the court file, by way of an
affidavit of service, will the court proceed with the matter.
In circumstances where the spouse's whereabouts is not known and it
is not possible to find the spouse to serve the petition, one may apply
to court for the dispensation of service. The court will then fix a date
for the hearing.
132 LRA, section 6(2).
See also Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980, Rule 3.
Ibid. Rule 4 and 5.
Petition must be signed by both parties and thetr solicitors (if any).
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Under exceptional circumstances, the court may, upon application by
the parties, reduce the period after which the decree would be made
absolute to one month or any period requested. If the divorce is
contested, the court may proceed to hear the contested divorce with
the parties and the witnesses.
Where both spouses agree to the divorce but are not agreeable on the
terms of custody and maintenance or division of matrimonial property,
the court may grant the decree nisi nevertheless and adjourn the case
to be heard on the disputed matters after the divorce.
If the petition is uncontested, the court will, in the presence of the
parties, grant the decree nisi to be made absolute in three months. The
LRA empowers the Registrar of the Court with new and additional
powers in undefended petitions (and where there are no children of
the family) to consign these petitions to the special procedure list after
considering the evidence filed by the petitioner and certifying that the
petitioner has proved the contents of the petition and is entitled to a
decree. After issuing this certificate the Registrar shall fix a day for
the pronouncement of the decree by a judge in open court. This special
procedure will lead to a quicker granting of decrees. Parties to the
petition need not even appear before the judge on the day fixed for
pronouncement. This procedure is under Rule 39 of the Divorce and
Matrimonial Proceedings Rules, 1980, which is similar to the English
Matrimonial Causes Rules, 1977, Rule 48. A way to obtain a simpler
divorce where there are no children of the marriage to complicate or
delay matters, has yet to be devised. It has to be said that the effect
of this special procedure has been to make the judge's function formal
and ritualistic.
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2.6 RECONCILIATION.
Section 55 of the LRA provides for the establishment of conciliatory
bodies as a means of encouraging reconciliation. Subsection (1)
stipulates that the provision may be made by rules of court for
requiring that before a petition may be presented, the petitioner shall
have recourse to the assistance and advice of persons or bodies for the
purpose of reconciling the estranged parties to the marriage. This has
to be read with section 106, which provides that (except for divorce on
the grounds that one's spouse has converted to Islam and divorce by
mutual consent) one must first refer the matrimonial difficulty to a
conciliatory body which must first certify that it has failed to reconcile
the spouses before one can petition for divorce.
In England, solicitors advising clients in matrimonial matters are put
under a strict duty to advise them as to reconciliation first before
advising them as to divorce.' 36
 However, in Malaysia, the LRA goes
further. Section 106 provides for a mandatory reference of a
matrimonial difficulty to a conciliatory body before the presentation of
a petition, unless the exceptions mentioned apply. On the face of it,
this would seem to achieve exactly what is designed to do. However,
the cumbersome procedure involved in referring a matter to a
conciliatory body, its composition and several other factors, prove to
be stumbling blocks to attaining the desired objective. Further, section
106 has inadvertently rendered certain other sections of the Act
virtually inoperable.
The extent to which the LRA encourages reconciliation can be seen in
sub-section 2, where it is provided that although the proceedings for
divorce have already commenced, the court has the discretionary power
136 Matrimomal Causes Act 1973, section 6 (1), for further details see Report of the Commitee on
One-Parent Families, Cmnd. 5629, 1974, London, H M.S.O., see also Law Commission, Reform
of the Grounds of Divorce: The Field of Choice, 1966, Cmnd 3123, London, H.M.S.O.
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to adjourn the proceedings for such a period as it thinks fit to enable
attempts to be made to reconcile the spouses if it appears to the
court that there is a reasonable possibility of a reconciliation.
A conciliatory body may be either:
(a) a council set up for the purposes of reconciliation by the
appropriate authority of any religion, community, clan or
association; or
(b) a marriage tribunal set up for a specified area or district
consisting of a Chairman and not less than two and not more
than four other members nominated by the Minister; or
(c) any other body approved as such by the Minister.
A matrimonial difficulty may be referred to any conciliatory body
acceptable to both parties, but in the absence of agreement reference
may be made to the appropriate marriage tribunal. A conciliatory body
to which the matrimonial difficulty has been referred to is given six
months to resolve it. It requires the attendance of the disputing parties
and shall give each of them an opportunity of being heard and may
also hear such other persons and make such inquiries as it may think
fit.
If the conciliatory body is unable to resolve the matrimonial difficulty
to the satisfaction of the parties and to persuade the spouses to
resume married life, it shall issue a certificate to that effect and may
append to its certificate such recommendation as it thinks fit regarding
maintenance, division of matrimonial property and the custody of
minor children, if any, of the marriage.
As to rules of practice and procedure to be observed during the
conduct of the hearings and enquiries, members of these bodies are
left entirely on their own as there are no specific rules. However,
under Section 55(1) of the Act rules of court may be made. The words
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"entirely on their own" are used advisedly as Section 106(5)(c) of the
Act stated that:
"No advocate or solicitor shall appear or act as such for any
party in any proceeding before a conciliatory body and no party
shall be represented by any person, other than a member of his
or her family, without the leave of the conciliatory body."
As no procedural rules have been formulated under Section 55(1) of
the Act for the guidance of these conciliatory bodies, their
implementation has been haphazard. In particular, at the marriage
tribunals, members are at best guided by common sense rules as to
fairness and justice in the conduct of their investigations and inquires.
Noor Faridah Ariffin in her paper' 37 presented at the 7th. Malaysian
Law Conference, 1983 stated that from the practitioner's point of view,
the implementation of the LRA has given rise to a number of
problems, the most pressing of which is the mandatory reference of
matrimonial difficulties to a conciliatory body before the presentation
of a petition.
The Bar Council recommended that conciliatory procedure should be
available after filing of petition. It should be done behind closed doors
and the findings must not be revealed to the judge. A simple
certificate of outcome should be given to the judge. Section 106 (5)(b)
should be amended to state this. The conciliatory body's power of
recommendation regarding maintenance, division of matrimonial
property and the custody of children should be deleted. It is agreed,
in particular, that the conciliatory body's power to make
recommendations with respect to ancillary matters be deleted.
Ancillary matters are vital issues in any divorce proceedings - issues
which should be resolved only after all relevant facts have been
137 For further details e Ariffm, 1983.
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disclosed to the court under oath. Any recommendations made as to
ancillary issues by the conciliatory body will only be after three or four
meetings with both parties. If it is agreed that it is purely in the
discretion of the members whether to make such recommendation, they
must be seriously questioned. Nesarajam's study' 38 revealed that there
is a tacit understanding that the Conciliatory Body is not to make
recommendations with respect to ancillary issues, as it is felt that the
members of the body are not competent on the law relating to such
matters.
The Bar Council also recommended that there should be an obligation
of secrecy on the part of members of the conciliatory body and a
penalty for breach of this. The reason for the first limb of this
provision is clear and requires no further elaboration. There are in fact
directives from the relevant authorities as to the necessity for secrecy.
However, beyond a reprimand, there is no further sanction for this
provision. It is felt that the imposition of a penalty on members for
breach is inappropriate because of the difficulty of enforcement. It is
also felt that a better solution would be for these bodies to draw up
their own code of ethics. It is of interest to note that Singapore and
Australia have legislated on the issue of the duty of secrecy in relation
to the admissibility of evidence of anything said in the course of
reconciliation. Section 85(4) of the Singapore Women's Charter 1961
states that evidence of anything said, or of any admission made in the
course of an endeavour to effect a reconciliation under this section,
shall not be admissible in any Court.
Further recommendations were also advocated by the Federation of
Women Lawyers. They laid emphasis on the composition of the
conciliatory body. Presently, the bodies are composed of laymen. They
138 Sitravelu, Mary Nesarajam, Conciliatory Bothes m Kiang and Petaling Jaya, Academic Exercise,
Faculty of Law, Umversity of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1983.
166
are not trained in their burdensome roles of reconciling estranged
couples,' 39 neither are there any guidelines as to how to approach
their task. It would appear that general directives have been issued by
the relevant authorities. However, these deal mainly with procedure.
Some districts organise explanatory and briefing sessions prior to the
session, but Sitravelu's study' 4° suggested that not very many
members of the conciliatory bodies knew about these sessions and
some had not even seen the directives. The necessity for secrecy is
stressed several times in the directives. It also states that the Body
may call and hear any number of people apart from the couple to help
in their investigations. Nowhere in the directive are there guidelines
on how to counsel. It is felt that the task of reconciliation, should be
undertaken by trained personnel. It is timely for the relevant
authorities to recognise that the prescribed role of the conciliatory
body is one that requires training and experience.
The Federation of Women Lawyers also recommended that the
administration of the conciliatory bodies should be removed from the
National Registration Department, whose ordinary functions do not
include such activities. The ideal solution, and this again underlines its
importance, is for the setting up of a family court. The whole system
of counselling should become part and parcel of the family court
infrastructure. A study of countries which have a family court, notably
Japan and the United States in particular, the Los Angeles Family
Court and the Toledo Family Court, which provide for conciliatory
services, should be carried out in depth and proposals for its urgent
implementation in Malaysia be made.14'
139 As pointed out by a woman politician, Kee Phaik Cheen, the present mamage tnbunals are run
by volunteers with questionable qualifications. Madam Kee suggest the National Unity and
Community Development Ministry to send personnel overseas to be trained as marnage
counselors.
140 Sitravelu, 1983.
141 For further details see Chapter 6, pp.460-491.
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Another frequent complaint is that the composition of the Conciliatory
Bodies is constantly changing so that the parties have to keep
repeating their problems each time they attend. The time lag between
the first meeting and the next cannot possibly help as any kind of
counselling sessions should really be intensive, frequent and continuous
within the six month period. The members of the conciliatory bodies
are in fact volunteers or nominees. They receive no remuneration,
compensation, nor even travelling allowance. The obvious advantage of
having trained personnel to take on the counselling as a paid job, is
that counselling can be undertaken on a frequent and more regular
basis and not merely when all the members of the panel are available.
E.E. Sim, the Judicial Commisioner of the Family and Property
Division, suggested that the onerous task of these voluntary bodies be
made available only if it appears to the Court that there is a
reasonable possibility of reconciliation between parties to the marriage
during the course of the hearing. During the adjournment by Court
although expert help from conciliatory bodies may not save the
marriage, with the help of trained officers in the Social Welfare
Department this period may give time to parties to the marriage to
resolve issues relating to custody of "children of the family" as defined
under Section 2 of the Act.
He also agreed with the other recommendation of the Bar Council that
conciliatory bodies should have no power to make recommendations
regarding maintenance, division of matrimonial property and the
custody of minor children of the marriage. To continue to allow them
to do so would, among other things, be treating the Matrimonial Court
like a rubber stamp.'42
142 Sim, Ewe Oug, "Conciliatory Body under Law Reform (Mamage and Divorce) Act, 1976",
Malaysian Current Law Journal, 1982, p339.
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Anantham in his paper entitled Reforms of the Law Reform (Marriage
and Divorce) Act, 1976 suggested the abolition of Section 106(1). The
section as presently worded suggests that no party to a marriage can
file a petition unless he/she has first referred the matrimonial difficulty
to a conciliatory body. Accordingly, a petitioner cannot file a divorce
petition even if the respondent is in possession of a certificate from
the conciliatory body. This could not have been the intention of
Parliament as the conciliatory body is only required to issue one
certificate in respect of any one marriage. He also contended that
Section 106(1) of the Act does not serve the intended purpose. Very
often, it is the party who wants the divorce (but has been advised by
his/her solicitor that a petition cannot be filed without a certificate)
who applies to the conciliatory body. Accordingly, the intention behind
the application is not to seek the assistance of the conciliatory body to
resolve his/her matrimonial differences but merely to get a certificate.
Furthermore, as the intention of the applicant is to secure a certificate
at the end of the six month period, the applicant is normally advised
either not to attend the joint conciliatory meetings convened by the
body or to inform the body at such meetings of his/her desire to end
the marriage. Hence, it is apparent that section 106(1) of the Act does
not serve the intended purpose. On the contrary, it effectively serves
to delay the filing of a divorce petition.
Anantham also suggested that if Section 106(1) is to be retained, then,
section 106(1)(vi) should be amended. More often than not, the
dispensation is sought under sub-section (vi). Unfortunately, there are
no provisions in the Act as to what constitutes "exceptional
circumstances". Accordingly, legal practitioners have difficulty in
advising parties eager to obtain a divorce as to which is faster, seeking
dispensation from the court or applying to the conciliatory body.
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In so far as both the lawyer and the client are satisfied that the
marriage is over, it seems best that an application for dispensation be
made to the court. However, should the application be dismissed some
three to six months after the intending petitioner first visited his/her
lawyer, the dismissal of an application for dispensation would place the
plans of the intending petitioner for an early divorce behind schedule
by this period of time. Anantham added that, to make matters worse,
the intending petitioner will have to start afresh by applying to the
conciliatory body for a certificate before being in a position to file a
petition. As a solution, he recommended that section 106(1) be
amended by the inclusion of provisions as to what constitutes
exceptional circumstances. Essentially, parties above a certain age or
who have been married for ten years or more should be exempted from
having their disputes sent to a conciliatory body. Alternatively, this
section should be amended to allow for the filing of a petition subject
to no decree nisi being granted unless the petitioner or respondent
obtains dispensation or produces a certificate from the conciliatory
body prior to the granting of the decree nisi by the court.'43
2.7 CONCLUSION
The LRA of 1976 came into force in 1982.' This much-delayed
event effected the long-awaited changes to the family law applicable to
non-Muslims in Malaysia. Regarded as a milestone in law reform, the
Act abolishes polygamy, 145
 prescribes a minimum age of eighteen
143 Anantham, K. "Reforms of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976," Seminar on
Family Law, Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, 1990.
Act 164 as amended by the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) (Amendment) Act, 1980 (Act
A498).
145 LR.A, section 5.
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years for marriage' 46 and provides for compulsory registration of all
marriages.147
It is clear from the summary of the main provisions of the Act relating
to divorce that the Act has effected a reform of the law of marriage
and divorce in conformity with modern thinking on these subjects. A
general postmortem of the divorce clauses in the LRA immediately
reveals that it makes for potentially easier divorces. The LRA grants
a divorce decree based on mutual consent with proper safeguards for
the wife and children of the family.' 48
 This factor makes collusion
irrelevant.149
There is a reduction of the period of restriction on filing petitions for
dissolution from three years under the previous law to only two under
the LRA.'5° The Court may even allow presentation of a petition
within two years on the ground of exceptional circumstances or
hardship suffered by the petitioner,' 5 ' whereas under the previous
law, the grounds were "exceptional hardship suffered by the petitioner
or exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent." 52
 This may
be justified in a way that if a marriage cannot work from the very
beginning, it will be much better to end the mistake rather than to
continue a false tolerance of each other.
There is also seemingly unrestrained access to a joint petition by
mutual consent under section 52. The idea behind easier divorce is also
146 LRA, section 10.
147 LRA, sections 25-27, 31, 35.
' LRA, section 52.
149 Section 91 of the repealed Divorce Ordinance, 1952.
LRA, section 50(1).
151 LRA, section 50(2).
152 Divorce Ordinance, 1952, section 13.
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to reduce the bitterness and strife that normally follow divorce
proceedings. If the couple mutually agree to split up, or even if one
spouse merely petitions on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of
marriage by proof of certain facts, there will be less need to wash dirty
linen in public and less embarrassment for the children.
The LRA also gives a spouse the right to petition for divorce on the
ground of conversion by the other spouse to Islam. The 1980
amendment added a provision empowering the court to make orders
with regard to the maintenance and custody of children as well as the
maintenance of either spouse in the event of such a divorce being
granted.' 53
 This in fact means that although the Act as a whole does
not apply to Muslims, persons who have converted to Islam after
contracting a marriage which is subject to the Act, can be ordered to
maintain their spouse of that marriage even though by their new
personal law, that is Islamic law, the said marriage may have ceased
to subsist on the conversion by one of the parties to Islam and the
subsequent failure of the other party to do so. This provision has thus
solved a long-standing problem faced by non-Muslim wives who were
unable to get relief in the Shariah Courts or bring actions under the
law applicable to non-Muslims against husbands who had converted to
Islam.
The LRA has also put Malaysia close to the law in England,' 54
 which
recognises irretrievable breakdown of marriage as the sole grounds of
There can be no finding of irretrievable breakdown
without proof of one or more specific facts, which may be summed up
as adultery, intolerable behavoour desertion and separation.' 56
 These
' LRA, section 51.
'' English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973.
'' LRA, section 53.
156 LRA, section 54.
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are reforms from the previous position which provided for the
traditional grounds for divorce under the Divorce Ordinance, 1952.
The LRA has also gone a long way to achieve its object of enabling
"the empty legal shell to be destroyed with the minimum bitterness,
distress and humiliation," 57 but it is still probable that defended
proceedings will generally be attended by the bitterness, distress and
even humiliation which the Act in the first place was to overcome.'58
With the abrogation of collusion as a bar to divorce, the parties are
now free to reach agreement or arrangement on questions relating to
maintenance or provisions for any children of the marriage no matter
which of the four guidelines the petitioner proceeds upon.
We have seen that in spite of the distinct retreat of fault as a cause
of divorce, the notion of fault has not been totally eliminated. In
England, the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is the only
grounds for divorce since the Divorce Reform Act of 1969.159 The
Malaysian law of divorce extends the grounds of divorce not only to
the irretrievable breakdown of marriage but also to mutual consent'6°
and conversion to Islam.161
The testimony of a cross-section of views advanced by various critics
towards the Divorce Reform Act, 1969 showed that its chief criticism
is that it is a compromise between the old law based on matrimonial
fault and the new concept of irretrievable breakdown of marriage
which perpetuates many of the defects of the former without
157 Law Commission Report, Reform of the Grounds of Divorce: The Fie'd of Choice, para 15 (cmnd.
3123), London, HMSO, 1966.
158 See Bromley, P.M. and Lowe Family Law, 8th ed., London, Butterworths, 1992, p.227-8.
159 Incorporated in the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973.
160 LRA, section 52.
161 LRA, section 51.
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necessarily producing the advantages of the latter. The first three
guidelines to the proof of breakdown in marriage as stated in Section
54 of the LRA will still raise questions of matrimonial misconduct. In
addition, the court will still have the duty to consider the conduct of
the parties whenever it must determine matters of financial provisions,
property distribution, or welfare of the children. To this extent,
distress, bitterness and humiliation are likely to remain part of divorce
proceedings for some time to come. This can be reflected by making
a brief appraisal of the practical working of similar divorce laws in
England a few years after the Divorce Reform Act, 1969. A
considerable amount of literature has been written on this. For
instance, Finlay criticized the dichotomy of interpretation which began
to emerge four years after the Divorce Reform Act, 1969, came into
operation. He submitted that even where irretrievable breakdown has
been found to exist, dissolution was refused in certain cases not
because of the law but because its provisions have been interpreted
and applied in accordance with traditional methods of adjudication
derived from a fault-based philosophy that has not yet been
unequivocally discarded. He succinctly compared the "somewhat uneasy
compromise" characterised by the Act as "much old wine in the new
bottles." 62
 In adopting the English divorce provisions based on
irretrievable breakdown, the LRA might just as well have adopted its
defects too.
The court cannot grant a decree nisi under the existing LRA when the
parties to the marriage are agreeable to the dissolution of the marriage
but have not reached agreement on questions of maintenance and
custody, the rationale presumably being that the wife and the children
may suffer if the husband is granted a decree nisi when no proper
162 Finlay, HA, and Baily-Harris, RJ, Family Law in Australia, 4th ed. New South Wales,
Butterworths, 1989, pp. 117-121, see also Law Comimssion Report, 1988.
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order has been made to protect the interests of the wife and the
children.
There is no justification for keeping alive a marriage for the duration
of time it takes a court to decide on the rights of the parties on
maintenance and the distribution of matrimonial assets on a permanent
basis. It has three distinct disadvantages. First, either for financial
reasons or to avoid blame for the failure of the marriage, the parties
very often may stay together pending a decision of the court. The
"forced" living together of two unhappy adults can lead to violence
within the marriage. Secondly, in so far as the resolution of the issue
of permanent maintenance and distribution of matrimonial assets may
take as long as two years, it is highly undesirable that the children
should be forced to live with two unhappy parents for such a long
period of time. Thirdly, the parties may be compelled to indulge in
protracted and expensive divorce proceedings when the dispute is only
over ancillary relief.
It is therefore submitted that this section be amended to allow the
courts to grant a decree nisi even if the parties only agree to the
dissolution of the marriage but not on the ancillary issues. This will
not work unfairly as sufficient legislation exists in the form of the
Guardianship of Infants Act, 1961 and the Married Women and
Children (Maintenance) Act, 1950 which enable the wife to obtain
custody of the children and adequate maintenance pending resolution
by the court of the issue of permanent maintenance and distribution
of matrimonial assets.
The Act has also introduced a new feature to divorce proceedings in
Malaysia, which is the requirement of mandatory reference to a
conciliatory body before petitioning for divorce. 163 The Act provides
163 LRA, section 106.
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for attempts to be made to reconcile the estranged spouses before a
petition for divorce can be presented; and also for the adjournment of
court proceedings when there remains a reasonable probability of
success in bringing the spouses together.' 64 Since the LRA came into
effect on 1st. March, 1982, there has been a public outcry over the
requirement that parties must go through conciliatory proceedings
before they can file a petition for divorce.
Although designed to encourage reconciliation, it is doubtful if section
106 will achieve its aim because the section itself provides for a variety
of circumstances in which the requirement can be dispensed with. Some
of the permitted exceptions will defeat the very purpose of the
provision, for example, the exception in paragraph (iii) "where the
respondent has been required to appear before a conciliatory body and
has wilfully failed to attend," and in paragraph (vi) "where the court
is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances which make
reference to a conciliatory body impracticable."
If the ten years of experience of the English provision are anything to
go by, the Malaysian provision is likely to be a failure, although the
more active role of the court may improve it chances. However, since
the Malaysian divorce court is required by law to "act and give relief
on principles which in the opinion of the court are, as nearly as may
be, conformable to the principles on which the High Court of England
acts and gives relief",' 65 there may be some useful lessons to be
learned from English practice. The English provision is based on the
practice in Australia,' 66
 where there is little evidence to suggest that
it has succeeded in achieving reconciliation.
164 LRA, section 55 and 106. This provision is in pari matena with section 6(2) of the English
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973.
165 LRA, section 47.
166 O'Donovan, Katherine, Conciliation and Reconciliation on Divorce in Malaysian Legal Essays,
edited by M B Hooker, Malaysian Law Journal, Kuala Lumpur, 1986 p.40.
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Only time will tell how successful this innovative set-up of conciliatory
bodies will be in reconciling parties. It has been stated that their
setting-up was a futile effort, that it will not work in Asian societies
and is, therefore, undesirable. In Malaysian society, conciliatory efforts
would have been exhausted by the couple's parents and relatives before
the parties petition for divorce. In some cases religious institutions in
Malaysia also assume an important role in reconciling estranged
parties. However there are no formal structures since Malaysian society
is such that few are prepared to talk to strangers and to express their
intimate feelings. It might be better if this hurdle of a conciliatory
body were removed from its present pre-petition position to a position
after a petition is filed? This suggestion deserves serious thinking.
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CHAPTER 3
THE MUSLIM DIVORCE AND ITS LAW IN THE FEDERAL
TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMFUR
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In 1984, the Islamic Family Law Act (Federal Territory) 1984 (IFLA)
was enacted to regulate divorce in Kuala Lumpur only) It repeals
various provisions2
 of the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment,
1952, Act A 206, of Selangor that had been made applicable to Kuala
Lumpur, when it became a Federal Territory in 1974. Before that,
amendments were made to the provisions of the Administration of
Muslim law Enactment, 1952, to extend its applicability to Kuala
Lumpur. Unfortunately the only amendments made involved the word
"The Yang DiPertuan Agung" being substituted for "Sultan" and the
"Federal Territory" being substituted for "Selangor". Other than these
slight amendments, the provisions of the Administration of Muslim Law
Enactment, 1952, had been adopted and enforced in Kuala Lumpur in
full before the IFLA came into force.5
IFLA, section 1.
2 IFLA, Parts VI, VII, sections 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, and para (a) of section 178; section 135.
P.U.(A) 44174.
' The administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1952 (Selangor Enactment No3 52) is extended
to Federal Territory (P.U(A) 44174, Act A 576 84, P.0 (A) 390 81.
The Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952 of Selangor was modified by the Federal
Territory (Modification of Administration of Mushm Law Enactment Order 1974 made pursuant
to Section 6(4) of the Constitution (Amendment)(No.2) Act 1973 and in force in Kuala Lumpur
by virtue of Section 6(1); IFLA, section 2.
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The Islamic Family Law Act (Federal Territory) 1984, Act 3036 is, as
its long title states, an Act to enact certain provisions of the Islamic
family law in respect of marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship
and other matters connected with family life. This attempt at
codification is a welcome move since the Islamic law is complex and
at times has to be traced from several different sources. However, this
codification is not complete and there are several sections of the Act
that still refer to the Hukum Shara'. 7 This means that the primary
sources of Islamic law will still have to be referred to for a full
interpretation of some provisions. Nevertheless, the effect of IFLA is
to simplify and to a certain extent improve the administration of family
law in Kuala Lumpur.
IFLA was the result of an attempt made by the Federal Government
to have a model law for the administration of Islamic Family law in
Malaysia. In drafting the law, the example of the Law Reform Bill
appears to have been used but certain modifications were made to
bring the law into line with the teachings of Islam. There was also
some borrowing from legislation in Singapore, Egypt, India and
Pakistan. The draft was then submitted to the Conference of Rulers
and when it was approved in principle, sent to the individual states for
their comments and adoption. In Kuala Lumpur a committee was set
up to consider the legislation, which had among its members the Mufti,
The Chief Qadhi, Officials of the Religious Department, two academics
from the University of Malaya and a representative of Wanita
UMNO 8. The legislation produced by this committee was enacted as
6 Hereafter abbreviated as IFLA.
Hukum Shara' means the laws of Islam in any recognised sects; IFLA, section 2.
8 The ladies wing of the United Malays National Orgamsation (UMNO), the ruling party in
Malaysia.
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the Islamic Family Law ( Federal Territory) Act, 1984 (Act 3O3). It
is pertinent to note that IFLA represents the fruit of an attempt to
unify and reform the existing law through a draft model presented to
the Conference of Rulers. 1° The main thrust of IFLA is the "tidying-
up" of the administrative machinery, 11
 a move that was long over-due.
These needs have been met in the new legislation. 12 However, these
legislative amendments are of little use if the wsll to enforce them does
not exist.
Part V of IFLA deals specifically with the dissolution of marriage.
Before that, the Selangor Muslim Law Enactment, 1952, which had
been adopted in full, was used. However, the 1952 Enactment is only
a law of general application. In Selangor, besides this main enactment,
the Rules on Marriage, Divorce and Reconciliation, 1967, which is
subsidiary legislation laying down the various rules and procedures of
marriage and divorce were also applied. The Rules of Marriage,
Divorce and Revocation, 1967 do not apply in Kuala Lumpur because
this legislation has not been made under the main enactment. Thus,
there were no specific rules and procedures to guide the qadhis in
conducting marriage and divorce in Kuala Lumpur. The qadhis usually
exercised their discretion in this and the procedure they followed was
still that prescribed by the Selangor rules despite the fact that there
was no legal enforcement.'3
Ibrahim, Ahmad bin Mohamed, "Recent Legislation on Islamic Law in Malaysia", Law Seminar,
International Islamic University, Petahng Jaya, July, 1986, pp. 26-27.
10 Islamic law falls within the legislative authority of the States, hence the need for the Ruler of each
state's approval.
" See Parliamentary Debate (Dewan Rakyat) December, 1986.
12 Siraj, Mehrun, Family Law, Survey of Malaysian Law, 1984, p.162.
Haji Haron, Maznah bt., Muslim Marnage and Dworce in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur,
Academic Exercise, Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, p.96.
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Before examining the provisions relating to divorce under these two
laws, a brief discussion on divorce in Islam will be made as a preface
to the main discussion in this chapter.
3.2 DIVORCE UNDER MUSLIM LAW
In Islam, the family is the primary and essential unit of social
organisation." Its proper constitution and functioning is therefore
necessary for the health and happiness of society and this is attained
through the institution of marriage. Muslim jurists unanimously declare
it both a sacred and a social contract. It is considered sacred because
marriage is declared and regulated by the injunctions of God. And it
is also social because on it depends the constitution and well-being of
society.' 5
 Marriage combines the nature of both ibadat (worship) and
muamalat (social relations).' 6
 Because marriage in Islam is the basis
of society, the means by which the race is perpetuated, it has always
been viewed by Sunni Muslims as a permanent institution. The Qur'an
has enjoined a formal permanent contract between man and woman as
the basis of matrimonial life; and all kinds of temporary sexual contact
between man and woman have therefore been forbidden.'7
According to Sunni when the parties enter a marital contract, the
intention must be clear to make the bond permanent. However, to
insist on the permanent character of marriage does not mean that the
marital contract is absolutely indissoluble. In spite of the sacred
' Hassan Ibrahim Hassan, Islam: Religious. Political, Social and Economic Study. Beirut, 1967,
p.255.
See Siddiqi, Mohammad Mazheruddin, Women in Islam, Lahore, Institute of Islamic Culture,
1966, pp. 50-5 1; Abd-AI Ati, Hammudah, Islam in Focus, Indiana, American Trust Publications,
1977, p. 179.
16 Esposito, John, Women in Muslim Family Law, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1982, p. 16.
17 Marghinani, Hedaya translated by Charles Hamilton, Lahore, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1957, p.73.
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character of the marriage-tie, Islam recognises the necessity of keeping
the way open for its dissolution by divorce. Islam does not recommend
the sacramental nature of marriage that renders the marriage
indissoluble and would cause great hardship to both the parties if
marriage proved to be incompatible.'8
A marriage unites two different individuals by love and affection and
two different families by a bond of kinship. When these objects, among
others, fail, the continuation of a marriage may not be in the interest
of the spouses. Under such circumstances, it is permissible to break the
marriage bond. As stated by Wilson, in the Muslim system of law,
divorce or dissolution of the marriage is a "makeshift" solution for the
purpose of avoiding the evil consequences of an unhappy marriage.'9
As pointed out by Abdur Rahim, marriage under Muslim law partakes
of the nature of both a sacramenL.and a civil contract. 2° Consistent
with this view, provisions were made for legal action to protect the
rights of each partner if the terms of the contract were not met. Under
such circumstances, an attempt is first to be made for reconciliation by
referring the matter to arbitration. Thus it is laid down in the Quran,
"And if you fear a breach between the two (husband and wife),
then appoint an arbiter from his (husband's) people and an
arbiter from her (wife's) people. if they desire agreement, Allah
will effect harmony between them. "21
18 Al Faruqi, Ismail R, Islam, Niles, Illinois, Argus Cominumcations 1979, p.48-9; see also Hanifi,
Manzoor, A Survey of Muslim Institutions and Qilture, Lahore, Sb. Muhammad Ashraf, 1962
p.236.
19 Wilson, R.K, Anglo-Muhammedan Law: A Digest, London, 1930, p.53.
Rahim, Abdur, The Principles of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, Lahore, PLD Pubhshers, 1958,
p.327.
21 Al Qur'an, Surah An Nisa: 35.
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According to the spirit of Islamic law, the marriage may only be
dissolved if disagreement continues and effort to bring about a
reconciliation meet with failure. 22 Judicial separation in which the
aggrieved spouse is allowed to live separately from the other without
the marriage being dissolved is an institution not recognised by Muslim
law. The reason for this is that the objects of marriage are not
restored by a judicial separation, while it may result in immorality
which in Islam is an evil far greater than divorce.
Muslim jurists have held different views regarding divorce in Islam.
According to some, divorce is generally prohibited but is permissible
in cases of necessity. It is stated in Al-Radd Al-Mukhtar, dealing with
Hanafi law, that although divorce is forbidden, it becomes mubah
(permissible) for certain reasons. When there is no cause for
separation, there is no necessity for release. Thus, if there is no legal
ground for talag, then it must be considered unlawful. This is based on
the principles in the Quran that says,
"So if they (your women) obey you, seek not a way against
them. "23
It is stated that Abu Hanifah believe that if there is no urgent need
for release from the marriage-tie, the divorce is haram (forbidden).24
Divorce without good cause is a specific injury that is not allowed
under Islamic law. This is based on the sayings of the Prophet:
"There must be no injury and no ill-treatment in Islamic. "25
Ahmad, K.N, The Muslim Law of Divorce, Islamabad, Pakistan, Islamic Research Institute, 1972,
p.4.
Al Qur'an, Surah An Nisa': 34.
24 Hj. Ibrahim, Hj Said bin, Persekitaran Talak dan Rujuk, Siniposium Rumah Tanjza Bahagia,
Institute Technology Mara, 1987.
Anderson, 1950, p.179.
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The Qur'an enjoins some forbearance, as Ibrahim showed when he
analysed these verses chronologically and wrote that the first Muslim
regulation about talag seems to be the prohibition to use it for
extortions from the woman. 26
 He quoted Surah An Nisa' verse 24:
"0 Believer, it is unlawful for you to inherit women against
their will, neither debar them, that you may go off with part of
what you have given them, except when they commit a manifest
indecency. Consort with them honourably; or if you are averse
to them, it is possible you may be averse to a thing, and God
set in it much good."
Traditional jurists regarded marriage as a civil contract, so it follows
that divorce is a simpler matter in Islam than it is in other religions
and legal systems. However, some modernist Islamic scholars lay great
emphasis on those Quranic verses and traditions in which divorce is
looked upon with great disfavour. Furthermore, they tend to
recommend some means of settlement for family disputes other than
of divorce.
The Prophet (s.a.w) is reported to have said that if any woman asks
her husband for divorce without any strong reason the odour of
paradise will be forbidden to her. 27
 These negative attitudes toward
divorce in Islam are also clearly reflected in the opinions of Hanafi
jurists. As the Hedaya says, divorce is:
"...a dangerous and disapproved procedure as it dissolves
marriage, an institution which involves many circumstances as
well of a temporal as of a spiritual nature, nor is its property
at all admitted, but on the grounds of urgency of release from
an unsuitable wife. "28
Hj. Ibrahim, 1987.
All, Maulana Muhammad, A Manual of Hadith, Lahore, The Ajmadiyya Anjuman Jshaat Islam,
1944, p.284.
Marghinani, 1957, p.73.
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From the above, it can be seen that in Islam, divorce, when not
absolutely necessary, is strongly dissapproved of and discouraged. This
has been done in two ways, namely, by condemning divorce except in
certain circumstances and commending forbearance and the
continuation of marital relationship even in cases of disagreement and
some suffering. Divorce is permitted as a matter of necessity for the
avoidance of greater evil which may result from the continuance of a
marriage. Every attempt should be made to maintain a marriage but
once the marriage becomes a failure, Muslim law allows the parties to
separate from one another. Therefore, divorce in Islam serves as a
safety valve in cases where the spouses can no longer live in harmony
and where the very purpose of marriage would be defeated if they
remained together.
3.3 DIVORCE LAW IN KUALA LUMPUR
There are various forms of divorce practised under Muslim law but the
more common ones in Kuala Lumpur are: talag, khulu', fasakh, and
ta'lig. These are the forms of dissolution of marriage that are
recognised under IFLA. There are three more forms that are described
by classical jurists, but have little practical relevance now:
(a) Zihar - that is when the husband compares his wife to a relative
within a prohibited degree, for example to his mother.29
(b) Vow of Continence (Ila), that is when the husband makes an
oath of abstention from the wife for four months or more.3°
(c) Imprecation (1jj,) where the husband affirms under oath that
the wife has committed adultery and that the child born of her
is not his, and she affirms under oath the contrary.3'
This is based on Al Qur'an, Surah Al Mujadilla, verse 1-4.
3° This is based on Al-Our'an, Surah Al-Baqarah: 226.
31 This is based on Al Qur'an, Surah An-Nuc 6-9.
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3.3.1 Talaq
The most common manner of divorcing a wife by a Muslim husband is
by a pronouncement of a talag or repudiation against her. The word
talag is an Arabic word derived from a root word "tallaqa" meaning
"to release from a tether". Talag. in its primitive sense, therefore
means dismissal. In law, it signifies the dissolution of a marriage.32
The institution of talag finds its sanction in the Qur'an.
"Thus when they fulfilled their term appointed, either take them
back on equitable terms or part with them on equitable
terms.
The instructions of the Prophet (s.a.w) also serve as an authority for
the recognition of divorce by talag. The Prophet (s.a.w) is reported to
have said that:
"The most detestable of all things permitted by God is a!
talag
As discussed above, it is obvious that talag, though permissible is
strongly condemned in Islam. However once it is pronounced by a
husband who is agil. that is of sound mind and mature age, it is valid
irrespective of whatever the cause may have been. No particular
formula or words have been prescribed by the Sunni law for
pronouncing a divorce. The pronouncement of talag according to
Shafi'i school, if it is in explicit terms (sarih) and therefore indicates
a clear intention to dissolve a marriage, is valid and effective. Explicit
terms include repudiation, separation and dismissal. If on the other
hand, the pronouncement of talag is in implicit terms (kinayat), then
32 Marghinaui, 1957, p.72.
Al Qur'an. Surah At-Talaq:2.
Muslim Ibn Al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Vol IV, translated by Abdul Hameed Siddiqi, Lahore, Sh.
Muhammad Ashraf, 1976 p.756.
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the husband must really intend to repudiate his wife. Any words can
serve the purpose so long as they clearly denote the husband's
intention to divorce his wife.
A husband may pronounce one, two or three talags (severally or
jointly) to his wife. Any other declarations that are implied, and with
the intention that the husband divorces his wife, are considered as
divorce by one talag. For example, when the husband says "I have
released you" or "go back to your family", this may or may not
constitute divorce. The verdict depends on the husband's intention. If
his intention is to divorce his wife it is considered as a divorce by one
talag. Talaq may be given verbally or in writing. In the Kedah case of
Haji Hanafiah v Rokiah, 35 the Appeal Board held that a written talag
read by the husband was ineffective since he had no intention to
divorce his wife.
Under the Hanafi school of law, the talag is effective even when
uttered under compulsion or in jest. The talag is also effective if
uttered when the husband is drunk. 36 Where as under the Shafi'i
school, a talag extorted under violence has no legal effect, unless it
duly appears that the husband already had the intention of repudiating
his wife. When a person has temporarily lost his reason through liquor
or medicine, according to the majority of Shafi'i's opinion, he is
nonetheless capable of pronouncing talag. 37 Divorce may be
pronounced before or after the consummation of marriage. Regarding
repudiation prior to consummation, the Quran says:
[1970] 2 J.H p.103.
Marghinani, 1957, p.76.
Nawawi, Yahya ibn Sharif, Minhaj-et-Talibin, A Manual of Muhammadan Law According to the
School of Shafi'i, translation by E.0 Howard, London, W.Thacker, 1914, p. 330.
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"0 You who believe! When you marry believing women, and
then repudiate them before you have touched them, no period
of iddah have you to count in respect of them, so give them a
present and set them free according to decent custom."
The Hanafi classify the talag according to the number of times it is
pronounced and the circumstances applying, viz:
a) talag al Sunnah, that is the repudiation which conforms with
the dictate of the Prophet (s.a.w) and therefore approved and;
b) talag a! Bid'ah, that is, the repudiation which does not
conform with the dictate of the Prophet (s.a.w) and is
regarded as "bid'ah" or innovated and therefore not approved.
The talag al-sunnah is the only mode that is plainly recognised by the
Quran, so it is regarded as being the most regular and proper mode of
repudiation. It is of two kinds; ahsan (most laudable) and hasan
(laudable).
(i)	 Ahsan repudiation is where the husband repudiates his wife
with a single sentence during the period of her tuhr
(purity) where he has not had sexual relations with her and
then leaves her untill the expiry of her iddah (waiting
period). This mode of divorce is termed the most laudable for
two reasons. First, because the companion of the Prophet (s.a.w)
esteemed most those who gave no more than one divorce until
the expiry of the iddah, as holding this to be a more excellent
method than that of giving three divorces, by repeating the
sentence on each of the two succeeding tuhr or periods of purity.
Secondly, because in pursuing this method the husband leaves it
still in his power, to restore his wife, if he should be so inclined,
by a reversal of the divorce during her iddah. This method is
moreover, the least harmful to the woman, as she remains a
lawful wife.38
Marghinani, 1957, p.72.
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(ii) Hasan; the hasan form is where a husband repudiates a wife by
three sentences of divorces, in three tuhrs. Each of these
repudiations should have been made at a time when no carnal
connection has taken place during that particular period of
purity. On the third repudiation the talag becomes irrevocable
and final.
a Talag aI-Bid'ah.
This is the opposite form to the talag al-sunnah. The very name
"bid'ah" signifies its irregularity and it is therefore a disapproved form
of talag, as it does not comply with the direction of the Sunnah and
finds no sanction in the Quran. It is considered as bid'ah to repudiate
one's wife during her menstruation periods or during her purity but
after having had intercourse. It is also regarded as bid'ah (a) to
repudiate one's wife with three talags in a single period of purity
whether in one sentence or in three sentences; (b) to divorce with one
single but irrevocable talag either during the period of purity or even
at other times.
The Maliki and Hanbali schools do not regard the form of repudiation,
which the Hanafi school term the "hasan" form, as al-sunnah. On the
ground that divorce being in itself a dangerous and disapproved
procedure, it is only because of the urgency of release from an
unsuitable partner that the law gives sanction to a divorce, and this
urgency is fully answered by a single tuhr. after which the woman
should be left till the expiry of the iddah.
It must be noted that the Shafi'i school of law as followed in Malaysia
divides talag into two kinds, that is talag raj'i or revocable divorce and
talag bain or irrevocable divorce. Talag has three stages before it
becomes final and irrevocable, with each stage consisting of a single
divorce. The first two divorces or repudiations are revocable in the
sense that a husband is allowed to revoke the divorce by the process
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known as ruju' (revocation of divorce). In such a case,there is no need
for a fresh contract of marriage if the wife is still in her iddah. 39 This
is because, during the iddah period, the marital rights do not cease,
otherwise, a fresh contract of marriage is essential. This provision is
based on the Quranic ruling:
"and their husbands have the better right to take them back in
that period if they wish for reconciliation" and "Repudiated
women shall wait concerning themselves for three monthly
periods. "40
By the third talag however, the wife becomes decisively divorced and
the talag is irrevocable. This is based on the Quranic ruling that "A
divorce is only permissible twice: after that the parties should either
hold together on equitable terms or separate with kindness."4'
Thus, it can be seen that in this form of divorce, it is necessary to
repeat the declaration of divorce three times in three different tuhrs
and to abstain from sexual intercourse with the wife during the whole
of this period. The divorce becomes absolute and irrevocable on the
pronouncement of third divorce unless revoked in the meantime. In
fiqh terminology it is called irrevocable divorce of major degree, that
is talag bain kubra, and as a result of it, the husband cannot re-enter
into a marriage contract with the same wife, unless she has married
and has been divorced from him or the second husband has died.42
Iddah literally means counting or numeration. In Islam, it means the period of time after a
marriage is dissolved before the wife can many agam. The period refers to three periods of
menstruation and is calculated to be three months and ten days in Malaysia.
4° Al Qurn, Surah Al Baqarah :228.
41 Al Qurn, Surah Al Baqarah: 229.
42 Hj. Ibrahim, 1987.
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According to Naser, this kind of talag has resulted in many abuses of
Quranic regulations. First, it bypassed the waiting period (iddah) that
the Quran had intended for reconciliation. Furthermore, since this
form of divorce is irrevocable, remarriage was impossible without an
intervening marriage of the wife to another man. Among the practices
that resulted was that of tahlil (making lawful). Its aim was the
circumvention of the impediment to remarriage resulting from a triple
repudiation. The former (divorced) husband would arrange the
marriage of his former wife to another man (muhallil) with the
understanding that upon consummation (real or pretended) the second
man would then divorce her. Only then would the former husband and
wife be free to remarry. 43
 Such a process is also practised in Malaysia
and is well known as "Cina Buta". 44
 Some legal scholars, such as Ibn
Taimiyya condemned tahlil as an abuse of the spirit of the law and
thus invalid.45
Therefore, it can be seen that Muslim law, while it permits divorce,
insists that there shall be some guarantee that the husband or the wife
is not acting from caprice or frivolity or on the impulse of a
momentary provocation. For this purpose, certain restrictions as
discussed above are imposed by the law upon the spouses' right to
dissolve their marriage. This cautious attitude towards divorce forms
the basis of the al-talag al-sunnah under which marriage is terminated
only after a minimum period of three terms of the wife's menstrual
courses from the time of the pronouncement of divorce. During this
period the husband has the option to take the wife back.
Nasir, Jamal J., The Status of Women under Islamic Law and Under Modem Islamic Legislation,
London, Graham and Trotman Ltd., 1990.
' "China Buta", the derisive term used for the Arabic "muhallil" or person who agrees to marry a
woman with the promise to divorce her after consummation of the mamage, so as to enable her
to remarry her former husband, who has divorced her for the third time. Although allowed the
device is regarded as sinful.
For further details, see El Alami, Dawoud, The Marria ge Contract in Islamic Law in the Shariah
and Personal status Laws of Egwt and Morocco, London, Graham and Trotman, 1992.
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Some jurists are of the opinion, that three talags pronounced with one
sentence or in three sentences will count as only one talag on the basis
of the instruction of the Prophet that talag should be given only once
during the period of purity and on the understanding of the Quranic
verse 46
 that gives the impression that the decisive talag that is talag
kubra has three stages on three separate occassions. The report by Ibn
Abbas saying that the procedure of talag in the time of Prophet
(s.a.w), the Caliph of Abu Bakar and for two years in the Caliph of
Umar, was that talag pronounced three times on one occasion was a
single talag. Also Umar has said that since people in his time had
made haste in a matter that offered them an opportunity for
deliberation, they were bound by their decisions.47
From the above statement, it can be seen that the validity of this triple
divorce resulted from the consultation between Umar and his
counsellors. The aim was to discourage the growing frequency of its
use. It was also intended as a punishment to those who disregarded the
rule of talag as directed by God. In other words, the jurists who held
the opinion that double or triple talag should be counted as only a
single revocable divorce were in fact following the practice as
established in the Prophet's time.
Mutararrif bin Abd Allah reported that Imran bin Hussain was asked
about a person who divorces his wife and then has intercourse with her
but does not call any witness to her divorce nor her restoration. He
said:
Al Qur'an. Surah Al Baqarah :229.
Muslim, 1976, p.1099.
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"You divorced against the Sunnah and took her back against
the Sunnah. Call someone to bear witness to her divorce and
to her return to marriage and do not repeat "48
In another hadith it is said that Ibn Umar said he divorced his wife
while she was menstruating and Umar mentioned the matter to the
Prophet. The Prophet (s.a.w) said:
"Order him he must take her back until she is purified, then
has another menstrual period and is purified. Thereafter if he
desires he may divorce her before having intercourse with her,
for that is the period of waiting which Allah the Glorified has
commanded for the divorce of women."49
It is clear from the Qur'an and Sunnah that divorce should not be
pronounced at the whim and fancy of the husband but should only be
effected for good reason and where it is obvious that the parties can
no longer live within the limits ordained by Allah and that the
marriage has irretrievably broken down. It is stated in the Qur'an that;
"And among His signs is this, that he created for you spouses
from among yourselves, that you may dwell in tranquillity with
them and He has put love and mercy between your hearts.
Verily is that are signs for those who reflect. "50
Al Bukhari, Muhammad ibn Ismail, Sahth Al Bukhari, Vol VI, Translation by Muhammad Muhsin
Khan, Hilal Yayinlain, Ankara, Turkey, 1976, p.129.
Ibid.
Al Qur'an, Surah Al Rum:21.
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3.3.2 Procedure for TaIaq5'
IFLA has provided an elaborate procedure for divorce by way of
pronouncement of talag by the husband. 52 It is provided in Kuala
Lumpur that the court can make an order of divorce or permit a
husband to pronounce a talag if the marriage has been registered or
deemed to be registered under the Act, and the marriage was
contracted in accordance with Hukum Shara'. It is also required that
the residence of either of the parties to the marriage at the time when
the application is presented is in Kuala Lumpur. 53 A husband or wife
who desires divorce shall present an application for divorce to the
court in the prescribed form, accompanied by a statutory declaration.
Upon receiving an application for divorce, the court shall cause a
summons to be served on the other party. If the other party consents
to the divorce and the court is satisfied after inquiry and investigation
that the marriage has irretrievably broken down, the court shall advise
the husband to pronounce one talag before the court.
Where the other party does not consent to the divorce or it appears
to the court that there is reasonable possibility of a reconciliation
between the parties, the court shall as soon as possible appoint a
conciliatory committee consisting of a religious officer as Chairman
and two other persons, one to act for the husband and the other for
the wife, and refer the case to the committee. In appointing the two
persons, the court shall give preference to close relatives of the parties
having knowledge of the circumstances of the case. The court may give
directions to the conciliatory committee as to the conduct of the
conciliation and if the court is not satisfied with the conciliation, the
51 Personal conversation with Ustaz Mohammad Ibrahun, Registrar of Shana Court, Kuala Lumpur,
in December, 1992.
52 IFLA, section 47.
IFLA, section 45.
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court may remove the committee and appoint another committee in its
place.
The Committee shall endeavour to effect reconciliation within a period
of six months. If it fails to reconcile the parties, a certificate will be
issued to that effect. If within this period the couple are reconciled,
the application will be dismissed. If there is no reconciliation, the
husband will be asked to pronounce a talag. If he refuses, the matter
will be referred to a hakam. 54
 A hakam is very similar to the earlier
committee stated in section 47. The two arbitrators too are relatives
of the parties or persons aware of the circumstances of the case. The
difference with the earlier committee lies;-
i. if the parties give the arbitrators full authority, the arbitrators
may pronounce the talag on behalf of the husband.
ii. if they have not, the court will then appoint another hakam to
pronounce the talag or order the divorce.55
This procedure is based on the recommendation found in the Qur'an
that in the case of marital disputes, this method of settlement must
be adopted. The judges are required to try to reconcile the couple,
failing which a divorce would be the last resort. In fact in this
procedure certain limitations are placed upon the exercise of this right
and the husband is not permitted to use it arbitrarily.56
IFLA, section 48.
Ibid.
Personal conversation with Sheikh Ghazali Abdul Rahinan, Chief Qadhi, Sharih Court, Federal
Territory of Kuala Lumpur in March 1992.
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The verse on hakam 57
 justifies the idea that no formula of divorce
should be pronounced outside a court of law, before making any
attempt at reconciliation.58
The requirement for reference to a conciliatory committee is not
applicable in the following cases:
a. desertion;
b. where the other party residing outside West Malaysia and it is
unlikely that she/he will be within the jurisdiction of the court
within six months after the date of application;
c. where the other party is imprisoned for a term of three years or
more;
d. where the applicant alleges that the other party is suffering
	 from
incurable mental illness; or
e. where the court is satisfied that there are exceptional
circumstances that make reference to a conciliatory committee
impracticable.59
Before the IFLA came into force in Kuala Lumpur, the 1952
Enactment failed to set out the particular conditions and procedures
in its administration of divorce. As stated above, the Rules on
Marriage, Divorce and Revocation 1967 of Selangor were not adopted.
The only law that applied and acted as guidance is the 1952 Muslim
Law Enactment that only gave the general principles as to the
administration of Muslim law.
However, it has been seen that the qadhis used their own discretion
and made several attempts to curb the power of the husband. First,
Al Qur'an. Surah An Nisa':35.
Khan, Qamaruddin. The Right of Divorce, Karachi, Dawn, 1982.
IFLA, section 47 (15).
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they required the petitioner to fill in a specific form for the
application of divorce. This form (MUIWP 3/75) which is to be filled
by the petitioner discloses the causes of the break in marital ties. In
this form, the party seeking divorce will also have to state all
particulars especially those relating to maintenance during iddah, and
specify the amount to be given to the children who are often in his
former wife's custody. There must be two witnesses to the divorce and
they are required to attest and sign the document of application. The
contents of the form will be subjected to scrutiny by the qadhi and if
he is satisfied that all the facts are true and attempts at reconciliation
have failed, and assures himself that whatever is stated in the form has
been complied with, he may grant the divorce.
Although this requirement is a commendable step towards an attempt
to curb the increase in the number of divorces each year, it appears
from a study made by Haron that a large number of divorces still take
place at home instead at the qadhi's office. Only when the talag has
been pronounced does the husband register the divorce and only at
that particular time do they fill in the application form for divorce.
This has killed the motive behind the requirement of the application
for a divorce form.6°
IFLA has improved the situation by having a provision requiring both
parties to apply for divorce. 61
 Any man who divorces his wife by
pronouncement of talag in any form outside the Court and without the
permission of the Court commits an offence punishable by a fine not
exceeding one thousand Malaysian ringgit or by imprisonment not
exceeding six months or both.62
Haji Haron, 1976, p.46.
61 IFLA, section 47.
62 IflA, section 124.
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In the other states in Peninsular Malaysia, the same procedure applies
except that the express provision that a husband must ztpply on the
prescribed form to the Qadhi or the Registrar of the locality in which
the divorce takes place for permission to divorce his wife is not
stipulated. The only requirement is that the husband must report the
divorce.
However, in Pahang, a report of a divorce or revocation must be made
within fifteen days and not seven days as in other states. Upon receipt
of such form from a husband who intends to divorce or has divorced
his wife, the Registrar shall for the purpose of effecting a
reconciliation investigate the applicant and his wife. Every husband and
wife intending to have a divorce may together appear in person before
the Registrar in the area in which they reside. If the husiband and the
wife cannot be reconciled, the divorce shall be effected Jbut all rights
between husband and wife shall first be determined by consent of both
parties in the presence of the Registrar. In such a case the husband
shall pay by way of advance to the Registrar a sum not hess than one
month's personal expenses unless the divorce does nort require the
husband to provide maintenance.
Every divorce must be registered. When the divorce has been
registered the Registrar shall issue a certificate of divorce to the
husband and the wife but if the divorce is revocable the certificate of
divorce shall be given to the wife on her completing the iddah. It is
provided that it shall be an offence if a husband fails to surrender to
the wife or destroys or damages the property after the apportionment
has been made to the husband. A husband who wishes to effect a ruju'
with his former wife must fill the prescribed form and submat it to the
Registrar. The Registrar shall make an entry in the Divorce Register,
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and the certificate of divorce shall be revoked and a certificate of ruju'
issued 63
Just as marriage should be effected in love and understanding, so too
divorce should be effected with kindness and on equitable terms. The
man should not be allowed to divorce his wife in anger or to injure her
or to take undue advantage of her. A Muslim husband cannot justly
divorce his wife in the absence of reasonable grounds and without
having recourse to an attempt at reconciliation. It is unfortunate that
this basic principle regarding divorce has been abused. This conception
of law ignores the strong condemnation and disapproval of divorce in
Islam and has led many husband to abuse their power of talag. This
often results in great misery and unhappiness for the wife and children
and has made marriage insecure and the wife's position very
precarious.
It is unfortunate that in the past the law has been very lax in allowing
husbands to divorce their wives without any control with the result that
hardships and injustices have been done to many wives. This is the
reason why the law has been tightened. Under the IFLA, it is clear
that what is contemplated is that all divorces should be effected
through the court. A husband or wife who desires divorce shall present
an application for divorce to the Sharia Court. The Sharia Court will
then ensure that every effort is made to effect reconciliation between
the parties and only if the court is satisfied that the marriage has
irretrievably broken down, would the court advise the husband to
Administration of the Religion of Islam and the Malay Custom of Pahang Enactment, 1982,
sections 67,68 and 76. Kelantan Shariah Courts and Muslim Matrimonial Causes Enactment 1966,
sections 68 and 75; Trengganu Administration of Islamic Law Enactment, 1955, sections 103 and
109; Penang Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1959, sections 121 and 122, Malacca
Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1959, sections 120 and 121; Kedah Administration of
Muslim Law Enactment, 1962, sections 121 and 122; Perak Administration of Muslim Law
Enactment, 1965, section 124; Johore Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1978, section
118, Perils Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1963, sections 90, 90A and 93.
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pronounce one talag before the court. 64
 A divorce can only be
registered if there is an order of court dissolving the marriage or
permitting the talag to be pronounced before the court. 65 There seems
to be no procedure for the registration of divorces effected outside the
court66
 although a divorce effected without the court's permission is
made an offence.67
In the Qur'an and Hadith, there are rules laying down the procedure
to be followed when a person wishes to divorce his wife. These rules
are meant for the good and benefit of all parties and to avoid cruelty
and injustice. A divorce should be pronounced in accordance with
those rules and with the enactment of the Act. These rules have been
enacted in the form of law. It is the duty of judges, Sharia lawyers and
other officials to enforce the law and to advise everyone to abide by
them. If someone has not obeyed and followed the law, the court
should not rush to help him to obtain what he wants, even though he
has clearly not complied with the rules laid down and his act may bring
about cruelty and injustice.
If the procedure and rules which have been laid down by Allah and
which have been provided in the IFLA are followed, a person who
wishes to divorce his wife should pronounce one talag at a time. In
this way he is given the opportunity to exercise his right to revoke the
divorce. On the other hand if he does not want to exercise his right of
revocation, his wife will be effectively divorced at the end of the
period of iddah. If however, the wife is pregnant at the time that the
talag is pronounced or the order is made, the talag or the order shall
64 IFLA, section 47.
65 IFLA, section 54.
See proposal in Appendix II.
67 LFLA. section 124.
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not be effective until the pregnancy ends. 68
 Even in that case, he has
the opportunity to remarry her, if they both agree. If a person does
not follow this procedure and he pronounces all three talags at once,
he has no opportunity to revoke the divorce and his wife will be
revoked by talag bain, which cannot be revoked. Ahmad Ibrahim stated
that it is generally thought that the best and correct method of
pronouncing the talag is to pronounce all three divorces at once. He
recommended that this wrong belief should be rejected and corrected
by all who are involved including judges and Sharia lawyers.69
However, in a study of Malay divorce in Trengganu, Abdul Jalil found
that an average Malay in Trengganu normally gives only one talag
should he want to divorce his wife either by pronouncement or by
letter, and then lets the period of her iddah elapse. Only if a person
is completely shattered on account of his wife's gross failing does he
pronounce a triple talag at once. This triple talag is not unusual, but
it is rarely practised because it is understood that when it is uttered,
the talag becomes complete (bain kubra). Reunion cannot take place
by simply revoking the talag or entering a new marriage contract and
giving a fresh mahr if the waiting period is passed, but the divorced
woman must first marry another husband and later see that this
marriage also come to an end.7°
There is a view held in some Muslim countries where the Hanafi
school of thought is followed that in order to avoid possible
wrongdoing and injustice in this matter, a divorce coupled with a
number should be counted as one. This view has been applied in the
68 IFLA, section 47.
Ibrahini, Ahmad bin Mohamad, Perkahwinan dan Perceraian dalam Undang-Undang Islam,
Seminar Wanita dan Undang-Undanz, Kuala Lumpur, 1981.
7° Haji Hassan, Abdul Jail bin, The Influence of the Shafi'i School of Muslim Law on Marriage and
Divorce in the Malay Peninsular with Special Reference to the State of Trengganu, Ph.D Thesis,
University of St.Andrews, 1969.
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case of Re Mohd Hussin bin Abdul Ghani and Anor, 7twhich was decided
by the Appeal Board in Kuala Lumpur. However, there is no fatwa or
law in Malaysia to provide that the pronouncement of three talags at
once should take effect as one talag only. In the case of Ibrahim v
Fatimah 72 the Appeal Board held that in the absence of clear
evidence to the contrary, the talag pronounced was considered as one
talag only.
In Kuala Lumpur, which generally adheres to the Shafi'i school of
thought, a pronouncement of three talags by the husband is normally
taken as three talags. Consequently, this form of divorce cannot be
revoked even after the wife's period of iddah. These rules have caused
a lot of hardship to the wife especially if the talag has been
pronounced in haste. In Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Syria, Morocco, Tunisia,
Indonesia and Pakistan, reforms have been made and a divorce by
three talags is taken to be one and thus can be revoked. 73
 This
reform is supported not only by cogent arguments from the Qur'an but
by a statement attributed by Muslim to Ibn Abbas (and also reported
as from Ali and Abu Musa al-Ashari). This is also the view of
Muhammad bin Ishaq, Daud al-Zahiri, various doctors of Cordova, and
later jurists such as Ibn Taimiyyah and Ibn Qaiyyim al-Jauziyyah.74
The practice adopted by the Sharia Court of Singapore is that when a
divorce by three talags has been pronounced by a man all at once and
in the same place, the court will declare that there has been one talag.
It is only where the three talags have been pronounced three times on
three different occasions that the court will declare that there has been
71 [1990] 2 M.LJ lxxv.
(1979) I J.H Part I p.74.
Abmad, 1972, p.88.
Anderson, J.N.D, The Problem of Divorce in the Sharia Law of Islam, Journal of the Royal
Central Asian Society. 37, 1950, p.Ifl.
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a divorce by three talags. In Malaysia, the opinion of Shafi'i is still
dominant. However, the court should exercise caution in confirming
such a divorce and should always examine the matter carefully and in
detail.
In Rojmah bte Abdul Kadir v Mohsin bin Ahmad, 75 the matter of
divorce was not treated with care and circumspection. The husband
respondent claimed that he had on 10th January 1990 divorced his wife
by pronouncing three talags in her presence. He subsequently applied
to the Sharia Court under Section 47 of IFLA to divorce his wife
officially. At the hearing before the Sharia Court, the wife denied that
the husband had pronounced the divorce in her presence on the date
stated. From the record of the learned judge, it appears that the
husband was not certain when he pronounced the divorce. This clearly
goes against the regulation fixed by Allah that requires the divorce to
be pronounced "at their prescribed periods and count accurately their
prescribed periods." The burden of calling witnesses to prove his case
lies on the husband. From the record of the trial, the Sharia Appeal
Board came to a conclusion that the judge hearing the case in the first
instance gave more weight to the evidence of the lawyers rather than
the evidence of the parties themselves. No witness was produced by the
husband regarding the pronouncement of the divorce. According to the
Sharia Appeal Board in a case where the pronouncement of the
divorce is disputed, it would have been better if the learned judge had
called for and considered all the evidence available. As there were
many defects and omissions in the trial before the trial judge, the
Appeal Board, ordered that the case be retried before another judge.
The learned judge who is asked to rehear the case should hear the
witnesses produced, record all the evidence and the arguments offered
and decide whether the husband has pronounced the divorce as stated
by him.
[1991] 3 M.LJ.
203
In Pakistan, to discourage hasty exercise of the husband's right of
repudiation (talag), the law requires written notice to the Chairman of
the Arbitration Council as well as to the wife. 76
 A ninety day waiting
period is required during which the Council will seek to reconcile the
couple. 77
 Divorce will not take effect until the ninety day period has
elapsed or, if the wife is pregnant, the completion of pregnancy.78
Although failure to observe the above procedures is punishable by a
fine and/or imprisonment, these penalties are relatively light, that is
imprisonment of up to one year or a fine of up to 5,000 rupees.79
The Tunisian law of Personal Status, 1956, is quite similar to IFLA in
that a unilateral pronouncement of divorce is no longer possible. Talag
is dependent upon the consent of the court and in all circumstances a
decree of divorce shall only be granted if all possible efforts to effect
a reconciliation between the couple have failed. Arbitrators will oniy
be appointed if one party to the marriage alleges ill-treatment but has
no proof to substantiate the allegation. The arbitrators however have
no power to decree any divorce and all their decisions must be refered
to the court. 8° Should a husband divorce his wife, he is enjoined by
the Qur'an to give her a consolatory gift or mut'ah as understood from
the following verse;
"There is no blame on you if you divorce women before
consummation or the fixation of their dower, but bestow on
them (a suitable gift) the wealthy according to his means, and
the poor according to his means. "81
76 Family Law Ordinance, section 7.1.
Ibid. section 7.4.
78 Ibid, Sec. 73 and 7.5.
Ibid, section 7.2.
The Tunisian Law of Personal Status, Article 25,31 and 32.
Al Our'an, Surah Al Baqarah: 236.
204
Section 56 of IFLA gives a woman who has been divorced without just
cause by her husband, a right besides maintenance during iddah to
apply to the Court for mut'ah or a consolatory gift. The Court may
order the husband to pay such sum as may be fair and just according
to Hukum Shara'.82
IFLA also provides that pronouncement of talag or order of divorce
shall not be registered unless the Chief Registrar is satisfied that the
Court has made a final order or orders for the custody and
maintenance of the dependent children. This also includes maintenance
and accommodation of the divorced wife, and for the payment of
mut'ah to her. 83
 This provision is an improvement from the previous
law. It is unfortunate that previously, Malaysian jurists overlooked this
basic concept regarding divorce, and did not take into consideration
the hardship caused to a wife as a result of it. It cannot be gainsaid
that the previous practice which allows a husband to divorce his wife
unscrupulously, not only contravenes the basic principle of Muslim law
of marriage and divorce but also ruins the life of the wife and
children. In some cases, it even leaves the wife absolutely destitute.
The present Baitul Mal (Public Treasury) does not support divorced
women and their dependent children. It is assumed that their former
husband will be responsible for their welfare. Therefore it is necessary
that this provision be fully enforced so that the welfare of these
women and their children are taken care of in keeping with the basic
principle of Muslim law.
3.3.3 Khulu'
It is a misconception that Islam neglects the right of wife by awarding
the right of talag to the husband. In fact, Islam also gives the wife the
82 IFLA, section 56
83 IFIA, section 55.
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right to claim the dissolution of her marriage if there is apprehension
that she "will transgress the limits of God." For example in the case
when she deeply detests her husband and can no longer perform the
marital duties prescribed by the divine laws, she can take steps to
terminate the marriage. In such a case, she is permitted to compensate
her husband out of her property in lieu of a form of dissolution in her
favour known as khulu' 84 or divorce by redemption. Although her
right requires application to the court, the chances of succeeding are
not as slim as one would initially infer, because there are two other
forms of divorce available, that is fasakh and ta'liq.
Khulu', relates to a metaphoric description of the spouses in the
Quranic verse; "They are an apparel for you and you are apparel for
them."85 The Qur'an describes the closeness of the relationship of
married couples as both being garments for each other. Therefore,
their separation in this sense would mean the taking off of each other's
garments. In its technical term, khulu' is the divorce of husband and
wife for a compensation paid by the wife to the husband.
The following Qur'anic revelation serves as an authority for the
recognition of dissolution of marriage by khulu' in Islam:
"If ye (judges) do indeed fear that they would be unable to
keep the limits ordained by Allah, there is no blame on either
of them if she gives something for her freedom. These are the
limits ordained by Allah, so do not transgress them. "86
84 The Arabic form is Khulu' which literally means "to take off clothes" and hence "to lay down one's
authority over a wife". It is variously spelt "kholo" or "khula"in the States of Malaysia. The Malay
equivalent is "cerai tebus talak" or literally, divorce by redemption of the
85 Al Our'an,, Surah Al Baqarah: 187.
Al Qur'au, Surah Al Baqarah: 229.
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This verse permits a wife to redeem herself by giving some
consideration to her husband and permits the latter to accept it in
exchange for his repudiation when they cannot live according to God's
will. Morally and religiously, it is reprehensible for a husband to take
anything from the wife if actual aversion is from his part. Otherwise,
if the aversion is from the wife, it is also morally reprehensible for him
to take more than he has given to her. The basis of this approval can
be derived from the Quranic verse;
"and if you wish to exchange one wife for another and you
have given unto them a sum of money, take nothing from it.
Would you take it by the way of calumny and open. How can
you take it (back) after one of you hath gone into the other,
and they have taken a strong pledge from you."87
These two verses show that when the husband desires to replace one
wife with another as the result of his aversion for example, he must
not take back anything from her. Khulu' according to Ibn Qudamma is
valid without any payment on the wife's part. Anderson claimed that
Khulu' is a dissolution of marriage granted by the husband in exchange
for a payment by the wife-usually, but not necessarily, the return of
her dower. 88
 The Egyptian Code, Article 175 based upon the classical
authorities also lays down that a khulu' repudiation can validly takes
place before or after consummation of the marriage, and without
payment of compensation by the wife.
Khulu' also finds sanction in the traditions of the Prophet (s.a.w). Ibn
Abbas reported that Jamilah, the wife of Tsabit bin Qais came to the
Prophet (s.a.w) and said,
87 Al Qur'a, Surah An Nisa': 20-21.
Anderson, J.N.D., Islamic law in the Modern World, New York, New York University Press, 1959,
p32.
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"Oh Messenger of Allah, I do not blame Tsabit for defects in
his character or his religion, but I dislike ingratitude in Islam.
The Messenger of Allah asked if she is prepared to return the
garden given to her by Tsa bit. She said, "Yes ". Then the
Prophet (s.a.w) said to Tsabit, "Accept the garden and divorce
her once. "89
This tradition shows that there was an order from the Prophet to
Tsabit to take back the garden given by him to his wife as mahr and
give her a single talag, as the Prophet (s.a.w) was satisfied that the
couple could not amicably live together and he never asked for the
consent of her husband. As a result of the above evidence, therefore,
one could deduce that khulu' is the right of the wife to claim her
release from a marriage bond with a husband she detests, just as talag
is the right of the husband to dissolve his marriage with a woman
whom he cannot live with.
The Report of the Commission on Marriage and Family laws in
Pakistan endorses this view in the following statement;
khula, that is divorce sought by the wife, there is a
consensus of opinion that Islam has granted this right to the
woman if she foregoes the mehr or a part of it, if it is so
demanded by the husband. There is a universally accepted
Hadith about a khula divorce which arose between a woman of
the name of Jamila and her husband Sabit (Tsabit) ibn Qais.
The Holy Prophet granted the divorce on the basis of extreme
incompatibility of temperament only; no other accusation was
made by the wife as a ground for the demand of divorce. We
are recommending that incompatibility of temperament should
not give the wife a right to demand a divorce except in the
khula form."9°
In Islam, therefore, both sexes have been given the right of dissolving
their marriage vow, so that neither party must be forced to continue
A1-Bukhari, 1976, p.150.
Khurshid Ahmad, Studies in the Family Law of I1am, 2nd. ed., Karachi, 1961, pp.61-2.
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in marriage where the objects of marriage have been frustrated.
Although a woman has the right to claim khulu', there is an important
limitation on this right. It is considered sinful for any woman to
demand khulu' without necessity and this can be deduced from the
tradition of the Prophet (s.a.w) which bears the meaning that any
woman who asks her husband for a divorce without necessity will lose
heaven.9'
Khulu' operates as a single irrevocable repudiation or talag after the
wife offers and the husband accepts compensation out of her property
for the release of his marital rights. It is classified as a talag bain
sughra. The obvious consequence is that marital life cannot be resumed
by reconciliation but a fresh contract of marriage with a new mahr is
necessary. It must be noted that according to the Shafi'i school of law,
it is not compulsory for the husband to accept the compensation
offered by the wife and to grant her divorce. His consent is necessary
and he cannot be forced to give a khulu' divorce.
This has been shown in the Penang case of Rokiah v Abu Bakar,92
where the court decided that a divorce by khulu' must be by the
consent of the husband.
However, the situation in Pakistan is very different. Initially, the full
bench Pakistan Supreme Court decided in the case of Sayeeda Khanam
v. Muhd. Sami, 93
 that if wives were allowed to dissolve their marriage
without consent of their husbands by merely giving up their dowers, the
institution of marriage would be meaningless as there would be no
stability attached to it. However, in Baiqis Fatima v Najm -uI-Ikram
91 Hj. Ibrahim, 1987.
Taylor, E.N., "Mohammedan Divorce by Khula", in Journal of the Ro yal Asiatic Society, (1948)
Vol. 21 Part 2, p.10.
(1952) P.L.D Lahore 113.
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Qureshl94 the High Court of Lahore asserted its right to grant a
khulu' divorce where serious incompatibility made a harmonious
marriage impossible. According to Hanafi law, a khulu' divorce is extra
judicial, based on mutual agreement and, most importantly, dependent
upon the husband's consent for its validity. However, basing themselves
on the Qur'an Surah Al Bagarah verse 229:
"If ye (judges) do indeed fear that they would be unable to
keep the limits ordained by God, there is no blame on either of
them if she give something for her freedom."
The court interpretation was that the hakam has the power to separate
the spouses and so dissolve their marriage. Thus the court, through its
interpretation of Islamic sources, departed from the traditional Hanafi
law and allowed judicial dissolution of a marriage by a judge upon the
evidence that:
"... the limits of God will not be observed, that is, in their
relations to one another, the spouses will not obey God, that a
harmonious married state as envisaged by Islam, will not be
possible.
According to the court, the requirement set for a wife seeking such a
divorce was to show that incompatibility prevented a harmonious
marriage and to return her dower. The court's attempt to remedy the
social injustice suffered by women can be seen in the Justices'
observation that the marriage had to be terminated because it is not
a reasonably possible view that a marriage must continue even though
the husband misbehaves, or is unable to perform his obligation or for
no fault of the wife it would be cruel to continue it.96
(1959) P.L.D Lahore 566.
Ibid.
Id.
210
This position of the High Court was given the highest approbation in
1967 when in the case of Khurshid Bibi v Mohd Amin, 97 the Supreme
Court, declared that Khurshid Bibi was entitled to a divorce upon
returning her dower to her husband. Thus, while the right of the man
to repudiate his wife has remained unfettered, the granting of a
unilateral khulu' divorce to a woman in case of incompatibility
represents significant headway in achieving a balance of human rights.
In Peninsular Malaysia, divorce by khulu' is known by the Malays as
"tebus talaq". The word "tebus" is Malay meaning redeem, thus the
wife recovers her freedom by making some payment to the husband. A
Malay wife who is so eager to dissolve her marriage normally induces
her husband to release her by offering him some monetary or other
material compensation. Usually the payment given by a Malay wife
when seeking a khulu' divorce is to surrender her claim to the
"maskahwin" (mahr), if still unpaid by her husband or to pay him back
the amount of it if she had already accepted. In the case where a
couple have only recently married, it is not unusual for the husband to
demand some more substantial compensation before he will assent to
grant the divorce.
In addition, according to the Malay custom, if a husband guiltless of
offence towards his wife under religious and customary law refuses her
divorce, she can leave him "sehelai sepinggang" (in the clothes she
wears) and return the dower. If she wants a divorce because she cannot
endure her husband's behaviour but not because of any offence towards
her under religious law, then she can get a divorce in accordance with
custom, returning half her dower. All property acquired during
(1967) P.L.D S.0 97.
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marriage goes to the man, but each party takes his or her personal
property.98
3.3.4 Procedure for Khulu'
In Kuala Lumpur, there were no statutory provisions for khulu' under
the previous enactment. The present law however, provides that where
the husband does not agree to pronounce a talag voluntarily, but the
parties agree to a divorce by redemption or "cerai tebus talaq" the
court shall, after the amount of the payment of "tebus talaq" is agreed
upon by the parties, cause the husband to pronounce a divorce by
redemption. Such divorce is bain sughra or irrevocable. 99
 If the
parties cannot agree to the amount of compensation payable, the court
may assess the amount in accordance with Hukum Shara', taking into
consideration the status and means of the parties.'°° Where the
husband does not agree to a divorce by redemption or does not appear
before the court as directed, or where it appears to the court that
there is a reasonable possibility of a reconciliation, the court shall
appoint a conciliatory committee as provided under section 47b01
Previously, there were no express statutory provisions for khulu' in
other states in Peninsular Malaysia. In Selangor, Kuala Lumpur, Negeri
Sembilan and Malacca, it would appear that the gadhis can make
decrees of khulu' in accordance with Hukum Shara'. The procedure in
the other states is quite dissimilar. For example in Kelantan,
Trengganu and Perak, it is provided that a married women may apply
to a qadhi for a divorce in accordance with Muslim law. In any such
case, the gadhi summons the husband and inquires whether he consents
KempeJ.E and Winsteadt, R.O., A Malay Legal Miscellany, J.M.B.R.A.S, Vol 25, Pt.1, (1952),
p.6.
IFLA, section 49.
100 IFLA, section 49(3).
101 IFLA, section 49(4).
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to the divorce. If the husband consents, the gadhi will cause him to
pronounce a divorce by redemption and registers the divorce. If the
husband does not agree to divorce by redemption, the gadhi may
appoint arbitrators to deal with the matter.'°2
On the other hand, in Pahang, if such an application for divorce has
been brought by a female spouse because of a serious disagreement
between the husband and her, the qadhi will first appoint two
arbitrators, representing both parties, with sufficient powers given by
the latter to enable the arbitrators to effect a peaceful reconciliation
of the parties, to the extent of the arbitrator of the husband divorcing
the wife and the arbitrator of the wife applying for a divorce by
redemption. If both arbitrators decide on a divorce, whether by
redemption or not, the arbitrator of the husband may divorce the wife
and the divorce shall be registered. If the husband does not agree to
a divorce, but the parties agree to a divorce by redemption, the qadhi
may assess the amount of the payment to be made by the wife and
shall then cause the husband to pronounce the divorce by redemption
and register the divorce.'03
In Penang and Kedah it is provided that a married woman may make
application to a gadhi for the divorce known as khulu'. Notice of the
application must be served on the husband. The qadhi is required to
record the evidence of the wife and at least two witnesses and may
then, if satisfied that the provisions of Muslim law have been complied
with, make such an order or decree as is lawful. 104
 Whereas in
102 Kelantan Shanah Courts and Mushni Matrimonial Causes Enactment,1966, section 69; Perak
Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1965 section 125; Trengganu Administration of
Islamic Law Enactment, 1955, section 104.
103 Pahang Administration of the Religion of Islam and The Malay Custom of Pahang Enactment,
1982, section 73.
104 Penang Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1959, section 123; Kedah Administration of
Muslim Law Enactment, 1962, section 123.
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Johore, it is provided that a wife may request divorce in accordance
with Hukum Shara' by application to the Registrar of Muslim
Marriages and Divorces who shall then summon the husband before
him and enquire if the husband consents to divorce the wife. If so the
Registrar shall request the husband to pronounce the divorce in his
presence. 105
In the Penis case of Che Pa v Sill Rahmah,'°6 the plaintiff had
applied for an order that his wife, the defendant, should return and
cohabit with him. The defendant refused to do so since she claimed the
husband was a gambler and a drunkard and did not pray. She asked for
a divorce from him and offered to pay compensation for a "tebus
talaq." The court after hearing the parties ordered the wife to return
to the husband and ordered the husband to pay her maintenance and
provide a house for her. The wife refused to go back to her husband
and the husband did not give the maintenance as ordered. The qadhi
thereupon ordered that hakam be appointed under section 90 A(1) of
the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1963. The hakam were
able to get the agreement of the parties for a khulu' divorce on the
payment of one hundred Malaysian ninggit to the husband. On payment
of this sum, the husband divorced the wife and this was recorded by
the court.
3.3.5 Fasakh
All the Sunni schools unanimously agree that every couple has the
(	 right to the option of rescinding the marriage contract'° 7 if either
party is found to be afflicted with elephantiasis, leprosy, insanity, or
105 Johore Administration of Islamic Law Enactment, 1978, section 119.
106 (1976) 2 J.H. 244.
For further details, see Abu Zalira, Muhammad, Family Law in Majid Khadduri and HJ Liebesny
(eds) Law in the Middle-East, Origin and Development of Islamic Law, Washmgton D.C., Middle
East Institute, 1955, pp.146-9.
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a defect of the procreative organs. This defect would cause not only a
sense of physical repulsion in the other party leading to the defeat of
the very object of marriage as a field for both mutual love and
procreation, but also to the possibility of transmitting such diseases
and defects to the issue of the marriage. The reason they confined the
right of dissolution to these specified defects was both the absence of
any textual authority for any extension of the principle and also their
belief that to only these diseases were the above arguments wholly
applicable.
Moreover, all of the Sunni schools held that no such right existed
where one person entered a marriage with another in the knowledge
that he or she was so afflicted. All the above is concerned with defects
existing at the time of the marriage. In cases where such defects occur
subsequently there is less unanimity, but the Shafi'i generally allow
dissolution on the same terms as above, provided that the other party
has not expressly or tacitly consented to continue the relationship. The
exception is that once the marriage has been consummated they regard
no disease of the procreative organs as a ground for its dissolution. In
all these cases, dissolution of the marriage tie is termed judicial
rescission, that is fasakh by the Shafi'i and Hanbali, but judicial
divorce by the Malikis.'°8
According to the Shafi'i school, fasakh . l®
 operates under the
heading of khiyar (option). Divorce by fasakh is primarily a right given
to the wife on application to a qadhi. The option to repudiate may be
exercised by the wife if the husband is suffering from vital defects such
as impotence, insanity, leprosy or elephantiasis, if he is unable to
Anderson, 1950, pp. 177-178.
® Fasakh literally means annulment or abrogation The Malay equivalent is "fasah" or "pasah".
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maintain her or if he is not equal in kufu', (marriage equality)." 0 to
her.
In theory, a similar option is given to the husband when he becomes
aware that his wife is insane, suffering from leprosy or elephantiasis
or is incapable of sexual intercourse because of some physical
infirmity. In practise however, this option is rarely exercised as the
husband already has the right of talaq.
In cases where a man had decided to use his option of rescinding the
marriage through the discovery of a defect in his wife, the wife would
not be entitled to receive her mahr nor the mut'ah if the marriage had
not been consumated. But should the marriage have been
consummated, then she would entitled to her mahr.112
A wife's right to judicial divorce by reason of her husband's defects
covers defects existing at the time of the marriage contract as well as
those acquired subsequently. However, a husband who becomes
impotent after cohabitation with the wife cannot be repudiated by her.
If it can be proved that the husband is totally impotent, then the
qadhi. may, upon application by the wife to rescind the marriage, pass
a judgement of rescission, provided that a year's grace has first been
given to the husband so that he may undergo sufficient medical
treatment. The option will also be lost if a party to the marriage fails
to repudiate the marriage within a reasonable time after coming to
know of the defect in the other party."3
110 For further details on kufu'see Nasir, 1990, pp.18-19.
Re Husseinah Banoo (1963) 5 M.L.R 392 at p.395.
112 Hj. Ibrahim, 1987.
113 Ibid.
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When a husband during his marriage, becomes insolvent and can no
longer give the minimum maintenance prescribed, and the wife can no
longer bear such an insolvent husband, she can demand the rescission
of the marriage since her husband no longer fulfils his obligation.
However, the Hanafi jurists refuse any right of dissolution in such
cases. This opinion is based on the Quranic verse" 4
 to the effect that
no one is expected to spend more than God has granted to him.
Therefore, if the husband is indigent, he cannot properly be required
to provide his wife with maintenance. But this outstanding sum may be
regarded as a debt payable at a later date when the husband becomes
more prosperous.
On the other hand, under the Shafi'i school, if the husband's
insolvency is proved, the qadhi may pronounce the rescission of the
marriage. However, three days respite must be allowed to the husband
before it can be effected.
Another report of Shafi'i says that the wife is not entitled to make
rescission on the grounds of the husband's insolvency as she is allowed
to earn her own income. The maintenance outstanding from the
husband then becomes a debt which he may pay during a later period
of solvency.'15
In cases where the husband has the means to maintain his wife but
refuses or fails to do so, although the wife is blameless, the wife still
has no claim to rescission, since the husband may, if still resident
within the country, be ordered or compelled by the court to support
his wife. Should he be absent, then maintenance can be paid to his
wife out of his property. But when such property cannot be traced in
time, and the husband is not actually indigent, the marriage contract
Al Our'an, Surah Al Talaq: 7.
115 Hj. Ibrahim, 1987.
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may not be rescinded either, because destitution is not regarded as a
defect and thus cannot be the primary reason for dissolution in such
an issue.'16
Though according to the Shafi'i school, a fasakh decree cannot
normally be granted on the grounds of lack of maintenance in cases
where a husband is solvent, some jurists, are of the opinion that a
qadhi may grant a fasakh decree. It is based upon this view that fasakh
decree have been granted by qadhi to wives deserted and left without
maintenance by husbands who, although not paupers, cannot be traced.
In the Kedah case of Abdul Aziz v Che Pa," 7the Appeal Court
confirmed an order of fasakh on the grounds that the husband was
incapable of maintaining the wife.
Under the Malay custom, a woman deserted for three years without
maintenance can get a divorce but must arrest the man if she meets
him. 118 Judicial rescission of a contract of marriage is known to the
Malays as "pasah", which is obviously derived from the Arabic fasakh,
meaning rescission. "Pasah" has been recognised as the legal authority
of a gadhi to rescind a marriage contract upon the application of a
married woman. In the Malay Peninsula, it was the practice, before the
ta'liq (cerai taklik as the Malay call it) became so popular, for a qadhi
to grant a decree of "pasah" to a complainant wife on the grounds of
non-maintenance if her husband had abandoned her for a long period
and not supported her in any way.
The general conception behind the legality of "pasah", as subsequently
understood by the Malays is that the qadhi exercises his legal authority
116 For further details see Anderson, 1950, pp. 175-6.
117 (1972) 2 J.1-L p.113.
118 Kempe, 1952, p.7.
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in dissolving a marriage contract so as to give relief to an injured wife,
since the wife has not been given the power of talag like the husband.
It is perhaps due to this conception that most Malay guardians prefer
to attach the right of talag ta'Iig to a marriage contract, so that the
future wife will have the right to demand the dissolution of the
marriage from a gadhi if she is deserted and not maintained.
Section 128 of the Administration of the Muslim Enactment, 1952
covers fasakh and ta'lig but no details are given as to grounds under
fasakh. Section 52, IFLA improves the situation by providing and
specifying the grounds that could be used under fasakh. A woman who
married in accordance with Hukum Shara', shall be entitled to obtain
an order for the dissolution of marriage or fasakh on any one or more
of the following grounds:-
(a) that the whereabouts of the husband have not been known for a
period of more than one year;
(b) that the husband has neglected or failed to provide for her
maintenance for a period of three months;
(c) that the husband has been sentenced to imprisonment for a
period of three years or more;
(d) that the husband has failed to perform, without reasonable
cause, his marital obligations (nafkah batin) for a period of one
year;
(e) that the husband was impotent at the time of marriage and
remains so and she was not aware at the time of the marriage
that he was impotent;
(f) that the husband has been insane for a period of two years or is
suffering from leprosy or vitiligo or is suffering from a venereal
disease in a communicable form;
(g) that she, having been given in marriage by her father or
grandfather before she attained the age of 16 years, repudiated
the marriage before attaining the age of 18 years, the marriage
not having been consummated;
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(h)	 that the husband treats her with cruelty, that is inter alia:
i. habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by
cruelty of conduct; or
ii. associates with women of evil repute or leads what,
according to Hukum Shara' is an infamous life, or
iii. attempts to force her to lead an immoral life
iv. disposes of her property or prevents her from exercising
her legal rights over it, or
v. obstructs her in the observance of her religious obligations
or practice or
vi. if he has more wives than one, does not treat her
equitably in accordance with the requirements of Hukum
Shara';
(i) that even after the lapse of four months, the marriage has still
not been consummated owing to the wilful refusal of the
husband;
(j)	 that she did not consent to the marriage or consent was not
valid, whether in consequence of duress, mistake, unsoundness
of mind, or any other circumstances recognized by Hukurn
Shara';
(k) that at the time of the marriage she, although capable of giving
a valid consent, was, whether or intermittently, a mentally
disordered person within the meaning of the Mental Disorders
Ordinance 1952 and her mental disorder was of such a kind or
to such extent as to render her unfit for marriage;
(1)
	
	 any other grounds that are recognised as valid for dissolution of
marriages of fasakh under Hukum Shara"9
The grounds covered in IFLA are so many and varied since they
encompass virtually every situation which a wife would wish to free
herself from.
119 IFLA, section 52.
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However, unlike Kuala Lumpur, in Kelantan under its Islamic Family
Law Enactment in 1983,120 the grounds for fasakh are more limited
than those under the IFLA and seem to be confined to the grounds
recognised in the Shafi'i school of thought.
Twentieth century reforms in other Muslim countries have sought to
establish grounds that would enable women to sue for judicial divorce
and to limit the husband's exercise of talag. In Egypt, broader grounds
for divorce were established by Law No. 25 of 1929. This reform
legislation recognised four situations in which a woman could sue for
divorce:
a. her husband's failure to provide nafagah (maintenance)
b. dangerous or contagious disease of the husband.
c. desertion
d. maltreatment.
Article 1 of the Egyptian law of 1929 decreed that maintenance was a
cumulative debt owed by the husband to his wife, commencing with the
first time the husband failed to support his wife.121
Article 4 decreed that non-support due to a husband's incapacity or
unwillingness to support constitutes grounds for a wife's divorce suit.
The only exception permitted involved cases of destitution in which the
husband was granted a grace period of not more than one month. If
the husband is absent or imprisoned and if there is a lack of property
from which his wife's maintenance can be extracted, the wife is entitled
to a divorce on grounds of non-support. If, on the other hand, the
120 No.1 of 1983 as amended by E No.6 of 1984 and E No.3 of 1987.
121 r'j provision requiring payment of past maintenance was the cause of many false claims as to
the arrears date. Thus the code of 1931 decreed that claims should not be in excess of three years
prior to the date of the suit.
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husband is at a great distance or if his location is unknown, the wife
is granted a divorce at once.'22
The third and fourth grounds giving a woman the right to sue for
divorce, maltreatment and desertion, were established through law No.
25 of 1929. Maltreatment or darar (cruelty) finds its only support as
grounds for divorce in the Maliki school. Following this source, Article
6 decreed that where a wife's allegation of maltreatment detrimental
to the continued marital relationship is substantiated and reconciliation
seems impossible, the qadhi shall grant the wife an irrevocable divorce.
The law grants the wife the right to repetition if her first petition is
denied on grounds of unsubstantiated evidence. In the event of a
second rejection of her petition, the qadhi is required to appoint two
arbitrators. However, if this is not possible, men acquainted with the
circumstance of the case should be appointed.' 23
 Their task is a
thorough investigation of the causes for the marital conflict and the
submission of recommendations to the court for a reconciliation.
However, if reconciliation proves impossible, and if responsibility for
the conflict lies with the husband, with both spouses, or if the source
of the conflict is unknown, the qadhi is instructed to grant a single but
irrevocable divorce.'24
Article 10 stipulates that should the report of the arbitrators indicate
a deadlock, the qadhi is to order them to make a fresh attempt. Should
their renewed efforts prove fruitless, then other arbitrators are to be
appointed. And finally, the court is to render its judgement in
accordance with the recommendation of the arbitrators' report.' 25
 The
' Article 5, Law No. 25, 1920.
Article 7, Law No. 25, 1929.
124 Article 8 and 9, Law No.25, 1929.
125 Article 11, Law No. 25, 1929.
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fourth and final grounds for divorce is desertion. The legislation of
1929 decreed that if a husband was absent for one year or more
without sufficient reason, a wife had the right to sue for an irrevocable
divorce on the grounds of injury due to his unwarranted absence. If the
husband can be reached, the gadhi must inform him of the pending
suit. The husband's failure to return or make arrangements for his wife
to join him will result in a decree of divorce. If, on the other hand,
contact with the husband proves impossible, the court must then grant
the wife a divorce immediately. Moreover, a petition based on
desertion may be initiated even if the husband has property from which
the wife's maintenance can be obtained.126
Article 14 addressed itself to a specific kind of desertion which had
been the source of much hardship, that is the husband's imprisonment.
The law decreed that a woman whose husband had been sentenced to
/ not less than three years may, after a separation of at least one year,
petition the court for divorce.
3.3.6 Procedure for Fasakh
Section 50 of IFLA provides that upon the application of the wife for
a fasakh divorce, the gadhi will send a notice to the husband informing
him of the wife's intention. He will then proceed to record the sworn
statement of the wife and of at least two witnesses. If the gadhi is
satisfied that the provisions of Muslim law have been complied with,
he will make an order or decree as is lawful for fasakh divorce and he
will register and issue the certificate for divorce.
The procedure for a fasakh in other states' 27
 is very similar, although
126 Article 12 and 13, Law no. 25 of 1929.
127 Selangor Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1952, s.128; Penang Administration of
Muslim Law Enactment, 1959, s.123; Malacca Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1959,
s.122; Negeri Sembilan Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1960, s.123; Kedah
Administration of Muslini Law Enactment, 1962, s.123; Kelantan Shariah Courts and Muslim
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it is further provided in Penis that if the husband is not in the state
or it is impossible to serve the notice on him, then such notice shall
be served on the nearest relative of the husband. No decree of fasakh
shall be pronounced by the gadhi save in accordance with Muslim law
and in pursuance of the evidence of the married woman and at least
two witnesses. Upon pronouncing a decree for the dissolution of
marriage, the gadhi must register it as a divorce and issue a certificate
thereof in a prescribed form to the wife.'28
In the Perak case of Mashitah v Hussain' 29, the wife applied for
fasakh divorce. She claimed that she was married in January 1974 but
her husband had left her in August 1974. He had not given
maintenance to her and had no property within the jurisdiction of the
court from which maintenance could be obtained. The gadhi ordered
the claim to be advertised in the newspaper and when the husband did
not appear, and after a suitable adjournment, the qadhi asked the wife
to take an oath that she had been faithful to the husband and that he
had not given her maintenance. After the wife had taken the oath, the
gadhi ruled that the conditions for a fasakh had been fulfilled and
allowed the wife to have the fasakh divorce.
3.3.7 Ta'lig
In Muslim jurisprudence, a formula uttered by any sane adult husband
as a condition for divorcing his wife upon the occurrence of a specified
condition is effective. The condition, according to the majority of
jurists of the four schools can be operative, not merely when the
husband really desires to terminate the marriage if the specified
conditions are fulfilled, but also includes the use of the condition as
Matrimonial Causes Enactment,1966, s.71; Trengganu Administration of Islamic Law
Enactment,1955, s.106; Perak Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1965, s.128.
128 Perhs Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1963, section 91.
129 (1979) 2 J.H. 153.
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a threat to the wife, an inducement or deterrent to a third party or an
oath to reinforce some assertion or promise made by the husband. This
conditional divorce is known in Muslim jurisprudence as Ta'Iig a! talag.
Thus a husband may bind himself to divorce his wife for example if he
cruelly assaults her. This mode of divorce is popular under the Shafi'i
school of law and is known by the Malays as "Cerai Taklik" that is
divorce by the breaking of a condition.
When a marriage contract is prepared it is possible for the bride's
guardian as a means of protecting his ward's interest, to insist upon
the attachment of a ta'lig. The usual form of ta'lig is the condition set
down giving the wife the right to s ek divorce if the husband fails to
maintain her for a period of th cc to our months or if the husband
absents himself for six months on land or a year at sea without sending
any letter or money to the wife. If such a thing happens, the wife, on
the evidence of the breaking of this condition, may make a complaint
to the gadhi and apply for a divorce by ta'lig. Upon receiving such
application, the gadhi shall serve a notice on the husband and if the
husband does not appear to show just cause for his break of the
condition, the gadhi will then record the sworn statement of the wife
and of at least two witnesses. If he is satisfied that the provisions of
Muslim law have been complied with, he will proceed to make an order
or decree as is lawful. The particulars and the nature of the divorce
are then entered into the register and a certificate of divorce issued.
Ta'lig as described above is perhaps the easiest way of getting a
divorce because all the wife needs to establish is the breach of the
promise on the part of the husband.'3°
The form of ta'lig prescribed in Selangor is as follows;
130 IFLA, section 50.
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"Every time that I fail to provide maintenance to my wife for
a period of four months or more, she can make a complaint to
the gadhi's court and if her complaint is proved, then she is
divorced by one talag. and every time I revoke the divorce and
my wife refuses to agree to it, she is divorced by one
talag. "131
Under the previous law, it was provided that a qadhi may receive from
a married woman an application for cerai ta'liq. Notice of the
application was required to be served on the husband and the qadhi
was required to record the evidence of the wife and at least two
witnesses. The qadhi could make the order if he was satisfied that the
provisions of the Muslim law had been complied with.'32
Under IFLA, it is provided that a married woman may, if entitled to
a divorce in pursuance of the terms of a ta'liq certificate made upon
a marriage, apply to the court to declare that such divorce has taken
place. The court shall examine the application and make an inquiry
into the validity of the divorce, and shall, if satisfied that the divorce
is valid according to Hukum Shara', confirm and record the
divorce.' 33
 The provision under IFLA is therefore wider than the
previous enactment as ta'lig could be exercised according to Hukum
Shara' rather than limiting it to the Shafi'i school of thought only.
In the Kuala Lumpur case of Rokiah v Mohamed Yunus,' 34 the wife
claimed divorce by ta'liq, alleging that the husband had not given her
maintenance in breach of the ta'liq agreement, agreed to by the
husband after the marriage. She produced witnesses in support of her
claim. The husband gave evidence alleging that he had given her some
131 Selangor Rules relating to Marriage, Divorce and Revocation of Divorce, 1962.
132 Section 128, Administration of Islamic Law Enactment, Selangor.
133 IFLA, section 50.
' (1981) 5 J.H. 80.
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maintenance. The court gave judgement in favour of the wife and and
decided that whoever makes a ta'lig to grant a divorce on a condition
and the condition takes place this effects a talag in accordance with
the terms of the ta'lig. The court also referred to a hadith to the
effect that a believer is bound by his agreement.
Although ta'lig is not compulsory under the Hukum Shara', it is a
practice based on the agreement between the parties. In the recent
case of Aisny bte Mohd Daris v Haji Fahro Rozi bin Mohdi,' 35 the wife
applied to the Sharia Subordinate Court for confirmation of a divorce
under ta'lig under section 50(1) of IFLA. The husband had pronounced
the ta'liq in the statutory form 136
 and the wife claimed that the
husband had not complied with the terms of the ta'liq in that he had
not given maintenance to his wife and children for over four months.
The Subordinate Sharia Court referred in this respect to the verse in
the Quran to the effect;
"0 you who believe! Fulfil all obligations. "137 and "And fulfil
every engagement for every engagement will be enquired into on
the day of reckoning. "138
It is said in the Qur'an that the liability of the husband to pay
maintenance to his wife is based on the condition that the wife is
obedient to him.' 39
 It is therefore clear that the ta'Iiq requires the
135 [1990] 2 M.LJ xxvi.
136 The husband had pronounced a ]q in the statutory form as follows; "Every time I do not give
my wife named Aisny bt Mohamed Daris such maintenance for her as is sufficient according to
the custom for four months or more, my wife can make a complaint to a Sharia judge. If the
complaint is proved before the Shana judge she will be divorced by one And eveiytime I
revoke the divorce without her consent, one divorce will be effected".
137 Al Qur'an. Surah Al Maidah:l.
138 Al Qur'an, Surah Al-Isra:34.
139 And woman shall have nghts similar to the rights agamst them accordmg to what is equitable; j
Quiaji, Surah Al Baqarah: 228, In another verse it is said that men are the protectors and
maintenances of women because Allah has given the one more strength than the other and
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obedience of the wife to the husband for in the ta'liq or agreement,
what is stated is the obligation of the husband to pay maintenance to
his wife, which in law depends on the obedience of the wife.
The Sharia Appeal Board (Kuala Lumpur) confirmed the decision of
the Subordinate Sharia Court in holding that although the form of
ta'lig does not touch on the question of obedience of the wife to the
husband, it mentions maintenance as an obligation of the husband and
therefore it is necessary for the wife to show that she is not nushuz.
In most of the other states in Peninsular Malaysia, the situation is
similar to Kuala Lumpur. Specifically in Kelantan, Trengganu, Pahang
and Perak, the Registrar of Marriage is required, in registering a
marriage, to prepare a surat ta'lig in a prescribed form and to obtain
the signatures of the parties thereto.' 4° In the other states, ta'lig is
encouraged even though it is not made compulsory. The general form
of the ta'Iiq for the states is similar although there are differences in
various aspects. In all the states except Perlis which has no special
provision for ta'lig,' 41 the procedure for application of a divorce by
ta'lig is expressly provided by their respective enactments. The
procedure is generally similar. A married woman may apply to the
qadhi's court for the declaration that a divorce in pursuance of the
terms of a ta'liq made upon marriage has taken place. Notice of the
application is required to be served on the husband and the gadhi is
required to record the evidence of the wife and at least two witnesses.
However, these requirements are not stipulated in Kelantan,
because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly
obedient and guard in the husband's absence what Allah would have them guard; Al Qur'an,
Surah An Nisaa':34.
'4° Kelantan, Shanah Courts and Muslim Matrimonial Causes Enactment, 1956, s.67(5); Trengganu
Administration of Islamic Law Enactment,1955, s.102(5); Perak Administration of Muslim Law
Enactment,1965,s.122(5); Pahang Administration of the Rehgion of Islam and the Malay Custom
of Pahang Enactment, 1982, s.63.
14! Perlis Administration Of Muslim Law Enactment, 1963, s.87(8).
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Trengganu, Perak and Pahang. The gadhi will then examine and make
enquiry into such application and shall if satisfied that the divorce is
valid, confirm the divorce and register it. It is interesting to note that
ta'lig in customary law in Rembau, Negeri Sembilan is usually
employed at the marriage of a Rembau woman to a man from another
state and may also be used where the bridegroom is a local man.'42
3.4 DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE BY CONVERSION.
Under the Shafi'i school of thought, a wife may also bring an action
to invalidate her contract where the husband does not meet the
conditions stipulated in the marriage, for instance provisions relating
to the husband's religion. Apostasy from Islam by either of the spouses
is in itself sufficient to cause the complete dissolution of the marriage.
A new provision of some significance under IFLA is that the
conversion (whether into Islam by a party to a non-Muslim marriage
or out of Islam by a party to a Muslim marriage) will not operate to
dissolve the marriage until and unless confirmed by the court.'43
3.5 ARBITRATION BY HAKAM
As discussed, the fundamental principle behind the marriage contract
in Islam is permanency. Islam encourages a married couple to treat
each other kindly and to build a good relationship with each other.
When serious differences or misunderstandings arise between them,
Islam enjoins an attempt at reconciliation by the appointment of
arbitrators. This attempt at arbitration is served by the institution of
hakam. The settlement of marital disputes by arbitration is
recommended in the Quran, which says:
142 Taylor, 1970, p.45.
IFLA, section 46.
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"And if you fear a breach between the husband and wife
appoint a hakam (arbitrator) from his family and a hakam
from her family; if they shall a reconciliation God will cause
them to agree. "144
By this institution, when there is a conflict between the married
couple, the gadhi will appoint two arbitrators, one each from the
families of both the husband and the wife, in an attempt to find
peaceful means to resolve the conflict. The rationale behind the
institution of hakam is to enable parties to a marriage to overcome
marital conflicts without having to go through the bitter experience of
a divorce and to enable the couple to reach some form of a
compromise. Hussein noted that the rules governing the process of
reconciliation reveal the Qur'an's emphasis upon the importance of
marriage and the gravity of divorce.'45
According to the prevailing view of the Maliki school when arbitrators
have been appointed, but have failed to bring about a reconciliation
between the couples, the arbitrators have the right to decide whether
there should be a divorce. Their decision can be enforced by the court.
This opinion is based on the understanding that the two arbitrators are
two judges, not agents. On the other hand, according to the prevailing
view of the Shafi'i school, if the arbitrators are unable to affect
reconciliation between the couple, their powers of arbitration cease.
Therefore, it is then the duty of the Ruler or court to give a
judgement which can be considered as beneficial to the parties. The
arbitrators may arrange a divorce or khulu' only when they have been
specially empowered to do so as authorised agents by the husband in
a court and by both parties in khulu'. This view is based on the
understanding that they are two agents who may act only by consent
Al Qur'an, Surah An Nisaa: 35.
145 Hussein SJ. "Marriage Breakdown: Comparative View." International Islamic University Law
Journal, Vol.1, No.1, 1989, p.136.
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of the parties. However, there is also a minority Shafi'i view that
follows the Maliki school and says that the two arbitrators are two
judges appointed by the ruler or court.' 46 This opinion has been
accepted on the grounds that the Qur'an has named each of them as
hakam and an agent is not an arbitrator. Accordingly, the consent of
the two spouses is not a condition of their appointment, and they may
give what decision they consider beneficial, particularly whether the
marriage should be continued or that it should be dissolved. In the
case where the arbitrators themselves have differed in their finding,
their decision cannot be enforced until they have come to a unanimous
agreement.147
IFLA provides that if the court is satisfied that there are shiqag
(constant quarrels) between the parties to a marriage, the court may
appoint in accordance with Hukum Shara' two arbitrators or hakam to
act for the husband and wife respectively. This provision does not
specifically mention that the Shafi'i school of thought should be
followed. Therefore, it leaves the task of interpretation to the qadhi
to decide which school of thought he wants to adopt.
In other states specifically in Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Penang,
and Pahang it is provided that where a qadhi is satisfied that there are
constant quarrels between the parties to a marriage he may appoint in
accordance with Muslim law, two arbitrators or hakam to act for the
husband and the wife respectively. In making such appointment the
qadhi shall, where possible, give preference to close relatives of the
parties having knowledge of the circumstances of the case. The qadhi
may give directions to the hakam as to the conduct of the arbitration
and they shall conduct it in accordance with such directions as
specified by Muslim law. If they are unable to agree or, if the qadhi
Hj. Ibrabiin, 1987.
147 Ibid.
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is not satisfied with their conduct of the arbitration, he may remove
them and appoint other hakam in their place. The hakam shall
endeavour to obtain from their respective principals full authority and
may if their authority extends so far, decree a divorce and shall in such
an event report it to the gadhi for registration. If the hakam are of the
opinion that the parties should be divorced but are unable for any
reason to decree a divorce, the qadhi shall appoint other hakam and
shall confer on them authority to effect a divorce and shall, if they do
so, register the divorce and issue certificates to the parties.' 48
 These
provisions show that the Shafi'i school of thought has been followed
where the hakam only acts as agent.
However, the situation in Perlis is quite different. In Penis it is
provided that whenever any misunderstanding arises from the decision
of the court, the qadhi shall have the power to order both parties to
appoint their representatives to find ways of solving the
misunderstanding and the representatives shall have power on behalf
of the husband to receive the compensation and on behalf of the wife
to receive the divorce. If the two representatives are incompetent and
without ability to effect a settlement the gadhi shall have power to
appoint two arbitrators, one to act on behalf of the husband and the
other to act on behalf of the wife in order to find ways of solving the
misunderstanding. The arbitrator representing the husband shall have
the power to declare a divorce. If the two arbitrators are unable to
solve the misunderstanding between the husband and the wife the
qadhi shall refer the matter to the "Majlis" for decision and the
decision and the decision of the "Majlis" shall be final. On satisfactory
proof being given that the wife is without property and that she still
refuses to return to her husband the arbitrators shall have power to
148 Kelantan Council of Religion and Malay Custom and Kadhis Courts Enactment, 1953, s.15()-,
Trengganu Administration of Islamic Law Enactment, 1955, s. 108; Penang Adinuustration of
Muslim Law Enactment, 1959, section 126; Kedah Administration of Muslim Law Enactment,
1962, section 27, Pahang Adnumstration of the Law of the Religion of Islam Enactment, 1956,
section 27.
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decree a divorce without compensation if it appears to them that to
compel her to return to her husband will cause hardship and that a
divorce is in the interests of both parties. If a divorce with
compensation is decreed and the wife is possessed of property such
property is liable to be attached for the recovery of such compensation.
If a reconciliation is impossible, the party applying for divorce shall
complete the prescribed form. The rights of each party shall be agreed
to in the presence of the Registrar. The husband shall deposit a sum
of not less than one month's maintenance for the wife with the qadhi
unless under the divorce the husband is not required to pay any
maintenance of the wife. Each party to the divorce shall return to the
other the property to which he or she is entitled. The husband is
required to report the divorce to the Registrar within seven days.'49
There is no express statutory provision for the appointment of hakam
in the other states of Malaysia. Different Muslim countries have
introduced the institution of hakam in different forms. The courts in
Pakistan while handling the principle of shiqag have unequivocally
ruled that procedural technicalities cannot become a hindrance in
separating the spouses who cannot observe the limits of God. They
have declared that a judge will consider whether the rift between the
parties is a serious one although he may not consider the reasons of
the rift. It must be pointed out here that under the Islamic law, the
courts or the qadhi do not probe into the most intimate as well as
complex details of relationship between a man and his wife causing
humiliation, embarassment and bitterness. Such things are happening
in Western divorce law based on the concept of marriage breakdown
and have been greatly denounced. Marriage has been considered as
ibadah. an
 act of worship. What Islam contemplates is that when the
legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed without any
149 Perlis Administration of Muslim Enactment, 1963, s. 90A.
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prospects of reconciliation, then and only then is divorce allowed. This
is the essence of the doctrine of shigaq.'5°
In Pakistan, all applications for repudiation, second marriage and
maintenance shall be referred to the Arbitration Council consisting of
a Chairman and a representative of each of the parties.'51
The Ottoman law of Family Rights of 1917 provides that if quarrelling
or discord develops between the spouses and one of them refers the
matter to the court, the court shall appoint an arbitrator from the
family of each of the parties. If there are no suitable members of the
family who can be appointed, then it shall appoint someone suitable
from outside. The family council so formed shall investigate complaints
and replies of each of the parties and do its best to reconcile them. If
this proves impossible, then if the fault is the husband's, the court
shall divorce them while if the fault is the wife's, it shall decree a
dissolution by khulu'. If the Arbitration Council cannot reach an
agreement, the court shall appoint another council of suitable
arbitrators or shall appoint a third arbitrator unrelated to either of the
parties. The judgement of the arbitrator shall be final.152
In Tunisia, when one spouse alleges ill-treatment but has no proof to
substantiate the allegation, arbitrators will be appointed. The
arbitrators however, have no power to decree a divorce and all their
decisions must be referred to the court.'53
'° Hussein, 1989.
151 Pakistan Family Law Ordinance, 1961, section 7.
152 Ottoman law of Family Rights, 1917, Article 130.
153 Tunisian Law of Personal Status, 1956, section 25.
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In Indonesia, under the regulations of 1955,154 a husband who desires
to divorce his wife is required to apply to either the Consultation
Bureau in the Ministry of Religious Affairs or to the Marriage
Councils. The parties shall then be summoned and a reconciliation
attempted. If the attempt fails, the matter shall be postponed for seven
days and the parties shall be asked to reconsider the matter within that
period.
The Egyptian Family law Act, 1979, section 7-11 lays down the
essential conditions to be possessed by the two arbitrators, the
considerations relating to the appointment and the time of the
commencement and termination of their duties. The period from
commencement to termination should not normally exceed six months.
The court should inform the arbitrators and the parties of the order
of appointment made and require the arbitrators to take an oath to
carry out their duties in good faith. The court has power also to extend
the period of the arbitration to an additional period not exceeding
three months.
In order to avoid undue prolongation of the arbitration, the
amendment provides for the appointment of a third arbitrator, who will
act with the other arbitrators. The court will act on the decision of all
the arbitrators or a majority of them. If the three arbitrators are still
unable to reach a solution or do not submit a report in due time, the
court can itself act, take evidence and give its decision, as set out in
section 11.
The appointment of the third arbitrator does not appear to be in
conflict with the sources of Islamic law. The Qur'an does not forbid
it. At the present time it has became necessary as a way of achieving
154 Marriage and Divorce Regulations, 1955, section 3.
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justice and avoiding injustice. In fact some jurists believe that oniy one
arbitrator can be appointed.'55
If the court finds that all its efforts at reconciliation have failed and
it is clear that is impossible for the parties to live together in peace
and harmony and the wife persists in asking for divorce, the court is
given the power to decree an irrevocable divorce and if necessary to
order the wife to pay reasonable compensation. These provisions are
taken directly or indirectly from the views of the Maliki school.156
In cases where the application is for a divorce by talag, the committee
should advise the husband against the pronouncement of a talag. In
cases where the application is for another forms of divorce, the
committee should first of all attempt a conciliation of the parties. If
this fails, the committee should then proceed a step further by
conducting a preliminary inquiry into the matter and determine
whether the claim for divorce, be it by fasakh, ta'liq or khulu', is
justifiable and if so whether the case should be heard by the Court of
Qadhi or Chief Qadhi.
In Singapore, legislation as regards conciliatory works was introduced
by the Muslim (Amendment) Ordinance 1960.157 It should be noted
however that this Ordinance merely enabled the Shariah Court, before
making an order for divorce, to refer the application to the
conciliatory body preceding the hearing of the case. In spite of that,
since 1960, conciliation has become the principal means by which the
Shariah Courts of Singapore have been able to reduce the number of
155 Hj. Ibrahim, 1987.
' Ibrahim, Ahmad bin Mohamed, "Recent Amendments to the Egyptian Family Law," J.M.C.L
[1980] p.81.
157 Number 40 of 1960 which came into force on 27th. May 1960.
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divorces among the Muslims in that country.' 58 The institution of
hakam, therefore, if properly put into practice would serve as a useful
and effective means for the Sharia Courts in Malaysia to check the
rate of divorce.'59
' Siraj, M. "The Shariah Court and its Control of Divorce Rate m Smgapore", 1963, Mal L.R, p.148.
' Mahinood, 1979, p.98.
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PART TWO
CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL
TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter reports the results of a divorce survey carried out in
Kuala Lumpur on Muslim divorce between 1983-1990 and non-Muslim
divorce between 1975-1990. The survey was carried out in a random
fashion targeted towards 150 divorce files in each year of the sixteen
year period for the non-Muslim population and eight year period for
the Muslim population in Kuala Lumpur. This involved in the research
of 2305 files (32.3 percent of 7428 files) filed with the High Court of
Kuala Lumpur for non-Muslim divorce and 1200 files in the Sharia
Court for Muslim divorce. The jurisdiction of these courts covers an
area of nearly 243.65 square kilometres with a population of 977,102.1
The divorce survey form as shown in Appendix II was used as the
criterion upon which the survey was carried out. The analysis, to a
large extent, represents the divorce behaviour of an urban population
with a more liberal attitude towards family life, marriage and also
divorce, as compared with the general population of Malaysia.
1 Information Malaysia, 1990, p.726.
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Since one of the primary motivation factors of this study was to
analyse the effect of the LRA on the trends and patterns of non-
Muslim divorce in Kuala Lumpur, the periods selected were between
1975-1982 and 1983-1990. 1982 is the watershed year as it was on 1st
March 1982 that the LRA was brought into force. 2 Therefore, for most
practical purposes, it was assumed that the effect of the LRA was
minimal and negligible with respect to the overall trend and patterns
of divorce for non-Muslims between 1975 and 1982. Nevertheless, it
must be borne in mind that there would be some effects of the LRA
in 1982 that would show up as a slight deviation from the norm, which
will be pointed out in the appropriate section.
For Muslims, the effect of IFLA could not be properly analysed in a
shorter time frame as compared to the LRA. This is due to the fact
that the IFLA was in force only on 24th April 1987. Nevertheless, the
outcome of the data seems to show similarities with the non-Muslims
except in certain circumstances.
Besides comparing and contrasting the effect of the two laws, the
research was also to investigate whether certain factors can be
correlated to a high probability of divorce. As the source of the
following analysis is solely from the records, there are certain obvious
difficulties in trying to find explanations for behaviour. Some important
sociological information concerning educational level, income or
background of the couple, is not available. Nevertheless, it should be
possible to produce some quite important findings from this limited
source of information.
2 P.U.(B) 73 82.
Interview with Ustaz Mohd, Nasir, Registrar of Muslim Marriages and Divorces, Jabatan Agama
Wilayah Persekutuan (JAW!) in June, 1992.
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This analysis is organised into several sections :-
(a) Sex of petitioner in Muslim and Non-Muslim divorce.
(b) Nature of petition in Non-Muslim divorce.
(c) Kind of petition in Non-Muslim divorce.
(d) Grounds for divorce in Muslim and Non-Muslim divorce.
(e) Age at marriage and divorce for Muslim and Non-Muslim
divorce.
(f) Types of Muslim divorce.
(g) Methods of Muslim divorce.
(h) Duration of marriage in Muslim and Non-Muslim divorce.
(i) Occupational status of husband and wife in Muslim and Non-
Muslim divorce.
(h) Number of children in Muslim and Non-Muslim divorce.
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TABLE 4.01
Percentage Distribution of Unilateral Petitions By Sex of
Non-Muslim Petitioners from 1975-1990
Description	 1975-1982	 1983.1990
Male	 32.2	 26.1
Female	 67.8	 73.9
1975-1982	 1983-1990
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4.2 SEX OF PETITIONER
It is obviously of some interest to consider matrimonial proceedings in
the light of which spouse initiates them. In this research, an attempt
will be made to investigate who usually petitions for divorce, the
husband or the wife. Only unilateral petitions were studied because in
a joint-petition, it is not possible to conclude who actually initiates the
divorce.
Table 4.01 represents the distribution of sex of non-Muslim petitioners
in unilateral petitions for the years 1975 to 1990. The LRA appears to
have made no difference to the percentage of petitions brought by
husbands or wives, hence, the patterns do not change much. In both
periods, females predominate with a representation of 67.8 percent in
the period 1975-1982 compared with the male percentage of 32.2
percent before the LRA. After LRA, the picture is still the same in
that females are still in the majority in unilateral petitions at 73.9
percent with males coming in at 26.1 percent.
Can we assume from this figure that men in general are more
committed to sustaining the marriage? The present study is not
conclusive on this point but research carried out by Davies and Murch
in Bristol in their Conciliation in Divorce Study (1988) concluded that
whilst the husband had not wanted a divorce, he had not wanted much
of a marriage either, and it was this that prompted his wife to issue
proceedings. They also found that not only did women tend to be the
initiator of divorce, but were also correspondingly less likely to regret
the ending of a marriage.4
Davies, Gwynm and Murch, Meivin, Grounds for Divorce, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988, pp33-
34.
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Research also show that in the majority of divorce cases the petitions
are brought by women. It would be naive to assume that this
necessarily reflect a greater dissatisfaction with marriage on the part
of the women. In an urban society the Kuala Lumpur, economic
dependence is the main deterrent to divorce, and women have
traditionally been more constrained in this respect than men. 5 Women
sometimes make an application for divorce for economic reasons, such
as to receive money for child maintenance and custody orders, whereas
the husband' reasons are more simply to obtain termination of
marriage. The legal process of divorce, in practice, involves the
division of property, settling maintenance and arrangements for
children. These are matters that are particular concern to women who
are most likely to retain prime responsibility for the children and are
least likely to be the major wage earner. 6
Law and custom gave wives who are economically dependent on their
husbands, limited choice but to stay in an unhappy marriage. As
poignantly put by Huber,
"In preindustrial societies, marriage was situated in a web of
economic reciprocities. Tearing that web decreased the
durability of marriages, not because modern husbands and
wives get along less well but they are open to other options if
they grow to dislike one another. "
For further discussion on this point see Chapter 5 pp.398-404.
6 Martin, Richards, The Changing Role of Men, in Chan ge in Marriage, Rugby, National Marriage
Guidance Council, 1982, p.125.
Huber, Joan and Spilze Glenna, Sex Stratification: Children, Housework and Jobs, New York,
Academic Press, 1983, p.88.
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TABLE 4.02
Percentage Distribution of Unilateral Petition by Sex of
Muslim Petitioners from 1983-1990
Description	 1983-1986	 1987-1990
Male	 97.5	 73.2
Female	 02.5	 26.8
r1
N
100
' 70
60
50
N40
30
20
10
1983-1986
1987-1990
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The increase in women's paid employment has been a primary
influence in the rise of the female petitioners rate. Another factor has
been the Legal Aid Scheme which was first introduced in 1971 through
the Legal Aid Act 1971 to enable litigants of limited means to initiate
divorce proceedings.8
The increase in women petitioners also suggests that traditional roles
within the family have also been challenged on an unprecedented scale.
Women have become much more articulate in complaining about their
domestic lot, claiming equality and seeking choices as between home-
making, motherhood and career. This study on non-Muslim divorce
confirms research made by Choudhary on Indian divorces in which he
concludes that the trend in India indicates that increasing education
among women, greater female employment opportunities, and changing
sex roles of women will increase marital disruption.9
As for the Muslim population in Kuala Lumpur, from 1983-1986, it was
observed that the majority of petitioners were males (see Table 4.02).
At 97.5 percent, males were overwhelmingly in the majority, compared
to only 2.5 percent for females. This was the case for the period 1987-
1990 as well. However, the numbers of male petitioners dropped to
73.2 percent and the proportion of female petitioners increased to 26.8
percent after the new law was enforced.
Prima facie, the findings in this study seem to confirm research done
by Tan (1987)'° that in Malay divorces, it is the husband who is more
8 Section 15 and 16 of the Legal Aid Act, 1971; The number of applicants increased after legal aid
was introduced.
Choudhaiy, 1988, p.47.
10 Tan Poo Chang, 1987, p.24.
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inclined towards divorce. Other studies such as Kuchiba (1979)11 and
Jones (1981)12 indicate that in most cases the wife instigates the
divorce and persuades the husband to divorce her by talag.
It is interesting to note that a report by the Unit Perunding dan
Pembangunan Keluarga (Consultation and Development of Family
Unit) points to the fact that most of the cases covered by the report
are complaints made by the wives against their husbands. These cases
are brought up to the Sharia Court after failure of reconciliation. In
most of the cases, both parties would mutually agree to divorce.13
According to Wan Sulaiman, to facilitate the divorce process, the
husband would petition for the divorce through talag. 14 Therefore, it
would seem on the paper records that it is the males who do the
petitioning whereas the true situation is that both agree to divorce
after consultation with the officer at the Unit Perunding dan
Pembangunan Keluarga.
Divorce proceedings in the Sharia Court show that securing a divorce
can be a trying experience. This is especially so for rural and poorly
educated women. In fact, going to court is regarded as something
embarrassing and undesirable in Malay culture. It is often avoided
unless necessary. Due to financial hardship, parties often cannot afford
to engage lawyers to plead their cases. The petitioners also run a great
Kuchiba, Masuo, Yoshihiro Tsubouchi and Narifumi Maeda (eds), Three Mala y Villages: A
Sociology of Paddy Growers in West Malaysia translated by Peter and Stephanie Hawkes,
Honolulu, The University Press of Hawaii, 1979, pp. 162.
12 Jones, 1981, p.264.
13 Laporan Unit Perunding dan Pembangunan Keluarga,Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan,
1990.
14 Personal Conversation with Ustaz Wan Sulaiman, Head of Counselling Unit, Department of
Religious Affairs, Kuala Lumpur, March, 1992.
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risk of their divorce petitions being rejected through no fault of their
own but because of the strict way with which the law is upheld.'5
In a study of Muslim divorces in Kedah, Sharifah noted that a divorce
petition is normally settled after an average of three court sittings that
covered a span of about seven to eight months Hearings are often
adjourned on the slightest excuse. As far as the petitioner is
concerned, this practice has been known to cause undue financial and
psychological hardships. The rigorous procedures which the women are
subjected to, before and during court hearings, can leave them
spiritually demoralized and financially worse of."6
However, from the point of view of the ciadhi, adjourning hearings may
help estranged couples to become reconciled. In tact, according to the
professional ethics of the qadhi, it is his obligation to attempt a
reconciliation first before giving the permission to divorce.'7
However, Sharifah commented that the overriding concern of the court
officers to make sure that God's laws are administered and that
everything should be done according to the stipalations demanded in
the Sharia, has resulted in a certain degree of rigidity, which is
intensified by the strict rules associated with the modern bureaucracy
that Malaysian courts are a part of.18
It can be seen from Table 4.03, that quite apart from the overall
preponderance of female petitioners in the non-Muslim divorce, the
15 New Straits Times, February 17, 1989.
16 Syed Hassan, Sharifah Zaleha bt, "Women, Divorce and Islam in Kedah", SOJOURN, No.2, 1986,
pp.183-199.
17 Personal Conversation with Ustaz Abdul Aziz bin Mashuri, Judge of the Shana Court, Kuala
Lumpur in July, 1993.
18 Syed Hassan, 1986.
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proportionate use of the grounds for divorce varies significantly
between the sexes. The most significant feature is the wives' virtual
monopoly of cruelty and desertion ground. For male petitioners,
desertion is the most popular ground.
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TABLE 4.03
Percentage Distribution of Unilateral Petitions by Grounds for Divorce and
Sex of Non-Muslim Petitioner from 1975-1990
MALE	 FEMALE
GROUP	 1975-1982	 1983-1990	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
Adultery	 04.1	 00.9	 10.3	 02.8
Cruelty	 05.7	 08.0	 21.3	 23.0
Desertion	 17.5	 15.3	 23.9	 34.0
Mixture	 04.9	 1	 00.9	 11.8	 10.7
Conversion	 00.0	 1	 00.6	 01.3	 02.8
1975-1982	 1983-1990	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
MALE	 FEMALE
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Under the ground of desertion, males had a percentage of 17.5 percent
which decreased to 15.3 percent after the LRA. It is difficult to
ascertain why the husband petitioner prefer desertion to the other
grounds. It may be due to the fact that reasons which led to the
desertion of wife are usually unspecific, unlike the case of adultery and
cruelty which are specific matrimonial offences of which details must
be given to the court. Moreover, according to the records, adultery and
cruelty are the more usual matrimonial offences committed by the
husbands. Table 4.03 showed that before the LRA, the percentage of
males using adultery as a ground for divorce was only 4.1 percent
whereas of females petitioner it was 10.3 percent. As for the ground
of cruelty, males using this ground accounted for only 5.7 percent,
while female petitioners showed a higher percentage of 21.3 percent,
and after the LRA, males were only at 8 percent while the percentage
of female petitioners using these grounds increased to 23 percent.
As can be seen, most wife petitioners rely on the grounds of cruelty,
desertion and separation. Due to the nature of traditional upbringing
in most Asian homes, large number of wives are still economically
dependent and subservient to their husbands. This has resulted in
husbands feeling superior to their wives.'9
The above results confirmed findings made by Chester and Streather
in England that wives have been the principal users of cruelty as
grounds for divorce since its introduction in 1937. It is interesting to
note, however, that the definition of what constitutes "cruelty" came
to be broadened considerably, going well beyond the original
conception of physical violence.20
19 For further discussion on this point e Chapter 1.
20 Chester,R. and Streather J., "Cruelty in English Divorce: Some Empirical Findings", Journal of
Marriage and the Family, 34, (1972) 706.
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As for desertion and separation, studies in Philadelphia and Chicago
showed that desertion, popularly known as the "poor man's divorce",
was prevalent among the foreign population and in the slum districts.
Desertion rivalled divorce in frequency of occurrence, and the
enquiries further indicated that these two phases of marital disruption
somewhat overlapped. Cahen quoted a study carried out by Colcord in
1919 which concluded that desertion is not the poor man's divorce
since the deserter does not generally consider his absence from home
to amount to anything so final and definite as a divorce. The consensus
of opinion of social workers seems to be that desertion is merely the
"poor man's vacation".2'
Under the mixture of grounds (combination of adultery, cruelty,
desertion and separation), male petitioners were quite low at 4.9
percent whereas females recorded a percentage of 11.8 percent and
after the LRA, for these grounds, males are at 0.9 percent and females
at 10.7 percent. The grounds of conversion which were only introduced
in 1982 had no effect on males but was used by females as grounds for
divorce at 0.4 percent, and after the LRA, 0.6 percent of males used
these grounds and the percentage of females increased to 2.8.
The change in the law could have brought about these changes as was
the case in New Zealand. Although the 1898 law in New Zealand gave
women equal access to divorce for the grounds of adultery, the number
of women's petitions on the grounds of adultery scarcely changed at
all. Although women's organisations in New Zealand agitated for
equality, what turned out to be most useful to women in reality was
not equalization, but liberalisation of divorce law. This is because
women's petitions for divorce far outnumbered men's when founded on
the newly recognised matrimonial offenses of desertion and
drunkenness.
21 Cahen, Alfred, Statistical Analysis of American Divorce, New York, Columbia University Press,
1932 p.16.
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TABLE 4.04
Percentage Distribution of Petitions by Grounds for Divorce and Sex of
Muslim Petitioners from 1983-1990
MALE	 FEMALE
GROUP	 19834986	 1987-1990	 1983-1986	 1987-1990
Adultery	 3.8	 03.8	 0.4	 00.4
Cruelty	 0.2	 003	 0.0	 01.2
Desertion	 2.2	 02.2	 0.9	 00.9
Mixture	 1.5	 00.7	 0.2	 00.5
Polygamy	 2.5	 00.3	 0.0	 01.4
Intolerable	 0.3	 68.7	 1.1	 20.8
Behaviour1
Intolerable behaviour for women includes drinking, gambling, and womanising and
inability or refusal of the husband to maintain (nafaqah) the wife and the family. For
the husband, intolerable behaviour would mean that the wife is recalcitrant (nushuz)
or disobedient.
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Phillips concluded that it was these new grounds for divorce which
reversed the sex ratio of divorce petitions.22
Whereas, Chester (1970) has shown that the English experience
regarding the male-female share of petitions varies according to factors
such as duration of marriage and fertility and he also notes that the
issue is further obscured by the effects of the 1969 Divorce Reform
Act. Evidence from his field study suggests that the pattern does not
represent agreed arrangements between the spouses about
petitioning23.
As observed previously, males were predominant in the Muslim divorce
scene and this is exemplified by the low frequencies of females
petitioning for divorce under the various grounds available in Table
4.04.
It was observed that intolerable behaviour was the ground used most
frequently by females in the 1987-1990 period at 20.8 percent. This was
followed by polygamy at 1.4 percent, cruelty at 1.2 percent, desertion
at 0.9 percent and adultery at 0.4 percent.
Males mostly divorced under intolerable behaviour at 68.7 percent,
followed by adultery at 3.8 percent and desertion at 2.2 percent. The
least used grounds were cruelty and polygamy at 0.3 percent each.
Desertion on the part of husband in the Muslim divorce is deemed to
upset the marital relationship. In an uncontested case, desertion is
relatively easy to ascertain. In most cases, the wife's oath, the
witnesses' evidence and the prolonged absence of the husband in
Phillips, R., Divorce in New Zealand: A Social History, Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1981,
pp.65-7!.
Chester, Robert, Divorce in England and Wales, in Divorce m Euro pe, edited by Robert Chester,
Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, Vol. 3, 1977, pp. 81-92.
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subsequent hearings together confirm the qadhi's suspicion that the
man has indeed abandoned his wife. Even then, some women may
encounter difficulties in this matter because they produce witnesses
who give conflicting evidence about the exact date when their husbands
were supposed to have left them. Conflicting evidence can cause a
petition for ta'Iiq divorce to be dismissed. It is not surprising that
witnesses make this error because women often submit petitions for
ta'lig divorce two or more years after they have been abandoned by
their husbands. Newspapers have disclosed many instances of desertion
in "wanted" advertisements seeking husbands to attend court hearings
for petitions based on fasakh or ta'liq filed by their wives.
Very few respondents divorced because of a desire to remarry. Women
in Tan's study were more likely to do so than men, partly because a
Muslim man can marry up to four wives at any one time while a
Muslim woman can only marry one man at a time.24
There is quite a difference in the trend before and after IFLA came
into force. Except for desertion and adultery, the proportion of females
increased over all the various grounds of divorce. The percentage of
females using intolerable behaviour increased tremendously from 1.1
percent to 20.8 percent and males using the same grounds increased
from 0.3 percent to 68.7 percent. Polygamy (inability to treat wives
equally) as grounds for divorce for males decreased in percentage
from 2.5 percent to 0.3 percent due to the stringency of the law in
permitting polygamy. However, for the females, the percentage using
inequality of treatment in polygamy as grounds for divorce increased
from 0 percent to 1.4 percent. This probably shows that the law has
been more sympathetic towards wives who were ill-treated in a
polygamous marriage.
Tan Poo Chang, 1987, pp.41-2.
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It is interesting to note that in Tan's study, about one third of the
male respondents practised polygamy and it is the practice of
polygamy, which may have contributed towards the failure of some
marriages. Female respondents in his study stated that it is better to
be divorced than to share the spouse.25
The practice of polygamy appears to have declined in recent years,
partly as a result of higher education of women, increasing
urbanisation and increasing awareness among women of their rights.26
Under the LRA, polygamy for Non-Muslims was abolished. 27
 There
has been no similar proposal for Muslims but under the new law a
Muslim man will be allowed to marry a second wife only with the
consent of the Judge of the Sharia Court.28
Ibid.p.20.
See Aziz, 1981; p34.
27 See Chapter 3.
28 I1A, section 23.
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TABLE 4.05
Percentage Distribution of Petitioners b y Sex of
Non-Muslim Petitioners and Ethnic Group from 1975-1990
MALE	 FEMALE
ETHNIC GROUP	 1975-1982	 1983-1990	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
Chinese	 80.1	 78.4	 75.2	 75.9
Indians	 17.3	 20.9	 17.6	 22.5
Others	 02.6	 00.7	 07.2	 01.6
1975-1982	 1983-1990	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
MALE	 FEMALE
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To see how far the ethnicity of a petitioner affects ithe initiation of the
divorce petition, a Table was constructed by cross tabulating the sex
of the petitioner by ethnic group of the petitioner. Table 4.05 shows
that the overwhelming majority of non-Muslim divorcees are Chinese,
followed by Indians and finally Other races. Before LRA, the
percentages were 80.1 percent, 17.3 percent and 2.6 percent
respectively for the males. After LRA, this changed slightly to 78.4
percent, 20.9 percent and 0.7 percent respectively. For the ethnic
groups of the wives, it was observed that the frecjuency for Chinese,
Indians and other races were 75.2 percent, 17.6 percent and 7.2
percent respectively. After LRA the frequencies were 75.9 percent, 22.5
percent and 1.6 percent respectively. This appears to reflect the known
pattern of the population of Kuala Lumpur in which the Chinese
account for 51.9 percent, the Indians 14.3 percent and other races at
1.0 percent of the total non-Muslim population in Kuala Lumpur. 29
 It
can be observed that there is a slight increase in the representation of
Chinese in divorce cases.
29 See Department of Statistics, Population and Housing Census of Malaysia in General Report of
the Population Census, edited by Khoo Teik Huat, Vol 1, Kuala Lunpur, Government Printers,
1980, p22.
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TABLE 4.06
Percentage Distribution of Petitioners by Sex of
Muslim Petitioners and Ethnic Group from 1983-1990
MALE	 FEMALE
ET11NIC GROUP
	
1975.1982	 1983-1990	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
Malay	 99.3	 97.3	 99.2	 98.3
Chinese	 00.2	 01.0	 00.2	 00.2
Indians	 003	 01.3	 00.5	 00.5
Others	 00.0	 00.3	 00.2	 00.1
1975-1982	 1983-1990	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
MALE	 FEMALE
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TABLE 4.07
Percentage Distribution of Unilateral Petitions of
Non-Muslim Male Petitioners by Ethnic Group from 1975-1990
ETHNIC GROUP	 1975.1982	 1983-1990
Chinese male
	
72.79	 57.32
Indian male
	
23.61	 39.02
Others male	 03.61	 03.66
Chinese Male
	 Indian Male	 Others Mate
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TABLE 4.08
Percentage Distribution of Unilateral Petitions of
Non-Muslim Female Petitioners by Ethiiic Group from 1975-1990
ETHNIC GROUP	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
Chinese female	 77.36	 68.1
Indiaii female	 16.59	 30.62
Others female	 06.05	 01.3
Chinese Male
	
Indian Male	 Others Male
LII 1975-1982 • 1983-1990
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Table 4.06 reflects the fact that the majority of Muslims in Kuala
Lumpur are Malays. 99.3 percent and 97.3 percent of the males who
divorced in the periods 1983-1986 and 1987-1990 were Malays. Chinese,
Indians and "Other" races in the Muslim community made up 0.2
percent, and 0.5 percent of all Muslim divorces respectively. For the
period 1987-1990, the figures were 0.2 percent, 0.5 percent and 1
percent respectively for the Chinese, Indians and "Other" races. This
phenomenon is reaffirmed in the same Table by the female percentage
whereby 99.2 percent for the period 1983-1986 and 98.3 percent from
1987-1990 of all females divorced in Kuala Lumpur were Malays. There
were minimal representations by the Chinese, Indian, and Other races
in the Muslim community for the period from 1983-1986 and 1987-
1990.
Table 4.07 shows that before and after LRA, unilateral petitions
initiated by Chinese males made up the overwhelming majority at 72.7
percent and 57.3 percent respectively of the total non-Muslim male
petitioners. In second place are Indian males which made up most of
the remainder at 23.6 percent. This figure increased substantially to 39
percent after the LRA came into force. Others constitute 3.6 percent
only.
As seen in Table 4.08, the same pattern repeats itself for female
petitioners. Before and after the LRA, unilateral petitions initiated by
Chinese females were 77.4 percent and 68.1 percent respectively. This
was followed by Indian females at a rate of 16.6 percent but the
percentage increased substantially to 30.6 percent after the LRA. This
was followed by Others at 6.0 percent of the total female petitioners.
The present research does not show why there is a difference in ethnic
tendency when it comes to divorce but from the statistics, Chinese
wives seem to be the most litigious when it comes to petitioning for a
divorce. Indian wives seem comparatively quite reluctant. This may be
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due to Indian culture which is still traditionally very conservative and
does not tolerate divorce.30
4.3 NATURE OF PETITION
For the purposes of this research, nature of petition means whether
the petition is defended or undefended. The nature of petition is only
applicable to "unilateral petitions", that is petitions brought by one
party, as opposed to a joint petition which is brought by both parties
of the marriage.
Before the LRA, all petitions were unilateral petitions and a petition
for divorce could oniy be brought by one party alone. However, since
1982, with the introduction of LRA and the new grounds of divorce by
mutual consent, a joint petition by both parties is possible.
The meaning of "undefended cause" has a different meaning under the
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Rules, 1953 from the Divorce and
Matrimonial Proceedings Rules, 1980, that is the new law. Under the
former, "undefended cause" means a matrimonial cause in which no
answer has been filed or in which all answers filed have been struck
out, but does not include:
(i) a cause in which relief is sought under section 7(1)(d), 7(2)(f)
or 15(1)(g) of the Ordinance,
(ii) a cause in which a co-respondent, party-cited or person named,
whether made a respondent or not, denies in accordance with
Rule 16, a charge of adultery without filing an answer; or
(iii) a cause in which a co-respondent claims to be heard as to
damages without filing an answer.
"Defended causes" means a matrimonial cause not being an
undefended cause.
° For further details see Chapter 1.
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Under the Proceedings Rules, (Rule 2) of the new law, "undefended
cause" means:
(a) in the case of an application under section 50 of the Act, a
cause in which the respondent has not given notice of intention
to defend within the time limit.
(b) in any other case
(i) a cause in which no answer has been filed or an answer
filed has been struck out, or
(ii) a cause which is proceeding only on the respondent's
answer and in which no reply or answer to the
respondent's answer has been filed or any such reply or
answer has been struck out; or
(iii) a cause to which to which Rule 16(4) applies and in which
no notice has been given under that rule or any notice so
given has been withdrawn. "defended cause" means a cause
not being an undefended cause.
For the purposes of this research, the meaning of "undefended cause"
used corresponds to the Rules applicable to the said petition; therefore
a case decided before the LRA will follow the meaning under the new
Rules.
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TABLE 4.09
Percentage Distribution of Nature of Petitions from 1975-1990
DESCRIP'HON	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
Defended	 10.5	 01.8
Undefended	 89.5	 98.2
Defended	 Undefended
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TABLE 4.10
Percentage Distribution of Nature of Petitions by Sex of
Non-Muslim Petitioners from 1975-1990
MALE	 FEMALE
NATURE OF PETITION 	 1975-1982	 1983-1990	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
____________________	
I
I	 I
Defended	 05.9	 :	 00.0	 04.5	 1	 01.5
I	 I
I	 I
Undefended	 26.4	 1	 26.2	 63.2	 1	 72.0
__________________________________ 	
I	 I
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1975-1982	 1983-1990 1975-1982	 1983-1990
MALE	 FEMALE
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Table 4.09 shows that overall, there is a change in the nature of
petitions submitted before and after the enforcement of the LRA. In
both cases, undefended petitions predominate with a percentage of 89.5
percent in the period 1975-1982 and a percentage of 98.2 percent from
1983-1990. The representation of defended petitions dropped
substantially from 10.5 percent before the LRA to 1.8 percent after the
LRA.
Table 4.10 deals with the nature of petition according to sex of
petitioner, petitioners were predominantly female and mostly
undefended. Before the LRA, for defended petitions, males accounted
for 5.9 percent whereas females accounted for only 4.5 percent.
However in undefended petitions, it was observed that females made
up the majority at 63.2 percent compared to the male percentage at
only 26.4 percent. After the LRA, surprisingly, there were no cases of
males defending divorce petitions. The rate for females was also
reduced to 2.1 percent.
In undefended cases, the pattern remains unchanged. Males accounted
for 26.4 percent before the LRA, and 26.2 percent afterwards. However
the percentage of female involved in undefended cases increased to 72
percent of the total petitions after the LRA, from 63.2 percent
previously.
It is not possible to discover the reason for this change, but it is
hypothesized that the reason for the reduction in defended petitions
is due mainly to the presence of mutual consent which was introduced
in the LRA. Whereas previously, the petitioner's spouse may have
wished to defend the petition and in so doing remove any possible
stigma arising from the charge of adultery, cruelty, desertion or
separation, this was no longer the case the case under the LRA. With
the enforcement of the LRA, a more amicable reason for divorce can
be used. Hence, the use of mutual consent where there is irretrievable
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breakdown of the marriage minimises the social stigma attaching to
divorce. Perhaps this is also partially due to financial constraints or it
maybe that the wife freely consented to the divorce. Hence, the
reduction in the percentage of defended cases.
There are small numbers of contested divorce suits, the majority of
which are probably of a technical nature concerning matters such as
the disposition of children, alimony or the jurisdiction of the court,
and are not genuine attempts to prevent the divorce. The overwhelming
prevalence of mutual consent reflects the accuracy of the above
statement.
4.4 KIND OF PETITION
Kind of petition for the purposes of this research means whether the
petition is unilateral or joint. It may be observed from Table 4.11 that
from 1975-1982, unilateral petitions predominated with 90.4 percent of
all petitions being unilateral in nature and joint petitions only 9.6
percent. However, from 1983-1990, that is after the enforcement of the
LRA, unilateral petitions dropped to 26.9 percent of all petitions filed
and joint petitions rose to 73.1 percent. This figures illustrate the
popularity of joint petitions with divorcing couples.
This may be explained by the fact that under the previous Ordinance,
there were limited number of grounds under which divorce could be
granted. Grounds such as adultery, cruelty, desertion and separation do
not lend themselves well to joint divorce petitions.
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TABLE 4.11
Percentage Distribution of Kind of Non-Muslim Petitions from 1975-1990
NATURE OF PETI11ON	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
Unilateral	 90.4	 26.9
Joint	 09.6	 73.1
Unilateral	 Joint
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It was only after the coming into force of the LRA that this change
occurred. The LRA provided for two additional cases for divorce,
namely conversion to Islam and mutual agreement. It is the latter
grounds upon which joint petitions may be submitted as these grounds
require proof from both parties that their marriage has broken down.
There are various reasons why couples preferred a joint petition. The
high number of undefended causes in the years before 1982 suggests
that most respondents agreed or consented to the divorce. Basically,
a joint petition or divorce by mutual consent means both the parties
agree and freely consent to the divorce.
By submitting a joint petition, a great deal of animosity and bitterness
is reduced. More importantly, the parties need not provide the grounds
or reasons for their divorce and therefore, need not allege the faults
of the other party. Most persons prefer their divorce to be a private
matter and the joint petition provides for this.
In America, no-fault divorce led to less costly divorce. American
lawyers advertised easy, inexpensive divorces more frequently than any
other legal services. 3 ' Where divorce costs little, according to Goode,
there will be a high divorce rate. This is a reciprocal and reinforcing
relationship. Easy divorce means in effect that there are fewer strong
factors to maintain the boundaries of the family unit. Where divorce
is difficult and costly, it is primarily an upper-class phenomenon.32
In Malaysia, it is also cheaper to divorce by submitting a joint petition.
Legal sources have quoted an estimate of one thousand and five
hundred RM equivalent to approximately 300 pounds) as legal fees for
' Riley, Glenda, Divorce: An American Tradition, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 165.
32 Goode, William, Marital Satisfaction and Instability: A Cross-Cultural Class Analysis of Divorce
Rates" International Social Science Journal, VoL 14, No3, (1962), pp.507-526.
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a joint petition while lawyers charge between $1500-$2000 as legal fees
for a unilateral petition or even higher, if the case is complicated and
lengthy.
Besides, there is less chance for a reluctant spouse to delay the divorce
process in a joint petition. In a single petition, the respondent can
delay the process by avoiding service of the petition or by defending
the cause. However, there is no need for service of the petition nor is
there the need to defend it in a joint petition. Hence, the overall
process is less time-consuming.
This analysis which is structured around the time of changes in divorce
legislation (1975-1990) indicate the importance of changes in the law.
The clear tendency was for petitioning under the new grounds, of
mutual consent and conversion. This is evidence that the legislative
reforms themselves responded to needs within the married population
of Malaysia.
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TABLE 4.13
Percentage Distribution of Kind of Petition by Occupational Group of
Non-Muslim Wives from 1975-1990
UNILATERAL	 JOINT
GROUP	 1975-1982	 1983-1990	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
Professional	 01.8	 03.1	 02.4	 03.2
Administrative	 03.5	 02.4	 03.6	 04.5
Clencal	 25.4	 19.2	 29.8	 31.1
Sales	 03.8	 14.3	 03.6	 04.5
Service	 11.9	 04.9	 11.9	 05.9
Agriculture	 00.2	 n/a	 00.0	 n/a
Labour	 13.9	 09.8	 10.7	 08.5
Unclassified	 00.5	 00.0	 04.8	 00.4
Unemployed	 36.6	 43.6	 31.0	 33.5
Outside Labour	 02.3	 02.8	 02.4	 02.6
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1975.1982	 1983-1990	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
UNILATERAL	 JOWIT
• PEOFESSION AJ •	 JSTRATIVE •
	
o SALES	 U SERVI
• AGRIOJI11JRE	 U LABOUR	 U UNCLASSIFIED	 • ENEMPLOVED	 U OTrSIDE LABOUR
272
Table 4.12 shows that before LRA, male petitioners in the labour
group seemed to top the list for unilateral petitions (22.9 percent),
followed by those in sales. In joint petitions, males in sales were top
at 29.8 percent followed by those in the labour group. The pattern
does not change after the LRA. Males in labour remained at the top
(31 percent) followed by males in sales at 27.9 percent. For joint
petitions, sales were at 26.9 percent and labourer at 24.1 percent. As
for female petitioners, Table 4.13 shows that before the LRA,
unemployed wives seemed to be the top (36.6 percent) of petitioners
using unilateral petitions followed by those in clerical were at 25.4
percent. The pattern remains unchanged for joint petitions.
Unemployed wives constituted 31 percent followed by women in clerical
work at 29.8 percent. After the LRA, the percentage of unemployed
wives involved in unilateral petitions increased to 43.6 percent. Those
using joint petitions rose to 33.5 percent. Clerical workers came next
but the percentage decreased to 19.2 percent for unilateral petitions
and increased to 31.1 percent for joint petitions.
The data above shows that whether the petition is unilateral or joint,
male divorcees are mainly from the group of labourers and sales,
whereas females are mostly housewives and those involved in clerical
work. This is due to the over representation of those in these fields in
Kuala Lumpur.
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TABLE 4.14
Percentage Distribution of Grounds for Divorce of
Non-Muslims from 1975-1990
GROUNDS	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
Adulteiy	 13.0	 01.0
Cruelty	 24.5	 08.7
Desertion	 37.6	 15.0
Mixture'	 15.2	 03.2
Conversion	 00.4	 00.9
Mutual	 09.3	 03.2
The item listed as combination causes (mixture) jn the study to more than one ground
cited for divorce has been arranged for a more refined distribution
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4.5 GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE IN UNILATERAL PETITIONS
"Grounds for divorce", however defined, bear only little relationship
to divorce complaints as they appear in divorce petitions. The basis
upon which a divorce petition is filed need not, of itself be the root
cause of marriage breakdown. In general, the rule in such petitions is
that the legally most effective and morally least accusatory grounds are
asserted in the suit.
Cahen quoted the US Marriage and Divorce Report, 1928 which stated
that:
"The legal cause shown by the court records may or may not,
of course, be the true cause underlying the action for divorce....
Frequently too, the actual cause is not a legal cause in the
particular state in which the court action takes place.... For this
reason it may truthfully be said that in a compilation of
statistics covering divorce, there is no phase of the subject so
unsatisfactory as the causes assigned for the granting of the
decrees"33
Thus, it is safe to say that in almost every divorce case there are far
more basic conflicts in the marriage than are asserted in the petition,
and that these more basic conflicts would have been aired if the stated
grounds had not been accepted by the court.
An attempt to glean the real causes of divorce from statistics regarding
the grounds for divorce for the year before and after LRA is not very
illuminating. Grounds for divorce seem to be employed interchangeably
according to the wishes of the applicants.
Five major categories of grounds for divorce are presented in Table
4.14 which shows the percentage distribution for 1975-1982 and 1983-
1990 for the grounds of divorce in unilateral petitions. It may be
Cahen, 1932, p.39.
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observed that from 1975-1982, desertion and separation were the main
grounds of divorce cited with 37.6 percent. Cruelty was next at 24.5
percent followed by adultery at 13.0 percent of the total. A variety of
grounds cited as "mixture" was represented at 15.2 percent. Conversion
was last at 0.4 percent but mutual consent was represented at 9.3
percent. These last two grounds were grounds introduced only under
the LRA. As observed, conversion had very little effect on the overall
divorce trend. However it is interesting to note that even though the
LRA was enforced in March 1982, it made a substantial impact as 98
couples or 9.3 percent of the population was divorced under these
grounds.
This was even more pronounced from 1983-1990 as divorces under the
grounds of mutual consent increased to 72.1 percent of the total
divorces granted. Desertion and separation had declined to 15 percent,
cruelty to 8.7 percent and mixture to 3.2 percent. Adultery had gone
down to 1.0 percent and conversion was once again last at 0.9 percent
of the total.
From the research which was based on the kind of petition and ground
of divorce, it can be inferred that most petitioners prefer a private and
peaceful means to end a bad marriage. Most of them agree to the
divorce even if they are the respondent. If there is a more efficient,
cheaper and less time-consuming way out most of them would choose
it, given that more than 72.1 percent of the cases are joint petitions
after the LRA. Also, the petitioners, if possible will try to keep as
much of the marital trouble and faults away from the courts by
choosing either neutral grounds like desertion and separation or
submitting a joint petition where no reasons need be given.
Desertion which never reached the courts also appears to have been
rampant, but because no statistics are available, it is impossible to
measure the extent of duration of desertion or the causes for it.
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Adultery as grounds for divorce is perhaps the best illustration of
changes in the norms of society. Before LRA, it was broadly used in
about 13 percent of cases. The decrease use of this ground to 1
percent only shows that those involved in divorce do not wish to "wash
their dirty linen in public."
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TABLE 4.15
Percentage Distribution of Grounds for Divorce of
Muslims from 1983-1990
GROUNDS	 1983-1986	 1987-1990
Adultety	 04.2	 02.2
Cruelty	 00.2	 01.7
Desertion	 03.1	 03.9
Mixture	 01.6	 01.2
Polygamy	 02.5	 01.7
Intolerable behaviour	 88.4	 89.4
>._
(_)	 (,) 0
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From Table 4.15, it can be seen that intolerable behaviour was cited
as the major grounds for divorce among the Muslims. From Ii 983-1986,
88.4 percent of divorces cited intolerable behaviour as their reason for
divorce. Data from 1987-1990 also agrees with this conclusion in that
89.4 percent of all divorces in this period cited intolerable behaviour.
From a frequency of 4.2 percent in the 1983-1986 year period, the
percentage for adultery decreased to only 2.2 percent in the 11987-1990.
This was followed by desertion at 3.1 percent which later increased to
3.9 percent. Due to the strict nature of the law relating to polygamy,
these grounds declined from 2.5 percent in 1983-1986, to only 1.7
percent after the new law was enforced. Cruelty at 0.2 percent were
the grounds cited for the least number of divorces in the 1983-1986
period. But, in the 1987-1990 period, it increased to 1.7 percent.
"Mixture" became the least used grounds at 1.2 percent in 1987-1990.
Riley has suggested that the growing use of cruelty as gounds for
divorce may have resulted, at least in part, from the incilination of
legislator to extend its scope. 34 The situation described by Riley
perhaps bore the same effect on Muslim divorces as the grounds of
cruelty under the new law also includes "mental suffering."35
Riley, 1991, p.89.
IFLA section 2 "Darar Syarie" means harm, accordmg to what is normally reogiused by Islamic
law, affecting a wife in respect of religion, life, body, mind, or property, for proposai of this
defmition, see Appendix II.
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TABLE 4.16
Percentage Distribution of Grounds for Divorce by Sex of
Non-Muslim Petitioner (Male) and Ethnic Group from 1975-1990
CHINESE MALE
	 INDIAN MALE
	 OThERS
1975-1982	 1982-1990	 1975-1983	 1983-1990	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
GROUNDS
Adulteiy	 11.6	 02.0	 13.9	 05.6	 27.3	 n/a
Cruelty	 16.1	 38.3	 20.8	 19.4	 27.3	 n/a
Desertion	 57.1	 53.1	 47.2	 66.7	 66.7	 n/a
Mixture	 15.2	 04.1	 18.1	 02.8	 00.0	 n/a
Conversion	 00.0	 02.0	 00.0	 02.8	 n/a	 n/a
1975-1982	 1982-1990	 1975-19813	 1983-1990	 1975-1982	 1983.1990
CHINESE MALE	 INDIAN MALE	 OTHERS
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TABLE 4.17
Percentage Distribution of Sex of Petitioner by Ethnic Group and Grounds of
Divorce for Muslims (Male) from 1983-1990
MALAY	 CHINESE	 INIMANS	 OTHERS
GROUNDS	 83-86 87-90 83-86 87-90 83-86 87-90 83-86 87-90
Adultery	 03.9	 02.1	 0	 0	 0	 00.0	 0	 0
Cruelty	 00.2	 00.5	 0	 0	 0	 00.0	 0	 0
Desertion	 02.3	 02.1	 0	 0	 0	 01.5	 0	 0
Mixture	 01.5	 00.9	 0	 0	 0	 00.0	 0	 0
Polygamy	 02.6	 00.5	 0	 0	 0	 00.0	 0	 0
Intolerable behaviour	 89.5	 93.8	 100	 100	 100 1 75.0	 0 1	 0
____________________ _____ _____ _____ .1 _____ _____ 1 _____ _____ .1 _____
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TABLE 4.18
Percentage Distribution of Grounds for Divorce by Sex of
Non-Muslim Petitioners (Female) and Ethnic Group from 1975-1990
CHINESE MALE	 INDIAN FEMALE	 OTHERS
	
GROUNDS 1975.1982 ' 1983-1990	 1975-1982	 1983-1990	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
Adultery	 15.2	 05.5	 09.3	 n/a	 30.8	 n/a
Cruelty	 29.5	 29.1	 42.1	 36.6	 28.2	 33.3
Desertion	 37.7	 47.9	 25.2	 42.3	 33.3	 66.7
Mixture	 17.2	 14.5	 21.5	 15.5	 07.7	 n/a
Conversion	 00.4	 03.0	 01.9	 05.6	 n/a	 n/a
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Is there a tendency for different ethnic groups to have particular
reasons for divorce? As shown in Table 4.16, before LRA, for the
grounds of adultery, "Others" had the highest percentage using these
grounds at 27.3 percent followed by Indian males at 13.9 percent and
then Chinese males at 11.6 percent. After the LRA, unfortunately no
data is available for Others, but there was a decrease in percentage of
Indians using these grounds only 5.6 percent and Chinese male
petitioners to only 2 percent.
For the grounds of cruelty, not before after the LRA, Chinese males
seem to lead. They accounted for about 38.8 percent followed by the
Indian males at only 19.4 percent. For desertion and separation, the
Indian males were 66.7 percent and Chinese 53.1 percent. For Mixture
of Grounds, Chinese males were 4.1 percent and Indian males only 2.8
percent. Conversion for Chinese males was only 2.0 percent and
Indian males 2.8 percent.
Examining this trend further in Table 4.17, it was found that from
1983-1986, the Chinese Muslims, Indian Muslims and Other Muslim
races divorced exclusively due to intolerable behaviour. Malay males
showed a wider variation, divorcing at 3.9 percent for adultery, 0.2
percent for cruelty, 2.3 percent for desertion, 1.5 percent for
"Mixture", 2.6 percent for polygamy and an overwhelming 89.5 percent
for intolerable behaviour.
The trend continues in the 1987-1990 period except for the Indian
Muslim males, 1.5 percent of whom used desertion as their ground for
divorce. This is a similar trend to that seen in non-Muslim Indian
males.
According to Table 4.18, the grounds of adultery seem to be very
popular amongst the wives of Others, that is about 30.8 percent. They
are followed by the Chinese female petitioners using adultery as
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grounds for divorce at 15.2 percent. As expected, after the LRA, the
percentage droped to only 5.5 percent. As for the Indian female
petitioners, before the LRA, the percentage was quite low, that is 9.3
percent.
As for the grounds of cruelty, the Indian females used these grounds
the most (42.1 percent) which shows that cruelty exists more in the
Indian community than in to the Chinese, where the percentage of
females using these grounds was 29.5 percent. After the enforcement
of the LRA, the percentage for the Indian females dropped slightly to
36.6 percent whereas for the Chinese, there is slight drop to 29.1
percent.
After the enforcement of LRA, about 66.7 percent of other use the
grounds of desertion and separation, followed by the Chinese at 47.9
percent which was only 37.7 percent before the LRA. As for female
Indian petitioners, the percentage doubled from only 25.2 percent
before the LRA to 42.3 percent after the enforcement of the LRA.
Under the mixture of grounds, the Indian female petitioners lead at a
percentage of 21.5 before the LRA which dropped to 15.5 percent after
the enforcement of the LRA. For the Chinese female petitioners using
these grounds, the percentage decreased slightly from 17.2 percent
before the LRA to 14.5 percent after the LRA.
Conversion seems to be popular among Indian males, as female Indian
petitioners used these grounds most frequently at 5.6 percent after the
LRA followed by the Chinese at 3.0 percent.
From the above data, Indian males were more likely to cite desertion
than any other reason for divorce. This seems to imply that their
spouses would go back to their parents in cases of marital disruption
for customary support. It is reported in Negeri Sembilan that parental
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meddling is one of the major causes for divorce. 36 But the problem
is not peculiar to Malaysia. A psychologist, Mat Saad Baki believes
that parental interference is a common problem in all Asian societies.
But even if such conflicts occur, studies indicate that they do not
necessarily lead to divorce. Rather, they merely aggravate problems in
a relationship that is already sour.
New Straits Times, Aprtl 2, 1991.
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TABLE 4.19
Percentage Distribution of Sex of Petitioner by Ethnic Group of
the Muslims (Female) and Grounds of Divorce from 1983-1990
MALAYS	 CHINESE	 INDIANS	 OTHERS
GROUNDS	 83.86 87-90 83-86 87-90 83-86 87-90 83-86 87-90
Adulteiy	 14.3	 14.3	 0	 0	 0	 0	 ()	 0
Cruelty	 00.0	 04.6	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
Desertion	 04.6	 07.8	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 100
Mixture	 07.1	 02.0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
Polygamy	 02.0	 05.2	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
Intolerable behaviour	 42.9	 79.2	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
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For Muslim females from 1983-1986 (Table 4.19), a similar trend
emerges where Malays showed more variation than any other race.
Females of Other races divorced exclusively for desertion but Chinese
and Indian female divorced exclusively on account of intolerable
behaviour. At 79.2 percent, intolerable behaviour was widely used by
Malay females after 1987 as the grounds for divorce.
From 1987-1990, there were no Chinese or Indian females who were
divorced. Females of Other races divorced exclusively for desertion.
Malay females show more variation, with a frequency of 76.2 percent
under intolerable behaviour, 10.1 percent under desertion and cruelty
at 6.9 percent. The incidence of polygamy was 4.8 percent, cruelty at
4.2 percent and 2.4 percent for adultery and a mixture of grounds.
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4.20a
Percentage Distribution of Ground for Divorce by Occupational Group of
Non-Muslim Wives from 1975-1982
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4.20b
Percentage Distribution of Ground for Divorce by Occupational Group of
Non-Muslim Wives from 1983-1990
30
20
10
60
50
40
70
0
ci-,
CI,
ci,
0
0
2	 g,	 (f)	 0	 Ci,	 0(/1	 -	
-	 E	 -
--	 -
E	 C,)
U Adultery	 U Cruelty	 U Desertion El Mixture	 El Conversion • Mutual
290
Table 4.20 shows that before the LRA, wives who were unemployed
seemed to be the leading group using the ground of adultery for
divorce (42.3 percent). This is followed by wives in clerical work at
21.1 percent and wives in service at 12.4 percent. Surprisingly, there
are no professional wives using these grounds for divorce. After the
LRA, the percentage for unemployed wives using these grounds
increased to 54.5 percent, followed by wives in sales and service at a
lower percentage of 18.2 percent.
Concerning cruelty as grounds for divorce, wives in clerical work seem
to lead at a percentage of 30 percent followed by unemployed wives at
29.6 percent. After the LRA, unemployed wives used cruelty more
often as grounds for divorce given that the percentage has risen to 46.2
percent. The lowest percentage is that of wives working as
professionals and also those outside labour force.
As for desertion, the unemployed wives seem to be the ones who are
always being deserted (38.5 percent) before the LRA this increased to
41.4 percent after the LRA. Second in line are the wives from the
clerical field at 26.3 percent before the LRA which dropped to 20.4
percent after LRA. This pattern seems to repeat itself in all grounds
of divorce.
On the grounds of "Mixture", again the housewives stay at the top of
the list with a percentage of 37.3 percent before and 33.3 percent after
the LRA. This is as usual followed by wives in clerical work at 20.3
percent and 15.2 percent after the LRA.
The grounds of conversion tell an interesting story in that the highest
percentage involves spouses of housewives,at 66.7 percent before and
72.7 percent after the LRA. Conversion also happens to spouses of
those in service, at 33.3 percent but surprisingly none after the LRA.
The Others are not involved in any significant way.
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Divorce initiated by mutual consent showed an interesting picture in
that after its introduction it has changed the pattern of grounds for
divorce and as expected the housewives used these grounds at 33.4
percent followed by those in clerical work at 31.1 percent.
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4.21a
Percentage Distribution of Ground of Divorce by Occupational Group of
Muslim Wives from 1983-1986
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4.21b
Percentage Distribution of Divorce by Occupational Group of
Muslim Wives from 1987-1990
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From Table 4.21, it may be observed that 50 percent of all Muslim
women who used adultery as ground for divorce was unemployed,
followed by 6.5 percent in service, 5.6 percent in clerical work, and 4.5
percent those outside labour. By contrast, from 1987-1990, the
percentage for unemployed decreased to 33.3 percent, followed by
clerical workers at 3 percent, service at 2.6 percent and labourers at
2.2 percent.
0.4 percent of those who divorced on grounds of cruelty between 1983-
1986 were unemployed. There was more variation from 1987-1990. The
percentage of unemployed increased to 1.7 percent, but the percentage
for those in sales rose to 7.4 percent. Labourer and clerical worker
rates rose to 2.2 percent and 1 percent respectively.
Between 1983-1986 desertion is at 0 (zero) percent for professional,
followed by 9.1 percent for those in sales, 6.5 percent for those in
service and 2.8 for the unemployed.
From 1983-1986, it was observed that 4.8 percent of wives who were
divorced for a mixture of reasons including adultery, cruelty and
desertion were labourers while 3.2 percent were those in service. From
1987-1990, the percentage decreased to 0.7 percent.
Wives in sales accounted for 9.1 percent of those using the grounds of
polygamy for divorce from 1983-1986 followed by the unemployed and
labourers at 3.1 percent and 1.6 percent respectively. In the time
period 1987-1990, however, service workers who divorced due to
polygamy rose to 5.3 percent followed by the unemployed at 1.2
percent. Service workers are represented at 8.7 percent compared to
0 percent before. However, the frequencies of clerical workers
increased to 1 percent.
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4.22b
Percentage Distribution of Grounds by Occupational Group of
Non-Muslim Husbands from 1983-1990
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
7= 	-
I)	 H
o -	 -	 >-
(1W)	
_5	 0	 7=
0	 -
-J	 (_)	 -2	 0	 0	 -=
=
• Adultery	 • Cruelty	 U Desertion LII Mixture	 • Conversion • Mutual
299
The administrative workers and the unemployed were the majority of
those who divorced by reason of intolerable behaviour. 83.3 percent of
divorces in this category from 1983-1986 and 92 percent from 1987-
1990 were attributed to the administrative and the unemployed. Table
4.22 indicates that adultery seems to be the most popular grounds used
by husbands involved in sales, at 24.8 percent. They were followed by
the professionals. After the LRA, these grounds are used less in that
only 18.2 percent used it for divorce whereas for the professionals, this
ground decreases to only 9.1 percent. Perhaps the increase in divorce
by mutual consent was a contributing factor.
It is very interesting to note that husbands who are labourers and
those involved in sales seem to be those using the grounds of cruelty
for divorce at 23.3 percent. After the LRA, the percentage using
cruelty increased to 31.2 percent for those in sales and for labourers,
the percentage also increased to 30.1 percent. It is rather interesting
to note that before the enforcement of the LRA, husbands outside
labour force used adultery as grounds for divorce at a rate of only 2.2
percent but after the LRA, it increased to 18.2 percent.
The same pattern seems to happen to husbands working as labourers.
Before the LRA, they account for only 16.1 percent, but after the
LRA, the percentage increased to 27.3 percent.
As regards desertion, the same pattern repeats itself where the people
involved in sales and labourers used these grounds for divorce. After
the LRA, the percentage increased to 26.3 percent for sales and 31.6
percent for labourers.
On top of the list for husbands using "Mixture" of grounds for divorce
are the administrators who account for 24.1 percent. This rate
dropped tremendously after the LRA to 18.2 percent. The labourers
accounted for 22.2 percent which then increased to 36.4 percent.
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For conversions, interesting trends seem to occur in that, sales workers
topped the list at 66.7 percent followed by service workers at 33.3
percent. After the LRA, the percentage in sales decreased
tremendously to only 36.4 percent followed by labourers at 27.3
percent of which before LRA there were no such cases. This is
followed by those in professional and clerical categories.
Before the LRA, those in sales tended to use mutual consent as a
ground for divorce most frequently at 29.3 percent followed by those
in labour at 26.9 percent. After the LRA, the percentage decreased to
26.9 percent for sales workers and 24.2 percent for labourers.
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4.23a
Percentage Distribution of Grounds for Divorce by Occupational Group of
Muslim Husbands from 1983-1986
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4.23b
Percentage Distribution of Grounds for Divorce by Occupational Group of
Muslim Husbands from 1987-1990
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Intolerable behaviour was cited as the major grounds of divorce
amongst Muslims. As shown in Table 4.23, from 1983-1986, 88.4
percent of petitioners cited intolerable behaviour as their reason for
divorce. Cruelty at 0.2 percent were the grounds cited least cited. Data
from 1987-1990, also agree with this conclusion in that 89.4 percent of
all divorces in this period are based on intolerable behaviour.
"Mixture", were the least cited grounds for divorce at only 1.2 percent.
It may be observed from Table 4.23, that from 1983-1986,
administrative workers accounted for 8.3 percent of petitions under
adultery, followed by 7.1 percent for professionals, followed by 5
percent for labourers. From 1987-1990, all the percentages for adultery
decreased except for clerical staff, increasing from 3.5 percent to 5.3
percent.
Regarding cruelty, from 1983-1986, only those in service used these
grounds at 1.2 percent. From 1987-1990, cruelty seems to be favoured
by the professionals at 4 percent, sales at 2.6 percent, unemployed at
2.2 percent followed by the labourers at 2 percent.
The unemployed make up the majority of those divorced due to
desertion of their wives. In 1983-1986 and 1987-1990, there were 11.1
percent and 4.4 percent respectively of the unemployed using desertion
as ground for divorce. From 1983-1986, the professionals made up 7.1
percent and 4.2 percent respectively, followed by clerical workers at 3.5
percent. Comparison with the data from 1987-1990, showed that
whereas the rate for professionals rose to 16 percent, the unemployed
had decreased to 4.4 percent followed by clerical and sales workers at
3.5 and 2.6 percent respectively.
Divorce due to mixture of grounds was most pronounced among
labourers at 3.6 percent with 2.1 percent frequency for administrative
workers from 1983-1986. The frequency for the labourers decreased to
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1.5 percent from 1987-1990 in this category. The percentage for
administrative workers increased from 2.1 percent to 4.4 percent. There
was an increase in the proportion of the unemployed from 0 percent
to 2.2 percent.
Sales was pronounced as the major occupational group who divorced
due to polygamy as evidenced by a 4.1 percent figure from 1983-1986
and 3.9 percent from 1987-1990. Clerical workers were next with 3.5
percent followed by the labourers for the period 1983-1986. During this
same period, administrative staff and the unemployed recorded rates
of 2.1 and 2.2 percent respectively. No polygamy was found as grounds
for the professional group. From 1987-1990, there was a decrease in all
the percentages.
Every occupational group was represented in divorce due to intolerable
behaviour. At 93.1 percent and 93.2 percent, clerical workers and sales
were the majority, followed by service workers and professionals.
For the period 1987-1990, the proportion of clerical workers who
divorced due to intolerable behaviour had dropped to 91.2 percent.
This was made up by increase in every other occupational group except
for administrative workers, labourers and the unemployed.
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TABLE 4.24
Percentage Distribution of Age of Non-Muslim Wives at
First Marriage from 1975-1990
AGE GROUP	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
16-19	 14.0	 13.5
20-24	 54.8	 53.5
25-29	 26.1	 25.3
30-34	 04.2	 05.8
35-39	 00.8	 01.3
40-44	 00.1	 00.4
45-49	 00.1	 00.1
50 and above	 00.0	 00.0
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above
1975-1982 LI 1983-1990
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4.6 AGE AT MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Table 4.24 shows the distribution of divorces by the age of marriage.
Age of female divorcees at marriage before and after the LRA is
mostly from the age group of 20-24. The mean age of marriages of the
general male and female is not available. Therefore, statistics from the
Population Census taken in 1980 are referred to. The median age (for
the purposes of this research, the median age is assumed to be the
same as the mean age; statistically, the difference is usually small) of
the first marriage for the Malaysian male of non-Malay origin is 24.2-
26.2; for the Malaysian female it is 18.3 to 23.1. It is interesting to
note that there is a large gap between the sexes in the median age at
first marriage. As is customary in most countries of the world, the
figures confirm that males enter first marriage at a later age than
females. However, the difference is seen to be exceptionally high
among the Indians."
Comparing the mean of marriage of the divorcees with the median age
of first marriage of the general population, the figures do not support
the hypothesis that divorcees marry at a younger age.
However, it may not be prudent to compare the age of marriage of
divorcees with that of the general population. Given that Kuala
Lumpur is an urban area with a high percentage of professionals and
working people, the mean age of marriage of male and female here
may be higher than that of the general population. However, the lack
of specific statistics make it impossible to arrive at any definite
conclusion.
It can be observed from Table 4.24 that there is no significant
deviation in the patterns before and after the introduction of the LRA
Department of Statistics, 1980, pp.42-5.
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for the age of wife at marriage. From 1975-1982, 54.8 percent of all
women who married were in the age group 20-24. This was also
observed in the period 1983-1990 where 52.2 percent of all women in
the survey married between the ages of 20-24.
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TABLE 4.25
Percentage Distribution of Age of Muslim Wives at
First Marriage from 1983-1990
AGE GROUP	 1983-1986	 1987-1990
16-19	 29.7	 31.7
20-24	 41.0	 41.0
25-29	 15.9	 16.6
30-34	 08.3	 05.8
35-39	 03.3	 03.9
40-44	 00.7	 00.5
45-49	 00.5	 00.3
50 and above	 00.1	 00.2
16-19	 20-24	 25-29	 30-34	 35-39	 40-44	 45-49 50 and
above
U 1983-1986 U 1987-1990
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Table 4.25 for the Muslim wives shows that between 1983-1986, the
majority of Muslim women who married were between 16-24 years of
age with an overall frequency of 70.7 percent of the total population.
This can be subdivided into a percentage of 29.7 percent and 41
percent for the age group 16-19 and 20-24 years of age respectively. As
age increased, there were fewer and fewer number of women who
married resulting in only 1 percent of all women in Kuala Lumpur who
got married aged 50 and above.
Generally, this could also be observed for the ages of wife at marriage
for the period 1987-1990. The figures peaked at the age group 20-24
with 41 percent followed by the age group 16-19 at 31.7 percent of the
female population. Again, there was a rapid decrease in the number of
women who married at an increasing age, dropping to a low of 0.2
percent for women aged 50 and above.
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TABLE 4.26
Percentage Distribution of Age of Non-Muslim Husbands at
First Marriage from 1975-1990
AGE GROUP	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
16-19	 01.6	 01.2
20-24	 35.8	 30.3
25-29	 40.6	 44.8
30-34	 16.4	 15.1
35-39	 03.9	 00.9
40-44	 01.1	 01.7
45-49	 00.4	 00.5
50 and above	 00.2	 00.5
16-19	 20-24 25-29
	
30-34	 35-39	 40-44 45-49 50 and
above
312
TABLE 4.27
Percentage Distribution of Age of Muslim Husbands at
First Marriage from 1983-1990
AGE GROUP	 1983-1986	 1987-1990
16-19	 06.0	 10.6
20-24	 40.7	 40.4
25-29	 29.6	 26.8
30-34	 12.9	 11.6
35-39	 04.0	 04.9
40-44	 03.1	 02.0
45-49	 01.2	 01.8
50 and above	 02.6	 01.8
_f'H______
1j
16-19	 20-24	 25-29	 30-34	 35-39	 40-44 45-49 50 and
above
1983-1986 E 1987-1990
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In the case of age of husband at marriage, it can be observed from
Table 4.26 that in both time periods, two co-dominant age groups
could be found. Between 1975-1982, it could be observed that the age
group 20-24 and 25-29 recorded percentages of 35.8 and 40.6 percent
respectively. Similarly for the period 1983-1990, the age group 20-24
and 25-29 were represented by 30.3 and 44.8 percent respectively.
Hence, over 75 percent of all males who married between 1975-1990
were between 20-29 years old. Very few men, that is 0.2 percent and
0.5 percent for 1975-1982 and 1983-1990 respectively married over the
age of fifty.
For Muslims, from Table 4.27, it may be observed that between 1983-
1986, 40.7 percent of all Muslim men who married in Kuala Lumpur
were between 20-24 years of age, followed by 25-29 years at the
frequency of 29.6 percent. Together, they made up a majority at 70.3
percent of men who marry between the ages of 20-29. Then, as the
ages increased, there was a decreasing representation of males
culminating in a frequency of 1.2 percent for the ages 45-49. There was
a slight increase in representation of men aged 50 and above at 2.6
percent of the total male population.
The same trend was also observed in the periods after IFLA was
enforced, that is 1987-1990 where 40.4 percent and 26.8 percent of all
men who married during this period were of the ages 20-24 and 25-29
respectively. As noticed previously, there was a proportionate drop in
the frequencies as age increased until the ages of 45-49 where only 1.8
percent of men who were married were from this age group. Men aged
50 and above were represented by a 1.8 percent of the total
population.
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TABLE 4.28
Percentage Distribution of Age of Non-Muslim Wives at
Divorce from 1975-1990
AGE GROUP	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
16-19	 00.7	 00.3
20-24	 08.1	 08.7
25-29	 31.0	 38.7
30-34	 31.6	 28.2
35-39	 17.1	 15.0
40-44	 08.0	 04.0
45-49	 03.0	 03.1
50 and above	 00.5	 01.9
III iii
35-39	 40-44	 45-49 50 and
above
• 1975-1982 • 1983-1990
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TABLE 4.29
Percentage Distribution of Age of Muslim Wives at
Divorce from 1983-1990
AGE GROUP	 1983-1986	 1987-1990
16-19	 04.1	 03.0
20-24	 24.1	 15.6
25-29	 31.2	 29.3
30-34	 21.0	 25.4
35-39	 10.3	 15.6
40-44	 03.8	 06.3
45-49	 03.1	 02.9
50 and above	 02.4	 02.0
16-19	 20-24	 25-29	 30-34	 35-39	 40-44	 45-49 50 and
above
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TABLE 4.30
Percentage Distribution of Age of Non-Muslim Husbands at Divorce
from 1975-1990
AGE GROUP	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
16-19	 02.0	 02.0
20-24	 18.0	 01.5
25-29	 30.6	 20.5
30-34	 26.6	 34.9
35-39	 13.9	 24.0
40-44	 06.0	 09.9
45-49	 03.1	 05.2
50 and above	 00.0	 03.8
16-19	 20-24	 25-29	 30-34	 35-39	 40-44	 45-49 50 and
above
• 1975-1982 LII 1983-1990
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From Table 4.28, it may be observed that there are two dominant age
groups at which women are divorced. From 1975-1982, the age groups
25-29 and 30-34, predominate at 31 percent and 31.6 percent. After the
introduction of the LRA, a more pronounced trend can be observed in
that the percentage of divorce for the 25-29 age group it was 38.7
percent whereas for the 30-34 age group was 28.2 percent.
Table 4.29 highlights the distribution pattern of the ages of Muslim
women at divorce. From 1983-1986, it may be observed that from a 4.1
percent frequency of divorce in the age group of 16-19, there was a
sharp rise to 15.6 percent for the age group 20-24 years, peaking at
29 3 percent for women aged between 25-29. There was a steady
decrease in the number and percentage of divorces with increasing age
to a minimum of 2 percent at the age of 50 and above.
This pattern is repeated between 1987-1990, where it starts off with a
3 percent frequency of divorce in the 16-19 age group, followed by an
increase to 15.6 percent for the 20-24 years and finally peaks at 29.3
percent for the ages 25-29 years. Again, there was a steady drop of
divorces with increasing age to finally bottom out at 2 percent for
women aged 50 and above.
Table 4.30 shows another co-dominant pattern emerging whereby the
age group 30-34 years of age gave a percentage of 30.6 and the age
group 35-39 giving 36.9 percent of the total male divorces from 1975-
1982. After the LRA, this pattern changed slightly with the most
popular age to be divorced between 30-34 with a total rate of 34.9
percent.
From this data, it could be concluded that generally the men are older
than the women at marriage and there are no significant changes due
to the introduction of the LRA. For both males and females, the
critical age of divorce lies between 25-39 because the highest
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percentage of males and females were divorced at this age. Generally,
men divorce at a later age than women. This is due to the fact that
they marry at a later age compared with women. This decline in age
at divorce was a consequence of the decreasing age at marriage and
the trend towards shorter duration of marriage.
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TABLE 4.31
Percentage Distribution of Age of Muslim Husbands from 1983-1990
AGE GROUP	 1983-1986	 1987-1990
16-19	 00.3	 00.5
20-24	 10.6	 07.0
25-29	 31.6	 24.3
30-34	 23.0	 26.6
35-39	 15.0	 19.9
40-44	 08.3	 09.7
45-49	 04.1	 04.5
50 and above	 07.1	 07.4
16-19	 20-24	 25-29	 30-34	 35-39	 40-44	 45-49 50 and
above
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It may be noticed from Table 4.31 that the majority of men who
divorced in the period 1983-1986 were between the ages of 25-29 with
a frequency of 31.6 percent followed by the age group of 30-34 years
who contributed 23 percent of the total male divorcees. The percentage
of men who divorced decreased on either side of these two peaks until
only 4.1 percent of all marriages were dissolved by men aged 45-49
years old. There was a slight increas to 7.1 percent of marriages
dissolved when the men were aged 50 and above. However, the lowest
percentage of all was 0.3 percent of men who were divorced between
the ages of 16-19.
From 1987-1990, it may be observed that this trend did change with
the age group 30-34 peaking at 26.6 percent, followed by the 25-29
years age group at 24.3. At 45-49 years there were only 4.5 percent of
men who divorced at that age. However, there was an increase to 7.4
percent for men aged 50 and above. The lowest percentage, however
occurs in the age group 16-19 years who only accounted for 0.5 percent
of all divorced men in this period.
Rimmer also showed that the younger the wife at marriage, the greater
the risk of divorce irrespective of how long the marriage lasts. For
marriages which have lasted at least three years, the divorce rate for
women married between twenty to twenty four are three times as high
as for those who married between the ages of twenty five and twenty
nine.38
Elliot and Merrill also concluded that women who married early have
a very high divorce and separation rate. In fact, those who married
38 Rinimer, Lesley, Changing Patterns of Marriage and Remarriage, in Chan ge in Marnage, Rugby,
National Marriage Guidance Council, 1982, p. 102.
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under 18 have a much higher divorce rate than those who married a
few years later.39
The tendency to focus on the age of the women might well be seen as
an unconscious attempt to fix greater responsibility for marital
breakdown on the wife than on the husband and overlooks evidence
that divorced men have also generally been relatively young at
marriage compared to men who married but did not subsequently
divorce.
Monahan's study also showed that early marriage was risky and tends
to be less stable than marriage contracted at later ages. The age at
marriage was considered to be a pre-disposing condition. The findings
of the study established the fact that people involved in early
marriages tend to be unstable in their married life due to emotional
immaturity.40
On the basis of a study of 425 divorces, Goode arrived at the same
conclusion that early marriages (below twenties) reduce the possibility
of adjustments. 41 In a study of 500 cases of marital happiness, Hart
and Shields found statistically that people getting married under the
age of twenty two were more likely to be unhappy than those getting
married between the ages of twenty two and twenty nine. The greatest
risk seemed to appear when both husband and wife were under twenty
two years.42
Elliot M and Merrill, F., Social Disor2anization, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1961
p.425.
4° Monahan, T.P., "Does Age at Marriage Matter in Divorce," Social Force, Vol. 32, 1953, pp.81-87.
41 Goode, William J., After Divorce, New York, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1956, p.40-i.
42 Popenoc, P. Marriage is What You Mak ji7, New York, The Mac. Millan, 1950, p.14.
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Burgess and Cottrell in a study of 526 marriages, found more unhappy
marriages among men who married under twenty two and women who
married under nineteen years old. The findings of Burgess and
Cottrell's study revealed that one of the factors having a moderate
correlation with adjustment in marriage was the fact of husband and
wife being twenty two to thirty years old at the time of marriage. Two
of the important factors found to be statistically correlated with
marital adjustment were husband's age being above twenty one years
and wife's age being twenty years or over at the time of marriage.43
Cahen summarised his study which indicate the relatively high
probabilities of divorce during the early years of married life, even
after corrections are allowed for both the marriage rate and the death
rate.44
In a study of Muslim divorces in Malaysia, Tan found by utilising a
sample which was mainly made up of rural Malays that most of the
divorced respondents, particularly the females, married at very young
ages. Age at divorce for her sample was young. 53 percent of men
divorced when they were below the age of 25 years while for females,
82 percent of divorcees were below the age of 20 years at the time of
the divorce.45
The Islamic Research Centre also considers early marriage as one of
the main causes for divorce. They consider that with marriage at an
early age either or both spouse may start off on the wrong footing
because the parties lack the degree of maturity required to share the
responsibilities of married life. Once they discover that they are unable
Burgess, Earnest W. and Cottrell, Leonard S. Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage, New
York, Prentice Hall, 1939.
Cahen, 1932, p. 125.
Tan, 1987, p.14.
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to fulfil their obligations, they resort to the simplest solution -
divorce.46
On the other hand, Palmore and Ariffin, using the 1966-1967 West
Malaysian Survey, found that women who were married more than once
generally tended to be those who married at young ages. Tan and Siti
using the 1974 Malaysian Fertility and Family Survey, found that both
education and age at marriage had significant negative effects on the
number of times a women married.
Prabu writes that likes and dislikes and the general mental attitude of
men and women becomes more formed and fixed as individuals advance
in age, so that there is often little or no room left for mutual
adjustments and psychological compatibility of a couple which appears
to come together at a rather late age.47
A survey by the National Population and Family Development Board
has shown that more and more people prefer to marry later. Higher
education and a greater interest in furthering careers were the two
main reasons people gave for not marrying early according to the 1988
nationwide survey. There was a drastic drop in the number of females
aged 15-19 who married. This fell from 37 percent in 1957 to only 6
percent in 1988. The number of unmarried women aged 30-39 years old
increased from 1 to 10 percent over the last 30 years. Late marriages
however, resulted in more stable marriages, with 91 percent of the
marriages in 1988 still intact compared with 81 percent in 1974.
Kertaskeqa Bill, Perceraian di Dalam Masyarakat Islam di Malaysia, Seminar Kadi-Kadi Seluruh
Malaysia, Pusat Penyehdikan Islam, Jabatan Perdana Menteri, 1975; see also Ali, Osman bin, et.al,
"The Patterns of Divorce Among Malay Families in Malaysia," Malaysiaii Journal of Family
Studies, No.2, December, 1990, p.66.
Prabhu, 1963, pp.183-6.
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A survey done by the National Population and Family Development
Board also shows that marriage among those with little schooling at all
are ten times more likely to end up in divorce compared with couples
with a higher level of education. The findings found 16.6 percent of
couples with no schooling had their marriages dissolved compared with
1.6 percent of those with higher education. The study in 1989 also
showed that 3.1 percent of those choosing their own partners
eventually divorced compared with 10.6 percent with arranged
marriages. There was, however, a drop in the number of divorce cases.
The improvement in marital stability was attributed to the decline in
the number of people marrying at a young age.48
While age at marriage has increased for all ethnic groups, Malays still
marry at younger ages compared with the Indians and the Chinese.49
From the above arguments, it could be concluded that researchers
consistently find age at marriage to be one of the strongest predictors
of marital disruption and divorce. This association holds true with
controls for such variables as culture, education and income.
Unfortunately, these variables are not present in the divorce files in
this study. Similar difficulties arise with the determination of the
significance of age at marriage for divorce. Although there are credible
hypotheses to explain why marriages at a young age might prove
especially prone to breakdown, other variables interfere with my ability
to draw definite conclusions.
New Straits Times, October 5, 1991.
Tan BA and Chak C.S, Nuptiality, Meeting on the Results of Population Surveys and Policy
Implications. National Population and Family Development Board, 1987
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Some studies have shown that other factors are also strongly associated
with divorce, including pre-marital pregnancy and unskilled manual
occupations, which are overrepresented in teenage marriages. 50 A
disproportionately high presence of these factors in any marriage,
whatever the age of the couple, would be expected to increase their
chances to divorce, with the result that it is difficult to isolate the
importance of individual factors such as age at marriage.5'
5° Thornes, B and Collard, J., Who Divorces? London, Roulledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, pp.72-80.
51 See Phillips, 1988, p.587.
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TABLE 4.32
Percentage Distribution of Types of Muslim Divorces from 1983-1990
TYPES OF DIVORCE	 1983-1986	 1987-1990
Talaq	 99.2	 97.2
Ta'liq	 00.8	 01.8
Fasakh	 00.0	 00.5
Khulu'	 00.0	 00.5
Taaq	 TaIiq	 Fasakh	 Khuu
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4.7 TYPES OF MUSLIM DIVORCES
This study focuses on four types of Muslim divorces: talag, (which is
used exclusively by men) ta'lig, fasakh and khulu' which are considered
the right of women who wish to release themselves from bad marriages.
It is obviously of some interest to see to what extent these types of
divorce have been used by women.
Talag, or unilateral repudiation of the wife by a husband was found to
be the most common type of divorce as shown in Table 4.32. From
1983-1986, 99.2 percent of divorces were by talag, 0.8 by ta'liq but
none under fasakh and khulu'. This pattern held when considering the
data for 1987-1990. For this period, 97.2 percent of marriages were
dissolved by talag, 1.8 percent by ta'Iiq, and 0.5 percent each for
fasakh and khulu'. The reason for the popularity of talag is two fold;
the first reason is due to the reaffirmation of the superior status of the
husband over the wives. The other is its simplicity. A phrase such as
"I divorce you" or "go home to your parents" may be binding and is
easily uttered in the heat of a domestic quarrel. Also, it is a quick and
convenient way to obtain a divorce and is sometimes requested by the
wife in order that a divorce may be expedited.
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TABLE 4.33
Percentage Distribution of Types of Muslim Divorce by Sex of
Petitioner from 1983-1990
MALE	 FEMALE
TYPESOF
DIVORCE	 1983-1986	 1987-1990	 1983-1986	 1987-1990
Talaq	 100	 1	 100	 0.0	 0.0
Ta'liq	 0	 0	 0.8	 1.8
Fasakh	 0	 1	 0	 0.0	 0.5
Khulu'	 0	 1	 0	 0.0	 1	 0.5I_____________ _____________
1983-1986	 1987-1990	 1983-1986	 1987-1990
MALE	 FEMALE
• Taaq U Ta'Iiq U Fasakh U
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TABLE 4.34
Percentage Distribution of Grounds for Divorce by Types of
Muslim Divorce from 1983-1990
1'ALAQ	 'I'A'LIQ	 FASAKH	 KIIULU'
83-86 87-90 83-86 87-90	 83-86	 87-90	 83-86	 87-90
Adultery	 04.2	 02.1	 0.0	 10	 0	 00.0	 1	 00.0
Cruelty	 00.2	 01.4	 0.0	 0	 0	 33.3	 0	 33.3
Desertion	 03.1	 03.8	 0.0	 0	 0	 00.0	 0	 00.0
Mixture	 01.6	 01.2	 0.0	 0	 0	 00.0	 0	 00.0
Polygamy	 02.6	 01.6	 0.0	 0	 0	 00.0	 0	 00.0
Intolerable behaviour	 87.5 1 89.9	 0.0	 0	 0	 66.7	 0	 66.7
90
80-
70
60-
50-
40-
_	 Iliji
83-86	 87-90	 83-86	 87-90	 83-86	 87-90	 83-86	 87-90
TALAQ	 TA'LIQ	 IDflJLU'
• AdulIey • Ciuelly	 • Deseron U
	
• Polygamy • k4o4erthle
B.ha#iour
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A highly skewed distribution is obtained as shown in Table 4.33. From
1983-1986, the great majority of talag divorces were carried out by the
males.
Ta'liq, fasakh and khulu' were used exclusively by females. Females
were under-represented at a frequency of 0.8 percent for ta'lig and
none under fasakh and khulu' in the 1983-1986 time period. In the
1987-1990 period there was an increase in percentage in all types of
divorce by females. Fasakh increased to 1.8 percent, fasakh and khulu'
to 0.5 percent each.
As shown in Table 4.33, khulu' and fasakh are the types of divorce
used less frequently in dissolving Muslim marriages. Table 4.34 shows
that although there were no divorces under khulu' and fasakh on any
grounds cited in 1983-1986, the pattern changed from 1987-1990. 66.7
percent of Khulu' and fasakh divorces were on the grounds of
intolerable behaviour. Intolerable behaviour was also cited as the
ground for ta'liq, which, in the 1987-1990 time period accounted for 10
percent of divorces. Ta'liq was used to dissolve 10 percent of marriages
based on the ground of desertion and non-maintenance for more then
four months. Fasakh and khulu' were also employed in 33.3 percent of
cases citing cruelty as grounds for divorce. Talaq, due to its quick and
preemptory nature was used in the majority of grounds. Talaq was used
to dissolve marriages on the grounds of intolerable behaviour at 87.5
percent. This was followed by adultery at 4.2 percent. Talaq was least
used for cruelty at 0.2 percent. There were decreases in percentages
in all grounds for talag except for cruelty which slightly increased to
1.4 percent. Desertion increased to 3.8 percent from 3.1 percent, and
intolerable behaviour to 89.9 percent.
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TABLE 35a
Percentage Distribution of Types of Divorce by Occupational Group of
Muslim Wives from 1983-1986
OCCUI'A'IlONAL GROUP
	 Talaq	 i'a'Iiq	 Fasakh	 Khulu'
Professional	 00.6	 00.0	 00	 0
Administrative	 01.2	 02.1	 00	 0
Clerical	 10.3	 08.8	 00	 0
Sales	 03.6	 04.3	 00	 0
Service	 04.6	 00.0	 00	 0
Agriculture	 00.0	 00.0	 00	 0
Labourer	 18.4	 21.3	 50	 0
Unclassified	 00.6	 00.0	 00	 0
Unemployed	 60.7	 63.8	 50	 0
Outside Labour
	 00.2	 00.0	 00	 0
tj
g -	 -	 .	 -Q -	 -	 0	 -	 >-..
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TABLE 35b
Percentage Distribution of Types of Divorce by Occupational Group of
Muslim Wives from 1987-1990
OCCUPA'JlONAL GROUP	 Talaq	 Ta'Iiq	 Fasakh	 Khulu'
Professional	 00.7	 00.0	 00.0	 00.0
Administrative	 03.3	 06.0	 00.0	 00.0
Clerical	 13.3	 31.1	 33.3	 00.0
Sales	 05.2	 06.3	 33.3	 00.0
Service	 05.8	 12.5	 33.3	 00.0
Agriculture	 00.0	 00.0	 00.0	 00.0
Labourer	 23.8	 12.5	 00.0	 00.0
Unclassified	 00.4	 00.0	 00.0	 00.0
Unemployed	 47.1	 07.5	 00.0	 66.7
Outside Labour
	 00.4	 00.0	 00.0	 00.0
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Table 4.35a shows that in 1983-1986, the unemployed were the majority
group with 60.7 percent being divorced by their husband through talag.
Labourers, clerical, service and sales workers were next with 18.4
percent, 10.3 percent, 4.6 percent and 3.6 percent respectively.
Administrative staff at 1.2 percent, professional and classified workers
at 0.6 percent each and 0.2 percent for those outside the labour force
make up the rest.
During the 1987-1990 period, it was observed that the percentage of
the unemployed being divorced by their husbands through talag fell to
47.1 percent which triggered off a corresponding rise in the frequencies
of the other occupational group from 0.1 percent to 5.4 percent with
the exception of those Outside the labour force which fell 0.2 percent
to 0.4 percent of the total number of women being divorced by talaq
From 1983-1986, 63.8 percent of women using ta'liq for divorce were
unemployed followed by a figure of 21.3 percent for labourers, 8.8
percent for clerical staff, 4.3 percent for sales and 2.1 percent for
administrators. From 1987-1990, this pattern had changed with clerical
staff at 31.3 percent being dominant followed by 12.5 percent for
service workers and labourers. The unemployed only made up 7.5
percent with 6.3 percent each for sales and administrative workers.
During 1987-1990, fasakh was used as a means of divorce by clerical,
sales and service workers in a three way split of 33.3 percent (Table
4.35b). Khulu' was used exclusively by the unemployed from 1983-1986
but fell to 66.7 percent from 1987-1990. The only other occupational
group to use khulu' was administrative workers at 33.3 percent.
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TABLE 4.36
Percentage Distribution of Types of Divorce by Occupational Group of
Muslim Husbands from 1983-1990
Occupational Group
	 1983-1986	 1987.1990
Professional	 01.6	 03.3
Administrative	 08.1	 08.5
Clerical	 09.0	 09.8
Sales	 11.3	 13.0
Service	 16.0	 16.3
Agriculture	 00.1	 00.3
Labourer	 45.6	 38.0
Unclassified	 00.6	 00.3
Unemployed	 06.7	 00.0
Outside Labour	 01.7	 00.0
C.)	 -	 (i	 a.	 C..C)	 C.)	 C.)
6	 5	 -	
-E	 >
-	 0
U,	 -	 -	 4?3	 .0	 (I-)	 -9	 E
-	 C)'	 -J	 C.)	 -J0
a-	 -
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Table 4.36 shows at 45.6 percent, labourers make up the majority of
talag cases from 1983-1986. They were followed by service workers at
16 percent and sales workers at 11.3 percent. Then, there was a
reduction in proportion from 9 percent for clerical staff to 8.1 percent
for administrative workers to 6.7 percent for the unemployed. 1.7
percent and 1.6 percent were recorded for those outside the labour
force and professionals respectively.
In 1987-1990, it was observed that the proportion of labourers who
used talag for divorce had been reduced to 38 percent. This brought
a corresponding increase from 0.1 percent to 2.7 percent across the
board with the oniy exception being unclassified workers which were
reduced to 0.3 percent.
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TABLE 4.37
Percentage Distribution of Methods of Divorce for Muslims from 1983-1990
METHOD OF DIVORCE	 1983-1986	 1987.1990
With permission	 0	 24.2
Without permission	 100	 75.8
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1983-1986	 1987-1990
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4.8 METHODS OF MUSLIM DIVORCES
In traditional Islamic law, the husband is granted absolute and
exclusive right to initiate divorce by pronouncing a talag. He is
authorised to divorce his wife without assigning any cause and he is
not required to resort to any court proceedings in order to effect the
talaq. 52 The rampant use of this unilateral right to divorce caused
hardship to women, raised the divorce rate and generally gave a bad
name to Muslim family law. Controls over the exercise of this right
became imperative. The state is not debarred from regulating divorce
in the interests of all its citizens and for their general welfare.53
Section 47 of IFLA requires an application for divorce to be submitted
to the Sharia Court which will inquire into the facts of the case. The
parties will be subjected to reconciliation procedures and only when
these fail will the divorce be permitted.
It is obviously of some initerest to see to what extent this requirement
has been adhered to after its enforcement. Table 4.37 shows that from
1983-1986, an overwhelming majority of 100 percent of talags took
place outside the Sharia Court. This is due to the fact that there were
no requirements to do so. There was only a slight change however
from 1987-1990. The frequency of divorce without permission dropped
to 75.8 percent and divorce with permission rose to 24.2 percent. It
could be hypothesized that these divorces were now pre-meditated and
some may have been at the request of the wife so as to bring about a
quick divorce. The interference of the court in the so-called
unequivocal right of the husband is to regulate the divorce so that it
is not being abused, and to protect the women.
52 Personal conversation with Ustaz Abdullah Abu Bakar, Associate Professor, Kulliyyah of Laws,
International Islamic University, m March 1992
Ibrahiin, 1965, p. 106.
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A case study of Muslim divorce in 1989 by Haji Wan Mohammad shows
that although divorce without the permission of the Sharia Court is
considered as an offence, 68 percent of all divorces that were
registered in 1989 were pronounced without the permission of the
court. Though Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (JAW!) had
taken legal action towards them, cases under section 124 is still
considered the highest so far taken by the Unit Penguatkuasa dan
Pendakwa (Enforcement and Litigation Unit).54
In Kelantan in 1984, the very first year of the implementation of the
Enactment, divorce rates dramatically dropped by half. This is evidence
of the efficacy of the controls introduced by the Enactment. However,
the rate has begun to increase and it could be because the men have
learnt that even if they do not comply with the enactment, their
pronouncement of talag will still be effective for the purpose of
dissolving the marriage. They are charged with committing an offence
but may gladly pay the fine because after that the divorce is
registered.55
Haji Abdul Aziz, Hj. Wan Mohammad bin, Suatu Pengainatan Umum Terhadap Isu
Kekeluargaan, Kajian Kes di Kuala Lumpur, Seminar Tatacara Kekeluaraan, Institut Sains
Komputer, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, September 1990.
Siraj, Mehrun, Developments in Muslim Family Law, Seminar on Family Law, Faculty of Law,
University of Malaya, January, 1987.
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TABLE 4.38
Percentage Distribution of Duration of Non-Muslim Marriages from 1975-1990
DURA HON
	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
Less than 3 years
	 13.3	 16.6
4-5 years	 22.3	 20.0
6-7 years	 16.7	 17.3
8-9 years	 12.7	 13.2
10-11 years	 09.9	 09.3
12-13 years	 08.7	 07.3
14-15 years	 05.3	 03.7
16 years or more	 11.2	 10.6
25
20
15
Less	 4.5	 6-7	 8-9	 10-11	 12-13	 14-15
	
16 yrs
than 3 years
	 years	 years	 years years years	 or
yrs	 more
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4.9 DURATION OF MARRIAGE
There are several ways of conceptualising duration of marriage, and
Monahan (1962) has shown that very different pictures are created
depending upon whether duration is measured from date of marriage
to date of divorce or from date of marriage to date of actual
separation.56
Duration of marriage in the present study refers only to the interval
between marriage and the date of its legal dissolution (de jure
duration.) These statistics, whilst providing an accurate picture of one
aspect of trends in divorce behaviour, will not reflect actual marital
duration, because cohabitation will have ceased sometime prior to the
granting of the decree absolute.
The divorce petitions used in the present survey came from marriages
which had lasted between three years and sixteen years and beyond.
This means that marriages of widely differing durations were being
examined. Duration of the marriage is calculated from the date of the
marriage until the date the decree was made absolute to the nearest
year.
Table 4.38 shows that the general patterns of duration of marriages do
not change overall before or after LRA. This means therefore that the
LRA does not directly affect duration of marriage. Rather, it helps to
facilitate divorce when the marriage ends. But on its own, it does
nothing to reduce the duration of marriages.
From 1975-1982, it was observed that a peak was reached at 4-5 years
where 22.3 percent of couples were married for this period before they
Monahan, T.P. "When Married Couples Part: Statistical Trends and Relationships in American
Divorce", American Sociological Review, 27, 1962, pp. 625-633.
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divorced. Then, in descending order were 6-7 years at 16.1 percent, 3
years or less at 13.3 percent, 8-9 years at 12.7 percent, 16 years and
more at 11.2 percent, 10-11 years at 9.9 percent, 12-13 years at 8.7
percent and 14-15 years at 5.3 percent.
A similar pattern can be observed for the period 1983-1990 where 4-5
years stand at 20 percent followed by 6-7 years at 17.3 percent and
then 3 years or less at 16.6 percent. This was followed by 8-9 years at
13.2 percent and 16 years or more at 10.6 percent. Those who divorced
after 10-11 years of marriage stand at 9.3 percent, 12-13 years at 7.3
percent and 14-15 years at 5.7 percent.
From the above figures, it can be seen that marriages last generally for
4-5 years before ending in divorce. This period seems to be the most
critical period. Figures are also reasonably high just before and after
this period. Therefore taken cumulatively over 50 percent of marriages
last for up to 7 years irrespective of the time period in which this
study was made.
It may also be observed that fewer and fewer couples dissolve their
marriage as the life-span of the marriage increases. This is generally
true except for the category 16 years and more which accounts for 10-
11 percent of all divorces. This could be due to a number of reasons.
Firstly, it could be due to the artificially constructed category of 16
years or more. This category might be too big and so bring about an
artificially induced high divorce rate. A solution would be to subdivide
this category further. This would then give more accurate assessment.
Secondly, it may also be due to the fact that after 16 years or more of
marriage, boredom sets in.
However, after the LRA, only 16.6 percent of the marriages ended
before the duration of three years. This may be due to the legal bar
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to divorce. If the marriage is less than three years under section 6(1)
of Ordinance, 1952, and two years under the present law. 57
 For the
same reason, the period of 4-5 years after the marriage has the highest
number of divorces. Couples wishing to divorce earlier must have
waited for the expiry of the time-bar to divorce before commencing
divorce proceedings.
LRA, section 50, 5 1(3).
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TABLE 4.39
Percentage Distribution of Duration of Muslim Marriages from 1983-1990
DURA11ON	 1983.1986	 1987.1990
Less than 1 years	 07.6	 05.0
1-2 years	 27.6	 18.2
3-4 years	 18.7	 17.8
5-6 years	 13.2	 13.9
7-8 years	 09.4	 13.9
9-10 years	 06.6	 08.0
11-12 years	 05.3	 05.5
13-14 years	 02.7	 05.4
15-16 years	 02.4	 02.9
More than 17 years	 06.6	 09.6
Less	 1-2	 3-4	 5-6	 7-8	 9-10	 12-12 13-14 15-16 More
than 1 years years years years years years years years than
yrs	 l7yrs
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From Table 4.39, it can be observed that 7.6 percent and 5.0 percent
of all marriages were dissolved during the first year from 1983-1986
and 1987-1990 respectively. The divorce rate reached a peak at 1-2
years after marriage where 27.6 percent of divorces took place at this
time from 1983-1986. For this period as well, 18.7 percent and 13.2
percent of all divorces were carried out after 3-4 and 5-6 years of
marriage. Together, 53.9 percent of all divorces happened within six
years of marriage.
A similar picture also emerges from 1987-1990, where divorces peaked
after 2-3 years of marriage at 18.2 percent. 17.8 percent of all divorces
happened after 3-4 years of marriage and 13.8 percent after 5-6 years
of marriage.
In both time periods, there was a corresponding drop in the frequency
of divorce with increasing duration of marriage. However, it was
observed that there was still a significant percentage of couples who
divorced after 16 years or more of marital life. From 1983-1986, there
were 78 such cases bringing the percentage up to 6.6 percent. However
between 1987-1990, there were 95 such cases increasing the percentage
to 9.6 percent.
It is extremely difficult to estimate the critical stages of marriage on
the basis of statistics, and the only thing can be said is that the first
years are the most difficult. 58
 In western societies, the first three
years of marriages are considered to be the more dangerous period
because this is the time of greatest adjustments. Monahan demonstrates
this point by using American data and pointed out in 1957, 14.9
percent of divorces in Wisconsin were of couples who were married for
one or less than one year and 30.3 percent of the divorces were of
According to Dr. Parameswara Deva, the next crises peak is the 15th year when already stressful
unions may wear out with either one partner deciding to end the marriage; New Straits fimes,
January 1, 1991.
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couples who were married for three or less than three years. 59 This
seems to be in line with Jacobson's study, in which he concluded that
the divorce frequency is highest in the early period of married life.
The rate for America was at a maximum in the third year of marriage
(duration 2-3 years), dropped sharply through the seventh year, and
thereafter declined less rapidly but almost steadily with each advance
of matrimonial duration.6°
Bowman also related that approximately two-fifths of the divorces he
studied were granted to couples married for less than five years. One-
fourth were granted to couples married for five to nine years. Thus,
about one-third of divorces occur during or after the tenth year of
marriage. Only a small percentage occurs before the end of the first
year. These figures also show that couples do not rush into divorce as
soon as trouble starts. It usually takes time for a couple to discover
that their marriage is a failure. After that, a considerable period
elapses before they bring themselves to the point where divorce is
sought as a remedy.6'
Several matters concerning adjustment may be found in the early
period of the marriage. These may, later on, determine the chances of
stability or instability in marriage. Efforts for adjustment are very
much required. It is because of these that some sociologists have held
that in general, divorce frequency is highest in the early period of
married life.62
Monahan, 1962, p. 633.
Jacobson, Paul H., "Differentials m Divorce by Duration of Marriage and Size of Family",
American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, 1950. p.239.
61 Bowman, Henry A., Marria ge for Moderns, New York, Mc Graw Hill, 1954, p.505.
62 Winch, Robert, and Mc Ginimis, Robert, The Family, New York, Heniy Holt and Company, New
York, 1971, p.550.
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The oft-repeated sociological reference to the third or fourth years of
marriage as showing the highest percentage of divorce decrees and the
implication given thereby that marriage crises grow until then,
according to Monahan, is a spurious statistical assertion. The popular
belief that "the first year is the hardest" is according to him is the
view which has always been supported by the more complete and
refined information. A true recognition of this social reality should
bring us to a better understanding and appreciation of the special
difficulties of the first year of marriage for American couples. Data on
desertion and non-support cases confirm the finding that couples who
have difficulty in married life mostly manifest their problem in the first
year, with diminishing frequency thereafter.63
In the present study of the Non-Muslims, 13.3 percent were couples
who were married for three or less than three years. Whereas for the
Muslims, 5-7 percent were couples who were married for a year or less
and less than 20 percent of the Muslim divorces were of couples who
were married for three years. Comparatively, this shows that Asian
people still regard divorce as a social taboo and it only occurs under
extreme circumstances.
This conclusion confirms the study made by Monahan which showed
that duration of marriage varies from area to area, from time to time,
and from one population class to another. 64
 It has been found that
couples have longer durations of marriage when they are in their first
marriage, have children, are in higher socio-economic occupational
groups, generally, and live in less metropolitan but middle-sized
population areas. The grounds chosen for divorce and the legal
structure are also related to duration. It is also likely that race,
Monahan, 1962, p. 633.
Ibid. p.625.
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educational achievement, premarital pregnancy, and other elements
also bear a relationship to this measure of marriage duration.65
The study made by Collard in 1979 also pointed out that those
marriages involving a teenage partner, a pre-marital pregnailcy, early
fertility or which were infertile also had relatively shorter periods of
cohabitation. The findings of a study made by Collard have indicated
that, in many ways, those who have divorced may have had both
environmental disadvantages and have been more at risk to personal
stresses. Divorce behaviour, however, is inevitably affected by the
macro-social system. Whilst those who divorce do so because they are
unhappily married, other factors will also influence the actual decision
to divorce.
65 Id.
Thornes and Collard, 1979, pp.14-117.
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TABLE 4.40a
Percentage Distribution of Duration of Non-Muslim Marriage by Numbers of
Children from 1975-1982
DURATION	 One	 Two	 Three	 Four	 Five	 Six or more
Less than 3 years	 73.9	 13.0	 10.9	 02.2	 00.0	 0.0
4-5 years	 733	 21.6	 05.2	 00.0	 00.0	 0.0
6-7 years	 53.3	 38.3	 08.3	 00.0	 00.0	 0.0
8-9 years	 33.0	 44.3	 13.4	 08.2	 01.0	 0.0
10-11 years	 40.4	 38.2	 10.1	 05.6	 04.5	 1.1
12-13 years	 26.3	 34.2	 28.9	 06.6	 01.3	 2.6
14-15 years	 25.9	 29.6	 31.5	 09.3	 03.7	 0.0
16 years or more	 16.4	 32.7	 25.5	 11.8	 10.0	 3.6
Less	 4-5	 6-7	 8-9	 10-11	 12-13	 14-15	 16ñ-s
Pian	 years	 years	 years	 years	 years	 years	 or
3ys	 more
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TABLE 4.40b
Percentage Distribution of Duration of Muslim Marriage by Numbers of
Children from 1983-1990
DURA'IlON	 One	 Two	 Three	 Four	 Five	 Six or more
Less than 3 years	 66.7	 18.5	 09.3	 00.0	 03.7	 01.9
4-5 years	 72.9	 16.7	 073	 02.1	 00.0	 01.0
6-7 years	 68.3	 24.6	 06.3	 00.8	 00.0	 00.0
8-9 years	 44.1	 47.1	 07.8	 01.0	 00.0	 00.0
10-11 years
	
31.1	 44.4	 17.8	 05.6	 01.1	 00.0
12-13 years	 35.5	 44.1	 10.3	 08.8	 01.5	 00.0
14-15 years	 27.1	 44.1	 11.9	 10.2	 06.7	 00.0
16 years or more	 14.3	 37.1	 26.7	 13.3	 01.9	 06.7
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The duration of marriages by occupational group was studied by
Tarvwer for five selected years in Wisconsin (1948-1952). He found
that the manager-proprietor-official group showed the longest
durations, and was followed by farmers and skilled workers.
Professional and semi-professional occupations, rather oddly, along
with the semi-skilled workers had the lowest median durations. While
the figures on duration of marriage to divorce and percentage
distributions of such data have a general usefulness, it is incorrect to
use such information to conclude that divorces are occurring sooner,
or that marriages are showing more fragihty.67
According to Monahan, in order to know precisely what proportion of
marriage ends in divorce, one must know how long marriages last
before their dissolution and this means that the probability of divorce
should be calculated for each year of duration of marriage.68
Unfortunately, because of the sorry state of marriage and divorce
statistics in Kuala Lumpur, the basic data needed have not been
available therefore only data from divorce records filed the High Court
are used to measure de jure duration.
Table 4.40a shows that for those having one child, the duration of
marriage of less than 3 years involved in divorce petitions is 73.9
percent followed by those in the 4-5 year period at 73.3 percent. As
the years increased, the probability of divorce decreases to only 16.4
percent in the 16 years and more category (Table 4.40b).
The pattern does not change after LRA except instead the percentage
at 4-5 years is top of the list compared to those in the less than 3
years category. For those with two children, the duration of marriage
67 Ogburn, William F. and Nimkoff, Meyer F., Technolo gy and the Changing Family, Boslon,
Houghton-Miffm, 1955, pp.221-3.
Monahan, 1962, pp.625-633.
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is highest at 44.3 percent, in the 8-9 years category. There is no
specific pattern in this category but the percentage increase to 47.1
percent after the LRA is still in the 8-9 years category.
For those with three children, the most common duration of marriage
is 14-15 years at 31.5 percent followed by 12-13 years at 28.9 percent.
After the LRA, the pattern changed, that is the highest percentage
happens in couples falling under the 16 years and more category at
only 26.7 percent. For those having four children, the highest
percentage is only 11.8 percent at 16 years or more category and after
the LRA, the pattern is still the same, that is only at 13.3 percent.
And for those having 5 children, the highest percentage is only 10
percent in the 16 year and more category and after LRA, the pattern
remains unchanged oniy it is reduced to 6.7 percent in the 14-15 year
period whereas the 16 year period falls to only 1.9 percent.
As regards those having six and more children, the chances of divorce
decreases wherein in this category the highest percentage belonging to
the 16 and more years is oniy 3.6 percent but after LRA, there is
slight increase to 6.7 percent.
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4.41a
Percentage Distribution of Duration of Muslim Marriages by Numbers of
Children from 1983-1986
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4.41b
Percentage Distribution of Duration of Muslim Marriage by Numbers of
Children from 1987-1990
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It was observed in Table 4.41 that there was an optimum peak number
of children which corresponded to an increasing number of years of
marriage. For couples which break up in less than one year, it was
noted that for the time period 1983-1986, one child was the optimum
peak at 57.7 percent, followed by two children at 19.2 percent, three
and four children at 11.5 percent. This trend is generally repeated for
1987-1990 with a maximum of 66.7 percent at one child, decreasing to
11.1 percent with a slight rise to 16.7 percent for three children before
falling to 0 (zero) percent for five, six and more children.
For marriages which lasted one to two years for 1983-1986, a maximum
frequency of 82.4 percent was recorded for couples with one child,
which was followed by a steady decline to 9.2 percent for two children,
2.5 percent for three to five children to low of 0.8 percent for six or
more children. During 1987-1990, this trend was repeated with a peak
of 68.1 percent for one child, 19.8 percent for two children, 6.6 percent
for three children, 1.1 percent for four to a low of 0 (zero) percent for
five children with a slight increase for six or more children at 4.4
percent.
For marriages which lasted 3-4 years for 1983-1986, 50 percent of the
couples had one child, 40.1 percent had two children and the
percentage decreased with the increasing number of children. This
trend was also observed for the period 1987-1990 when 63.3 percent of
divorced couples in that time-period had one child, followed by 25.8
percent with two children, decreasing to 0 percent for six or more
children. A minimum of 2.5 percent was recorded for four children,
which increased slightly, not in a significant manner, to 3.3 percent for
five children.
There was a slight shift in emphasis for marriages which lasted 5-6
years during 1983-1986. 31.7 percent had one child but the maximum
of 38.9 percent was recorded for couples with two children. Together,
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they make up 70.6 percent of all couples who divorced after 5-6 years
of marriage. A further 19.8 percent had three children and this
frequency was reduced to 0.8 percent for six and more children. For
1987-1990, however, the trend was not evident with 53.4 percent of
couples who divorced after this period together having three children
coming to a low of 2.6 percent for four children. No cases were
recorded for couples with five and more children.
After 7-8 years of marriage, however, the maximum moved to couples
with two children with 51.7 percent for 1983-1986 and 38.3 percent for
the 1987-1990 time period. Couples with one child had a frequency of
20.2 percent, followed by 19.8 percent for three children from 1983-
1986. For 1987-1990, 26.3 percent of couples who divorced after 7-8
years of marriage had one child decreasing to only 3 percent for
couples with five children.
After 9-10 years of marriage, the maximum shifted again, in favour of
those with three children for the time period 1983-1986. There was a
steady decline by the couples that have more children. The data gets
very sketchy for marriages which lasted over 10 years as they only
made up 17 percent and 23.4 percent of all couples who divorced for
1983-1986 and 1987-1990 respectively.
However more data than expected was obtained for marriages which
break up after 17 or more years of marriage, suggesting that a further
subdivision might give more information. It appears that from 1983-
1986, a plateau of 23.1 percent was achieved by couples with 4 or more
children. A peak of 23.1 percent was also observed for couples with
three children from 1987-1990. The percentage decreases with the
increase number of children suggesting a damping down of the overall
response rate with increasing duration of marriage.
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TABLE 4.42
Percentage Distribution of Occupational Group of
Non-Muslim Husbands from 1975-1990
OCCUPATIONAL GROUP
	
1975-1982	 1983-1990
Professional	 11.5	 11.9
Administrative	 18.6	 14.8
Clencal	 14.5	 10.1
Sales	 22.4	 27.2
Service	 05.5	 05.5
Agriculture	 00.5	 00.5
Labourer	 22.9	 26.1
Unclassified	 01.3	 00.8
Unemployed	 00.8	 00.5
Outside Labour	 02.1	 02.6
(1)	 -	 -
%_2	 -	 -	 0	 -(f)	 .-	 -	 q)
C-)	 (i)	 -	 -J	 2	 £
.	 .
:D	 -
C
1975-1982 D 1983-1990
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4.10 OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE
The study is partly designed to investigate if there is a relationship
between divorce propensity and the economic status of the couple, in
other words whether divorce tends to occur more frequently among a
certain socio-economic class. In this study, the socio-economic status
of couple is indicated by the occupation of the husband or wife, since
information on the income and educational level is lacking in the
divorce files. Occupation is taken as the yard-stick not merely because
it is a source of livelihood but it also determines the social status of
persons in a complex society. There is a clear relationship between
occupation and marital life. It not only determines one's economic
status but also provides ample opportunities of social interaction,
which ultimately affects his marital life.
Due to the large variety of occupations involved in this study, the
various occupations are further classified under eight occupational
groups. The classification method used is adopted from the one used
by the Statistics Department.69
The breakdown of the occupational group is given in Table 4.42. It is
observed that the major occupational groups of divorced males are
mainly in sales and labour, with a representation of 22.4 percent and
22.9 percent respectively. This is followed successively by
administrative workers, that is 18.6 percent, clerical workers with a
percentage of 14.5 percent, professionals at 11.5 percent and service
oriented workers at only 5.5 percent of the total population. These was
then followed by those outside the labour force who make up 2.1
percent, unclassified workers at 1.3 percent, the unemployed 0.3
percent and finally the agricultural workers at 0.5 percent.
See Malaysia, Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, 1980, Appendix 2, pp ('p52-667.
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After the LRA, the distribution pattern has changed slightly in that
men involved in sales divorce more frequently with a percentage of
27.3 percent followed by labourers with a percentage of 26.1 percent.
These are then followed by those in administration with a
representation of 14.8 percent, professionals at 11.9 percent, clerical
workers at 10.1 percent and service oriented workers with a
representation of 5.5 percent of the population. These were then
followed by those outside the labour force who make up 2.6 percent of
the population followed by unclassified Workers at 0.8 percent and the
unemployed and agricultural at 0.5 percent each.
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TABLE 4.43
Percentage Distribution of Occupational Group of
Muslim Husbands from 1983-1990
OCCUPATIONAL GROUI'	 1983-1986	 1987-1990
Professional	 01.6	 03.3
Administrative	 08.1	 08.5
Clerical	 09.1	 10.1
Sales	 11.2	 13.0
Service	 15.8	 16.2
Agriculture	 00.2	 00.3
Labourer	 45.2	 37.9
Unclassified	 00.6	 00.4
Unemployed	 00.7	 08.6
Outside Labour	 01.1	 01.8
-	
-	 (t)	 -	 -
(_)	
-	 Cl)	 Cl)
=	 -	 -
o- 	 -	 -	 o	 =•	 Cl)	 V)	 In	 -	 C
(-I-)	 —J	
-	 E
*	 _	 L)	 Q)	 -0	 •	 •
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From Table 4.43, it may be observed that the majority of Muslim males
divorced from 1983-1986 were labourers at 45.2 percent followed by
those in service and sales workers at 15.8 and 11.2 percent respectively.
The lowest percentage was that in agriculture who make up 0.2 percent
of all the divorced men in this period. The situation was similar
between 1987 to 1990 where the labourers were the majority at the
level of 37.9 percent. There were also followed by service and sales
workers at 16.2 percent and 13 percent respectively. Again at 0.3
percent the agricultural workers were the lowest percentage of men
divorced during this period.
It may appear that the majority of divorcees are from the low income
group who are represented as labourers. These work in jobs which are
menial and repetitive requiring little skill and very poorly paid which
puts great economic and psychological pressure on the families
concerned. Hence, it could be that poverty is one reason why marriages
break up.7°
However, it must be noted that Kuala Lumpur is a major city and has
more than its fair share of factories and building sites in which work
can be easily obtained. Coupled with the fact that the Malays, although
the majority in terms of population, are still economically backward,
this might prove to be the reason as to why there is such a
preponderance of labourers in divorce statistics. This may simply be
due to their overwhelming numbers in these occupations. It is due to
similar factors that there is such a low representation of agricultural
workers who are divorced. As Kuala Lumpur is a major city, there is
a very low number of people who rely on agriculture, fishing, hunting
or forestry for their livelihood in Kuala Lumpur and thus they are
under-represented in this survey.
° See Kassun, Azizah bt, Women and Divorce among the Urban Malays in Women m Malaysia
edited by Hing Al Yun, et.al ., Kuala Lumpur, Pelanduk Publications, 1984, p.106.
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TABLE 4.44
Percentage Distribution of Occupational Group of
Non-Muslim Wives from 1975-1990
OCCUPA'IlONAL GROUP 	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
Professional	 01.8	 02.4
Administrative	 03.5	 03.6
Clerical	 25.4	 29.8
Sales	 03.9	 03.6
Service	 11.9	 11.9
Agriculture	 02.0	 00.0
Labourer	 13.9	 10.7
Unclassified	 00.5	 04.8
Unemployed	 36.6	 31.0
Outside Labour	 02.3	 02.4
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The divorce pattern based upon occupational group of the wife was
virtually unchanged before and after the LRA. From Table 4.44, it
could be observed that in both cases, the main occupational group that
was prone to divorce were the clerical workers and unemployed.
Between 1975-1982, 36.6 percent of non-Muslim wives were
unemployed followed by 25.4 percent who were clerical workers.
Between 1983-1990 the figures were 31.0 and 29.8 percent respectively.
It may be gathered from the above data that incidence of divorce
spreads fairly evenly across the employment categories. There is a
marked social-class gradient in relation to sex of petitioner. The
highest proportion of decrees were granted to unemployed wives, the
lowest to those in the professional group. These occupational groups
are not as prone to divorce as the statistics may have made them out
to be. Rather, these occupational groups are over-represented in Kuala
Lumpur. As the educational standard for clerical work is low and jobs
are plentiful, clerical workers are over-represented in this survey. The
other prominent group, the unemployed, are housewives, either due to
pressure from husband and family, or due to the children or other
circumstances such as low educational level. In addition to the above
factors, being a housewife has always been viewed to be a traditional
and hence, accepted role for women. On the other hand, it can also be
supposed that the wife finds employment before divorce when she
notes that the marriage is breaking up. Employment of the wife makes
divorce possible and eases the process of decision-making. Phillips
stated that to some extent, economic independence was a catalyst to
divorce and the importance of employment to divorced women is shown
by the fact that they were more likely to be employed than were
married women.7'
' Phillips, 1988, p.615.
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In recent years, increased educational opportunities and wider range
of employment for women have made it possible for women to live
independently and support themselves through a divorce. Not only has
divorce forced millions of women into the role of sole bread-winner,
but married women as well have found that a rapidly changing
economic structure means that a middle class wage is now earned by
two people.72
Working life has also exposed women to more social contacts and the
result of this may draw them away from their own marriage. Education
and working status may also have broadened their horizons;
consequently their attitudes towards marriage and divorce have become
more liberal. Various research shows that an increase in wife's income
and the ratio of her earnings to family income increases marital
dissolution.73
Peoples who are involved in sales are prone to divorce, probably due
to a number of reasons. The nature of their work means that they are
under a lot of pressure to outperform each other to achieve higher
sales targets. These means longer hours away from the family and
greater individual pressure which leads to marital instability. Burgess
and Locke observed that various studies seem to show that divorce is
relatively high among persons engaged in occupations necessitating
frequent absence from home, involving intimate contacts with the
opposite sex, and relatively little control by the community.74
The study by Fonseca in Indian communities in Bombay also revealed
that discord in the clerical and skilled, business, unskilled and
Mason, Mary Anne, The Equality Trap, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1988, p.108-118.
Heather, Ross and Sawlull, Isabel, Time of Transition, Washington, D.0 Urban Institute. 1975.
' Burgess, Earnest W. and Locke, Harvey J., The Family: From Institution to Companionship, New
York, Prentice Hall, 1950, p. 634.
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unemployed classes appear to outweigh discord in the professional
class.75
Another possible explanation for the high divorce rate amongst the
people involved in sales is due to the location of the study. As Kuala
Lumpur is a capital city of Malaysia and the focal point of many
industries and corporations, it follows that there would be
proportionately more sales personnel within Kuala Lumpur compared
to other areas.
Fonseca, Mabel, Counselling for Marital Ha ppiness, Bombay, P.0 Manaktala and Sons Ltd. 1966.
366
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
TABLE 4.45
Percentage Distribution of Occupational Group of
Muslim Wives from 1983-1990
OCCUPA'IlONAL GROUP 	 1983-1986	 1987-1990
Professional	 00.5	 00.7
Administrative	 01.3	 03.4
Clerical	 10.2	 13.5
Sales	 03.6	 05.3
Seivice	 04.4	 05.9
Agriculture	 n/a	 n/a
Labourer	 18.6	 23.5
Unclassified	 00.5	 00.4
Unemployed	 60.8	 46.8
Outside Labour
	 00.2	 00.4
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It may be seen from Table 4.45 that the majority of Muslim women are
unemployed. From 1983-1986, 58.1 percent of all women divorcees were
unemployed. This was then followed by productive and transport
workers, labourers at 18.6 percent and clerical and related workers at
10.2 percent. Overall, over 86.9 percent of female divorcees in this
time period were represented by these three occupational groups. The
lowest frequency at 0.2 percent was reported for women outside the
labour force.
From 1987-1990, a similar pattern emerges, whereby 46.8 percent of
divorced women were unemployed. Labourers were next at 23.5
percent, followed by clerical at 13.5 percent. Together, they made up
83.8 percent of the women in this time period. Unclassified workers
and workers outside the abour force both had the lowest percentage of
divorce at 0.4 percent each.
The reasons for such a high proportion of unemployed divorcees are
societal. Due to the traditional belief that a woman's place in the
home, many women are not encouraged to excel or extend their
studies. Even those who do so tend to be housewives after they marry.
Even if they do not, by a mixture of guilt and traditions, the wife tends
to stay at home once the couple has a child or children. Therefore, it
is believed that even in an urban environment like Kuala Lumpur, most
women are housewives and so are over-represented in this study.
An interest in social class as a factor in divorce stemmed originally
from United States Census reports, which have consistently shown an
inverse relationship between divorce and social class. Within the
United States, the lower the social class to which an individual
belongs, the greater risk of divorce. This progressive increase in the
probability of divorce has been explained by some in terms of
variations in the life styles of the different social classes, which
accordingly may make divorce more likely for individuals in
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progressively lower social strata, a point of view held by Goode who
postulated that the objective complexities and difficulties ensuing from
divorce are greater for upper strata marriages, so that they are more
likely to stay together. 76 According to Goode marriages from lower
strata may be less constrained by economic barriers than would
marriages from upper strata for two main reasons. First, he considers
that more of the income in upper strata marriages is set aside for long
term investment in houses, insurance schemes and the like, whereas
relatively more income in lower strata marriages is spent on consumer
goods. Consequently, it is far less easy for the husband in the upper
strata to abandon such obligations. Second, the potential financial loss
for the upper strata wife is perhaps greater than that for wives in
lower strata, since in the event of her having to work and support
herself after the divorce, the difference between the potential earnings
of the lower class wife and her husband may well be smaller than
between those of the wife and husband in the upper strata.77
The census survey of married couples in the United States showed that
although marriage instability exists at all socio-economic levels, the
general trend is for marriage break up to be more profound at the
lower status levels.78
This inverse relationship between divorce and social class observed for
the United States does not, however, appear to be the case within the
United Kingdom. For instance, Rowntree and Carrier (1958) found
that, within both a divorced and a continuing married population, there
76 Goode, 1961, pp.416-9.
Ibid,p.419.
Kenkel, William, F. The Family in Perspective, 3rd. edn., New York, Appleton Century Crafts,
1973.
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was an equal distribution of manual worker marriages. 79 Studies
carried out by Gibson (1974) showed that not only was there no direct
association between high divorce rates and tow social class but
conversely, even a slightly greater tendency for non-manual workers to
divorce.80
Research by Thornes and Collard showed that those from lower strata
backgrounds experienced more environmental disadvantage than did
others from other social classes. First, the environment in which they
grew up was more likely to have been overcrowded, since they came
from relatively large families of origin. Second, their job opportunities
would have been fewer and less financially rewarding, since they were
the least likely to have had a selective education or to have any further
education.
The marital environment may also be regarded as potentially more
economically disadvantaged. First, because they tend to marry at young
ages, therefore, and have the least likelihood of accumulating any
savings. Secondly, their early age at marriage also has implications with
regard to their economic position which is likely to remain low, since
their marital responsibilities probably neither encouraged nor permitted
any participation in job-training schemes which might have led to
improvements in their long-term economic position.8'
Gibson also suggest that early marriage with its increased risk of later
divorce predominantly associated with manually employed husband.82
Rowntree, G. and Carner, N. "The Resort to Divorce in England and Wales 1858-1957",
Population Studies, 11, 1958 p. 188.
80 Gibson, C.. "The Association between Divorce and Social Class in England", British Journal of
Sociology. 25, 1974, pp. 81-92.
81 Thornes and Collard, 1979, pp.41-43.
Gibson, 1974, p.79.
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The finding in this study that the unskilled manual group is the most
divorce prone is in line with the American findings on divorce rates
and social class. The above findings confirmed studies made by Chester
and Streather and Haskey which found that amongst petitions based on
the ground of cruelty, there was an over representation of couples
where the husband worked in a partly skilled or unskilled occupation,
and corresponding under representation of those who are professionals
and administrators.
In the study of the cross-cultural analysis of divorce rates in various
societies, William Goode demonstrated the relations between divorce
rates and occupational groups in various societies. He, however, raised
a word of warning that to date no conclusive findings have been
obtained.83
However, Tai Ching Ling in her study stated that in Singapore, there
was a positive correlation between occupational status and proneness
to divorce. She pointed out that in most cases in Singapore, those who
were at higher occupational status were more prone to divorce. She
suggested that such propensity to divorce may be due to the more
active social life led by men in the administrative and managerial fields
leading to the neglect of the wives at home. Among professional and
technical workers, it is often a conflict of opinions and different sets
of values that lead to the break-up of the marriages. 84 This trend
contradicts most of the findings of studies on divorce in western
83 Goode, 1962, pp307-526.
Tai Ching Ling, "A Sociological Analysis of Divorce in Singapore", Southeast Asian Journal of
Social Science, Vol 3, No.1, 1975, p-76.
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countries, where there were, in most cases, inverse correlations
between occupational status and proneness to divorce.85
However, as have been pointed out in the preceding chapter, the actual
decision to divorce is influenced by many factors, among which the
legal and financial consideration are most important in this study area.
Most of the workers in the higher socio-economic class are well
educated. The women, in particualar are more aware of the laws and
their legal rights and therefore, would prefer to dissolve their
marriages legally and formally.
Therefore, although the indices of divorce proneness in Singapore
indicate that the higher socio-economic groups are more prone to
divorce, it may be that the only safe conclusion to draw from the
figures is that they are more willing to seek the legal avenues formally
to dissolve their marriages.
85 See for example Kephart, William M. and Monahan, Thomas P. "Desertion and Divorce in
Philadelphia", American Sociolo gical Review, Vol. 17(1952) pp.710-727 and Goode, 1965, pp.44
-8.
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TABLE 4.46
Percentage Distribution of Number of Children of
Non-Muslims from 1975-1990
NUMBER OF CHILDREN	 1975-1982	 1983-1990
One	 28.9	 27.5
Two	 22.1	 20.7
Three	 04.0	 07.4
Four	 03.6	 03.0
Five	 01.8	 00.9
Six or more	 00.7	 00.8
None	 32.6	 39.8
One	 Two	 Three	 Four	 Five	 Six	 None
and
more
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4.11 NUMBER OF CHILDREN
It is widely held that divorce has a psychologically damaging effect
upon children and that parents ought to stay together for the sake of
the children. 86 It is said that the number of children is directly
related to the happiness of the marriage. This may have been true in
an agrarian society, where the child was important as a source of
labour and as a factor in continuity. It may be that it still holds true,
even though children signify, in today's world, a noticeable increase in
consumption needs. Children place pressure on the family finances, and
alter the parents' roles. This again, has led to the belief that children
keep marriage together. As most divorces happen in the early years of
marriage, both divorce and childlessness may be a result of more
fundamental conflicts in marriage.
No doubt, some marriages are kept together because of the children,
or the divorce is postponed or delayed. The children may thus be
considered to have a stabilizing effect. But the strong increase in the
number of children in divorce may also indicate that children in some
marriages are a source of conflict and instability, especially among the
young and lower class.
The number of children affected by divorce is of interest for several
reasons. The well-being of children (often thought of as the innocent
victims of divorce) has been and remains a principal concern of
legislators and social commentators. In addition, it is frequently
thought that childlessness makes divorce easier for married people, and
that divorced couples are typically childless.
See Wallerstein, Judith S. and Kelly, Surviving the Break-u p: How Children and Parents Cope
with Divorce, London, Grant Mc. Intyre, 1980.
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Table 4.46 shows the distribution of the number of living (but not
necessarily dependant) children in families affected by divorces from
1975-1990. It presents the number of the children only. The data give
only the trend, without relating it to other variables. As one would
expect, duration of marriage is related to the number of children in
divorcing families.
It may be observed that there is substantially no difference in the
divorce pattern as far as number of children are concerned. Between
1975-1982, 32.0 percent of couples had no children. 28.9 percent had
one child and 22.1 percent had two children. Collectively, they make
up 82.6 percent of the total. The percentage of the number of children
decreases with increasing number of children until a percentage of 0.7
percent for six or more children.
Between 1983-1990, the percentage of childless couples who divorced
was 39.8 percent followed by those with one child at 27.5 percent and
these with two children at 20.7 percent. Collectively, they make up 88.0
percent of the total. Again there was a steady increase in percentage
with increasing number of children. These reveal that the frequency of
divorce decreases with the number of children in the family.
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TABLE 4.47
Percentage Distribution of Number of Children of
the Muslims from 1983-1990
NUMBER OF CIHLI)REN	 1983-1986	 1987-1990
One	 23.5	 24.7
Two	 18.3	 19.3
Three	 09.9	 12.4
Four	 05.9	 06.4
Five	 03.0	 03.5
Six or more	 02.8	 02.3
None	 36.7	 31.4
One	 Two	 Three	 Four	 Five	 Six	 None
and
more
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From Table 4.47, it may be observed that the majority, that is 36.5
percent of divorce cases from 1983-1986 were childless couples. The
frequency of divorce decreased with increasing number of children
from 23.5 percent for one child and 18.3 percent for two children to
a low of 2.8 percent for couples with six or more children. A similar
trend could be observed from 1987-1990, in that 31.4 percent of
divorced couples were childless, 24.7 percent had one child and 19.3
percent had two children; decreasing steadily until a 2.3 percent for
couples with six or more children is reached.
Do children make for more stable marriage? If stability is defined as
not ending up in the divorce court, there may be some evidence to
support this. For example in United Kingdom in 1979, the median
duration of marriage in the case of divorcing couples with children
under the age of 16 was just over 11 years as compared with cases not
involving children. The child can represent unity in a marriage, but can
equally represent disunity. It can be the product of a reasoned decision
or a pawn in the conscious and unconscious power struggle of a
relationship.87
We were reminded by Clulow that, statistically speaking, the earlier
one marries (and particularly there is a child already on the way) the
more one runs the risk of a breakdown of a breakdown in the marital
relationship. It is widely believed that the presence of children in a
family acts as a powerful deterrent to divorce. This view probably had
its origin in the high proportion of divorces to couples without
children.
From United States statistics, Jacobson concluded that close to three-
fifths of the divorced couples had no children. And it is evident by his
87 Clulow, Christopher, Children, For Better, for Worse? in Chan ge m Mamage, Rugby, National
Mamage Guidance Council, 1982, p.34.
377
study that among families with children, the average number of
children increases with the duration of marriage prior to dissolution.88
Merton and Nisbet believe that childless couples are more likely to
divorce. But at the same time they hold that couples in great marital
conflict are less likely to have children.89
In Pothen's study divorce is more common among childless couples. In
the absence of children, the motivation to stay together under stress
is considerably lessened. 9° Whereas Fonseca's study in Bombay
disclosed that "the failure to have children induces divorce and family
instability, especially where there are other disruptive factors."9'
Tan, using Muslim samples, found that childlessness increased the
probability of divorce and the probability of divorce for a woman with
a son was lower than one without a son. She found out that the
inability to have children also seems to have some effect on marital
instability. A relatively large proportion (about 40 percent) reported
they did not have any children in their first marriage. In some cases,
divorce may occur soon after marriage, making it impossible to have
children. While the majority of the respondents in Tan's study seem to
indicate that the absence or presence of children would not make much
difference to a marriage, they have at the same time indicated that a
couple without children would not have a happy marriage. Thus it
would appear that infertility is not considered an important reason for
a marriage to break up. Nevertheless the relationship between a
Ibid., p. 239.
Merton, R.K. and Nisbet, R. Contemporary Social Problems, New York, Harcourt Brace and
World, 1966, p.548.
9° Pothen. 1986, pp.202-4.
91 Fonseka, 1966, pp.55-6.
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husband and wife seems to be affected to such an extent that divorce
becomes inevitable.92
Jacobson has shown that divorce proneness is evidently correlated with
childlessness. 93 Therefore, the above figures do support the hypothesis
that childless couples have a higher tendency to divorce. This reasoning
seems to imply that if the couple is childless, the decision to divorce
is an easier one to make. Also, the presence of children does deter the
divorce proneness of the parents, especially when the couple has more
than two children. This also shows that parents do consider the
interests of the children and the effect of divorce on them. Hence, if
there are more children in the family, the parents are more reluctant
to divorce.
As is often the case with a correlate of divorce, this relatively higher
degree of childlessness amongst divorced couples may be interpreted
in opposite ways. It can be argued that the survey fiiidings demonstrate
the void which may be created in a marriage where there are no
children, thus increasing the risk of marital breakdown. Conversely, it
may be that children do indeed reinforce the stability of a marriage,
although not by lessening any risk of marital unhappiness but rather
by making unhappily married parents more reluctant to divorce because
of an overriding sense of obligation to remain together for the sake of
their children.
Thornes and Collard's study has shown that there are strong pressures
towards parenthood, but there is also consistent evidence to suggest
that children probably do not enhance the marital relationship, since
couples with children living at home appear to have lower marital
Lee Kok Huat, et.al., 1985, p.187-9.
Jacobson, 1950, pp.239-243.
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happiness levels than those living alone, they also have greater
financial burdens and more interpersonal stress.94
In England and Wales in 1980, 60 percent of all divorcing couples had
children under the age of 16, and a further 10 percent having children
over this age. So the proportion of divorces involving couples without
children is very low, at three in ten. This proportion is obviously much
higher in cases of earlier divorce. 71 percent of divorces which occu red
within the first two years involved childless couples, as did 66 percent
of divorces occuring after three years of marriage. But, in case of
divorce after 10-14 years of marriage, only 15 percent one in six of
divorcing couples have, or have had, no children. In cases of divorce
after 15-19 years, this figure falls to just 9 percent.95
The relationship between childlessness and divorce has been explained
in terms of the stresses on marriage caused by infertility. Involuntary
childlessness might make the spouses doubt their sexuality and thwart
expectations of having a family. Alternatively, childless marriages might
be dissolved more frequently because divorces without custody issues
are less complicated. Against this, one persuasive article suggests that
the correlation of childlessness and divorce rests on the complete
misunderstanding of the data.96
Perhaps the most distressing, and least understood aspect, was the
effect of divorce on children. As more couples divorced, more children
were separated from one parent or the other. During the late twentieth
century, social workers, psychologists, and other experts who studied
the effect of divorce on children reached disparate conclusions. Some
Thornes and Collard, 1979, pp.88-96.
Rimmer, 1982, p.103.
Chester, R "Is there a Relationship between Childlessness and Marnage Breakdown"? in J oui nal
of Biosocial Science, 4 (1972), 343.
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maintained that children fared better in divorce than in a conflict-
ridden marriage, while others presented evidence that divorce exacted
its own heavy tolls of children. The results of a long-range study
published in 1989 indicated that the negative impact of divorce on
children was far greater than anyone had previously suspected.97
See Wallerstein Judith S., and Blakeslee, Sandra, Second Chances: Men, Women, and Children
a Decade after Divorce, London, Bantam, 1989, see also Wallersteui, 1980.
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TABLE 4.48
Percentage Distribution of Reconciliation in Muslim Divorces from 1983-1990
Ruju'	 1983-1986	 1987-1990
Yes	 93.3	 12.6
No	 06.7	 87.4
1983-1986	 1987-1990
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It may be concluded that children are a stabilizing influence on a
marriage and this has been borne out by this study which shows that
the more children a couple has, the less likely they are to divoice.
Therefore, it was predicted and indeed observed that the couples with
no children were the most prone to divorce.
4.12 RECONCILIATION IN MUSLIM DIVORCES
Table 4.48 shows the frequency of reconciliation of the estranged
couples within the two time periods. It appears that from 1983-1986,
93.3 percent of parties had a reconciliation and only 6.7 percent were
irrevocably divorced. However, the figures are estimated as no
information was available for the 98.8 percent of the divorce cases.
Therefore, the effective level of reconciliation in this light was only 1.2
percent. This data however is not significant and so, should not be
treated as proof that reconciliation occurs more readily than non-
reconciliation.
With respect to the period of 1987-1990, it was observed that
information on 51.4 percent of the estranged couples was available. Of
this totaL 87.2 percent were the majority who had no reconciliation and
only 12.6 percent of the divorced couples were reconciled.
4.13 CONCLUSION.
It emerges from this study that the divorce rate in Kuala Lumpur has
been increasing and more so, after the introduction of the LRA. The
change from a strict to more liberal law has also affected divorce
patterns. The Act has opened the door to justice for couples who could
not have obtained a divorce under the previous law, thus increasing the
number of divorce petitions. More couples are resorting to the court
to settle their marital breakdown. It should be noted that many couples
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who were married according to their custom could not obtain a
statutory divorce until the new law came into force.98
Also, due to the change in the philosophy of the law with its emphasis
on no-fault, husbands are more ready to petition for divorce. Divorce
by mutual consent is and will continue to be very popular, especially
among childless couples or couples with very few children.99
The present study has also shown that couples contemplating divorce
do consider the interests of their children and if they have more than
two children, are most reluctant to contemplate divorce, unless they
have very strong and compelling reasons to do so. The steep rise in
early divorces may indicate a move towards the dissolution of
unsuccessful marriages, before the decision is made to have
childen.'°° Furthermore, married people do not generally rush into
a divorce on the discovery of the shortcomings of the other spouse.
They are generally tolerant and patient, at least as compared to
western couples in so far as duration of marriage is considered as an
indicator of tolerance.'°'
It is also worth noting that both the LRA and IFLA discourage
marriage between parties, either one or both of whom are below the
age of 18.102 The policy of the law in discouraging teenage marriages
will in effect reduce the number of divorces which are brought by
young people who do not understand the heavy commitments a
See LRA, section 4.
See Table 4.11.
' See Table 4.41; see also Eekelaar, 1991 p. 57.
101 See Table 4.38.
102 See LRA, section 12; see also IFLA, section 8.
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marriage entails. Coupled with their immaturity, these young couples
may be ill-prepared to overcome their marital tensions with the result
that they turn, precipitately, to divorce. Some studies have suggested
that marriages by the young are more often motivated by a desire to
escape personal problems and to find a substitute relationship for
security, than by exclusive attraction to the other partner and
commitment to the marriage ideal.103
The above studies also point out the changes in the values and
perceptions of the spouses in relation to the institution of marriage
owing to a variety of social, cultural, political, and economic factors.
The increasing enthusiasm for higher education, particularly
professional education, and the employment of women played a vital
role in influencing the values of men and women and changing the
attitude towards marriage and divorce.' 04
 These changes have not
only contributed considerably to the breaking of traditional structure
of Malaysian marriage but also to the increase in the rate of divorce
in Malaysian society.
Marriage has changed from being institutional to companionate.
Freeman describes it as a union consisting:
"two individuals rather than two lineages, on the child-centred
household, on the quasi emancipation of women; and on the
structural isolation of the nuclear family from the kinship
system and the community. "105
See for example Dominian, J., Marital Breakdown, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1974 pp.131-
2; see also Furstenberg, Frank F., Jr. Premantal Pregnancy and Marital Instability, Journal of
Social Issues, Volume 32, Number 1, 1976, pp.67-85; see also Furstenberg Jr., Frank F. and
Spanier, Graham B., Recycling
 the Family: Remarriage After Divorce, Sage Publication,
California, 1984, p57.
'° Ibid.; see also Weiss, Robert S., Mantal Separation, Basic Books Inc. New York, 1975, pp 5-13.
105 Freeman, M.D.A, Questioning the Dc-legalization Movement in Family Law: Do We Really Want
a Family Court?" in The Resolution of Family Conflict - Comparative Legal Perspectives, edited
by John M.Eekelaar and Sanford N. Katz, Toronto, Butterworth and Co, 1984, p.9.
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If the essence of marriage is seen as a personal relationship, and if it
is no longer necessary to preserve the bond for economic reasons,
fulfilment may legitimately be sought in a second union.' 6 Evidence
from a study shows that marital breakdown and divorce are more
prevalent in urban, especially metropolitan areas, than in rural
areas. 107 Within Durkheim's analysis, it may be postulated that the
development of urban living has led to uprooting and greater social
isolation. 108 This may be seen to contribute to the stresses within
marriage and make it easier to leave the marriage.
Phillips suggests that the city must have facilitated divorce by providing
a labour market and other facilities for increased independence for
women not available in the rural areas. The effective decrease in the
cost of divorce proceedings and the development of social welfare
provisions make the process of filing for a divorce easier.'°9
This research has shown that persons of lower socio-economic status
prefer to end their marriages formally and legally." 0 Furthermore,
persons holding certain occupations are more prone to divorce, largely
due to the nature of their work." The risk of divorce within
marriage is higher at some periods than at others. Although figures
relating to the actual time of divorce are affected by the law governing
divorce, and also do not reflect the true duration of marriage, there
are some interesting differences by duration of marriage. The highest
106 See Weiss, 1975, pp. 8-10.
' Rheinstein, 1972, p. 307; e also Norton, Arthur J. and Ghck, Paul C., " Marital Instability Past,
Present, and Future" in Journal of Social Issues, Volume 32, Number 1, 1976, p. 17.
18 See Giddens, Anthony, Durkhe,m, London, Fontana, 1978, pp. 31-32.
'° Phillips, 1988, pp.582-634.
"° See Table 4.42.
See Table 4.42.
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rate of divorce currently occurs three years after marriage. After a
period of three years divorce rates fall to about two thirds which is
half the rate of divorce before a period of three years has elapsed.
After three years have passed the divorce rate decreases with each
subsequent year of marriage.'12
Duration of divorce figures, even when statistically correct, are open
to the sound criticism that divorced couples may have parted ways or
separated long before the granting of the decree. Even the legal
processing of divorce takes time. Administration in divorce
proceedings, such as court backlogs and scheduling of cases sometimes
delay to the time for the legal divorce. Recently, the growth of
compulsory conciliation procedures," 3 has meant that an additional
extension of the period of litigation might be anticipated. However,
adequate measurement of the over-all effects of these various legal
practices in delaying (or preventing) divorce has not been made, so it
is difficult to say whether the laws have slowed up the divorce process
or affected it at all.
This study also shows the attitude of some Muslim husbands who lay
more emphasis on divorce as the only way out of their marital
instability. Although Islam shows fundamental dislike of divorce in the
Qur'an and the Sunnah, these have not been emphasised in the daily
life of the divorcees resulting in the abuse of the power of talag. This
study shows that a number of husbands would ruju'(reconcile) soon
after that."4
112 See Table 438; e also Goode, 1965, pp. 109-110.
113 See LRA, section 106, and also IFLA, sections 47 and 48.
114 See Table 4.48.
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A study by Chiriboga et. al. showed that marital separation and
divorce, in the long run, is not the solution to problems. They stated
that;
"For many it was a relief from the chronic duress of an
unhappy marriage, for some it was also a crisis, but for all it
posed a challenge; to forge themselves a new life. The process
initiated by the decision to divorce in essence is the beginning
of a transition that is successfully concluded only with the
construction of a new and more satisfying life. "115
The total number of divorces recorded is fairly accurate, but
unfortunately, the records do not provide a very deep insight into the
underlying causes of divorce. Legal causes for divorce are decided by
legislative enactment. The petitioner must fit his or her grievances to
whatever grounds the statutes permit. The differences in the divorce
laws in Kuala Lumpur offer slight explanation of the wide variations
in divorce grounds between the Muslims and the non-Muslims.
Variations in the use of the different legal grounds illustrate not only
changes in the legislation, but also changes in the norms of the society.
This transition underlines the fact that cited grounds may be a poor
guide to the causes of marital disruption. The distribution of grounds
thus reflects legal rather than marital behaviour, and divorce by
consent, because of its advantage, may possibly come to dominate the
scene in due course.
The enumeration of factors that correlate with divorce and that might
therefore be called causes of divorce and the elaboration of linking
hypotheses are of limited use. Couples of low socio-economic status
115 Cluriboga, David, Catron, Linda S. and Assoc., Divorce, Crisis. Challenge or Relief?, New York,
New York University Press, 1991, p.292.
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have been found to be at a high risk of divorce." 6 Such causes of
divorce are the perceptions of the spouses involved and spouses
frequently give divergent accounts of the same marriage.' 17 Social
scientists generally consider such causes of divorce, as perceived by the
couples, to be secondary, and to represent symptoms of more
fundamental causes. The manifestations olf marital instability such as
violence, adultery, incompatibility, emotional indifference which are
said to constitute marriage breakdown, emerge from the interplay of
the personal and social characteristicts of the spouses and the context
of their marriage."8
Other variables that have been correlated with divorce in many
countries are premarital pregnancy, differences between husband and
wife in social or educational background, marriages without children,
employment by the wife or unemployment by the husband, and also the
family histories of divorce. 119 Several smaRl-scale studies in Malaysia
have listed incompatibility as one of the main reasons for divorce.'20
This study confirms research made by Haron which listed lack of
maintenance, polygamy, and incompatibikty as causes of divorce.'2'
Another interesting finding is that childrei, do not deter couples from
116 See Table 4.42; see also Haskey J., Social Class and Socio-Economic Diffentials in Divorce in
England and Wales, (1984), 38, Population Studies, p.430 see also Goode, 1965, pp 43-55.
117 See Bernard, J., The Future of Marria ge, Bantam, New York, 1973 p. 52. Bernard has referred
to "his" and "her" marriage m order to suggest the idea that there are two marriages in every
mantal union and that these do not always coincide.
118 Phillips, 1988, p. 585.
119 Thornes and Collard, 1979, pp.13O-2,
	 see also Furslenberg Jr., Frank. F., 1984, pp 67-85.
120 Tan Poo (lang, 1987, p. 83; Haji Haron, 1975, p.65; see also Lee, Kok Huat, Ct. al, Family Events
and Marital Stability in Peninsular, Discussion Paper No.6, Population Studies Unit, Faculty of
Economics and Administration. University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1985, p. 52.
121 See Table 4.17.
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divorce and infertility is not given as reason for divorce, as a man
could practise polygamy if the first wife is barren.'22
The Malay Muslims still have higher divorce rates than the other two
ethnic groups. This study shows that the higher number of divorces
may have resulted from the fact that a Muslim husband can divorce his
wife by talag at his own will without the intervention of the court.
With the implementation of the IFLA, the abuses of talag have
dramatically dropped.123
In many countries, studies have indicated that the wife is more likely
to petition for divorce than the husband. The working status of women
has also made them more willing to petition for a divorce. This reflects
changes in the position and attitudes of women. The sex differences
which have been outlined in this study strongly suggest that the choice
of grounds for divorce is determined by social mores and legal
convention. The grounds of mutual consent which were introduced in
the LRA have decreased the percentage of petitioners using adultery
as the grounds for divorce. As for Muslims, after the stringency of the
law relating to polygamy, the grounds of divorce based oii polygamy
have proportionately decreased.124
Unfortunately, due to the lack of information, this research could not
be concluded on certain points. It was not possible to conclude
positively as to whether inter-ethnic marriages are more prone to end
in divorce.
122 See Tan 1987, p. 48.
123 See Table 4.37.
124 See Table 4.15.
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Divorced women generally have a higher labour force employment rate,
but we do not always know whether they were employed while married
or whether they entered the labour force after divorce. The distinction
is vital if we are to theorize as to whether employment by married
women predisposes their marriages to breakdown. Similarly, most
divorced women are located in the lower socioeconomic groups, but
this distribution could well be not so much a factor in the probability
of divorce as a result of divorce; divorced women and their children
generally suffer economic decline after the separation, whereas the
economic position of divorced men usually improves after a
separation.125
In the past there may have been very little overlap between those who
were unhappily married and those who divorced. This may nowadays
be less so and it seems likely that those who divorced and those who
are unhappily married will, in the future, tend to become a more
homogeneous group. This is because the number of barriers to divorce
is diminishing and the viable alternatives to remaining in an unhappy
marriage are expanding. Also, changes in the law governing divorce
have led to its widespread availability, and these factors suggest that
divorce is increasingly regarded as an acceptable solution to marital
unhappiness and is therefore more normatively available within society
than it once was.
125 Weitzman, Lenore J., The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic
Consequences for Women and Children in America, New York, The Free Press, 1985, p. 323.
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PART THREE
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
I have explained the historical background to the various developments
in both the Muslim and non-Muslim divorce laws in Malaysia.' A
knowledge of that background helps to explain why the law is as it is,
but it does not necessarily provide a justification for it to remain
unchanged in those areas where reforms may be considered desirable.2
This study shows that in almost every respect, divorce in Kuala Lumpur
has undergone marked changes. Analysis of the LRA shows that
changes in the divorce law constitute a substantial cause of the
increasing rate of divorce. The law of divorce of non-Muslims has been
progressively liberalised and the procedure simplified so that divorce
becomes financially and legally feasible for an increasing proportion of
married people. The greater incidence of divorces and social familiarity
with divorce erodes negative attitudes and facilitates further legal
reform. While negative social sanctions mitigate, so too the legal and
economic constraints involved in obtaining divorces have become less
stringent.3
SeeParti.
2 for more comprehensive discussions on the loopholes of the LRA and IFLA see Chapters 3 and
4.
See Chapter 4.
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This study also shows that the present law and practice is very
confusing. There is a significant gap between theory and practice,
which leads to confusion and lack of respect for the law. The law can
only be effective as an instrument of change if it is authoritative and
commands respect from the public.
Criticisms of the LRA are not only directed at its main principles, but
also at the legal rules and processes on which the grounds for divorce
is based. First, the law states that the only ground for divorce is
irretrievable breakdown of marriage, which does not involve fault. On
the other hand, it provides that this can only be shown by proving one
of the five facts, three of which apparently do involve fault. Despite
having irretrievable breakdown of marriage as the sole ground for
divorce, 4 there are also two additional grounds, namely, divorce by
mutual consent5 and conversion to Islam.6
The present empirical study confirms that sex, class and other
differences in the use of the facts make it quite clear that they are
chosen for a variety of reasons which are not connected to the reality
of the case. 7
 The fact that is claimed by the petitioner in order to
prove the breakdown of the marriage therefore, does not have any
correlation with the real reason behind it.
In practice, defending a case on fault-based grounds is time consuming,
money wasting and an emotional drain which is beyond the resources
of most respondents. Even though parties are usually prepared to go
all the way in defending their cases, the outcome leaves them worse off
as it consumes limited resources. Legal aid is inadequate since the
' See LRA, section 54(1).
See LRA, section 52.
6 See LRA, section 51.
See Chapter 4.
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legal officers are overburdened with handling cases both from Muslim
and non-Muslim jurisdictions. Furthermore, legal aid is only available
in the capital of the state. 8 Due to these factors, lawyers often advise
their clients not to defend their case. In practice, an undefended
divorce suit can be obtained faster and easier. 9 Therefore, it is a
misconception to assume that undefended divorce is a result of
consensual decision.
When a marriage breaks down there are many practical questions to
be decided. The policy of the law is to assist the couples to try and
settle these conflicts through lawyers but negotiations can also be
abused by a party who is in a stronger position in relation to the
divorce itself. This open process of negotiation puts one party at an
unfair advantage.
It is a good feature of the present law that couples who do not want
to put the blame on each other can go through divorce by mutual
consent. However, the present law is unjust as it does not take into
consideration the unequal bargaining power which generally arises in
a patriarchal Malaysian society.
The present practice also does not completely fulfil its initial goals.
These are, first, the support of marriages which have a possibility of
survival, and secondly, the "to enable the empty shell to be destroyed
with maximum fairness and the minimum of bitterness, distress and
humiliation" of those that are involved.' 0
 The LRA does little to
rescue these marriages. Although there is a provision relating to
mandatory reconciliation, the present system of trying to reconcile the
8 Personal conversation with Puan Norsiah Baharui, Assistant Director, Legal Aid Bureau, Federal
Territory of Kuala Lumpur, in December, 1992.
Personal conversations with lawyers in Kuala Lumpur in December, 1992; see Appendix IV.
' See report of The Royal Commission on Non-Muslim Marriage and Divorce Laws, 1971, P. 13.
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estranged parties is a total failure and does not help the law's
objectives of supporting those marriages which have the likelihood of
survival. The law cannot deter people from separating, although it
could make it hard for people to get a divorce. There is no proper
conciliatory body which helps to explain the reality of divorce, that is
the emotional and the economic consequences of it. Thus, people go
into divorce without realising the adverse consequences.
The LRA has brought fundamental changes to the existing law of
matrimonial causes. The abolition of the "fault" concept as a factor in
the determination of matrimonial disputes, and the reduction of the
grounds of divorce to only one, namely irretrievable breakdown of
marriage, are undoubtedly changes of great magnitude. Reforms in
divorce law however, have been confined to the substantive aspects of
the law without any consideration as regards the judicial institutions
which would administer the law. Reform should not stop at the law
itself but should extend to the system of courts in which it is
administered and their procedures. In order to realise the full benefits
of reform in the substantive law on matrimonial matters, a
corresponding reform of court procedures is imperative.
As for IFLA, although it has improved greatly compared to the
previous law in Kuala Lumpur, and law in other states, it fails to
translate theory into practice and thus invites criticisms from the
public, especially women. The law may be good in theory but fails to
achieve its objective in practice. The enforcement agents fail to
demonstrate their commitment to the new norms due to lack of
manpower and ignorance of the public. There was no proper
explanation given regarding the new law, thus the enforcement agents
were left to interpret the Act themselves.'1
Personal conversation with Ustaz Ismail Abmad, Senior Officer, (Damansara),JAWI in December,
1992.
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To complicate matters further, IFLA arrived without much publicity
since it is only applicable in a more restncted jurisdiction. 12 It differs
greatly with the divorce legislation for the non-Muslims. LRA has a
nationwide application, therefore reform proposals are intensely
discussed in the national press. The debate achieves a degree of
sustained public attention. Furthermore, any important changes in
family law for non-Muslims is preceded by extensive studies of
behaviour and opinion of the rakyat.13
This study also points to the fact that although there is a provision
under the IFLA that talag must be pronounced in court, the conditions
are often not adhered to by Muslim men. In theory, this condition is
very commendable since it acts as a deterrent to the husband's misuse
of the power of talag. However, due to inadherance to the condition,
IFLA fails to achieve its objective in protecting women against the
abuse of the power of talag. Either the law fails to gain respect from
the public, or the law itself fails to answer the socio-historical needs
of the people.14
Above all, the present law on divorce fails to acknowledge that divorce
is not a final outcome but a part of a substantial change for the
couples and their children. In other words, divorce is not a separate
event but a social, psychological and only incidentally a legal process,
which takes place over a period of time.
All these defects present a formidable case for reform. In recent years
there has been a spate of new family legislation especially relating to
divorce in England, Australia, and some Muslim countries. In Pakistan,
12 The Malaysian Constitution, Schedule 9, List II.
13 In the Malaysian context, "rakyat" is normally use to indicate the citizens of Malaysia. Views of
the rakyat could be found in the Report of the Royal Commission, 1974, Appendix I.
14 Personal conversation with Ustaz Abdullah Abu Bakar, Lecturer in Islamic Family Law,
International Islamic University, in December 1992.
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as in Egypt, Muslim reform was due to internal processes within the
Muslim community and to external motivation from western presence
and criticism.' 5 Reinterpretation and reform have occurred in the
areas of both substantive law and jurisprudence in the name of social
progress. 16 Reform legislation has been enacted to meet more
equitably the changing social and economic needs of modern society.'7
In the seventeen years since the enactment of the LRA in 1976 and ten
years in the enactment of the IFLA in 1984, there have been
remarkable changes in the society and the climate of public opinion in
Malaysia. When we consider that the LRA did not set out to do much
more than achieve a uniform law for the non-Muslims in Malaysia,'8
it could easily be argued that what is needed now is a more radical
reappraisal of community needs and attitudes, and a thorough
reconsideration both of the legal and the institutional responses of
Malaysian society to the problems of divorce. However, the true
effectiveness of reform will depend upon the acceptance of the Act not
simply by those who legislate but by the entire Malaysian community.
The history of divorce as traced in this study points to several areas
that demand increased attention from legislators, jurists and policy
makers. Two major problems are identified as requiring solution:
15 See Chapters 2 and 3; see also Esposito, 1982, pp.94-'01.
16 The flexibility of Islamic legal system, due to its plurality and divergence ofjunstic opinion within
its broad framework, has resulted in the reformation of traditional family law, without parting with
its fundamental principles, see Mahniood, Tahir, Family Law Reform in the Muslim World, New
Delhi, The Indian Law Institute, 1972, pp. 267-8.
17 
"Two alternative courses of action - to end or to mend were available to the countries which
realised this need. However, only a few countries opted for a complete abandonment of the
traditional Islamic family law and its replacement by entirely secular syslems and even among
these countries, some have so far taken such a step only in the limited field of Islamic matnmonial
law",. Mahmood, 1972, pp.263-4.
See LRA, section 2, see also Chapter 3.
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i.	 The need to protect and support the family especially women
and children.
ii.	 The mechanism of divorce itself. This needs, at the very least,
attention and refinement or perhaps more fundamental reform.
These two major areas will be discussed separately in two concluding
chapters, although they are very much inter-related. Chapter 5 includes
discussion on several measures other than law which should be
considered towards the development of supportive systems for working
mothers or a general family support system.
Chapter 6 of Part III will end with a discussion of the reform of
divorce laws. Among the areas that will be touched are legal reforms
to protect women, grounds for divorce under Islamic law and civil law,
and also the setting up of family courts and systems of conciliation.
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CHAPTER 5
PROTECTION AND SUPPORT OF FAMILY INSTITUTION
5.1 INTRODUCTION
My purpose has not been to make detailed proposals but rather to
indicate a new direction in which the government could help support
and protect the family. The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir
Mohammad has emphasized in his Vision 2O2O' that society has a
sound and reasonable interest in actively promoting the nuclear family
as the chosen shelter for bringing up children who will take charge of
the future. 2° It is therefore submitted that, to achieve these
objectives, proposed reforms should be targeted with a view to relieve
any problems relating to women and children. 2 ' This proposal arises
from the fact that, under the present divorce laws, the terms of exit
from marriage are disadvantageous for almost all women in traditional
or quasi-traditional marriages in Malaysia.
Practically, women have a share in promoting the nuclear family, since
they bear a disproportional share of the hardship of its failure.
Economically and socially, women everywhere are made vulnerable, by
the historical correlation of female responsibility for bringing up
children with female subordination and dependence.
19 Within the context of Vision 2020, where family development is the vital agent of Human
Resource Development of the nation, it is imperative that greater efforts should be taken to
improve the available skills and knowledge which the members of society already possess about
the linkage between "family development' and "a nation's progress."
20 Utusan Malaysia, November 30, 1992.
21 For proposed reform in this area see Appendix I.
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The current practices of marriage itself contribute to economic
inequalities between women and men. 0km suggested that the arrival
of a child is most often the point where the wife becomes economically
dependent. 22
 Although this economically subordinate situation of
women frequently remains concealed during marriage, it becomes
instantly obvious on marriage breakdown, at which point the poverty
of women develops into a public problem.23
Women carry far greater responsibility for domestic duties and
children, whether or not they work outside the home. Constraints built
into society limits women in their efforts to be successful providers for
their families. Low level jobs and low-level wages typically paid to
women employees keeps them from earning incomes that would
adequately support them and their children. 24
 The combination of
domestic duties and unrewarding employment act as a strong deterrent
to women working outside the home and so actually discourage them
from doing so. Therefore, a women's weak position an the labour
market, which is itself a consequence of women's domestic role, in turn
reinforces their subordination in the home.
So far, Malaysian women regardless of religion and race share a
common background. They have been dominated and relegated to a
minor and subservient role in society. 25
 In the olden days, women
were deemed inferior to men. 26
 A woman's life centred around the
men in her life. For the Chinese, girls are subjected to a lifelong
See 0km,, Susan Moller, Justice, Gender, and the Family, New York, Basic Books, 1989, pp.138-9.
Ibid, p.139.
Arendell,T. Mothers and Divorce - Legal, Economic, and Social Dilemmas, Berkeley, Los
Angeles, University of California Press, 1986, pp.80-10!.
Hong, Evelyn, Rural Women in Development in Mala ysian Women: Problems and Issues, edited
by Evelyn Hong, Consumers Association of Penang, 1983, pp 24-7.
Traditionally, "proper" Malay girls are kept under strict surveillance from puberty onwards
Heyzer, Noeleen Working Women in South-East Asia. Development, Subordination and
Emancipation. England, Open University Press, 1986, p.113.
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discrimination, well described by the popular code of feminine ethics,
the three obedience, viz to obey her father at home, her husband after
marriage, and her eldest son after the death of her husband. 27 Women
themselves have and accepted certain social conceptions
about their position in society. Such was, and still is to a great extent,
Malaysian society. Even when the process of achieving equality is
generated, this may occur unevenly at different levels and for different
social groups.28
Studies on divorce show that the inequality of women in marriage and
their continuing fight to change that condition. 29 In common law, it
was well-established that the two partners became one entity at
marriage, with a single domicile - that of the husband. 3° When she got
married, the wife lost her status as feme sole, and her independent
legal rights were quite limited.31
This is due to the fact that the traditional notion of "sex-
differentiated marital responsibility", with the husband as provider and
wife in the domestic roles, continues to be a solid influence on what
men and women think and the way they behave. In fact, both the
division of these responsibilities between the spouses resulting in
women's economic dependence on men and the related responsibility
of husbands to support their wives compromise the choice of
occupation of both sexes.
See Wong, 1978, p.252. see also Salim, Rafiah bt, The Legal Status of Women in a Multi-Racial
Malaysian Society in Hing Yun, et.al . (eds) Women in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur Pelanduk
Publications, 1984, p.187.
See Heyzer, 1986, p.113.
See Heyzer, 1986; see also Nicholas, Susan C., Rights and Wrongs: Women's Struggle for Legal
Equality, New York, pp. 22-9.
See LRA, section 49.
31 See Chapter 3, see also Snell, James G., In the Shadow of the Law, Divorce in Canada, 1900-1939,
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1991, p. 9.
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As is generally known, most married men give priority to their careers.
However, the present divorce rules do not grant women their share of
investment in men's career. Divorce rules expect her to enter the
labour market as his equal, even though she has fewer job skills, and
is at the same time carrying major responsibilities for their children
after divorce. Women by virtue of their limited education have been
ill-equipped to compete with men for such positions. Apart from the
lack of formal education, rural women in Malaysia usually marry
young32
 and are therefore deprived of many of the opportunities to
enhance their skills and experiences.
In Malaysia, women workers in manufacturing industries, like women
workers in other sectors of the economy, lack skills and training, and
are concentrated in certain industries. This, in combination with their
lack of independent unions or any affiliation with trade union
organizations, leaves them open to exploitation.33
Therefore, the prospects of a divorcing woman, particularly if she is a
custodial parent, are in many ways much bleaker than the prospects of
a divorcing man. Divorce usually pushes women down the class ladder.
Regardless of the consensus that existed about the division of family
labour, these women will lose most of the income that has supported
them and the social status that was attached to them because of their
husband's income and employment, often for the first time in many
years. This combination of prospects would seem to be enough to put
most traditional wives off the idea of divorcing even if they have good
cause to do so.
32 Lee, Kok Huat, Tan Poo Chang, and Siti Rohani Yahaya, Famil y Events and Marital Stability in
Peninsular Malaysia, Discussion Paper No.6, Population Studies Unit, Faculty of Economics and
Administration, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1985.
See Tan, Pek Leng, Women Factory Workers and the law in Malaysia women: Problems and
Issues edited by Evelyn Hong, Penang, Consumer's Association of Penang, 1983, pp.64-74.
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This is true in the Malaysian context as is shown in a study made at
Kampung Perupuk, Kelantan. Due to poverty of the family, the men
release their despair and frustration by beating their wives but the
wives do not seek divorce. Application for divorce will only be made
if their husbands are reluctant to work or court other women.
However, this occurred only when the women were young, and were
economically independent.34
Research in a number of states in America has shown that the
economic consequences of divorce are a greater blow to women than
men and it falls more heavily on women with dependent children.
Together with these is the huge social and psychological distress, as a
result of economic loss. Unlike men, both women and children
experience economic loss as the worst dimension of divorce. 35 In the
average case, the standard of living of divorced women and the
children who live with them plunges after divorce, whereas the
economic situation of divorced men tends to be better than when they
were married.36
Arendell's study also showed that for women, the main blow of divorce
is basically economic. 37 And due to that factor, divorced women with
See Narendran, Vasantha Malliha, The Women of Perupuk; An Economic Study, M.Soc Sc.
Theses, University of Science, Malaysia, 1975.
Weitzman reports that "what women say they miss most about marriage is the husband's income.
What men report missing is having a sexual partner and a partner in hfe"; Weitzman, L., The
Divorce Revolution, The Unexpected Social and Economic Conse quences for women and
Children in America, New York, The Free Press, 1985 pp.348-354. On emotional depnvation and
the diminished opportunities of middle-class children of divorce; see Wallerstein, Judith S. and
Kelly, Surviving the Break-up: How Children and Parents Cope with Divorce, London, Grant
Mcintyre, 1980, No such research bemg done in Malaysia yet.
See Funder,Kathleen Australia: A Proposal for Reform, Lenore Weitzman and Mavis Maclean
(eds), Economic Consequences of Divorce: The International Perspectives, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1991.
Arendall, 1986, p.153.
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young children had to take up employment. 38 Single parent families
headed by women are among the poorest groups in contemporary
society. It is extremely difficult for such families to lift themselves out
of poverty without the help of an extra income in the household. 39 In
many cases, full-time work or the minimum income, is insufficient for
these families as the women have insufficient job-training and
experience. As Bianchi and Spain state,
"women's labour market adjustments to accommodate children,
which are often made within a two-parent family context and
seem economically rational at the time, cause difficulty later
when these same women find themselves divorced and in great
need of supporting themselves and their children. "40
Although there is no research done in this area as yet in Malaysia, it
is a well known fact that these women suffer badly after divorce by the
number of maintenance cases filed at the Sharia and Civil Courts and
matters taken up by the Legal Aid Bureau. These also include cases of
wives being deserted by their husbands and left in limbo; what is
commonly termed as "gantung tak bertali" (literally; being hang
without a rope). Under the Malay custom, although it is embarrassing
to turun naik mahkamah. (literally; up and down the court) 4 ' the
women have no other choice as their present income is insufficient to
pull them out of poverty. The only advantage of Malaysian women
compared to their western counterparts is that of having an extended
38 Eekelaar citing Gordon and Kammeyer 1980, Eekelaar,J., Family Law and the Social Policy, 2nd.
edn., London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984, p.206.
On the chronicity of poverty in female headed households see Youssef, Nadia and Hetler, C.B,
Establishing the Economic Condition of Women-headed Households in the Third World: A New
Approach in Women and Poverty in Third World, edited by Mayra Buvinic, et.al, Johns Hopkins
University Press, London, p.216. See also Eekelaar, J., and Maclean, M., Maintenance After
Divorce, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986, pp.68-84.
4° 0km quoting Bianchi and Spam in American Women, p.163.
41 A term widely used to connote the frequency of going to the Shana court.
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family to help them to cope with the divorce trauma. Even then, the
financial burden is still shouldered by the women themselves.
Another reason why divorced women are likely to have to rely on their
own, often inadequate earnings is that they are much less likely than
their ex-husbands to remarry. 42 In divorce, remarriage is considered
a solution offered at individual level. 43 Although remarriage is widely
practised by Kelantanese women, 44
 it is not a general phenomenon
elsewhere in Malaysia. The reasons for this are almost all socially
created and therefore alterable. 45
 In the vast majority of cases, a
divorced mother continues to take primary responsibility for the
children, but she has lost a very large portion the financial resources
she had within marriage, making her a less attractive marital partner
than the typical divorced man.
Custody of children is known to be a cause that discourages
remarriage. Research has shown that divorced men who are in their
thirties and forties are usually non-custodial parents. Most often they
are at the height of their careers, which is a factor in attracting a
subsequent wife. Whereas increasing age is not much of a obstacle for
a man seeking to remarry, 0km suggests that ii seriously affects a
woman's chances, which decrease from 56 percent n her thirties to less
than 12 percent if she is in her fifties or older when divorced. This is
also due to the fact that emphasis is placed on youth and good looks.
42 Arendall, 1986, p.157.
Smart,C. The Ties That Bind: Law Marriage and the Reproduction of Patriarchal relations,
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984, p.23.
" In Kelantan, a "janda" (divorcee) readily remarnes without any stigma; Karmi, Wazir Jahan, (ed),
Emotions of culture: A Malay Perspective. Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1990, p.21. See
also Laderman, Carol, Putting Malay Women in their place in Women in Southeast Asia, Van
Esterik, Penny (ed), Northern Illinois University, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monograph
Series of Southeast Asian, 1982, p.87.
The ability of a large proportion of Kelantanese women to sustain themselves economically
enhanced their readiness to divorce and remarry Jones, 1981.
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And ironically, success at work, highly correlated with remarriage for
men, is inversely correlated for women. 46 Although no such study has
been carried out in Malaysia, it could be inferred that the trend would
be the same.
Such are the different structural opportunities that men and women
face at divorce. It is this structural economic inequality in marriage
that the law has failed to address. Recent research as well as the
present study show that any equality women have gained within divorce
law is largely symbolic. 47
 Although husbands and wives apparently
have equal access to obtaining legal divorce, in practice that equality
is not real. The present situation has made women and children victims
of the legal process. By attempting to treat men and women as equals
at the end of marriage, current divorce law ignores the obvious fact
that women are not socio-economic equals of men in the Malaysian
society. Not only that, it also fails to recognise the fact that the
experience of "gendered marriage" and primary parenting largely
aggravates the inequality that women already bring with them into the
marriage.48
5.2 REFORMS TO PROTECT WOMEN AND CHILDREN
The present problems in the light of development strategies should also
work towards a redefinition of these roles so that there can be a more
meaningful role for women in Malaysian society. It makes it imperative
for the government to begin considering of special social and
Onwomen's work success m America, see Blumstein and Schwartz, American Couples, New York,
Morrow, 1983, pp 32-33.
See Chapters 2-3, see also Arendell 1986, p.153.
For further details on gendered marriage, see 0km, 1991, p.166.
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educational programmes to achieve this. 49 This implies that social
reform could significantly alter the negative impact of divorce on those
who suffer most from it. It is reported that the Women Affairs
Secretariat (HAWA) in the National Unity and Social Development
Ministry will intensify its programmes to make women aware of their
legal rights. Its Minister, Datuk Napsiah Omar, also suggested that
strong family institutions be built in the Malaysian community and
divorce should only be the last resort. 5° It is really hoped that this
suggestion is followed by serious action as well.
Although there have been important legal changes that have improved
the status of married women in relation to their husbands, many of
these reforms have benefited women oniy indirectly, through their role
as guardian of the children. The law has attempted to improve the lot
of children and has done so by extending protection to their primary
carer.51
These legal reforms have not touched upon the principal structure of
marriage and the family which is based upon women's economic
dependency on men. The law's failure to realise that these women face
a "gender-structured" society puts them at a disadvantage as single-
parent providers which contributed directly to the extent of the
hardship they encounter. 52 It is therefore crucial that the rules of
divorce be redrawn so as to reflect the gendered or non-gendered
On the development of Malaysian women in economics see Lim, Teck Gee, Women, Economics
and the Environment in Malaysian Women, edited by Evelyn Hong. Penang, Consumers
Association of Penang, 1983, pp.3!-5.
5° Malay Mail, December 9, 1992.
51 On legal reform in this area in England see Brophy, J and Smart, C Women-in-Law: Explorations
in Law, Family and Sexuality (eds) London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985.
52 See Weiizman, 1985, pp.357-40! see also Glendon,M., Abortion and Divorce in Western Law,
Cambndge, Harvard University Press, 1987, Chap 2.
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character of the marriage that is ending, to a far greater extent than
they do now.
Gender-structured" marriage needs to be considered as a necessary
institution but one that is socially difficult. The legal system of a
society that allows couples to divide the labour of families in a
traditional or quasi-traditional way must accept the responsibility for
the vulnerable position in which divorce has placed the woman who has
completely or partially lost the capacity to be economically
independent especially when there are children. 54 When marriage does
come to an end, the law should try to ensure continuing family stability
for the children as far as possible by insisting that their lifestyle should
remain as it is.55
Therefore when marriage ceases, it is reasonable to demand that the
husband whose career has been largely unburdened by domestic
responsibilities support financially the wife who undertook these
responsibilities. This support, in the form of combined alimony and
child support, should be far more substantial than that which is often
ordered by the courts now. Both post divorce households should enjoy
the same standard of living.
There is also a need for the legal procedure relating to marriage to be
considered from a completely new viewpoint. One of the incentives for
the deregulation of divorce was the recognition that not all marriages
are the same. No single legal procedure is suitable for every single
case. The government should pay more attention in marriage to the
quality and stability of the environment in which children are brought
0km defines gender as "the deeply entrenched institutionalization of sexual difference", 0km,
1991, p.6.
Glendon has set out a "children first" approach to divorce in England; see Glendon, 1987 p.94.
See Chapter 6 note 13; see also Mason, 1988, p. 69; see also 0km, 1991, p. 183.
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up. 56 As we move to implement these goals, however, we must keep
in mind the laws governing marriage. If we have learned anything from
the work of Weitzman and others, 57 it is that we cannot expect to
remedy the defects of marriage at the point of divorce.
And this brings us to the crux of the matter. In trying to fight divorce,
Rheinstein rightly suggests that we are attacking the symptom, not the
malady. He stated that;
"Not divorce but the factual breakup of a marriage constitutes
the social evil which has been decried so often and so
passionately. It is this situation which turns the children into
'orphans which is likely to throw them and perhaps the wife
too as a charge on the tax payers, which creates the
psychological problems of loneliness, and which injects a
general element of instability into the fabric of social life. But
none of these effects is produced by divorce, which is an event
occurring not in the world of social living but in the universe
of formal law. "58
5.3 RECONCILIATION
A long standing official policy with respect to divorce procedures has
been the encouragement of attempts at reconciliation between the
parties. This policy is reflected in the provision in the LRA. 59 Under
the LRA, the court has the power to adjourn divorce proceedings at
any time if it appears that there is a reasonable prospect of the parties
becoming reconciled, for such a period as it thinks fit to enable
attempts to be made to effect such reconciliation. 60 However, it seems
See Mason, 1988, pp.71-2.
See Weitzman, 1985, P
. 
321; see also Goode 1956, p 121; see also Rheinstein, 1972, p.78.
Rhemstein, 1972, p.266.
See LRA, section 106.
60 See LRA, section 55.
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unlikely that either of these provisions is particularly effective, since
they only apply once one of the parties has filed for divorce, by which
time reconciliation seems a remote prospect.61
Studies in England showed that reconciliation procedures started after
the filing of the petition achieve little success and have tended to
become fruitless. 62 The Law Society in England took a similar
view, 63as the couples would have sought it before then from family,
friends or marriage guidance counsellors.
Various schemes which have been tried in foreign countries, requiring
compulsory attendance of parties to a divorce suit before some form
of conciliation agency or tribunal, have proved in the end to be a
routine and useless formality. It is ironic that despite various schemes
which showed that mandatory reconciliation is a failure, Malaysia is
still pressing on with it. Malaysian reformers should have looked into
all these before including the provision on compulsory
reconciliation. 64 Section 106 of the LRA should therefore be
repealed. 65 There must also be complete assurance of secrecy 66 as
the present members of the reconciliation tribunal are not given any
61 See Chapter 3 pp.45-47.
62 The Law Commission, The Denning Committee on Procedure in Matrimonial Causes 1947, The
Royal Committee on Mamage and Divorce 1956, The Law Commission in the Field of Choice
1966, and the Finer Committee on One-Parent Families 1974 all concluded that mandatory
reconciliation attempts within the court process were unlikely to succeed.
63 The Law Society, A Better Way Out, A discussion paper prepared by the Family Law Sub-
committee of the Law Society, London, Law Society, 1979.
Sheikh Ghazali Abdul Rahman, Chief Qadhi of Sharia Court, also agreed that there must be a
positive impulse on one side at least; see also Riley, 1991, p. 186.
65 See Ibrahim, (1979) on the proposal for niles relating to reconcthation; see also proposal in
Appendix I.
Under the Australian Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, Section 12, provides that a marriage guidance
counsellor is not competent or compellable to disclose any communication made in his capacity
as a marriage guidance counsellor and to guarantee complete secrecy, it is provided under section
12(2) of the same act that he has to take an oath before embarking upon his w rk of counselling.
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guidelines as to how they should consider these cases, and also they
are not bound to confidentiality.67
While in principle all reformers approved of reconciliation facilities as
an appropriate approach to stabilise marriage, not all of them regarded
mandatory counselling or court-based services as the answer to the
problem. The dominant view, held by legal practitioners and the
judiciary, would appear to be that there is little prospect of
reconciliation once divorce proceedings have begun.68
Academicians have been rejecting reconciliation provisions introduced
into divorce legislation. 69 However, according to research carried out
by Davis and Murch, the potential exists for reconciliation in a
significant number of divorce cases. The possibilities of reconciliation,
even when legal proceeding have began, may be greater than is
sometimes supposed. However, for most petitioners the decision to
seek a divorce is only taken after careful consideration.7°
Studies in England show that prospects of reconciliation are much
more favourable in the early stages of marital disharmony. Prolonged
conflict will leave the couples with no desire to restore the marriage,
and by the time steps have been taken to institute divorce proceedings
the prospects of bringing the couples together is bleak. 7 ' Therefore,
it is important that the general public should be brought to realise the
67 Samuel, Charlotte, Abused Women, paper presented at the Seminar on Law, Justice and the
Consumer. Consumers' Association of Penang, Penang, 19-23 November, 1982; for further
discussions in this area see Chapter 2.
See Chapter 2 PP. 56-57; see also The Field of Choice, see also Law Society, 1979 para 51 A
Better Way Out; see also A Better Way Out Reviewed, 1982, para 27.
Further discussions see Chapter 3 pp.34-35; see also Eekelaar, 1971, pp.182-3.
Davis, G., and Murch M. Grounds for Divorce, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, p53.
' Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, Morton Commission of 1956. Cmd. 9678, London,
H.M.S.O.
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importance of seeking competent advice before it is too late and to
sort out as early as possible problems of a serious nature.
In Singapore, the registration of divorce, revocation of divorces and
conciliation regarding marital disputes (functions formerly carried out
by Assistant Qadhi) were taken over by the Sharia Court. These duties
were then performed by the Qadhi and the Social Worker in the Sharia
Court. Since then, whenever there are marital disputes between the
spouse, the qadhi or assistant qadhi will initially see the husband and
wife separately. After several interviews with the couple separately, the
social worker or the qadhi will see the couple together where the
situation will be assessed and salient points brought before the couples
for further discussion so as to improve their relationship. The
counselling service has played a significant role in reducing the number
of divorces among Muslims in Singapore 72 and there is no reason why
the same service cannot be done in Malaysia.
The present marital agencies backed by the Government in Kuala
Lumpur such as Unit Perunding dan Pembangunan Keluarga in JAWI
are consulted only by a small proportion of people. Many seek help
elsewhere; some do not look for help at all especially those in the
higher income bracket. 73 This shows that the existing scheme is
operating on a limited scale, but the measure of success already
attained supports the view that in quite a number of cases, the
estranged spouse have been able, with the help of skilled counselors,
to overcome their difficulties and to achieve reconciliation. However,
further expansion of these facilities is required, and new methods need
to be formulated to cover all sorts of people from various walks of life.
If the present structure is to be continued, only certain groups of
Tai, Ching Ling, 1975, p.70.
Utusan Malaysia, January 14, 1993.
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people will approach it, the rest will endure in silence and when the
strain is too much too carry, it will disrupt in divorce.
The conclusion that appears to emerge from the foregoing is that the
stress that has been placed on the role of counselling and reconciling
estranged couples probably raise unreal expectations in the community
as to what can be achieved by counselling The government has thus
an interest in furthering reconciliation wherever possible. The
government's role should rather be to give every encouragement to the
existing agencies, statutory or voluntary, engaged in works relating to
marriage, as well as to other agencies which may be approved in
future. 74 Voluntary agencies which have proved their worth should
receive financial assistance from public funds. 75 Their activities should
be widely publicised and be made widely available throughout the
country. In extending the existing facilities, experiment and diversity
of method and technique should continue to be encouraged and a
system be formulated which provides agencies tailored to different
religious, cultural and ethnic needs.
Malaysia should also follow the example of China, where in Beijing, a
Chinese court, faced with a rising number of broken marriages, has
established a school for divorcing couples to help them part amicably
or be reconciled. The one month course set up by Jinan district court
in Shandong province provides systematic education on law, policies,
morals and ethics so that couples will take a correct attitude toward
divorce. So far in the six months of its operation, it has managed to
reconcile 37 percent while another 45 percent divorced amicably.76
A statutory agency would not be able to cater to such a broad cross-section of the Malaysian
community.
See proposal in Appendix I.
76 New Straits Times, December 12, 1992.
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This seems to be in line with the Islamic principles proposed by the
Qur'an, that is,
"the parties should either be together on equitable terms or
separate with kindness. "
I believe this is the best solution as further animosity would have bad
effects on the children of the already failed marriage.
5.4 OTHER MEASURES
It is worth emphasising that measures other than the rules on divorce
offer much better prospects for strengthening marriages. A wide scope
of problems arise in societies where an increasing proportion of both
spouses with children work outside the home to maintain financial
stability. Even when both the husband and wife have jobs, the wife is
expected by society to be primarily responsible for the reproduction
and child rearing. The emphasis placed on women's domestic roles has
therefore set limits to potential manipulation of family living.78
Most women in Malaysia now hold jobs, either by choice or
necessity79
 and they are entering fields that are already female-
dominated or are fast becoming so. At the top end are the traditional
female professions of teaching, nursing, and social work, at the bottom
end, unskilled and semi-skilled manufacturing jobs but the great middle
bulge, where most of the new jobs appear, is the service sector, which
Al Qur'an, Surah Al Ba garah : 229.
See Eekelaar, 1984 p.189;see also Rhode, Deborah L. and Minow, Martha, Reforming the
Questions, Questioning the Reforms m Divorce Reform at the Crossroads edited by Stephen D.
Sugarman and Henna Hill Kay, Yale University Press, 1990.
Eekelaar quoted study made by Gordon and Kammeyer (1980) that women with young children
take employment because of financial necessity Eekelaar, 1984, p.207.
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is made up of many jobs with secretarial and clerical areas as the
largest components.8°
Overall the gender stereotyping of occupational roles in Malaysia is
remarkably similar to the West. This, according to O'Brien, is
attributed to a number of reasons, prominent amongst them being the
colonial heritage and the effect of capitalism. 8 ' In addition, due to
socially propagated values as to what is suitable and right for women
and men, the effects of female occupational segregation is further
reinforced by their assignment to jobs with minimal possibilities of
advancement.82
The division of labour based on sex is more than a mere technical
division. It helps to enforce domination and create more
discrimination. For women, it has both domestic and external effects
which are interrelated. The interest placed by society on women's
reproductive function has an effect on women entering the labour force
on an equal footing with men. So when women do work in the wage
sector, the majority are distributed among the most poorly paid and
static jobs.83
Due to changes in traditional economic systems and labour
relationships, women in Malaysia today especially those in the rural
area have been reduced to a position of dependency on men. With
their total exclusion from the cash economy in terms of relationships
80 See Chapter 4; see also O'Brien, Leslie, Four Paces Behind: Women's Work in Peninsular
Malaysia in Lenore Manderson, (Cd) Women's Work and Women's Role in Economics and
Everyday Life in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, Monograph Australian National Umversity,
Developments Studies Centre, Camberra, 1980, p.194.
81 Ibid., p.217.
82 See Heyzer, 1986, p.7.
83 Hing Ai Yun, Women and Work in West Malaysia, in Women in Mala ysia, edited by Hmg Al
Yun, et. aL Kuala Lumpur, Pelanduk Publications, 1984, pp.5-li.
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with the larger society and with their further isolation in the domestic
sphere, women's status has fallen. This has never happened before in
traditional economies where women contribute to their share of the
economy and participate on equal terms in decision making processes
in agriculture and affairs which affect them and the lives of their
families.84
lone Fett in her analysis of changes in land tenure in Negeri Sembilan
showed that, whilst women collectively own more land today than at
any other time this century, individual shares have declined. As a
result, women's economic independence is being whittled away and
their position within the economy has thus become marginal.85
O'Brien's study points out that occupational opportunities are
predicated upon several factors such as the type of education received,
the gender, and the ethnic status of the recipient. With increasing
industrialisation and urbanisation, employment opportunities require
specialised skills; education has become the principal means of
recruitment to better pay and higher status positions in the labour
force. 86
 Even educated women will eventually marry and for this
reason sublimate their career aspirations to their marital obligations
and motherhood. This results in employment difficulties even for
educated women in the modern labour force.
84 The colonial administration is blamed for these changes which disrupted the traditional system;
Further discussions in this area, see Sundaram, J.K.,"Class Formation in Malaya: Capital, The
State and Urban Development" Ph.D Thesis, Harvard University, 1977.
85 Fetl,Ione, Land Ownership in Negeri Sembilan, 1900-1977, Women's Work and Women's Role -
Economics and Everyday Life in Indonesia, Malaysia and Smgapore, in Lenore Manderson (ed)
Women's Work and Women's Role in the Economics And Everyday Life in Indonesia, Malaysia
and Singapore. Monograph Austrahan National University, Development Studies Centre,
Camberra, 1980, p.73.
O'Bnen. 1981, p.194.
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As expectations regarding standards of living rise and as decent living
conditions come to require two incomes, more and more mothers of
young children work because of economic pressures. As a consequence,
working women in Malaysia, as in all other industrialised countries,
have the problem of juggling home and family roles with work outside
the home. Research indicates that in poverty groups, women tend to
work longer hours and have less leisure than men. Even with the long
hours spent in production, the extent of women's role in reproduction
does not decrease, resulting in a double burden for them. Unlike
women in the better-off classes, women in poverty groups tend not to
trade off between child care and income generating work. They cannot
afford to resign because their income helps to cover the family
expenses. This is especially so in urban centres with high cost of living
such as Kuala Lumpur. If these women resign and want to resume
employment later, they face another setback as they will lose out in
terms of seniority. In addition, the condition of women in the poverty
group according to Buvinic is different from the condition of men in
the sense that the increasing household burden and pressures for
income tend to change women's and children's but not necessarily
men's use of time, and their work burden.87
Faced with the difficulties of trying to coordinate and balance home-
life with work, the poor working class women tend to have more
marital problems. Azizah Kassim's study showed that divorce rates are
highest amongst the poor working class families, as contrasted with the
more educated and wealthier Malay families in Petaling Jaya. There
could be other variables influencing divorce trends. Nevertheless, the
correlation between poor working class women and high divorce rates
Buvinic Mayra (eds), Ct al., Women and Poverty in the Third World, Johns Hopkins Umversity
Press, London, 1983 pp.'4-31.
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is alarming as it would result in grave consequences for both women
and children.88
These potentially severe consequences for women themselves, for job
performance, and for family life generally require public policy
intervention. The purpose of such intervention is the development of
a social infrastructure supporting these dual responsibilities. The
infrastructure would, in fact, make work and parenting responsibilities
more possible. Such a support system would be needed even when
occupational roles and familial responsibilities are more equitably
shared by men89 and women.
If there is a real concern about young children, the government should
focus on the implementation of policies that would permit a parent the
option of staying home and caring for very young children. However,
there is no explicit or single public policy regarding the family in
Malaysia yet. Since marital disharmony is a major social problem, the
government should exercise more responsibility - shared with caring
individuals, by promoting independent initiatives for relieving private
misery and exercising social concern by the provision of services
through statutory and other public agencies to help with marital
problems. Family education in schools, beginning with pre-adolescents,
should include positive training on the role of nuclear families and the
responsibilities of parenthood.
The development of supportive systems for working mothers or a
general family support system involves change, reform, and innovation
in policy and in programme development. Measures should be taken to
88 Kassim, 1984, pp.94-Ill.
A psychologist, Dr. Mat Saad Baki believes that a husband should share the many responsibilities
of child rearing. As the leader of a family, he can be a figure of authority to the cliild New Straits
Times, July 1989.
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ensure that it is supportive of family living. The government concern
at divorce should focus on the internal aspects of family life, with the
need to protect individuals.
The responsibility for child rearing should be made a social
responsibility shared not only with other members of the family but
also with the rest of society. As it is generally known, from time
immemorial responsibility for running the home and rearing the
children have fallen heavily on the shoulders of women alone. It is
only shared whenever convenient with other members of society. This
fundamental function of society should not be shouldered by the
women but be made a truly social responsibility.90
Expansion of child care programmes is high on the list of unmet needs.
Malaysians need legislation providing extensive child care programmes.
Private and public agencies must also assist to reduce the stress on
contemporary marriage by providing quality child care which includes
infants, preschool and school-aged children. The growth of child care
centres well monitored by the government designed to supplement this
familial role would help low-income households, where the earnings of
the wife form a significant part of the family income. The problem of
child-care for employed women therefore plays an important part in
determining the totality of the family income.
In addition, large scale employers should be required to provide high-
quality on-site day care for children from infancy to school age. 9 ' In
order to ensure day-care of equal quality for all children, government
subsidies should to be used to make up the difference between the cost
° For further details see Abu Bakar, Noor Lady bt, Hashim, Rita Raj, Child Care for Working
Women in Women in Malaysia, edited by Hing Ai Yun, et.al, Kuala Lumpur, Pelanduh
Publications, 1984 pp.78-93.
91 Menara Bank Pembangunan has taken the first step towards fulfilling the needs of those working
in that building; Sunday Mail, 14th August, 1988.
419
of high-quality day-care and the amount that parents on lower incomes
could be expected to pay. 92 The availability of day care for children
within the workplace would enable mothers to continue to nurse, if
they chose, beyond the time of their parental leave. 93 Flexibility of
working and child-care conditions can allow wage-earning mothers both
to breast-feed their infants and to care for the child. 94 Institutions
which have already taken this step are the National University of
Malaysia, Institute for Medical Research and the National Population
and Family Development Board.95
More specifically, a social infrastructure supporting family and
employment responsibilities of married women with children should
include a variety of different economic measures such as tax benefits,
social welfare benefits to child-care, social security benefits (for
example special maternity benefits and child-care benefits), improved
technology for household tasks, expanded provision of services
facilitating housework and household management (workshops,
recreational facilities), and housing policies in order to help families
with children.96
Other possibilities of reducing these problems include alternating the
number of working hours for both parents. It should support changes
in traditional gender roles by including legislation setting a shorter
See 0km, 1989, p.176.
See Shreve,A. Remaking Motherhood: How Working Mothers Are Sha ping Our Children's
Future, New York, Fawcett Columbia, 1987, p. 237.
Fuchs carefully analyses the potential economic and social effects of alternative policies to
improve women's economic status, and concludes that" child-centred policies" such as parental
leave and subsidized day care are likely to have more positive impact on women's economic
position than "labour market policies"; Fuchs Victor, Women's Quest for Economic Equality,
Cambndge, Harvard Umversity Press, 1988.
Malay Mail, August 17, 1988.
Much of what I suggest here is not new. It has been widely practised in America and Britain.
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work day for parents of young children, programme development for
pre-schools and child health and also youth programmes.97
It must, however, be acknowledged that some of these issues are
probably controversial. Although these programmes involve substantial
amounts of money, the government should consider their long-term
benefits, which would outweigh the cost spent on such programmes. In
many cases in America, the cycle of poverty has been broken and
children have been able to escape from, or to avoid falling into it
through a much better early start in life.98
Moreover, the deficiency in the quantity and quality of the existing
programmes will result in negative consequences for women and
children. The society in general will be affected because of the loss of
productive female employment and the potential problems of poorly
cared children.99
The Government attempts through KEMAS (Community Development
Division of the Ministry of National and Rural Development)'00
recognised that the family needs all the support that society, through
the Government, can give. However, the programmes should go beyond
women's domestic and reproductive roles. Programmes should be
designed to reflect the proper functioning of the family in which it
could make important contributions to social stability by preventing
See Kamerman, S.B" Public Policy and the Family - A New Strategy for Women as Wives and
Mothers in Women into Wives : The Le gal and Economic Impact of Marnage, edited by
Chapman, J.R and Gates, M (eds), Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1977, pp.195-212.
98 Schoor has discussed the ways in which the cycle of disadvantage can be effectively broken, even
for those in the poorest circumstances; Schoor, Lisbeth B., Within Our Reach - Breaking the
Cycle of Disadvantage. New York, Anchor Press, Double Day, 1988. Chap. 8.
For a discussion of child care m Malaysia - Issues, Policies, and Programmes, see Abu Bakar,
1984.
'°° KEMAS has concentrated on classes in literacy, handicrafts, pre-school centres and family
development classes, ibid, p.78.
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juvenile delinquency and crime and producing adults who would be
well-adjusted to the values of the current social system.
If the government is really concerned about the effects of divorce on
women and children, they should not confine their concern to the time
period of the actual divorce proceedings. The curative process has to
start from pre-divorce period and continue into the post-divorce stage.
Many proposals have been suggested and attempted to lessen the rising
tide of divorces from sex education to pre-marital counselling services,
especially for teenagers whose marriages are notoriously vulnerable.
The Government should also encourage the establishment of adequate
pre-marital counselling services and it should be part of a
comprehensive programme of family life education. In the pluralistic
society where life within marriage is increasingly varied and uncertain,
many children are growing up in homes with inadequate parental
guidance, or where parental figures change. It is a recognised fact that
learning about growing up should not be done by a few sessions with
outsiders but within the framework of regular relationships with adults.
School programmes which involve teachers would be the best means in
educating the young with social education.
Educators and counsellors can support the ideal of marriage and assist
people to avoid divorce by expanding programmes which are designed
to educate people before and during marriage. 10 ' There should be
compulsory courses in every state in Malaysia relating to marriage,
family and parenthood as part of the requirement before marriage.'02
Rheinstein, 1972, p.435.
102 The National Population and Family Development Board and other agencies involved in family
development have been urged by Datuk Dr.Zaharah Sulamian., Deputy Minister in the Prime
Minister's Department to enhance their roles in helping to csolve family crises Berita Minggu,
July 9, 1989.
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The importance of this sort of preparation has been emphasized
recently by JAW! by preparing courses for the public.' 03 The courses
held by JAW! have made a noticeable impression on the divorce rate
in Kuala Lumpur where it is estimated that about a 30 percent
decrease has taken place since the courses were made compulsory. The
Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister Department, Dato' Dr. Abdul
Hamid Othman's statement that more courses regarding family matters
will be introduced in future 104sounds promising, but the
implementation of it would mean overcoming the crucial lack of
manpower which is normally the case in the Sharia jurisdiction.t05
In an era of experiment, various independent agencies also pioneered
courses of preparation for marriage. These have been in response to
their experience of meeting in counselling rooms and clinics and
interviews of many couples whose difficulties seem to spring from
ignorance about aspects of marriage. However, preparation and support
are seriously inadequate in the field of education about marriage.
Although there are some projects which have been done by churches,
voluntary organisations and religious bodies, the approaches to such
education are uncoordinated. The best way forward is to expand and
improve the present services. The government should set up counselling
units similar to those of the State Islamic Affairs Department.'° 6 Not
only is it essential that a marriage counselling service should be
provided, it is vitally important that people in the community should
know that it exists and that they should be given every opportunity, at
103 The courses are part of the requirement before marriage in the Federal Territory of Kuala
Lumpur.see Koleksi Persidan gan Kursus Perkahwinan dan Kekeluargaan dalam Islam JAW!
(Wilayah Persekutuan) 1989.
104 Utusan Malaysia, September 23, 1992.
105 See Abdul Rahman, Sheikh Ghazali, Perlaksanaan, Amalan dan Permasaalahan Undang-Undang
Keluarga Islam - Pengalaman Wilayah Persekutuan, Kursus Perkahwinan dan Kekeluargaan dalam
Islam. Kuala Lumpur, JAW! (Wilayah Persekutuan) 1989.
106 Star, August 19, 1991.
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the earliest stage, to seek counselling help on an entirely voluntary
basis.'°7
The provision of pre-marital counselling should not be the
responsibility of the court. The location and detailed organization of
such services must primarily be determined by local conditions. There
should be a higher standard of training and skill in marriage
counselling. This will depend a great deal on financial backing from
the government.
The system in Britain, under which the service operates under the
control of a voluntary organization which receives financial support
from the government, has been found to work well. At the same time,
the operation of private organizations using paid workers and
supported by community funds, as the United States, Australia and in
Canada, has also been shown to be effective.'08
It is a widely held belief that a tightening up of the divorce laws is the
best way to counteract disintegration of family life. This view is based
on two assumptions: first, that the incidence of divorce can be reduced
by making divorce more difficult; secondly, that the incidence of
divorce is a reliable indication of the stability or instability of family
life. Both assumptions are extremely doubtful. The contention that
"easy divorce breeds marriage breakdown" is entirely unproven. All the
evidence collected by experts show that there is no simple correlation
between the divorce laws and the incidence of marriage breakdown.'°9
Rheinstein was absolutely correct when he suggested that restrictive
107 Sanctuary,G. Marriage under Stress- A Comparative Stud y of Marriage Conciliation, London,
George Allen and Unwm Ltd., 1968, pp.71-89.
108 Finlay, 1989, p390.
'° Rheinstein, 1972, p. 94.
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divorce law was an inappropriate method of controlling the upswing of
divorce.110
The divorce rate is not a reliable indication of the stability or
instability of family life. This is shown by the experience of those
countries that do not permit divorce. There were still many broken
marriages, deserted wives and children, kept mistresses, desertion and
illegitimacy. In America, when the colonial and state governments
denied or restricted divorce, serious problems became apparent.
Adultery, abuse, separation and desertion were frequent occurrences
among the distraught spouses. They sought annulments for spurious
reasons, obtained divorces in more permissive jurisdictions, and
subverted the intent of restrained divorce laws by fabricating grounds
that fell within legal limitation.11'
On the other hand in England, the Morton Commission feared that
facilities for easier divorce would threaten the stability of marriage.
They thought that there is a tendency to take the duties and
responsibilities of marriage less seriously than formerly and an
increasing disposition to regard divorce, not as the last resort, but as
the obvious way out when things begin to go wrong, even that marital
disharmony is really due to the acceptance of false standards of value
and behaviour in marriage.'12
While it is doubtful whether "easy divorce breeds marriage
breakdown", it is certain that difficult divorce breeds immorality. In
the words of Henry H. Foster, Jr:
110 Ibid.
See Phillips, 1988, pp 528-533.
112 Para 47, p 329.
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"It seems relatively certain that a repressive law of divorce
engenders a higher incidence of prostitution, concubinage, the
mistress system, and illegitimacy. "113
Restrictive marriage law in Malaysia has also brought an adverse
effect. The present regulation in Kuala Lumpur makes marriage more
difficult by insisting both parties to the marriage to go through
compulsory interviews to ascertain their knowledge on the rights and
responsibilities of marriage." 4 Although this is commendable, there
are several negative side effects if it is not properly administered.
First, there are many instances of solemnisation occurring outside
jurisdiction, popularly known as "kahwin lan". 115 This would result
in more problems if it is done illegally by those who are not qualified
to do so.6
Investigation done by several officials from Majlis Agama Kedah
(Kedah Islamic Council) revealed that unauthorised people were
involved in solemnising marriages of couples who sought their help.
Due to several problems, including the family's rejection, many couples
resorted to having their marriage solemnised in Thailand and
Indonesia. Married men wishing to take another wife are also known
113 (1971-1972) 39 Clii. L.R. at 877.
114 See Siraj, 1989, p.5.
115 The number of "kahwin lan" (elopement) cases are mostly undetected It surfaces in cases where
the (guardian) makes a report to the Religious Department or the parties themselves applied
to validate their marriage certificate or m khalwat (close proximity cases. in Kelantan, it is
recorded that there are only 36 cases in 1984, and 112 cases in 1986. In Kedah, in 1984 only 4
cases, and 5 in 1985. However, according to the Deputy Chief Q of Narathiwat (South
Thailand), they have been processing 1000 application from Malaysian evezy year; Utusan
Malaysia, January 12, 1985.
116 Most of the time, the women will be at the losing end, on effects of "kahwm lan" (elopement) see
Yaakob, Md. Akhir bin, and Md.Nor, Siti Zahkhah bt., Bebera pa Aspek Mengenai Enakmen
Keluarga Islam di Malaysia, Petaling Jaya, Al Rahmaniah, 1989, pp.60-i.
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to have gone to Thailand to get married to escape going through set
procedures.117
To validate a marriage solemnised outside jurisdiction, the man need
only pay a small fine. 118 In the case of married man, although the
permission of the first wife is needed, this will not pose a great
problem as the wife will normally concede for the sake of the children.
It is considered virtuous under Malay custom for her to be patient. If
the law is really concerned about protecting women, the penalty for
contravention of this condition should be more severe so as to act as
deterrent for these men.
117 Utusan Malaysia, October 10, 1992.
118 See IFLA, section 124.
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CHAPTER 6
TOWARDS REFORM OF DIVORCE LAW IN MALAYSIA
6.1 REFORM OF ISLAMIC LAW ON DIVORCE
In Malaysia, family law is one area of law where Muslims are subject
to a set of rules that are different from those which govern the non-
Muslims.' Muslim family law has always been somethiing of a mystery
to the average Muslim in Malaysia. Its primary sources, the Qur'an
and the Sunnah, are only understood by those who study them. The
religious education of the Muslim individual in Malaysia concentrates
on the rituals and the basic principles relating to the faith. 2 In almost
all cases, there is a great deal of ignorance on the part of the people
as to how the law operates.' Parties seeking redress in the Sharia
Courts depended on the gadhi for the interpretation and the
implementation of Muslim law. It is not surprising therefore to find
that there were numerous complaints about maladministration
particularly from women who felt that they were being discriminated
against by the court officials. 4
 This complaint seems to be in line with
what has been suggested by Muhammad Abduh, that the Muslims have
1 Compared to other Muslim countries, the Shafi'i school of thought is prevalent as well as some
ancient customs known as the have survived and are adhered to along with the law of Islam.
The system of family law incorporating a dominant Islanuc and minor customary element, applied
to Muslims by the courts in Malaysia is descnbed by some authors as the Malayo-Islamic Law, see
Gordon,S; Preface in Ibrahini, 1965, p.2. For further discussions on this pomt see Chapter 1 pp
10-3.
2 Siraj, 1987.
Personal Conversation with Ustaz Abdul Aziz Mashuri, Judge of the Shana Court in August, 1993.
Siraj, 1983.
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erred in the education and training of women. Not teaching them about
their rights has led to the failure of them understanding the true
nature of the teachings of Islam.5
Generally speaking, it is possible to lay the blame on prevailing social
conditions - culture, custom, attitudes and ignorance of legal rights and
obligations. More specifically, it is clear that the weakness in the
system lies in the administration machinery - the structure, personnel,
powers and procedures of the Sharia Courts.6
Over the years, various efforts have been made to overcome these
problems. Reform in this regard is more difficult, as the matter falls
within the jurisdiction of the states and the prerogatives of the
Sultans, 7
 but a Committee has been set up to study and examine the
existing laws and study the feasibility of reforms, which, while keeping
the Islamic law in line with the principles laid down in the Qur'an and
Sunnah, will at the same time have regard for modern thinking and
also the changes affected in other Muslim countries. 8
 The effort which
began more than a decade ago is beginning to bear fruit. It has
introduced some changes designed to meet current needs and to
overcome pressing problems. The last few years have seen
developments that augur well for the administration of Muslim family
law in Malaysia.9
Some of the problems encountered in family law in Malaysia today lie
in the constitutional division of the jurisdiction between the Civil
See Esposito, 1982, p.50.
6 See Sira, 1987.
See Chapter 3.
8 See Ibrahun, 1984, p.11.
Siraj, 1987.
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Court and the Sharia Court. Recent changes to improve the
administration of Islamic law has brought new impetus of Islamic
reform in this multi racial country. The amendment of Art dc 121 of
the Federal Constitution, 1 ° in 1988 is a positive move towards
elevating the position of the Sharia Courts. The new Article 121 (1A)
provides that the courts referred to in Clause (1) of Article 121 (the
High Courts of Malaya) should have no jurisdiction in respect of any
matter within the jurisdiction of the Sharia Courts.
The important effect of the amendment is to avoid for the future any
conflict between the decisions of the Sharia Courts and the Civil
Courts which had occurred in a number of cases before.' 1 It frees the
Sharia Court from the Civil Court, thus lifting the standard of the
Sharia Court after long neglect during the British rule.' 2 Although
this seems to be the result, Ahmad Ibrahim suggests that there is a
need to amend or repeal other laws as well.13
Recently the Supreme Court decided in the case of Muhd Habibullah
v Faridah,' 4 that the Civil Court cannot interfere with matters which
fall under the jurisdiction of the Sharia Court. This important decision
has brought into legal effect the long-standing assertion that Islam is
the religion of the Federation.'5
10 Constitution (Amendment) Act 1988.
" See Myriam v Ariff [1971] 1 M.LJ 265; see also Roberts v Umi Kalthom [1966] 11 M.LJ 163;see
also Commissioner for Religious Affairs, Trengganu v Tengku Mariam [1970] 1 M.LJ 222; see
also Ibrahim, Ahmad bin Mohamed, The Amendment to Article 121 of the Federal Constitution:
Its Effect on Administration of Islamic Law, [1989] 2 M.LJ xvii-cxlvi.
12 Ibrahim, 1989, xvii.
13 See Ibrahim, Ahinad bm Mohamed, The Sharia Court in Malaysia, Eighth Malaysian Law
Conference, Kuala Lumpur, November 14-16, 1985.
14 [1992] 2 M.LJ 264.
15 Ibrahim, Ahmad bin Mohamed, Recent Developments of Islamic Family Law in Malaysia, paper
read at School of Onental and Afncan Studies (SOAS), London, January 1993.
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It is also necessary to free the Sharia Courts from any control by the
"Majlis Agama Islam" in each state. Recently in Kuala Lumpur, the
Sharia Court has been administered directly by the Prime Minister's
Department.' 6
 There is also a three tier court system in the Federal
Territory - The Sharia Subordinate Court, the Sharia High Court and
the Sharia Court of Appeal.' 7
 Steps have also been taken to improve
the professional competence of the judges in the Sharia Courts by the
institution of a course for the Diploma in Sharia Law and Practice at
the International Islamic University. There is a further proposal to
expand the course to cater the need for more qualified and well-
trained Sharia judges and practitioners.'8
The amendment discussed is just one way of improving the
administration of the law. Introducing legislation alone is not enough
to improve the administration of Muslim family law. Far more
important is the restructuring of the courts, the training of the
personnel, the upgrading of the position and powers of the qadhi or
Sharia court judge' 9 and the improvement of facilities.
Another matter that should be considered is the procedure of the
Sharia Courts and the law of evidence to be followed. Not enough
guidance was given to the judges of the Sharia Court and in most cases
the judges of the Sharia Court in Kuala Lumpur referred to the Rules
of the Subordinate Court and Rules of High Court under the civil
Personal conversation with Ustaz Mohamed bin Ibrahim, Registrar, Sharia Court, Federal
Territory of Kuala Lumpur, in March 1992.
17 See Administration of Muslim Law legislation for the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur.
18 STAR, April 21, 1988.
19 Qadhi draws a salary which does not commensurate with their position and responsibilities; Utusan
Malaysia, August 3, 1989.
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system. 2° According to a Supreme Court judge, for the purpose of
administering justice, procedure is very important, therefore it is
imperative that the Technical Committee gives due emphasis in this
area. He gave the example of Egypt, where the implementation of the
Personal Status under the Egyptian law was followed by the institution
of a Code of Procedure, with the exception of certain instances for
which special rules may be found in the Plan for the Regulation of the
Sharia Court of 1931.21
Kedah enacted the Islamic Civil Procedure Enactment of 1979 in
1984 22
 and Kelantan enacted the Sharia Civil Procedure Enactment in
1984 . 23
 Both these enactments appear to be based on the Subordinate
Court Rules and the Enactments have been followed with amendments
by the Committee set up in the Islamic Centre to draft a Sharia Civil
Code. The draft was followed in Sarawak, 24 and in Selangor.25
However, according to Ahmad Ibrahim, some defects have been found
in the laws especially with regard to trials in the Sharia Courts and it
is therefore necessary to have a new set of rules based on the Rules
of the High Court, 1980.26
20 Personal Conversation with Tan Sri Azmi Kamaruddin and Ustaz Mohammad Ibrahim, Registrar
of Sharia Court in August 1993.
21 Ibid.
22 No.2 of 1984.
No.5 of 1984.
24 Shana Civil Procedure Ordmance, 1991; No.7 of 1991.
No.7 of 1991.
Ibrahiin, Ahmad bin Mohamed, Islamic Law in Malaysia since 1972, m Developments m
Malaysian law - Essays to Commemorate the Twentieth Anniversary of the Faculty of Law,
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Pelanduk Publication, 1992, P.316.
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These improvements are in the process of being carried out and it is
hoped that it will be achieved in the near future. 27 But it should also
be recognised many problems stemming from the apparent inadequacies
and shortcomings are the consequence not of the fact that reforms
have been effected, but of the fact that some have not yet gone far
enough.28
6.2 LEGAL REFORMS TO PROTECT WOMEN
The religious and social equality of women with men is a theme well-
documented in the Qur'an. Although men and women are biologically
different, they stand equal before Allah. They have the same rights and
duties which come from the practice of religion. For example, like
men, women are also expected to render service (ibadat) to Allah.29
Equality is specifically affirmed in the area of divorce by the Qur'an
and the Sunnah. According to the Qur'an,
"... women shall have rights similar to the rights against them,
according to what is equitable. "30
While this verse recognizes equal rights of divorce for women, no
Quranic verse supports the licence of divorce presently awarded to
males.
In spite of changes in legislation in Kuala Lumpur to protect Muslim
wives, there is a widespread recognition of the need to overhaul
27 Siraj, 1989.
Personal conversation with Professor Tan Sn Datuk Ahmad Ibrahim, Head of Techmcal
Committee for Civil and Islanuc law, Januaiy 1993.
See Al Qur'an, Surah Al Imran: 194; see also Surah An Nisa': 7; see also Surah An NahI: 97.
30 Al Qur'an, Surah Al Baqarah :228.
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further the legal machinery involved in the granting of divorce decrees.
This study has shown that sex ratio of petitioners for divorce was
dependent on the terms of legislation. Predominance of women
initiating divorce in Kuala Lumpur reflects the fact that the LRA gave
non-Muslim women equal access to divorce. 31 By contrast, the IFLA
by a more complicated process of divorce for Muslim women has
effectively changed the sex ratio, 32 although there are more women
compared to men going to Unit Perunding dan Pembangunan Keluarga
for marital complaints.33
Variables other than legislation also come into play. Social pressure,
reflecting prevalent attitudes toward divorce, must have played a role
in encouraging or deterring men and women from filing for divorce.
These different attitudes also result from the way divorce pj . is
perceived by Muslims. 34 Several studies have shown that lack of
judicial supervision and ignorance of Muslim wives about their rights
have also contributed to capricious divorce.35
To counter Muslim men's abuse of their right of repudiation (talag),
reforms were introduced that restricted their exercise of talag, based
upon the Quran. A strong case can be made for establishing equal
divorce rights by taking away the male's extra-judicial rights of
repudiation, as well as equalizing the option to exercise divorce by
31 See Chapter 4, Table 4.01.
32 See Chapter 4, Table 4.02.
Laporan Unit Perunding dan Pembangunan Keluarga, 1990-1992, Jabatan Agama Wilayah
Persekutuan, 1992.
Hassan, 1986, see also Mahmood Tahir, The Muslim Law of India, 2nd ed. Allahabad, The Law
Book Co, 1982 p.95.
See Menski, Werner F, The Reform of Islamic Family Law and a Uniform Civil Code for India
in Mallat, Chibli and Connors, Jane (eds) in Islamic Family Law, London, Graham and Trotman,
1990 p.280. See also Othman, Junaidah bt. Talak Bain; Konse p dan Perlaksanaannya di Wilayah
Persekutuan, Academic Exercise, Islamic Academy, University of Malaya, 1990, p. 134; see also
Hassan, 1984, p. 238.
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requiring that all divorces be subject to the courts as has been done
in a number of Muslim countries. 36 The Qur'an and Sunnah, the
twofold support of the traditionally acknowledged material sources of
Islamic law, provide an Islamic rationale for legal reform in divorce.
As Shaykh Mahmud Shaltout said:
"Islam has not allowed divorce in order that a man may use
the threat of divorce as a sword which he waves in the woman's
life. On the contrary, Islam allows divorce as a bitter medicine
to be used by a man to cure a situation or get rid of an
association that defies remedy. Islam holds that if a man
trespasses on a woman's rights by divorcing her without cause,
he is abusing his power and is, therefore, liable to be held
responsible for committing a breach of duty. Islamic courts are
allowed to censure the man for misusing the right of divorce.
The law of Islam permits the woman to ask the courts of law
to look into her case... the court is authorised to order her to be
divorced if she is justified in her contentions and her husband
refuses to divorce her. "'
Whereas traditional Islamic law gives a Muslim male the unilateral
right of divorce, modern family law legislation subordinates his exercise
of this right to the jurisdiction of the courts.'This has been a very
contested area of reform. However, in all those jurisdictions, failure to
comply to the law does not render the divorce invalid but
The only exception to this process is Tunisia which declared an extra-
judicial divorce invalid. 39 The Tunisian law puts the wife in the matter
of divorce on an exactly equal footing, in theory with the husband.
36 In other countries like Turkey (1951), Tunisia (1956), Syria (1953), Iran (1967), Pakistan (1961),
Morocco(1958), and Iraq (1979), a husband desiring to divorce his wife has to apply to a court of
law. The laws of these countries are, however, not umform with regard to the circumstances in
which the court can honour the husband's wish to dissolve his mamage.
' Shaltout, Mahmud, Islamic Beliefs and Code of Laws, in Islam -The Straight Path: Islam
Interpreted by Muslims, edited by K.W Morgan, New York, Ronald Press, 1958, pp. 122-3.
38 See Esposito, 1982, pp.93-4.
See Tunisian Law of Personal Status, 1957, see also Esposito, 1982, p.94, see also Coulson, 1969,
p. 48.
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According to Coulson, for this revolutionary step, it is claimed that the
Qur'an itself provided the necessary authority, particularly Surah Al
Baqarah: 228.°
In Iran, it is also required that divorce be sanctioned only by civil
courts, with the aim of putting an end to the common practice of men
easily divorcing their wives against their wishes. 4 ' Shahla Sherkat,
editor of Zanan (women) magazine said that men are often able to
divorce their wives very easily. One of the reasons for this is that a
man in the workplace is more likely to meet the Head of a divorce
bureau, who is likely to be more sympathetic to the man than to the
woman. With the present law, it would not be that easy as the new law
states that officials who register a divorce without a civil court ruling
will be dismissed.42
In most Muslim countries, a husband may choose to ignore the reform
laws and exercise his traditional unlimited right of divorce, at the risk
of incurring imprisonment, a court fine or the payment of
compensation to his ex-wife. Reform legislation, therefore, has not
invalidated the traditional law but simply aimed to restrict it in certain
areas
The IFLA provisions on talag and ruju' appear to have gone a step
further than other measures in the Arab world with a few exceptions
in certain countries such as Tunisia, Iran and Somalia which have
provided for similar restrictive provisions with certain local variations.
° "And women have nghts similar to those that the men have over them."
In Iran, under Article 8 of the Family Protection Law of 1967, a certificate of "impossibility of
reconciliation" between the spouses must be obtamed from the court, before a divorce is effected
by a husband.
42 The Malay Mail, December 9, 1992.
° Esposito, 1982, p.94.
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The effect of the said provisions is that the husband no longer has an
arbitrary power to divorce his wife. 44 Section 124 of the Act
furthermore provides that any man who divorces his wife by the
pronouncement of talag in any form outside the court and without the
consent of the court commits an offence and shall be punished with
fine or imprisonment.45
Ustaz Abdullah Abu Bakar contended that the main question which has
to be considered in determining an application to divorce is whether
such divorce can be regarded as valid or otherwise by Hukum Shara'
and in line with the existing law in this country. If the divorce is valid
according to the Hukum Shara' and in line with the existing law, then
there is no problem. But the question which usually arises in the case
where an application for divorce is in line with Hukum Shara' but not
in compliance with the existing law. He believes that if such non-
compliance with the existing law does not concern the fundamental
elements, the court should recognise the validity of the divorce.
However, in any case, the court should declare a marriage or
dissolution void if it took place not in compliance with existing law and
in conflict with the Hukum Shara'.46
It is still common practice amongst men in Kuala Lumpur despite
having the said provision, to pronounce divorce without the permission
of the court. 47 They tend to ignore the provision and prefer to do it
privately without interference from third parties and are willing to pay
IFLA, section 47.
Datuk Abdul Hamid Othman, The Director General of the Islamic Religious Affairs Division,
states that before the laws were tightened, many husbands who divorced their wives had refused
to provide alimony and maintenance to their former wives; STAR, April 21, 1988.
Personal Conversation with Ustaz Abdullah Abu Bakar, Associate Professor, International Islamic
University, Petalrng Jaya, in March, 1992.
See Chapter 4 Table 4.37.
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the fines for doing so. The Registrar of the Sharia Court stated that
since the enforcement of the IFLA, an increase of 80 percent of the
court's revenue came from men who have contravened the said
provision. 48 The figure of 80 percent clearly shows that the provision
has not been successful in controlling the abuse of divorce in the
Muslim community in Kuala Lumpur. Ustaz Abdullah questions the
practicality of the said provision in the Malay-Muslim 49 community
and suggests that the rights to divorce remain with the husband but are
controlled by other means, that is to provide men with more religious
knowledge with emphasis on their responsibilities as head of the
family. 50 According to a report by the Lembaga Perancang dan
Pembangunan Keluarga Malaysia, besides transfering the right of
divorce from the Muslim husband to the court, education has also been
proven successful in decreasing capricious divorce in rural areas.5'
The Technical Committee for Sharia and Civil law has suggested that
a provision be made for the registration of such divorces but subject
to a penalty. 52 Mehrun Siraj stated that the fines for non-compliance
were relatively light (this has been true in most Muslim countries),
instead she suggested imprisonment to deter other men from
committing the same offence. 53 However, this view has been rejected
by the Registrar of the Sharia Court. He is of the opinion that
imprisonment would not solve the problem, but it would aggravate the
See note 16.
The Malay Muslim connotes a society which is more mfluenced by adat (custom) than by religion.
See note 49
51 Aziz, Datin Norlaily bt., et. a!, Kajian Tentang Perceraian Dalam Masyarakat Islam di
Semenanjung Malaysia,(Trengganu, Kelantan, Kedah, Perhs, Negen Sembilan dan Johor) Report
by Lembaa Perancang Keluarga Negara Malaysia, 1978.
52 Personal conversation with Haji Idris and Sheikh Ghazali Abdul Rahnian, members of the
Technical Committee of Shana and Civil law, January 1993.
Siraj, 1987.
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situation further as the men would not be able to maintain the family
during imprisonment.54
If a husband wishes to ruju' with his divorced wife the recohabitation
must take place by mutual consent. 55 It cannot take place unless the
fact of divorce has been disclosed by the husband to the wife.56
Therefore, in cases where the divorce has been pronounced without the
court's consent the husband cannot recohabit with his wife without
disclosing the fact of the divorce to her. The wife in exercising her
rights can refuse the ruju'on grounds allowed by the Hukum Shara'. In
this circumstances, therefore it is incumbent on the court to appoint
a reconciliatory committee to look over the case. 57 This section is
entrenched by section 131(1) which provides that any man having
lawfully divorced his wife, and resumes cohabitation with her without
having pronounced a lawful ruju' commits an offence and shall be
punishable under the Act. These sections on talag and ruju' have
categorically abolished traditional Shafi'i law and definitely deprived
a husband of his absolute rights of unilateral repudiation and ruju'.
As the Qur'an's primary legislative concern was the improvement of
women's status through the establishment and protection of her rights,
the main motivation behind modern Malaysian family reform should be
the uplifting of women's position. Malaysia could follow the example
of Iran in protecting women's rights. Iran's clerical leaders have
adopted a new divorce law granting unprecedented rights to women. It
See note 16.
IFLA, section 51 2).
56 IFLA, section 51 7).
IFLA, section 51 8).
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allows a woman to seek compensation through the courts for
housework her husband ordered her to do during the marriage.58
In the Indian sub-continent, and all those countries which were
formerly under British rule, the changes have been effected through
judicial decisions. 59
 It was by a series of judicial decisions that
Muslim wives in Pakistan have been given the right to a judicial
divorce on grounds which amount to incompatibility of temperament
or breakdown of marriage. In the case of Khurshid Bibi v Mohamed
Amin, 6° the Supreme Court, the highest judicial authority in Pakistan,
declared that Khurshid Bibi was entitled to a divorce upon returning
her dower to her husband. Thus, while the right of the man to
repudiate his wife has remained unaltered, the granting of a unilateral
khul' divorce to a woman in case of incompatibility represents
significant headway in achieving a balance of rights.61
Unfortunately, reforms in this area have had little effect in Malaysia.
According to the Shafi'i school of thought, it is not compulsory for her
husband to accept the compensation offered by his wife and give her
the divorce. His consent is, therefore, necessary and he cannot be
forced to give a khulu' divorce. 62
 With the adoption of Maliki schools
of thought on the grounds for divorce in the IFLA, 63 there is no
58 The Malay Mail, December, 9, 1992.
For further details on use of judicial decisions to reform the law, see Anderson, 1976, p.78.
60 (1967) P.L.D, S.0 97.
61 For further details see Anderson, 1976, pp.80-2.
62 See Taylor, E.N., "Mohammedan Divorce by Khula" (1948) J.M.B.R.A.S, Vol 21. Part 2; see also
Yaakob, Mohd. Akhir bin Khulu' dan Perlaksanaannya di Malaysia, (1983) J.H, 131.
63 See IFLA Section 52.
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reason why the same process should not be used in cases of khulu' so
as to give equal rights to women as elucidated in the Qur'an.64
Nevertheless, despite the obvious concern of the IFLA for the position
of the wife, the fact remained that the husband's established powers
could not be curtailed without his free consent in khulu'. According to
Coulson, reforms in the Middle East, by the use of administrative
regulations had succeeded in controlling the abuse of women's rights;
but the husband's basic rights of polygamy and repudiation remained
secure. Whatever restrictions social and economic factors might impose
upon their exercise, their mere existence under the law was sufficient
to constitute a formidable obstacle to a woman's real emancipation.65
It is obviously insufficient to attach blame to the judiciary for the
distortions without suggesting means whereby Muslim wives would be
better protected. 66
 Since education has been proved to have a
significant negative effect on divorce in Peninsular Malaysia, 67 the
right way forward would be to further educate women giving emphasis
on religious matters especially those in the rural areas. A legal literacy
campaign must be launched to educate women on laws that affect their
lives.
6.3 GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE UNDER ISLAMIC LAW
Legislation has been passed in several Muslim countries to correct
abuses68
 in Muslim society by granting women the additional Maliki
64 See note 4...
65 See Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, Edinburgh, University Press, 1964. pp.208-217.
See Menski, 1990, p.280.
67 See,Lee, Kok Huat, et.al., 1985.
For further details of these abuses see Anderson, 1976, p.39.
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grounds for divorce. 69 The juristic basis for this change was a doctrine
of takhayyur or selection suggested by Tahtawi as a reform method to
suit the need of modern times. This principle is an accepted method
of jurisprudence according to which a Muslim in a specific situation is
permitted to go outside his own personal school of law and follow the
interpretation from the remaining three Sunni schools.7°
The principle of takhayyur was adopted and used extensively by later
modernists. This principle has been progressively expanded in its scope.
In one country after another it has proved to be the major expedient
in legislation introduced to effect reforms in family law. 7' It has been
adopted in the Ottoman Family Rights Act which is the law applicable
to the Sunni Muslims of the Lebanon, followed by the laws of Syria,
Morocco, Iraq, Jordan, and Algeria.72
The legislators in enacting the IFLA besides adopting a collection of
various legislative enactments of the Middle East and Pakistan, used
this principle in departing from Shafi'i law73 in adopting the more
liberal and equitable teaching of the Maliki school in giving Muslim
women extended grounds for divorce.74
"The Malikis (who were the most liberal in this regard) allowed a wife to ground a petition on the
husband's cruelty, his refusal or inability to maintain her, his desertion, or his affliction with some
serious ailment which made the continuous of the marriage harmful to the wile"; Coulson, NJ.,
A History of Islamic Law, Edmburgh University Press, 1964, p. 185.
° Ibid., p.185; see also Anderson, 1976, p.51-2 see also Esposito, 1980, p.58.
71 Anderson, 1976, pp.51-8.
See Nasir, 1990, p.81.
' Buang, Ahmad Hidayat bin, Islamic Family Law: Reform in Malaysia with Special Reference to
the Islamic Family Law (Federal Terntoiy) Act 1984, Paper read at LL.M Seminar, School of
Onental and Afncan Studies, June 1989.
IFLA, section 52.
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There is also a provision to extend the interpretation to other schools
of thought, as long as it is considered valid for the dissolution of
marriage by fasakh in accordance with the Hukum Shara'. 75
 It is
noteworthy that the definition of Hukum Shara' as given in section 2,
refers to the laws of Islam in any of its recognised sects or schools.
The IFLA in this matter seems to have followed the original version
of the draft Bill presented by the Federal Council for Islamic religion
to the Council of Rulers. 76 Hukum Shara' in the draft Bill meant the
laws accepted by the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali and Shi'i
(Zaidiyya and Ja'fariyya) schools. 77
 The said provision could be
considered radical as it gives the gadhi power to use his own ijtihad.78
However, the provision in its actual practice has rarely been used by
Muslim women in Kuala Lumpur because of its complexity. 79 In most
cases, the man will initiate the divorce proceedings if the wife insists
on a divorce. 80
 And if the man refuses, the Unit Perunding dan
Pembangunan Keluarga will try to overcome this complication by
advising the husband to pronounce talag. If the husband after being
advised refuses to initiate the proceedings, only then will the wife
petition for a divorce. 8 ' A further device formulated by the law to
safeguard the wife's position was that of ta'lig. This study also shows
See IFLA, section 52(l).
76 Buang, 1989, p.20.
Ibrahim, Ahmad bin Mohamed, Islamic Law, Survey of Mala ysian Law, 1985, p. 243.
For further details on ijtihad, see Coulson, 1964, pp.60-129, see also Anderson, 1976, p32.
Personal conversations with Sharia' lawyers in the Federal Territory in December, 1992; see
Appendix IV.
80 Under the Malay custom, a man is considered less than a gentlemen if he does not divorce his
wife if she insist on it.
81 Personal conversation with Ustaz Wan Sulaiman, Head of the Unit Perundin dan Pembangunan
Keluarga, JAWI, April 1992.
443
that due to its less complicated process (as compared to fasakh), most
of the wives will resort to it.82
To protect the wife further, there is a provision in Egyptian and Iraqi
family law, that the wife must be informed if her husband takes
another wife, and she has the right to sue for divorce if she
disapproves of the marriage. 83 Furthermore, if a husband conceals
from his new wife that he is already married, this too will constitute
grounds for divorce by the new wife. 84 Under the Morrocan law, a
woman has the right to stipulate in the contract of marriage that her
husband should not take another wife, and if the husband does not
comply with this obligation, the wife retains the right to seek
dissolution of the marriage. 85 The Iranian Family Protection Act of
1967, which was then consolidated into the Family law of 1975 (now
abolished by the new regime since 1979) provided another approach to
protect the rights of a wife in a polygamous marriage. In addition to
requiring that a husband obtain judicial permission based upon proof
of financial competence and equal treatment, Article 2 required that
all marriage contracts include an irrevocable power of attorney to
enable a wife to divorce her husband if he should take another wife
without her consent. 86 Iran has mandated what was made optional in
other Muslim countries. 87 However, the Tunisian law of 1957 pursues
82 See Table 3.29.
83 Art.11a of Law 100, 1985, Egypt; see also Iraqi family law, 1959. see also El Alami, Dawoud S.,
The Marriage Contract in Islamic Law in the Shari'ah and Personal Status Laws of Egypt and
Morocco, Graham and Trotman, 1992, p.131.
See Article 45 of Iraqi Family Law; see also Esposito, 1980, p. 61.
85 See Book 1, Article 31, Moroccan Personal Status Code, 1957.
Article 2, Family Protection Act of Iran, 1967.
87 Esposito, 1982, p. 92-4.
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this notion to its extreme limit. 88 It prohibited polygamy89 on the
juristic basis, that the present day circumstances make it impossible for
the Quranic condition of equal treatment of co-wives 90 to be properly
fulfilled.91
The IFLA has not taken a great step forward in restricting polygamy,
giving special precedence to the first wife, and the right to seek
divorce where harm was caused to her by the second marriage. The
only control over polygamy is done through the Sharia Court where any
husband wishing to take on a second wife or subsequent wives must
obtain the written consent of a Sharia judge. 92 Consent will be
granted only if the court is satisfied that:
(a) the proposed marriage is just and necessary under the
circumstances. The circumstances which the Court will consider
include among others, sterility, physical infirmity, physical
unfitness for conjugal relations, or insanity on the part of the
existing wife or wives.
(b) that the applicant has the means to support all his wives and
dependents including the woman he proposes to marry and her
dependents;
(c) that the applicant will be able to treat all his wives equally;
Tahir Mahmood categorize this reform as "extra-doctrinal" in which the reformers are considered
as gomg beyond the limits of Islamic juristic opinion. Exercise of the power of remterpretation of
the basic legal prmciples (ijtihad) was, expresi!y or impliedly, made as the basis of such
exceptional reform; Mahmood, 1992, p.269.
89 Article 18, The Law of Personal Status of Tunisia, 1956.
It is evident from the Al Qur'an, Surah An Nisa':3 that polygamy is limited to a maximum number
of four, provided that the man could treat the wives with equality.
91 See Coulson, 1964, p. 210.
IFLA, section 23(1).
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(d) that the proposed marriage would not cause darar shar'i 93
 to
the existing wife or wives;
(e) that the proposed marriage would not directly or indirectly lower
the standard of living that the existing wife or wives and
dependants had been enjoying and would enjoy were the
marriage not to take place.94
A person who contracts a marriage in contravention of this section is
considered to have committed an offence under the IFLA punishable
with a fine of 1,000 Malaysian ringgit and/or imprisonment not
exceeding six months. 95
 However, the present wife or wives are not
entitled to use her husband's contravention of the law as grounds for
divorce.
If this provision is strictly enforced it would curtail the husband's
existing right in polygamy and in turn would protect the first wife's
interests and other women against the abuse of polygamy. Intensive
research in this area is therefore needed to see how far the existing
provision have come to the rescue of Muslim women in Kuala Lumpur.
In Pakistan, the Dissolution of Marriages Act of 1939, although
supposedly following Maliki law, had in several important instances
ignored Maliki doctrine concerning the grounds for divorce. Unlike
similar Egyptian legislation, which generally adhered to Maliki doctrine
concerning grounds for divorce, the Pakistan law has failed to include
the detailed procedures for arbitration in cases of desertion and
cruelty. From a traditional juristic point of Pakistan's law of 1939
arbitrarily deviated from Maliki opinion and Egyptian legislation by
Section 2 defmes "harm according to what is normally recognised by Islamic law affecting a wile
in respect of religion, life, body, mind or property". See proposed defmition in Appendix II.
94 IFLA, section 24.
IFLA, section 25.
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prescribing divorce by judicial decree (fasakh) rather than judicial
repudiation (talag). This deviation is significant not only because of
change in the date that the divorce becomes effective. A divorce by
fasakh takes effect immediately, but in divorce by talag does not take
effect until the expiry of the wife's 'iddah. Therefore, in a divorce
involving maintenance under the Egyptian legislation, a reconciliation
is possible if during the 'iddah period the husband shows that he is
willing and able to maintain his wife, whereas Pakistan's law does not
allow such a reconciliation. 96
 This is especially noteworthy since the
Maliki doctrine is based on a Quranic injunction.97
The All- Pakistan Women's Association continued to press for further
reform in marriage and divorce and proposed that in accordance with
the Quranic sayings notice of the intention of divorce should be given
to the authorities before the actual divorce notice, to improve the
chance of avoiding divorce. Furthermore, the wife should stay in her
husband's home during her 'iddat so that by remaining together they
may have a better chance of reconciliation.98
The Ordinance of 1961 remedied this deficiency by involving the
Arbitration Council for all cases of divorce. 99
 In order to discourage
the husband from hasty exercise of the husband's right of talag, this
reform legislation required written notice to the Chairman as well as
to the wife.'°° A ninety waiting day period is stipulated during which
the Council will attempt to reconcile the couple.'°' The divorce take
Esposito, 1982, p.97.
See Al Qur'an, Surah An Nisa':35.
Esposito, 1982, p.86.
Section 80.
100 Section 7 (1).
101 Section 7.4.
447
effect only when the ninety day period has expired or, if the wife is
pregnant, when the baby has been born.' 02 Although failure to follow
the above procedures can result in a fine and or imprisonment, the
penalties are relatively light. 103 Thitogether with the fact that failure
to comply with the regulations regarding the Arbitration Council does
not invalidate the divorce, has diminished its effectiveness.104
Although non-Muslims in seeking divorce (other than mutual consent)
must appear before a conciliatory body before they can petition for
divorce, this requirement is not mandatory under the IFLA. However,
in accordance with the Muslim law, the qadhi handling the case can
refer the couple to the Conciliatory Committee in which two close
relatives who have knowledge of the circumstances of the case are
usually chosen as members of the committee.'°5
It is interesting to note that under the Malay custom in Negeri
Sembilan, a husband who contemplates divorce must go through the
arbitration called bersuarang.'° 6 This process is in line with the
settlement of marital disputes as recommended in the Qur'an,'° 7 and
the IFLA should therefore move along those lines in settling disputes.
Arbitration Councils should be established and, following the spirit of
102 Section 7.3 and 5.
103 Section 7 (2).
'°' Esposito, 1982, p.85.
105 See IFLA, section 47.
106 A small feast is held by the husband, to which he mvites the relatives of his wife as well as his
own. The husband will then state his grievances, so that they may be considered by the parties
present. The elders of the family will try to reconcile the parties but if this fails, the divorce will
be allowed after agreement as to the disposal of the conjugal property, Ah, Haji Mohamed Din
bin, "Two Forces m Malay Society", Intisari, p.24.
See Al Qur'an, Surah An Nisa':35.
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the Quran, representatives of the involved parties (husband and wife)
should be its members.'°8
6.4 REFORM OF THE LRA
Section 47 of the LRA provides that "the court in all suits and
proceedings in Malaysia should act and give relief on principles which
in the opinion of the court are, as nearly as may be, conformable to
the principles on which the High Court of Justice in England acts and
gives relief in matrimonial proceedings." The value of this section has
been questioned often enough and it is encouraging to find Shankar J.
in the case of In re Divorce Petition Nos. 18. 20 and 24 of 1983109
articulating the belief that provision like section 47 "may create far
more problems than it solves". The learned judge pointed out that;
"unlike section 5 of the Civil Law Act 1956 which only imports
the application of English law in certain matters as it stood on
April 7th, 1956, section 47 of the Act has no limitation. It must
therefore be read in a contemporaneous context and if applied
must refer to the corresponding position in England today."
The learned judge examined the principles on which the High Court of
Justice in England acts and gives relief in petitions for divorce. He
seemed to agree with "juristic comment" in England that "the special
procedure has resulted in a spiralling of divorce". He then asks, "Are
we going the same way?" concluding finally with the comment that
perhaps the time has come for omitting from the Malaysian legislation
provisions that are likely to give rise to uncertainty and confusion not
only in the application and the interpretation of Malaysian law but also
in deciding which English laws are or are not applicable.
Ishak, Othnian bm, Hubun gan Antara Undang-undang Islam dan Undang-Undang Adat, Kuala
Lumpur, Dewan Bahasa Dan Pustaka, 1979, p.129.
109 [1984] 2 M.LJ 158.
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This call for the repeal of section 47 of the LRA could well be
extended to section 3 and 5 of the Civil Law Act, 1956. This section
should be amended to sever the connection with English law. The
Malaysian law of divorce must break out of the chains imposed by
history and the adoption of the English common law. Section 47 is in
itself too restrictive. Malaysia is in Southeast Asia, not western
Europe. Since 1972, the United Kingdom has been a member of the
European Community (now Union), a fact tending increasingly to bring
its legislation into line with that of its European colleagues. As rightly
put by Hickling, "to remain tied to the apron strings of Mother
England is unlikely to be good for the future of Malaysian law."1°
What is important is the quest for justice. However, if amendment is
to be made, a suitable model is desirable. The LRA must be
interpreted in Malaysian terms. In cases where no provision of the Act
is applicable, local customs shall apply and if there is no such
provision, the case shall be decided "by the general principles of the
law." General principles of law should be interpreted in a wider sense,
the judges would be free to range through the legal systems of the
world in order to extract an acceptable solution and not to be fettered
by any one system.
6.5 REFORM OF THE GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE UNDER THE LRA
6.5.1 Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage
Acceptance of the breakdown of marriage as sole grounds for divorce,
discarding the traditional fault-oriented grounds has been a radical
change towards the reformation of divorce law for non-Muslims in
Malaysia . 1U
 The LRA in this sense has put Malaysia at par with the
law in England.
110 Hickling, R.H, Malaysian Law, Kuala Lumpur, Professional Law Books Publishers, 1988, p.144.
Ibrahim, 1987, p.78.
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Unfortunately, the breakdown theory in its actual working in England
has not achieved its objectives.' 12 Since the Malaysian Royal
Commission on Non-Muslim Marriage and Divorce Laws adopted the
objectives of the Royal Commission in England, that is "the object of
reform should be to enable the empty shell of a marriage to be
destroyed with the maximum fairness and the minimum of bitterness,
distress and humiliation"," 3 the adoption in a different culture has
brought failure as well.
Section 54(1)(a) of the LRA read together with Section 58 seems to be
inconsistent with the objectives of the LRA as adultery is still being
singled out as a matrimonial offence. By reason of the fact that the
parties are unable to obtain a divorce by mutual consent under Section
52, they or one of them, will be compelled to apply for a divorce under
section 54 where one of the four facts will have to be proved; in order
that the court may then arbitrate on the ancillary issues. This will
result in protracted and expensive divorce proceedings when in
actuality the dispute is only over ancillary matters."4
The interpretation problems which have confronted the English courts
are also causing similar difficulties in Malaysia." 5 We have also
noticed how in English law the problem of interpreting "adultery" and
intolerability has raised complications. 116
 All these problems are due
to the fact that LRA, as pointed out by Ahmad Ibrahim, still retains
112 In its review of the current law in England, the Law Commission argued that it does not serve to
promote its intended objectives Law Commission (1988a) Facing the Future: A Discussion paper
on the Grounds for Divorce, Law Corn No 170, London, HMSO; see also Law Commission
(1990a) The Ground for Divorce Law Commission, No. 192, London, HMSO.
113 See Law Commission, "The Field of Choice', 1966, para 15, London, H.M.S.O.
1i4 Khoo, 1992.
115 See Chapter 3.
116 See Chapter 3.
451
the remnants of the old law. He pertinently questions why the
requirement of desertion for the continuous period of at least two
years is still retained when it is possible for the parties to show that
the marriage has broken down where they have lived apart for the
continuous period of at least two years. According to him, all this
complication arises because the Malaysian reformers have simply
followed or rather imported the English divorce law.117
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the law in England has been
successful in "taking the heat out of disputes." According to Cretney,
the weakness or the drawback lies in the fact that the law incorporates
the former grounds of divorce based on the notions of matrimonial
guilt. These notions were used to prove marriage breakdown." 8 The
Law Commission stated that the retention of fault grounds prevents
both the speedy termination of dead marriages and may aggravate
rather than reduce bitterness and humiliation."9
H.A Finlay of Australia has said:
"... If the great majority of divorces, even where ostensibly
based on fault, are in reality the outcome of agreement, active
or passive, between the spouses, and if the selection of fault is
merely a means of fitting that agreement into the system, it
makes a mockery both of the law and all its institutions. "120
The general assumption based on comparative experiences, that the
grounds for divorce are not efficient tools for diminishing the divorce
rate does not imply that family stability does not have a value for
family members and indirectly for society as a whole. On the contrary,
" Ibrahim, Ahmad bin, Law Reform and Divorce Bill, (1975) J.M.C.L 354.
118 Cretney, S.M., Principles of Family Law, 4th ed., London,Sweet and Maxwell, 1984, p. 214-217.
119 Law Commission (1988a), para 3.22 - 3.27, (1990a), para 2.16; see also Booth, 1985, para 2.10.
(1972) 46 Aust. U. at 546.
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stable and happy families are of the utmost importance for the next
generation. The question is whether such stability can be promoted by
legal means.
In the past the factor given emphasis in most countries were the
grounds for divorce and on the importance of preserving the existing
family. These days, when there is a high divorce rate in most countries,
it has become clear that the conditions for divorce offer very limited
possibilities for preserving a marriage.' 21 If one spouse is determined
to get a divorce, he or she will obtain it one way or the other.'22
Agell suggests that there are five stages in the development of grounds
for divorce in the civil and the common law countries.' 23
 In the first
stage is the acceptance of breakdown of the marriage as grounds for
divorce, along with different forms of "fault" by one spouse. The
second stage consists of the acceptance of marriage breakdown as the
sole grounds for divorce, although some countries such as England
have retained the aspect of fault. A third stage is to relax the
requirements for proving that the marriage has really broken down
permanently. 124 The fourth stage in the liberalisation process is the
acceptance of unilateral divorce that an application by one spouse is
considered sufficient proof of marriage breakdown. The fifth stage is
even more liberal in that it consists of the acceptance of unilateral
121 Rheinstem, 1972; see also Goode, 1970, P. 27.
Those who were fmancially able to do so could go to another country, obtain citizenship, get a
divorce, and then return to their own country Sgritta. G.B, and Tufary, P. Italy, in R.Chesler (ed),
Divorce m Europe, Leiden, Martmus Nijhoff, 1977, pp.253-81.
123 Agell, Anders, Grounds and Procedures Review in Mavis Maclean and Lenore Weitzman (eds),
Economic Conse quences of Divorce: The International Perspective, Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1992.
In Italy, the period of separation in 1987 was decreased from five to three years ibid.
453
divorce withaout any reference to marriage breakdown, the desire of
one spouse to terminate the marriage being sufficient.'25
According to Agell, the most industrialised countries will continue
changing their legislation until they reach the fourth stage or the fifth.
Separation is in many countries claimed as evidence of permanent
breakdown of the marriage, but only if it occurs before the application
for divorce. 126 If the spouses obtain divorce after living apart for a
very long period in order to show permanent breakdown of the
marriage, this shows only that the legislature has tried in vain to save
a dead marriage.'27
Agell is of the opinion that the law should contain only one sole
ground for divorce, and the desire of a spouse to terminate the
marriage should be respected. 128 It was also unanimously greed that
there should be some period of reconsideration, the length of which
can be discussed, between an application for divorce and the issuance
of a divorce decree. It was also stressed that it should not be necessary
to claim that the spouses lived apart during the transitional period.'29
The English Law Commission in 1988 appeared to consider not only
that the radical solution would be unacceptable to public opinion,'30
125 Sweden since 1974, see Agell, 1992, p.55.
126 Agell, 1992, p.56.
127 In Italy, a minimum of five years' separation was made a prerequisite for divorce, and some types
of cases the period was seven years Goode, 1970, p.26.
Cretney stated that such a scheme has strong logical attractions, but argued whether it would be
acceptable to public opinion. He suggests that a divorce law whereby divorce was made available,
on proof of the breakdown after one year of marriage (which according to him is similar to the
system of j .g) would be strongly opposed in England Cretney, 1984, 5.09, p.52.
129 Agell, 1992, p37.
As stated in Stage 5.
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but also that the Commission itself had a role in influencing public
opinion and should not endorse the attitude that divorce is a very easy
way to end a marriage. According to the Commission divorce should
not only be based on the desire of one spouse but also on an
irrebuttable presumption that an application for divorce means that the
marriage has broken down permanently.'3'
A close examination of the trends towards reforms of divorce law in
contemporary society reveal that it has, perhaps unconsciously,
marched in the direction of the fifth stage. This development without
undue exaggeration, has similarities to the principle of shiqag'32
under the Islamic law. This principle is enshrined in the Qur'an.'33
Neither in the Qur'an or the Hadith are the grounds for divorce
enumerated. This shows that Qur'an does not limit the causes to
specified cases. However, the qadhi has the necessary authority to
dissolve the marriage on various grounds.' 34 These are specific causes
which are not regarded as "shiqag".
Hussein suggests the use of shiqag (which is quite similar to the fifth
stage) as grounds for divorce in place of breakdown in marriage in the
LRA. This method has managed to settle complications (brought upon
by the former grounds, that is breakdown of marriage) in its
application in Pakistan. The courts in Pakistan while handling the
principle of shiqag have unequivocally ruled that procedural
technicalities cannot become a hindrance in separating the spouses who
cannot observe "the limits of God". They have also declared that a
131 Law Commission, Grounds for Divorce Law Comnnssion No. 170, London, HMSO, 1988.
132 Shigaci means discord and conflict between the spouses of such a serious nature that the bond of
mamage is strained to a breaking point; Ahmad, 1972, p.232.
133 If you (judges) do mdeed fear that they would be unable to keep the limits ordained by Allah,
there is no blame on either of them..." Surah Al Bagarah:229.
134 See Chapter 4 pp.34-40.
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judge will consider whether the rift between the parties is a serious
one though he may not consider the reasons for the rift.135
6.5.2 Conversion to Islam
The other grounds for divorce in Malaysia under the LRA are those
of conversion to Islam.' 36 This provision has caused a lot of
difficulties in its implementation since it is difficult to see how the
court can make a decree or order against a Muslim, to whom the Act
does not apply.' 37 This section deprives the converting party of any
remedies under the civil law, as he can neither apply under section 51
nor under section 53 as the Act' 38 does not apply to Muslims.
Neither can the converting party have recourse to the Sharia Courts as
the Sharia Court has no jurisdiction where one party (the non-
converting party) is not a Muslim.
Therefore, the party who has converted seems to be seen as the party
at fault, and he is punished by not only giving his or her spouse a right
to petition for divorce against him or her but also by depriving the
party who converted to Islam of the right to put an end to his or her
marriage which has clearly been broken.
According to Ahmad Ibrahim, in a statute which purported to make the
breakdown of marriage the sole ground of divorce, it seemed odd that
section 51 had been included. The provision seems to revive the
outmoded fault principle, in that one of the parties has been given the
right to petition for divorce because of the fault committed by the
other party, in this case the conversion to Islam. He suggested that a
135 Hussein, SJ, Mamage Breakdown under the LRA and in Islam: A Comparative View, Law
Seminar, International Islamic University, 1987.
' See Chapter 2 pp.45-9.
137 See Chapter 2 pp.45.
With the exception of section 51.
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better approach to the problem would have been to regard the
conversion of one of the parties to Islam as evidence that the marriage
had broken down and to give both the parties to the marriage the right
to petition for divorce.'39
Although this study shows that the grounds of conversion have very
little effect on the overall divorce trend, it is submitted that a more
just result would be achieved if section 5 1(1) be amended, as suggested
by Ahmad Ibrahim.'4°
The need for this amendment is even more desirable because at
present, if the non-converting party does not apply for dissolution
under section 51, the converting spouse will be precluded 141 from
benefitting from orders for ancillary relief which the court may make
subsequent upon dissolution under section 51(2).
On the other hand, for the Muslims in the case of renunciation of
Islam, the situation is rather different. Section 46 of IFLA provides
that renunciation of either party of lslam does not operate to dissolve
the marriage unless and until so confirmed by the court. Section 130
of IFLA, in addition provides that any person who dislikes his or her
spouse and by deception makes him or herself an apostate in order to
annul his or her marriage, commits an offence and shall be punished.
This provision was probably taken from the Indian Dissolution of
Muslim Marriage Act of 1939, section 4 which provides that the
renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman or by her
139 Ibrahim, Ahmad bin Mohamed, The Need to Amend Section 51 of the Law Reform (Marriage
and Divorce) Act, 1976, [1990] M.LJ 1 viii.
140 See Appendix I on proposal of reform in this area.
141 LRA, section 3(3).
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conversion to a faith other than Islam shall not by itself operate to
dissolve her marriage. The Indian Act, however, was designed to
protect the position of the husband rather than the wife. This is to
avoid the practice commonly occurred in India where many Hanafi
wives dissolved their marriages by resorting to apostasy.
6.5.3 Mutual Consent
Section 52 of the LRA also provides for divorce by mutual consent.
Although this form of divorce is alien to the English divorce law on
which the Act is based, it is not novel to Malaysia. It is interesting to
note that this provision is taken from the Matrimonial Causes
Ordinance of Sarawak.'42
Early in the twentieth century, several Americans also began to support
a radical plan to soften the divorce process by replacing adversarial
divorce with no-fault divorce. No-fault divorce laws are seen to reflect
the new egalitarian attitude toward divorce which has effectively
replaced moral responsibility.143
Jessie Bernard predicted that this no-fault divorce would remove the
last vestiges of stigma from divorce in America. She foresaw
independence for women who were increasingly able to support
themselves after divorce because of "spectacular" employment trends.
And drawing upon studies showing that children fared better after
divorce than in a disintegrating marriage, she foresaw stable mental
health for children of divorce.'44
142 Section 7, Matrimomal Causes Ordinance of Sarawak (Cap.94).
143 Riley, 1991, pp.'6'-168.
144 Bernard, Jessica, "No News, but New Ideas," m Paul Bohannan, (ed.) Divorce and After, New
York, 1970, p. 3-25.
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This study shows that due to the change in the philosophy of the law
with its emphasis on no-fault, mutual consent is and will continue to
be very popular, especially among childless couples or couples with
very few children in Malaysia.'45
No-fault divorce did bring about a number of significant alterations in
American divorce as it did in Malaysia. It changed the concept of
divorce from a punishment of an offending spouse to a "remedy for
situations which are unavoidable and unendurable." And, although no-
fault divorce law attempts to pressure marriages when possible, it
provided relief to dissatisfied spouses on non-judgemental grounds'46.
Unfortunately, no-fault divorce also had some destructive effects. As
early as 1973, the author of a women's divorce manual noted that
although no-fault divorce had been "hailed as the welcome end" to
finding one party guilty and the other "a paragon of virtue" it might
also bring "irremediable breakdown of the marriage institution." 147
Research done by Weitzman shows how legal reform laid down to
eliminate the bitterness of divorce themselves has created new pain
and hardships for divorced women and their children. The result of
this egalitarian approach in California,' 48
 is that a woman can expect
a 73% drop in disposable income one year after divorce, while her ex-
husband experiences a 42% increase.' 49
 It was apparent that no-fault
145 See Chapter 4.
Ginnow, Arnold 0. and Nilcolic, Milorad, Corpus Juris Secundum: A Contemporary Statement
of American Law as derived from Reported Cases and le gislation, St. Paul, 1986, p.36.
first, Barbara B., Divorce: What a Woman Needs To Know Chicago, Chicago University Press,
1973, pp.72-3.
' The pioneer of no-fault divorce in America.
Weitzman, Lenore J., The Divorce Law Revolution and the Illusion of Equality: A View from the
United States, in Essays in Family Law, Current Legal Problems, M.D.A Freeman (ed), 1986,
London, p.84.
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provisions contributed to the poverty of growing numbers of women
and children in the United States.' 5° Work done by Riley also
demonstrate that no-fault divorce worked against many divorcing
women during the 1980s, especially if they possessed little education,
job-skills, and work experience and received custody of several minor
children. Non-fault divorce exposed a growing trend toward women's
loss of custody of young children, wives' lack of redress for husband's
adultery and defection from the marriage, and the failure of judges to
offset women's low earnings with proportional property settlements.15'
The crucial weakness in no-fault divorce according to Maler
undermines "bargaining position of a dependent spouse" because the
court has the power to determine "support and maintenance awards on
the basis of demonstrated need and merit rather than on a mate's
guilt." He concluded that this practice could be unfair in its impact in
a particular case and was a "small price to pay for an honest system
of determination."152
During the 1980s, experts tried to answer this question-how had
legislators adopted no-fault divorce without any searching analysis of
what it would mean for women and children.' 53
 Sociologist Lenore
Weitzman explained that creators of no-fault divorce laws had intended
to establish norms for property settlements and alimony based on the
concept of wives as full economic partners and failed to realise that
'5° Ibid.
'' Riley, 1991, pp.167-8.
152 Maler, Michael, Divorce and Annulment in the Fifty States, New York, 1975, p.99.
153 For an answer to this query, see Jacob, Herbert, Silent Revolution: The Transformation of Divorce
laws in the United States, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1988.
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no-fault provisions would have dire economic consequences for many
divorcing women.154
Weitzman's work, which draws on a ten year scientific study, is a
timely reminder for the Malaysian reformers to reexamine the law on
mutual consent. Will it be responsible for similar impoverishment? So
far, the impact of mutual consent is unknown but there is on-going
research 155 of the kind pursued by Weitzman's. If it brings negative
results, perhaps we could improve the law and continually review the
machinery to ensure that it will bring justice to all those who seek for
it.
6.6 THE FAMILY COURT
The cost of marriage breakdown and divorce is higher than it need be
and is paid in terms of the pain of the families concerned. The
progressive reform and simplification of divorce legislation in Malaysia,
especially the recognition of de facto breakdown and the de-emphasis
on matrimonial fault, should make the dissolution of marriage less
painful. Although the LRA has radically overhauled the divorce law,
there has not been any reform as regards to the institutions which have
to administer it. It is still based on a judicial system which has as its
basis the traditional adversarial model of the Common Law. Without
any reforms in this area, existing courts together with their time
consuming and archaic procedures will continue to dispose off the
sensitive and delicate issues involved in family disputes. This matter
should be considered especially since the forerunners of the adversary
court system have established beyond doubt that existing traditional
Weitzman, 1985, pp357-376.
155 Research is being undertaken by Professor S. Jaffer Hussein, Kulliyyah of Laws, International
Islamic University.
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courts and adversary procedures are inappropriate as a suitable dispute
settlement body in family matters.
It has been suggested from many quarters that the present adversary
process has outlived its usefulness.' 56 In fact, the adversarial based
legal system has added to the tension and distress among the estranged
spouses.' 57 Not only are the present traditional procedures and
practices inadequate to deal with the present problems, they also
impair possibilities of reconciliation. Family disputes thus necessarily
require a far more humane approach. Immediate action is needed to
ensure that resources are applied to provide assistance to family
members in resolving their disputes in a dignified and inexpensive way.
Appropriate legal representation and other support services should be
made available to all those whose interests may be affected by any
dispute. These procedures should not be mixed up by the complexities
of the current practices, but should be simple, speedy and inexpensive
so as to constitute a guarantee for justice. This requires the
development of new techniques and procedures for the resolution of
marital disputes. There is a vital need for informal, flexible, and
investigative procedures directed to the adjustment of the family as a
whole.158
156 See Siraj, 1989; see also Khoo, 1992; see also Suppiah, Komathy; The Need for Family Courts
under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, Academic Exercise, Faculty of Law,
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1982.
157 See Hussein, 1986, p.6O; see also Fnedmann, W., Law in a Changing Society, Pelican Books,
Harmondsworth, 1964.; see also Pearson J and Thoeness N, Divorce Mediation: An American
Picture in Divorce Mediation and the Le gal Process, Dingwall R. and Eekelaar, J., Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1988, p.71.
158 Growmg dissatisfaction with the adversanal nature of divorce and the conflict resulted by it, and
concern about the effects of divorce on children has prompted the growth of conciliation in
Britam see Parkinson L., Conciliation and Separation in Divorce: Fmding Common Ground,
London, Croom Helm, 1986, pp 1-9.
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The Law Reform Commission in Canada suggested that the elimination
of the fault concept, without simultaneous changes in procedures and
practices reflecting a less adversarial approach, cannot eradicate
present problems. 159 Due to the same problems in Malaysia,
techniques, therefore must be devised to encourage spouses in conflict
to have early recourse to counselling and conciliation facilities. In fact,
the Law Commission of England report on the financial consequences
of divorce urged that "everything possible should be done to encourage
recourse to conciliation instead of litigation."160
Family courts have been set up in the United States for some time,
and have also been introduced in Australia, England and New Zealand
to fulfil these needs. 16 ' In the United States, family courts are
frequently seen as fulfilling a therapeutic role. In England, the family
court is seen as an institution which will improve the present
overlapping system, which has many weaknesses and defects. It is set
to improve the machinery and services which are available to deal
realistically with the practical problems resulting from marriage
breakdown. 162 Family courts also existed in Japan before the Second
World War and clearly benefited a large number of Japanese.'63
In advocating the establishment of a family court in Hawaii, the
Commission on Children and Youth stated that;
159 Canada, Law Reform Commission, Working Paper No. 1: The Family Court, 1974, p.12.
160 Law Commission, Family Law The Consequences of Divorce, London, H.M.S.O, 1981.
161 See Brown, The Legal Background to the Family Court [1966] BJ Crim 139, USA; The Family
Law Act 1975, Section 21, Australia, The Family Courts Act 1980, Section 4, New Zealand.
162 Finer M, Report of the Committee on One-Parent Families, Cmnd 5629, London. HMSO 1974,
para 4.281, p.173.
163 Minamikata, Satoshi, Kaj i Chotei: Mediation m the Japanese Family Court, in Divorce Mediation
and the Legal Process, Robert Dingwall and John Eekelaar, (eds), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988,
p.116.
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"An effective family court dealing with children and families
would need comprehensive jurisdiction, a full-time judge who
can become a specialist, procedures which are relatively
informal and directed towards determining the best disposition
or adjustment of the family situation while protecting the
interests of individual members, sufficient and competent
probation and other social services; availability of medical,
psychiatric and psychological services as required, adequate
detention facilities and shelter care facilities for the temporary
and emergency care of children awaiting disposition. In
addition, such courts require the co-operation of other local
and state agencies and the understanding and support of the
general public. "164
The suggestions advocated above by the Hawaiian Commission are
quite relevant in Malaysia, which is in need of specialist judges,
informal procedures and social services to cater for the present needs
of Malaysian society. The importance of family law in this country
undeniably justifies the creation of specialist courts and it would be
seen as a valuable step in adapting traditional courts and procedures
to the needs of the times.'65
The creation of a family court using divorce mediation is widely
canvassed in Malaysia as the answer to many of the present difficulties
in settling disputes at divorce.' 66 It is the most logical first step to
meet the pressing needs and also an important condition for further
legal reform. In general terms, the advantages of a family court would
be two fold. First, it would overcome the present problem of lack of
specialisation in the Malaysian courts to deal exclusively in family
matters. Secondly, a family court would substitute the traditional
Commission on Children and Youth, State of Hawaii, Report No.28 (1964).
165 The creation of the Family and Property Division in the Selangor High Court in 1971 can be seen
as a step in this direction. Although this division has exclusive jurisdiction over family and property
matters, however archaic procedures continue to be used. Improvement stops at specialization.
' See Siraj, 1989, see also Khoo, 1992, see also Komathy, 1982.
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adversarial model and place much greater emphasis on conciliation.'67
In Malaysia, as in most other countries, the family is regarded as the
basic sociological, economic and one of the bases on which modern
society has evolved. Its fundamental role in society surely justifies the
creation of a specialist system of family courts to cater its needs.
The traditional notion of a family court as described in the broad
outline in the Law Society's 168
 proposal, and as can be seen in some
American, Canadian, and Australian models, include the idea of an
institution that is judicial. In addition, it includes the use of such
techniques as specialist judges, professional staff, modifications in
rules, and physical designs more adapted to the needs of family law
adjudication.
Supporters of the family court movement advocate that a system which
operates informally and flexibly, simply, and speedily combines the best
in terms of fairness, efficiency, accessibility, and economy.'69
However, there is a need to unify and rationalise the various
procedures, remedies, and jurisdictions in the field of family law
Szwed believes that the main aim of any family court system should be
the unification and uniformity of law and procedures if the intention
is the provision of a service that is flexible, consistent, efficient,
accessible, and fair.17°
167 A family court would substitute the accusatorial system with a more diagnostic and therapeutic
process, more appropriate for family dispute settlement; Horgan, D.T, "Family Court; The Need
and the Obstacles" (1976), 27 Northern Ireland Law Review 123.
Law Society, A Family Court: Consultation Paper, London, Law Society, 1985.
169 See Booth, Mrs Justice, Report of the Matrimonial Causes Procedure Committee, 1985, pp.17-23,
see also Law Commission, The Ground for Divorce, Law Com. No. 192, London, HMSO, 1990.
Szwed, Elizabeth, The Family Court in The State, The Law and the Famil y - Critical Perspectives,
M.D.A Freeman (ed), London, Tavistock, p.270.
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The concept of a specialist family court with its specialised full-time
judge, seems to indicate that the family court judge should be resident
and adjudicate exclusively in the family court. There are clear benefits
to this but less obvious are the potential disadvantages. In British
Columbia even judges with an interest in family court work expressed
the need for a break from time to time, and preferred not to be
restricted to only family cases.'71
A lawyer, Ronald Khoo, said that the specialist judges at the family
courts, if set up, could make appropriate decisions to promote family
well-being in the long run. He said that a mediation process involving
a third party would encourage the disputants to find a mutually
agreeable settlement and added that with a family court, cases could
be resolved faster.'72
The Chief Oadhi of the Sharia Court also agreed with the
establishment of a family court coupled with a family court welfare
service. The functions of the latter would include the provision of a
service specifically concerned with conciliation. However, the provision
of a court conciliation service is not dependent on the establishment
of a family court. The conciliation service that is envisaged would exist
side by side with the legal structure. Whereas the function of the
courts is judicial, the main purpose of the conciliation service would
be to help individuals and couples to sort out their views, attitudes and
feelings, make decisions which are most beneficial to the mental and
emotional health of themselves, their spouses and their children, and
begin to adapt themselves to the implications of those decisions.'73
171 See Amren B and Mac Leod, F The British Columbia Unified Family Court Pilot Proiect 1974
to 1977: A Descritpions and Evaluations, Victona, B.C, Information Servics, 1979.
172 Khoo, 1992.
' Personal conversation with the Chief Kathi of the Sharia Court, Federal Territory of Kuala
Lumpur, December, 1992.
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High Court Judge Datuk Faiza Thamby Chik agreed with the
establishment of a family court to speed up the disposal of cases under
the LRA. However, with the proposal for a Court of Appeal under
serious consideration, he doubted that a suggestion for yet another
branch of the Judiciary would be taken up soon.174
In addition, it is also recommended that special halls be provided so
that each divorce could be discussed privately, thus guaranteeing
"secrecy and safety" to the family involved. This would counteract the
traditional argument opposing the handling of divorce cases in court
because it would expose private family problems to public view.175
Datuk Nafsiah 0mar 176 added that a family court should be set up
to hold divorce hearings. However, this and other family-related issues
should not be open to the public as they are personal.' 77 The family
court should have a counsellor who knows the laws governing family
issues well. She said such courts, if set up, could also act as adviser to
couples facing a crisis in their marriage and, if possible, save the
marriage.178
H.R Hahlo recommended that divorce cases should be heard in
chambers rather than in open court. According to him, it is in
conformity with worldwide trends, of which the Australian Family Law
is the latest manifestation, to hear divorce cases in private and to
place restrictions on the publications of reports of such cases. In
defended as well as in undefended divorce cases, rules of procedure
174 Sunday Times, December 6, 1992.
175 Esposito, 1982, p.60-i.
176 Minister of National Unity and Social Development Mmistry.
177 The policy behind this suggestion is to encourage open and frank testimony, to prevent public
embarassment and to prevent a septacle by the public and newspaper journalists who are seekmg
sensational fillmg for the press.
178 New Straits Times, December 4, 1992.
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should enable the courts to proceed with a minimum of formality.
Unless the court directs otherwise, evidence on affidavit should be
admitted. However, he still feels that representation by lawyers is still
the best guarantee that the cases of both parties will be properly
placed before the court.'79
However the idea of settling divorce cases in camera is totally rejected
by the Chief Oadhi of the Sharia Court due to the fact that to have a
fair trial, it should be open to the public. This is more so in the case
of the Sharia Court since it is often critised especially by women stet
being impartial.'8°
The statement made by the Chief Qadhi is correct in the sense that by
the early 1980s, criticisms were being voiced with increasing frequency
as to various aspects of Australian family law especially the principle
of a closed court. There had been attacks on both judges and premises
of the Family Court.' 8 ' Since the transactions of the court were
closed to the public, it resulted in little or no public scrutiny of its
work. Partly in response to these criticisms, Section 97 was amended
in 1983 to the effect that all proceedings in the Family Court or any
other court exercising jurisdiction under the Act are to be heard in
open court. It also makes some modifications in giving the court power
to make exclusion orders in respect of individuals or classes of persons
in individual cases.'82
179 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Studies on Divorce, 1975, p. 87.
180 See note 173.
181 See Finlay, H.A, NFault and Violence m the Family Court of Austraha", (1985) 59 A U 559.
182 Subsection 97(1) of the Australian Family Law Act now states that all proceedmgs in the Family
Court or any other court exercising jurisdiction under the Act are to be heard m open court.
Subsection (2) makes some modifications in giving the court power to make exclusion orders in
respect of mchviduals or classes of persons in individual cases.
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Based on the experience of the Australian Family court and on a well-
known principle in Administrative law that "justice must not only be
done but also seen to be done", I propose that divorce hearings should
be held in open court instead of the judge's chamber. 183 The divorce
process should involve some degree of privacy but it should not be
confused with total secrecy. A balance must be maintained between the
rights of the family and the right of the public to have sufficient
knowledge to assess the manner in which justice is administered. I
consider that this competing interest can best be served by divorce
hearings being open to the public, with the judge having power to
make exclusion orders in respect of individuals or classes of persons
in individual cases. This kind of provision does not materially impair
the principle of the open court.
In sum, the time has come for the establishment of family courts in
Malaysia and for specialist judges to bring about a cohesive approach
in family law and assist in the development of such law.
It is also submitted that there should be consolidated trials. Under the
present system, the various elements of a divorce are dealt with
separately.' 84 One disadvantage of this system of fragmented hearings
of cases is the increased time, not all of which is immediately obvious.
How much a hearing costs can be appreciated when it is considered
how many people are typically involved; a judge or magistrate, the two
spouses, their legal advisers, and perhaps witnesses and children as
well. Furthermore, the preparation through each stage requires
expenditure of time in getting the case ready for trial and some part
of the actual hearing itself is taken up in reacquainting the court with
183 The admission of the public was one of the normal attnbutes of a court and by preventing this,
the court will be turned into "secret tnbunal?; Scott v Scott [1913] A.0 132.
184 Petition for divorce is heard by a judge in open court. Applicant for maintenance and other forms
of fmancial relief are heard by a Judge or sometimes a Magistrate and application relating to the
custody of children are heard by a judge in Chambers.
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the facts of the case and informing it of the results of earlier
proceedings. In some parts, lawyers may have to travel to reach the
court which may be an appreciable factor in the cost of the case. The
more often attendance at court is required, the greater is the
likelihood of time being wasted in waiting because of slippage in court
timetables. This last factor may not seem very significant to an
outsider but anyone with experience of litigation will know that waiting
time can contribute noticeably to legal cost.
A reduction in the number of separate hearings in divorce proceedings
would bring about material savings in costs, both to private and public
funds. This can be achieved simply by reorganisation of the present
procedures. It can be arranged so that parties are required, to present
a comprehensive case to the court which would then dispose of all the
issues involved in the case at one time.
Apart from saving cost, a consolidated hearing procedure of the kind
mentioned, would produce another benefit. In a number of cases, the
various issues to be resolved are inter-dependant.' 85 A court which
has before it at one time full information on all aspects of the case is
likely better able to judge the relative importance of the various issues
involved and the consequences of its decision on any aspect. It would
thus be more favourably placed to make the best possible arrangements
than a court which did not at any time see the case as a whole, but
only in separate instalments.
With the growth of population and the considerable increase in the
workload of all courts and the importance of cases especially divorce
petitions, custody and maintenance, the creation of a specialised family
court is badly needed. Family disputes, by their very nature, require
185 For example, the decision on who has custody of the children is likely to be a vital consideration
in deciding who is to occupy the matrimonial home.
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immediate treatment and careful treatment. If immediate treatment is
denied, it may mean that the opportunity to help the parties is lost.
The economic cost of providing a family court will be great but the
social cost of failing to do so will be greater. The real costs of an
inadequate system for handling the broken families and desperate
children can only be measured in terms of human anguish and
degradation. The economic factor should be a secondary consideration
in these circumstances.
As a conclusion, a proposed model of family court in Malaysia should
include:
a) a court that has broad substantive and geographical jurisdiction
over all family matters so that the family could be viewed as a
whole rather than as a series of individual problems
b) informality, low-cost and easy access to the courts.
c) judges who ideally have some training in both law and social
sciences' 86, and are capable of co-operation with staff in
disciplines other than legal;
d) court that has a proper status;
e) a court that has a well-established conciliation service.
Counsellors and social workers attached to the court should
operate closely with the judges to provide information and
encourage communication between potential litigants.187
186 It should be noted that Section 22 (2)(b) of the Family Law Act of Australia provides that a
person shall not be appomted as the Judge of the Family Court of Australia unless "by reason of
traming, experience and personality, he is a suitable person to deal with matters of family law".
187 The Family Court of Australia is equipped with a specialised Court Counselling Service, whose
function is to counsel the parties, to assist them in reconciliation and in conciliation of their
differences and to provide reports for the court on matters related to the welfare, custody and
access to children, Fmlay, 1992.
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6.7 CONCILIATION
Simultaneous with the growth of the family court movement in various
countries has been the development in the conciliation movement. This
development has been accompanied by the growth of various processes
aimed at the settlement of family conflict by informal negotiation.188
Conciliation has been associated with the family courts and proposals
of family courts have provided for a conciliation service as part of
their structure. The practice of conciliation as a method of settling
disputes has increased rapidly in many countries.189
Finlay differentiates the adversarial process used in commercial and
civil litigation but in the case of family disputes,' 9° where the parties
usually remain in some kind of relationship to one another, particularly
as regards their children, a great deal of harm can happen if
adversarial processes are applied. 19 ' Schlesinger commented that
adversarial approach de-emphasises concern for the feelings and social
functioning of the children, as well as of the other spouse.'92
It follows from this that what is required in the circumstances is the
need to bring the estranged parties together and to stop them being
Davis, 1983, p.131.
189 The American experience of conciliation suggests that" counselling frequently has resulted m
reduced tensions and hostilities to the point where statutoiy settlements of support payments,
custody, visitation and other problems, have been accomplished prior to the final divorce hearing,
and which results otherwise would not have occurred without a bitter court contest", Henderson,
L.L. "Marriage Counselling m a Court of Conciliation", (1969) 52 Judicature 253 at 256.
190 Divorce litigation is unique among all legal actions in that it is almost invariably accompanied by
the most intense and intimate emotions. it is rarely a clear cut and dried piece of business with
a clear beginning and end which can be handled and filed away, Irving, Howard and Bohn, Peter,
"A Social Science Approach to Family Dispute Resolution", 1978, Canadian Bar Journal, 39.
191 Fmlay, 1992, p.39; see also Irvmg H. and Irvmg B., Conciliation Counselling in Divorce Litigation,
Reports of Family Law, Vol. 16, 1974.
Schlesmger, Benjamin; "Children and Divorce - A Selected Review", (1977) Conciliation Courts
Review, 36.
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driven further apart by the polarising process of litigation, to create
constructive opportunity for a reconciliation and if that is not possible
to reduce emotional temperatures so that other related issues can be
amicably discussed and resolved. Hence, when the marriage is dead,
proceedings should be of a nature which would allow the marriage to
be buried with decency and dignity and in a way which will encourage
harmonious relationships between the parties and their children in the
future.
In Japan, failure to reach agreement upon divorce where one party is
anxious to have the marriage terminated, results in bringing the matter
before the Family Court. The conciliation committee will seek to effect
either a conciliation and continuation of the marriage or, more
frequently, an agreement concerning terms on which the marriage may
be ended. It is reported that in the overwhelming majority of cases,
divorce is effected by extrajudicial agreement of the parties. Cases in
which the courts must intervene are rare.' 93
 The Japanese system
cannot be used as an example of how to deter divorces but it does
serve as a model of how to manage the problem of marriage
breakdown, pointing at the adjustment of conflicting interests of
individuals so that individual freedom is combined with flexibility.
In England, there is the increased awareness, since 1976, of the
benefits of conciliation in divorce. An amicable divorce is now
perceived as better for parties and, importantly, for their children than
a hostile one. As one leading exponent of conciliation has said;
"A legal process which facilitates agreement can help couples
to re-organise their lives and relationships in a humane and
civilised way, whereas a process which concentrates on
establishing which spouse is the guilty one increases antagonism
and discourages constructive solutions. "194
Mmamikata, 1988, p.'17.
194 Parkmson, 1986, p.11.
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Conciliation has become accepted and established so quickly in
England because the movement has been based on two fundamental
and crucially important principles. First, there is the absolute
importance of maintaining high standards in the selection, training and
supervision of mediators. Secondly, there is the obvious fact that
mediation has to be interdisciplinary. It offers clients a greater and
more flexible range of ways of handling their problems.'95
In England, the Finer Committee led the way in offering the first
official articulation of conciliation as something distinct from
reconciliation. Conciliation is defined as:
"assisting the parties to a dispute to deal with the consequences
of the established breakdown of their marriage, whether
resulting in a divorce or separation, by reaching agreements or
giving consents or reducing the area of conflict upon custody,
support, access to and education of the children, financial
provision, the disposition of the matrimonial home, lawyers'
fees, and every other matter arising from the breakdown which
calls for a decision on future arrangements. "196
Parkinson defines conciliation as:
"a structured process in which both parties to a dispute meet
voluntarily with one or more impartial third parties
(conciliators) who help them to explore possibilities of reaching
agreement, without having the power to impose a settlement on
them or the responsibility to advise either party
individually. "197
195 Westcott, John. Mediation - What Next?, July [1992] Fam Law 279.
196 Fmer Corn., op.cit.,para 4.288; The Booth Committee while also adopting the Finer definition,
added further that the essence of conciliation is that responsibility remains at all times with the
parties themselves to identify and seek agreement on the issues arismg from the breakdown of
their relationship, Booth, 1985, para 3.10.
' Parkinson, 1986, p.52.
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While this last definition is more precise as to the institutional
representation of the general idea of conciliation, that is as involving
some independent third party intervention, it still leaves many practical
aspects of the concept quite "hazy".' 98 The term conciliation,
according to Parkinson, is often used much more loosely. However, it
is clear from her definition that the basic concept has been modified
and adapted in a variety of ways by the different groups of
professionals who have sought to incorporate it into their own fields
of activity.' 99
 Bottomley suggests that this is understandable given
their professional concerns but unsafe if the effects are not fully
explored.200
Davis stated that,
"the common thread of an idea can be almost lost through the
speed with which it is modified to suit the purposes of
practitioners in different fields. The creation of a new role
merely confuses the issue if the task is not clearly defined or if
the mediator regards it as no more than a new name for
dealing with an old problem. "201
The ambiguities of conciliation are further stressed by the evidence
obtained by the Newcastle Conciliation Project Unit 202 of the views
198 See Roberts S., "Mediation in Family Disputes" Modern Law Review 1983, PP. 537-557, Even
Parkinson agrees that conciliation as currently practised is, "still far from being unambiguous as
well as a discrete process", Parkinson, L, "Mediation Matters" December [1990] Fam Law 477.
199 Howard J. and Shepherd G., Conciliation, Children and Divorce. A Family Systems Approach,
London, BT Batsford Ltd. 1987, P.8.
200	 . ,,	 .Bottomley A, 1984, p.296; This issue has been thoroughly examined by Davis G., in Conciliation
and the Professions" Family Law, 1983, p.6.
Davis, 1983, P.11.
202 See Roberts S., "A Bluepnnt for Family Conciliation" 53, Modern Law Review, 1990, pp. 88-90
see also Eekelaar, John, Regulating Div rce, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, pp.155-164.
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of relevant professional bodies as to the objectives of conciliation.203
Davis points out that conciliation should be a means of seeking
reasonable compromise solutions to disputes over specific issues rather
than a mechanism for safeguarding children's interest but one
consistent point that emerges from discussions of conciliation is that
its primary justification and focus is the welfare of children involved
in divorce.204
To view mediation primarily in terms of protecting children's interests
could lead to a very authoritative and judgmental form of conciliation.
According to Gerard, the development is one-sided since the majority
of schemes at present in United Kingdom limit their assistance to
problems relating to children.205
The costs and benefits of various conciliation services have been the
subject of a major research study conducted by the University of
Newcastle. 206
 This has revealed that conciliation is effective, both in
reducing the areas of conflict and in increasing the parents' satisfaction
with the arrangements made, but to be most effective, it should be a
recognised alternative to legal procedures for the resolution of
203 Follow-up interviews conducted by the Newcastle researchers showed that many of those who
came to conciliation had been confused about the conciliator's objective and role, Conciliation
Project Report, 1989.
204 Bottomley, 1984, p.292-303; see also Newcastle CPU 1989, Report to the Lord Chancellor on the
costs and effectiveness of conciliation in England and Wales, University of Newcastle, para 5.6;
see also Parkinson, 1990.
205 Gerard, A., "Conciliation: Present and Future" in The State, The Law and The Family : Critical
Perspectives, M.D.A Freeman (ed), London, Tavistock, p.281. Although some National Family
Conciliation Council affiliated conciliation services are now seeking to extend the scope of
conciliation to encompass all issues, others are continuing to restrict their help to child-related
issues only. According to Parkinson, the move from conciliation on child-related issues to all issues
"is not a simple step", Parkinson, [1990].
206 The Newcastle Conciliation Project unit (CPU) was established by the Lord Chancellor's
Department, with the purpose of researching the cost and effectiveness of all conciliation s *. hemes
in operation in England and Wales and of submitting a report to the Lord Chancellor to enable
hun to decide, whether and how, a national family conciliation might be established.
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disputes. The committee's view was that, if such a service were to be
introduced, it should firmly based on the principle of voluntary
participation and that its distinguishing feature should be to enable
couples to retain control of the decision-making process consequent on
separation and divorce, encouraging them to reach their own
agreements.207
Research findings show that agreements are reached in a substantial
proportion of cases, especially if conciliation is sought as the first
resort, and not as a last-ditch effort. 208 Parkinson says that,
"conciliation should be available to the parties at an early
stage... and should also be quickly accessible in crisis
situations. "209
However, according to Sanctuary, any attempt to provide marital
conciliation under compulsion will end in failure.21°
Conciliation is developing as an interdisciplinary initiative taken in
different parts of the world by senior lawyers, probation officers and
others. 21 ' In England, many different approaches to conciliation are
being explored in different parts of the country, but working towards
207 Newcastle Conciliation Project Unit. Report to the Lord Chancellor on the costs and effectiveness
of conciliation in England and Wales, University of Newcastle, 1989, para 20.19.
208 Research on Conciliation in Divorce by Gwynn Davies, Dept. of Social Administration, University
of Bristol.
209 Parkinson, 1990, p.24.
210 Sanctuaiy, G., Marriage under Stress: A Comparative Stud y of Marriage Conciliation, London,
George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1968, p.193.
211 In Australia, demands for the development of some alternative models had ansen, which resulted
in the establishment of the Family Law Mediation Service Pt! t Project which commenced to
operate at the Mamage Guidance Council of Victona. The Austrahan government have begun
to realise that mediation and other alternative methods of dispute resolution are actually more
effective, as well as much cheaper, than traditional court-based services Fmlay, 1992, p.43.
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the same goal. 212 Generally, these can be categorised into two types;
"in-court" and "out-of-court".
The problems with conciliation conducted by or at the court, although
it is valuable and effective, include the inevitable pressure to reach a
settlement quickly. The authority of the registrar or court welfare
officer conducting it, may unconsciously or consciously dictate the
outcome. And there are risks of confusing the welfare officer's
different roles of reporting to the court and assisting the couple to
reach agreement.213
In Bristol, conciliation management committees are chaired by local
circuit judges. 2" The out-of-court schemes are well-established in
Bristol in terms of past experience, but face an uncertain future
because of lack of funds. 215
 Lisa Parkinson suggested a practical way
in which conciliation might be funded but, clearly, funding will be the
major obstacle in the way of the establishment of a national mediation
service in England.216
Despite the widespread support for conciliation, there have also been
many criticisms at its implications. The main advantages claimed for
conciliation are that it offers the parties greater control over the
proceedings, and that it encourages agreement by moving away from
212 See Parkinson,L., Mediation Matters, December [19901 Fam Law. For recent developments in
Cambridge, see Richard, Martin, "Divorce Cambridge Style; New Developments in Conciliation",
November, [1990] Fam Law 436.
213 Newcastle CPU, 1989, para 5 18.
214 Parkinson, 1982, p. 77.
215 Gerard, 1984, p282. It is widely acknowledged that one of the major problems for conciliation in
UK is fundmg, see May, [1992] Fam.Law.
216 Parkinson, 1992, p.25.
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adversarial court-based proceedings. 217 It can save court costs and
court time and assists in promoting the welfare of children. It is
however, the last two claims, that is legal savings and children's
welfare, which are both the most contentious and potentially most
liable to move the concept in a divergent position. Davis stated that,
"if mediation is justified princIpally in these terms, and
developed so as to support these claims, it will ultimately be
diminished and subverted. "218
In addition, Eekelaar argued that there is no evidence that conciliation
saves overall costs.219
It has also been argued that conciliation implies a degree of loss of
control by the parties, since the definition they have been unable to
resolve the dispute on their own. 22° This in turn may lead to a
situation in which the conciliator actively encourages a certain form of
settlement, rather than allowing the parties to define the terms of their
own agreement. 22 ' For this reason, Davis has pointed to the dangers
of forcing the parties into a settlemetnt.222
This is in turn associated with the view that, rather than offering an
alternative to adjudicatory proceedings and thus a form of
217 See Parkmson, 1992, p.69; see also Murch, 1980, p 210; see also The Family Law Sub-Committee
of the Law Society; A Better Way out, para 15, 1983; Gerard A., 1984, p.286.
218 Davis,1983.
219 Eekelaar, 1991, p.160.
220 Roberts, 1983, p.541.
See Bottomley, 1984, pp.293-303.
Davis, G., "Mediation in Divorce: A Theoretical Perspective" Journal of Social Welfare Law, 1983,
p.135.
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deregulation, conciliation offers an extension of regulation. 223 This
arises from the fact that, first, conciliation as practised is not confined
oniy to those cases that would have gone on to be disputed in a full
hearing, but is applied in any case manifesting a dispute at an early
stage, even though that dispute might be settled by other means,
probably through solicitors if conciliation has not been available.
Second in relation to in-court schemes, the fear has been expressed
that conciliation has not in practice dissociated itself from the
adjudicatory function of the court and its personnel, rather, it has
become "effectively assimilated into the standard practice of the
courtroom. "224
This is argued to have particularly adverse consequences for women,
since the focus of much conciliation is the needs of the children.225
Thus, in the process of conciliation, women may be pressurised to
compromise in the interests of securing agreement "for the sake of the
children" even though their view of the needs of the children may be
different. This may in turn weaken the bargaining power of women in
relation to property and finance. Some feminists have argued against
the growth of conciliation (which presumes party competence) on the
ground that it is likely to favour men.226
Nevertheless, conciliation is characterised by a wide diversity of
practice, not all of which will present the dangers outlined here. What
remains in question, is the extent to which conciliation actually
223 Bottomley, 1984, p.294.
224 Davis,G., "Public Issues and Private Troubles: The Case of Dworce", Famil y Law, 1987, p.306; In
1985, the Family Law Council in Australia proposed to separate concthation from the judicial
functions of the court, Finlay, 1992, p.45.
225 See note 128 and 129.
226 Bottomley A., 1984.
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achieves the objectives that have been set for it, rather than simply
becoming an administratively convenient method of processing disputes.
There are many experiments going on in this field, and organisations
in different countries have tackled the problems in different ways. It
is understandable why the provision of marriage conciliation by one
means or another, has been gaining support, as it being understood in
all parts of the world that society has a vested interest in the
preservation of the family as a unit.
6.7.1 Lessons for Malaysia
It is one of the features of modern family law in many other western
countries with a common law tradition that both the law and the
procedures by which it is administered now conform less strictly than
they once did to the adversarial model of justice. These countries have
responded to changes in public attitudes to divorce by introducing new
legislation, setting up family courts and promoting opportunities for
conciliation in preference to adversarially conducted court
proceedings.227
It is submitted that any reform in the area of divorce in Malaysia
should not neglect this aspect, for the best laws serve no purpose if the
judicial institutions which are going to administer this law are not
adequately structured for this purpose. Moreover, if the court process
were to remain so formal, the client may have no understanding of
what is going on or that understanding be so minimal or distorted and
have the effect of reducing the likelihood of any conciliation. This
necessarily encourages the parties to delegate responsibility for
negotiation to their respective lawyers, thereby forfeiting the
Davis, 1983, p.131.
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opportunity of experience of direct participation in solving their own
problem.228
It has been suggested by Eekelaar that a shift away from legal
procedures and personnel is essential if the "adjustive" function of the
law is to be perfected, since the "adjustive" function, properly applied,
demands that the institutional arrangements direct the parties'
attention towards the future and maximise their opportunities to
realign their lives towards new family arrangements which cause the
minimum friction to all concerned.229
No doubt there is the tendency 23° to adopt conciliation as practised
in the West but it seems on balance that the nature of conciliation as
practised in England is unsuitable for resolving marital disputes within
the patriarchal Malaysian society where the extended family is still
dominant and strong.
Before colonisation, conciliation was used in almost all matters in
Malaysia. The Malays in general are not litigious persons. 231 Disputes
between individuals are settled in such a manner that does not bring
resentment to those affected by it. The Malay Muslims, use the Sharia
and Adat. Arbitration plays a very important role;
228 See Herman, Margaret S., Mc. Kenry, Patnck C. and Weber, Ruth E., Mediation and Arbitration
applied to Family Conflict Resolution, The Arbitration Journal, 19.
229 Eekelaar, 1984, p.54.
The ngid social stratification of the Malaysian society discouraged litigation and judicial decision-
making.
Minnatur, 1968, p.32.
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"small matters are the place for arbitration, great for the
application of custom, the most weighty for ancient ancestral
rights. "232
In Negeri Sembilan under the Malay custom, the Malays have been
known for practising the process of mediation in divorce matters which
has some similarities with the conciliation process in the western
context.
The advantages of the process of bersuarang compared to
"conciliation" is three-fold. First, both parties will be assured to have
equal bargaining powers due to the presence of elders from both sides.
Under the Malay custom, custody of the children are normally given
to women. 233 Therefore women will not be pressurised to compromise
in the interests of securing agreement "for the sake of the children."
Secondly, it moves away from the adversarial court based proceedings,
thus reducing the chances of the case being delayed and it would cut
cost to a minimum. The informal atmosphere in which the discussion
takes place is different from the formal proceedings within an
adjudicatory framework, and would also enable and encourage the
participants to assume an active role in their own problems.
Thirdly, a better decision can be reached where the literal application
of law could be avoided as it could lead to an undesirable result. The
adjudicatory procedure must be viewed as a narrow construct which
adheres strictly to legal rules and the doctrine of "stare decisis." The
bersuarang process however, utilises facts, circumstances, social
consequences and a host of other factors which do not fall strictly
within the perimeter of the law as an instrument for dispute
settlement. The bersuarang is based on the customary saying;
232 Dudok dengan aturan, kecil nama mempakat, besar nama Adat gedang bernama pesaka sembah,
Caldecott, 1908.
Selat, 1976, p.128.
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"The greatness of men lies in taking counsel together;
The greatness of prophets in performing miracles;
As a bamboo conduit makes a round jet of water;
So taking counsel together rounds men to one mind. "234
Under the Malay custom, since marriage entails the co-relationship of
a host of relatives, divorce would present considerable embarrassment
to the families concerned. Therefore, the family conflict is resolved
within the families itself so that they could save their family's
"face. "235
Bersuarang has striking similarities with the process of hakam in Islam.
It is said that the process of bersuarang adopted the spirit of hakam
with some modifications. It is provided by the Qur'an that the
institution of hakam be invoked whenever there is shigag (constant
conflict) between the husband and the wife. As stated in the Quran,
which says to the effect: "If you fear a breach between the husband
and wife appoint a hakam (arbitrator) from his family and a hakam
from her family; if they shall desire a reconciliation, God will cause
them to agree."236
Where arbitrators are appointed but are unable to effect a
reconciliation between the parties, the dominant view of the Hanafi
and Shafi'i schools is that the powers of the arbitrators cease and they
may arrange a divorce or khulu' only where they have been specifically
empowered to do so, as an authorised agents, by the husband in the
Kelebihan umat dengan muafakat
Kelebihan nabi dengan mukjizat
Bulat air kerana pembentung;
Bulat manusia kerana muafakat.
Caldecott, 1908.
For further details see Chapter 1.
See Al Qur'an, Surah An Nisa': 35.
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first case and by both spouses in the second. In the dominant view of
the Maliki school, on the other hand, the arbitrators have the right to
decide that nothing but divorce or khulu' will meet the case, and this
decision will be upheld and enforced by the court.
There is a minority Shafi'i opinion which follows the Maliki view. Al-
Sharbini states "in one view they (the two arbitrators) are two judges
appointed by the Ruler (or by the judge). This view has been preferred
by many on the ground that the Qur'an has named 'arbitrators'
(hakaman) and an agent is not an arbitrator... So the consent of the
two parties is not a condition of their appointment, and they may give
what judgement they consider beneficial, whether it be that the
marriage should be continued or dissolved." Ibn Hajar said: "And they
are two agents who may act only by consent of the parties. But on
another view they are the two judges appointed by the Ruler."237
Different Muslim countries have introduced the institution of hakam
in different forms. 238 However, it could be summarised that all of
them used hakam as a process for reconciliation. If reconciliation
failed, matters relating to children, maintenance or matrimonial
property which is considered as legal issues are handled by the gadhi
and not hakam.
Although IFLA has a provision on hakam, 239 it is a pity that the
judge does not fully resort to it as a means for conciliation. Hakam in
the provision has been used in certain cases only and has been
interpreted as fulfilling a role for reconciliation rather than
conciliation. According to Mahmood, one very important administrative
blunder which has occurred in Kelantan (and still does) is the fact that
Anderson quoting Al Sharbmi and Ibn Hajar, 1954, p.335.
For further discussions see Chapter 3.
See IFLA, section 48.
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the institution of hakam has not been put to its proper use. In
Kelantan, this process is only resorted to by the gadhi in cases relating
to an application of divorce made at the wife's request. 24° It should
be extended to other cases where there is conflict. Such a conflict can
be readily presumed to exist when the couples have decided to divorce
irrespective of which method of divorce they have decided. 24 ' The
practice of hakam would allow the estranged couples to review their
decisions, and if they have decided on terminating the marriage, they
could come to a compromise on matters relating to post divorce
arrangements for the children (if any) and matters relating to the
matrimonial property.
Little is known regarding the practice of this concept in the Federal
Territory of Kuala Lumpur because it is done behind closed doors in
the Sharia' Court. So far, no research has been done yet on the
practice of hakam. However, from the provisions under IFLA, it could
be seen that hakam is not invoked in cases where the husband has
pronounced talag. 242 It could it be deduced that due to this factor,
the function of hakam is interpret as a mechanism to unite the parties
rather than conciliation. Even so, through the experience of one Sharia
judge, it has failed to unite the estranged spouse since by the time
hakam has been invoked, the marriage has irretrievably broken
down. 243 Introducing hakam at this stage is useless. It should be
introduced earlier, that is when both parties went for counselling at
the Unit Perunding dan Pembangunan Keluarga. Unfortunately since
Unit Perunding dan Pembangunan Keluarga is not under the
administration of Sharia Court, the Sharia Court could not interfere.
240 That is when the wife applies for a divorce using section 69 but the husband refuses either to
divorce her or by redemption.
Mahmood, 1982, p.93.
242 Personal Conversations with Shana Lawyers in December, 1992.
Personal conversation with Abdul Aziz Mashuri, Sharia Court Judge, August 1993.
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Since there is a provision on hakam under IFLA, it is proposed that
this provision be fully utilised to all parties intending to divorce at a
much earlier stage. It is very ironic that when Islamic law has laid
down the means to settle disputes in a peaceful manner through the
concept of hakam, the Sharia court judge has had to deal divorce cases
through the adversarial system.
Bersuarang should also be revived for those who do not want any
intervention from the court, so that disputes can be settled within the
families with expert help from a mediator. The arbitrators from each
family would know the trait of both parties, and would be able to
effect a reconciliation and if that fails will conciliate the parties into
settling their disputes in an agreeable way. It also act as a safeguard
to ensure that agreements are fair and freely negotiate. Bersuarang
which includes both the process of reconciliation and conciliation is
suitable for settling family disputes, without too much publicity, or a
resort to the adversary court-based for the Malay-Muslims in
Malaysia. 244 It could work along similar lines as "out-of-court
conciliation" as practised in England, with some modifications made to
suit the present modern Malay society.
As for the Malaysian Chinese, they are also known to use conciliation
to settle their disputes. According to Goh Bee Chen, Chinese are non-
litigious people because they are heavily influenced by the Confucian
views based on family and morality. She stated that;
"Culturally, the common law justice system runs counter to the
rural Chinese Malaysian beliefs. The English judicial process
requires of a judge a verdict rather than a compromise solution.
This necessarily excludes the Confucian concept of yielding and
compromise..."
244 In the majority of cases, the misunderstanding can be mended. see Au, 1964, p.194.
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She added that to have one's case adjudged in the law court is a public
display of family shame in the Chinese sense. 245 Most of them rely
on kan-ching (good relations) and settle disputes through
mediation.246
It is interesting to note that the secret societies had their own system
of law which was in part embodied in written regulations of the society
and dealt not only with the internal regulation of the members'
behaviour towards one another and this includes prohibition against
litigation between members. Traditional Confucian familial concepts,
reinterpreted in the light of the new social situation, found their way
into the disciplinary code of the society.247
For the Indian Tamils, arbitration is normally dealt by a village
headman or elder. It is said that,
"the practice of settling disputes out of court is... the virtual
preserve of the Tamil Indian. "248
The mediator in their context takes a much broader view of the issues
involved than any common law judge, whose area of investigation is
limited by narrow concepts of what is relevant and what is not.249
Gob, Bee Chen, The Traditional Chinese Concept of Law, Justice and Dispute Settlement,
Academic Exercise, Faculty Law, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1983, p.204.
Ibid,p.173.
247 Comber, 1961, pp. 56-9.
Hon, Phaik Hong, Extra-Legal Methods of Setthng Disputes, Academic Exercise, Faculty of Law,
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1977, p.34.
"Once a matter is in the hands of the legal specialists, the lawyers and the judge, they impose their
own construction upon it in such a way that both the form and the course which the dispute takes
are largely beyond the disputant? control. What is in dispute and how it is to be dealt with are
determined by the reach of legal rules... A narrow concept of relevance also requires that the
precise issue m dispute is separated from any larger complex of relations between the two
disputants, and dealt with in isolation from their relationship"; Roberts, 1979, p21.
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However, the Ceylonese, Punjabi and Chettiar community who form the
upper crust of the Indian society are more litigation conscious,
primarily because they have the means to bear the legal costs.25°
Unfortunately, the present LRA which governs the non-Muslims does
not have any provisions on conciliation. The law requires the petitioner
through rules of court to "have recourse to the assistance and advice
of such persons or bodies as may be made available for the purpose of
effecting a reconciliation between parties to a marriage who have
become estranged." 25 ' Where divorce is on the grounds of
irretrievable breakdown, there is a compulsory reference of the
matrimonial problem to a "conciliatory body" at which the parties
attend without their lawyers. It is only after the conciliatory body "has
certified that it has failed to reconcile the parties" that the petition
can be presented, with certain exceptions.252
Even the role of mediator in conciliation in the definition given by
Parkinson is very different from the role of the "conciliatory body"
under the LRA. Parkinson stated that;
"Conciliation is not synonymous with divorce counselling
because counselling may involve only one party and because
counselling may take place on the periphery of the legal
process, without addressing the legal issues. Furthermore,
counselling may continue over a long period, with abstract
rather than practical objectives. Conciliation, in contrast, is
concerned with helping both parties to reach consensual
decisions on specific issues in the short term. These decisions
usually have major legal and financial implications and
consequences. Therefore, it must be clearly understood that
Ibid.
251 LRA, section 106.
252 Ibid., the exceptions are contamed m the proviso to section 106 (1). The exceptions relate to the
disappearance or unavailability of the respondent, wilful refusal of the respondent to attend a
concihation hearmg, imprisonment of the respondent for a term of five years or more, incurable
mental illness of the respondent, or other exceptional circumstances.
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conciliation offers an alternative to contested court proceedings,
not a substitute for legal advice and assistance. "253
And according to Mnookin, in private ordering the role of the law is
to act as a safety net where the bargaining spouses fail to agree. This
bargaining takes place against a legal backdrop.254
It is high time that the present marriage guidance organisations in
Malaysia should no longer see themselves as involved simply in
procuring reconciliation. The range of service should be much wider to
include conciliation as well. According to Freeman, conciliation is
important because "divorce does not end the problems of marriage.
Indeed, many problems only begin on divorce." 255 The present law
pays no attention to the post-divorce problem, therefore, it is proposed
that the provision on reconciliation be extended to conciliation as
well. 256 This process would allow people to disengage from a marital
relationship effectively and humanely, and in such a way that future
relationships are not prejudiced by the divorce.
In spite of much evidence of using conciliation to settle disputes in
various cases, however, it is difficult to assess the attitude of the
Muslims and non-Muslims in Malaysia since some have entered a
sophisticated urban society while, at the other end of the scale, others
have preserved the traditional values of older society. Whether
conciliation offers any solution to the problems in Malaysia depends
on several factors such as the philosophy behind it as well as its
Parkmson, L. "Bristol Courts Family Conciliation Service" [1982] 12 Fam.Law 13.
For further details see Mnookm, R.,"Bargaming in the Shadow of the Law;" The case of divorce
[1979] Current Legal Problems, 65.
Freeman, M.D.A, "Legal Responses to Mamage Breakdown," Current Le gal Problems, 1978,
pp. 121.
See proposal in Appendix I.
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method of operation. Much also depends upon the expectations held,
its aims, and of the role of conciliation in meeting the legal and social
needs of the Muslims and non-Muslims society in Malaysia. A Research
Committee should be appointed to look into research findings from
countries whose experience of conciliation is more extensive. Care
should be taken however not to draw generalised conclusions from
countries with different laws, legal systems and different social,
economic and cultural conditions.
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APPENDIX I
An Act to amend the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, 1976,
relating to divorce.
Short Title	 1. This Act may be cited as the Law Reform
(Marriage and Divorce)(Amendments Act, 1993)
Application	 3. The Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce Act,
of the law	 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act)
is amended by amending section 3 thereof -
3A. Section 3 be amended to read; This Act shall
not apply to a Muslim or to any person who is
married under Muslim Law and no marriage of one
of the parties which professes the religion of Islam
shall be solemnised or registered under this Act,
but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a
court before which a petition for divorce has been
made under section 51 from granting a divorce on
the petition of either party to the marriage where
one of the party to the marriage has converted to
Islam, and such decree shall, notwithstanding any
written law to the contrary, be valid against the
parties to the marriage.
New Section 4A 4.The Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act,
1976 is amended by inserting after section 4 thereof
the following new sections -
Abolition of
Domicile of
Dependent 4A. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the domicile of a
married woman as at any time on or after the
commencement of the Law Reform (Marriage and
Divorce) (Amendment) Act, 1993 shall instead of
being the same as her husband's by virtue only of
the marriage, be ascertained by reference to factors
as in the case of any other individual capable of
having an independent domicile.
(2) Where immediately before the commencement
of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce)
(Amendment) Act, 1993, a woman was married and
then had her husband's domicile by dependence,
she is to be treated as retaining that domicile (as a
domicile of choice, if it is not also her domicile of
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origin) unless and until it is changed by acquisition
or revival of another domicile either before or after
the commencement of the Act.
Repeal of
section 47
Repeal and
re-enactment
of section 48
Section 47 of the principal Act is hereby repealed.
Section 48 of the Act is hereby replaced and the
following new section substituted therefor-
Jurisdiction 48. The Court shall have jurisdiction to of court
entertain proceedings for divorce, in matrimonial
presumption of death and divorce proceedings or
judicial separation only if -
(a) the marriage has been registered under this
Act, or is deemed to be registered under
this Act, or was solemnised under a law
which expressly or impliedly provides that
the marriage shall be monogamous; and
(b) either of the parties to the manage is -
(i) domiciled in Malaysia at the commencement
of the proceedings; or
(ii) habitually resident in Malaysia for a period
of two years immediately preceding the
commencement of the proceedings
Repeal of
section 49
Repeal of
and re-
enactment
section 51
Section 49 of the principal Act is hereby
repealed
Section 51 of the principal Act is hereby
repealed and the following substituted
therefor -
51 (1) Where one party to the marriage has
converted to Islam, either party may petition for
divorce;
Repeal
and
re-enactment
of section 55.
Provided that no petition under this section shall be
presented before the expiration of the period of
three months from the date of conversion.
Section 55 of the principal Act is hereby
repealed and the following new section
substituted therefor-
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Conciliation Section 55.(1) It shall be the duty of the court in
which a petition for divorce or judicial separation
has been instituted to give consideration, from time
to time to the possibility of a reconciliation of the
parties to the marriage (unless the proceedings are
of such a nature that it would not be appropriate to
do so), and if at any time it appears to the Judge
constituting the court, either from the nature of the
case, the evidence in the proceedings or the
attitude of the parties or of either of them that
there is a reasonable possibility of such a
reconciliation, the Judge may do all or any of the
following;
(a) adjourn the proceedings to afford the parties
the opportunity of being reconciled or to
enable anything to be done in accordance
with either paragraph (b) or (C);
(b) with the consent of the parties, interview
them in chambers, with or without their
solicitors, as the court thinks proper, with a
view to effecting a reconciliation; and
(c) nominate conciliation officers to endeavour
the settlement of matrimonial property and
custody of the children.
(2) If, not less than fourteen days after the
adjournment under subsection (1) has taken
place, either of the parties to the marriage
requests that the hearing be proceeded with,
the judge shall resume the hearing, or
arrangements shall be made for the
proceedings to be dealt with another judge,
as the case requires, as soon as practicable.
(3) Evidence of anything said or of any
admission made in the course of an
endeavour to effect a reconciliation under
this section shall not be admissible in any
court.
Repeal of	 Sections 58 and 59 of the principal Act are
sections	 hereby repealed
58 and 59
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Repeal and
	 Sections 78 of the principal Act is hereby
re-enactment	 repealed and the following new section of
section 78
	 substituted therefor -
Assessment	 78. (1) In determining the amount of any of
of	 maintenance to be paid by a man to his
maintenance wife or former wife, the court shall have regard to
all the circumstances of the case including the
following matters:
(a) the income, earning capacity, property and
other financial resources which each of the
parties to the marriage has or is likely to
have in the foreseeable future;
(b) the financial needs, obligations and
responsibilities which each of the parties to
the marriage has or is likely to have in the
foreseeable future;
(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family
before the breakdown of the marriage;
(d) the age of each party to the marriage and
the duration of the marriage;
(e) any physical or mental disability of either of
the parties to the marriage;
(f) the contributions made by each of the
parties to the welfare of the family,
including any contribution made by looking
after the home or caring for the family; and
(g) in the case of proceedings for divorce or
nullity of marriage, the value of either of
the parties to the marriage of any benefit
(for example, a pension) which, by reason of
the dissolution or annulment of the marriage
that party will lose the chance of acquiring.
(2) In exercising its power under this section,
the court shall endeavour so to place the
parties, so far as it is practicable and,
having regard to their conduct, just to do so,
in the financial position in which they would
have been if the marriage had not broken
down and each had properly discharged his
or	 her	 financial	 obligations	 and
responsibilities towards the other.
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Criminal Offence for concealing matrimonial assets;
imprisonment or fine or both.
New Section	 The principal Act is hereby amended by
87A	 inserting after section 87 thereof a new
section 87A-
87A. (1) Subject to this section, the court shall not
make absolute any decree for divorce or nullity of
marriage or pronounce a decree of judicial
separation unless the court is satisfied as respects
every child -
(a) that arrangements have been made for the
welfare of the child and that those
arrangements are satisfactory or are the best
that can be devised in the circumstances; or
(b) that it is impracticable for the party or
parties appearing before the court to make
any such arrangements.
(2) The court may if it thinks fit proceed
without observing the requirements of
subsection (1) if it appears that there are
circumstances making it desireable that the
decree nisi be made absolute or, as the case
may be, that the decree for judicial
separation should be pronounced without
delay, and if the court has obtained a
satisfactory undertaking from either or both
of the parties to bring the question of the
arrangements for the child before the court
within a specified time.
(3) In this section, "welfare", in relation to a
child, includes the custody and education of
the child and financial provision for him/her.
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Repeal of
and
re-enactment
section 106
Section 106 of the principal Act is hereby
repealed and the following substituted
therefor -
106. (1) The Minister may appoint such public
officers as he thinks fit to be Conciliation officers
for the purposes of this Act.
(2) Where there are differences between the parties
to a marriage the parties or either of them may
refer the differences to a conciliation officer for his
advice and assistance.
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APPENDIX II
An Act to amend the Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act, 1984
relating to divorce.
Short Title 1. This Act may be cited as the Islamic Family
Law (Federal Territory) (Amendment Act)
1993.
Definition 2. Section 2 of the Islamic Family Law
(Federal Territory) Act, 1984 (hereinafter
referred to as the principal Act) is amended
by amending the definition of "darar syarie"
to read;
"darar syarie" means harm, according to
what is normally recognised by Islamic Law,
affecting a wife in respect of religion, life,
body, mind, dignity, or property;
Repeal and	 Section 47 (16) and (17) of the principal Act is
re-enactment of hereby repealed and the following substituted
section 47	 therefor -
(16) (17) 47 (16) A Talag raji'i pronounced by the husband
(except in cases of ruju' made during 'iddah made
explicitly or impliedly) or an order made by the
court shall not be effective until the expiring of the
'iddah
(17) If the wife is pregnant at the time the talag is
pronounced or the order is made, the talag or the
order shall not be effective to terminate the
marriage until the pregnancy ends.
(18) Nothing contained in this section shall affect
any right that a marriage woman has after the
dissolution of her marriage under this section from
marrying her formal husband except when the
dissolution is made effective after the third time.
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New section	 Section 48 is amended by inserting after section 48
49 (7)	 (6) thereof the following -
Repeal of and
re-enactment of
section 55
Section 48 (7) No advocate and solicitor shall
appear or act for any party in any proceeding
before a conciliatory committee and no party shall
be represented by any person, other than a member
of his of her family, without the leave of the
conciliatory committee.
Section 55 of the principal Act is hereby repealed
and the following new section substituted therefor
Section 55 A.
No pronouncement if talag or order of divorce or
annulment shall be registered unless the Chief
Registrar is satisfied that the order was made by
the court.
(1) Notwithstanding section 54, a husband who
divorces his wife by the pronouncement of talag is
any form outside the court and without the consent
of the Court, a report of the talag must be made to
the Court within 7 days.
(2) The Court shall examine and make an inquiry
into the validity of the divorce and shall, if satisfied
that the divorce is valid according to Hukum
Shara', subject to section 124, confirm and record
the divorce and send one certified copy of the
record to the appropriate Registrar and to the
Chief Registrar for registration.
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APPENDIX III
Divorce Survey Form For Sharia Court Files
1
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Year divorce granted
1975	 9.
1976	 10.
1977	 11.
1978	 12.
1979	 13.
1980	 14.
1981	 15.
1982	 16.
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
2	 Age of husband at marriage
1. 16-19	 5.	 35-39
2. 20-24	 6.	 40-44
3. 25-29	 7.	 45-49
4. 30-34	 8.	 50 and above
3
1.
2.
3.
4.
Age of wife at marriage
	16- 9	 5.
	20- 4	 6.
	
25-29	 7.
	
30-34	 8.
35-39
40-44
45-49
50 and above
4	 Age of husband at divorce
1. 16-19	 5.	 35-39
2. 20-24	 6.	 40-44
3. 25-29	 7.	 45-49
4. 30-34	 8.	 50 and above
5	 Age of wife at divorce
1. 16-19	 5.
2. 20-24	 6.
3. 25-29	 7.
4. 30-34	 8.
6	 Ethnic group of husband
1. Chinese
2. Indian
3. Others
4. Malay
35-39
40-44
45-49
50 and above
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7
	 Ethnic group of wife
1. Chinese
2. Indian
3. Others
4. Malay
8
	 Occupational group of husband
1. Professional, technical and related workers
2. Administrative and managerial skills
3. Clerical and related workers
4. Sales workers
5. Service workers
6. Agricultural, animal husbandry and forestry workers, fishermen
and labourers
7. Production and related workers, transport, equipment operators
and labourers
8. Workers not classified above
9. Unemployed
10. Outside labour force
9
	 Occupational group of wife
1. Professional, technical and related workers
2. Administrative and managerial skills
3. Clerical and related workers
4. Sales workers
5. Service workers
6. Agricultural, animal husbandry and forestry workers, fishermen
and hunters
7	 Production and related workers, transport, equipment operators
and labourers
8. Workers not classified above
9. Unemployed
10. Outside labour force
10	 Sex of petitioner
1. Male
2. Female
11	 Methods of divorce
1. With permission from court
2. Without permission
12	 Types of divorce
1. Talag
2. Ta'liq
3. Fasakh
4. Khulu'
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13	 Grounds for divorce
1. Adultery
2. Cruelty
3. Desertion and separation
4. Mixture
5. Polygamy (unequal treatment)
6. Intolerable behaviour
14	 Number of children
1. One
2. Two
3. Three
4. Four
5. Five
6. Six or more
7. None
15
	
Duration of marriage
1. Less than one year
2. 1-2
3. 3-4
4. 5-6
5. 7-8
6. 9-10
7. 11-12
8. 13-14
9. 15-16
10
	
16 and above
16
	
Ruju'
1.	 Yes
2
	
No
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APPENDIX IV
Detailed Classification of Ethnic Groups by Region, Malaysia, 1980
1980
Malay	-	 Malay
Indonesia
Jakun
Semai
Semelai
Te miar
Other Indigeneous
Other Malay i-ace
Chinese	 -	 Hokkien
Cantonese
Khek (Hakka)
Hainanese
Kwongsai
Hokchiu
Hokchia
Henghua
Other Chinese
Indian	 -	 Indian Tamil
Malayali
Telegu
Sikh
Other Punjabi
Other Indian
Pakistan
Bangladeshi
Sri Lanka Tamil
Other Sri Lankan
Others	 -	 Thai
Vietnamese
Other Asian
Eurasian
Others
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APPENDIX V
List of Persons Interviewed
1. Associate Professor Abdullah Abu Bakar, International Islamic University,
Malaysia.
2. Haji Idris bin Ahmad, member of the Technical Committee of Sharia and Civil
Law
3. Puan Norsiah Baharin, Assistant Director, Legal Aid Bureau, Federal Territory of
Kuala Lumpur.
4. Puan Siti Naaishah Hambali, Judge, Session Court, Federal Territory of Kuala
Lumpur.
5. Puan Unaizah Mohammad, Senior Assistant Registrar, Family and Property
Division, High Court, Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur.
6. Shariah and Civil Lawyers in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur.
7. Sheikh Ghazali Abdul Rahman, Chief Qadhi of the Shariah Court, Federal Teritory
of Kuala Lumpur.
8. Tan Sri Datuk Azmi Kamaruddin, Supreme Court Judge, Malaysia.
9. Tan Sri Datuk Professor Ahmad Ibrahim, Head of Technical Committee, Shariah
and Civil Laws, Malaysia.
10. Ustaz Abdul Aziz Mashuri, Shariah Court Judge, Federal Territory of Kuala
Lump u r
11. Ustaz Ismail Ahmad, Department of Religious Affairs, Federal Territory of Kuala
Lu mpu r.
12. Ustaz Mahammad Ibrahim, Registrar of Sharia Court, Federal Territory of Kuala
Lumpur.
13. Ustaz Wan Mohammad, Registrar of Marriages and Divorces, Department of
Religious Affairs, Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur.
14. Ustaz Wan Sulaiman, Head of Counselling and Development of Family Unit,
Department of Religious Affairs, Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur.
15. Ustazah Zawanah, Counsellor, Counselling and Development of Family Unit,
Department of Religious Affairs, Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur.
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APPENDIX VI
Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, 1980 Map Showing
Distribution of Population of Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur
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GLOSSARY
Adat
Adat Perpatih
Adat Temenggung
Adat Istiadat Melayu
Agong, Yang Di Pertuan
Allah
'Aqi
Bait al-Mal
Bersuarang
Bid'a
Buapak
Cerai ta'liq
Cerai Tebus Talaq
China Buta
Darar Shari'i
Endogamy and exogamy
Fasakh
Hadith
Hakam
Custom
Matrilineal custom
Patrilineal custom
Malay custom
The King
God
intellect, reason
Public Treasury
Arbitration or Settlement
Innovation
Elder of a family
Divorce by the breaking of a condition.
Divorce by redemption
Literally translated as "Blind Chinese", that is one who
carries out the legal fiction of marrying a woman
divorced from her husband by three talaq for the
expressed purpose of divorcing her and thereby making
it possible for her husband to remarry her
Harm according to what is normally recognised by
Islamic law, affecting a wife in respect of religion, life,
body, mind, or property
These term are used by the various authors to mean
respectively; a rule of marriage which requires a person
to take a spouse from within a kin group; a rule of
marriage which requires a person to take a spouse from
outside a kin group
Revocation, annulment of marriage by reason of any
circumstances permitted by Islamic law
Tradition
Arbitrator
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Polygamy
Qadhi
Ruju'
Shafi'i
Hanafis Followers of the largest of four school of law
mutually considered "orthodox", derives name from Abu
Hanifa. Shaybani and Yusuf are outstanding jurists,
represents ancient 'Iraqi School, adopted as official
school by Ottoman Turks and accordingly followed by
courts of Sudan, Egypt, Pale stin, Syria, Iraqi. Dominant
in Central Asia and India
Hanbali Followers of smallest "orthodox" school, Wahhabis of
Arabia repudiate many Hanbali tenets but adhere to
teachings of Hanbali reformers, Ibn Taimiyya and Ibn
Qaiyyim
Haram	 Prohibited, forbidden
Hukum Shara'	 The laws of Islam in any recognised sects
'Iddah	 Period of retirement specified for termination of the
legal effects of marriage
Islam	 Literally means submission to the will of God
Kufu'
Majlis Agama Islam
Melayu
Malikis
Mufti
Marriage equality
Council of Religion and dan Adat Istiadat
Malay Custom
Followers of "orthodox" school of Hijaz, Malik ibn Anas
nominal founder; found in Sudan, Upper Egypt,
throughout North and West Africa
Jurisconsult; qualified to issue legal opinion
Muta'ah	 Consolatory gift given to a divorced woman
Nushuz	 Wife unreasonably refuses to obey lawful wishes of
husband
This term is used to refer to polygyny
Judge
A return to the original married state
Adherents of school founded by Shafi'i, predominant in
lower Egypt, East Africa, much of Arabia, throughout
Southeast Asia
Sunnah	 A precedent based on the Prophets acts or sayings
Surat Ta'liq	 "Certificate of condition" attached to a marriage which
if broken entitles the woman to divorce
Se ma nda	 Derives from Sanskrit "sambandhakaran"; meaning
boundor wedded
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Sunnah A concrete implementation and tangible form and the
actual embodiment of the will of Allah in the form of
the Prophet Muhammad's deeds
Talaq	 Divorce
Talaq raj'i
	
Revocable divorce
Talaq bain	 Irrevocable divorce
Ta'liq	 A promise expressed by the husband after solemnisation
of marriage in accordance with Hukum Shara'
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ABBREVIATION
A.0
A.L.J.
ALL E.R
A.I.R.
I.L.R.
P.L.D
Q.B
S.A.W
F.M.S.L.R
J.H.
J.M.B.R.A.S
J.M.C.L
J.S.B.R.A.S.
Ky.
Leic.
M.L.R
M.0
M.L.J.
S.L.R
S.S.L.R
Appeal Cases
Australian Law Journal
All England Report
All India Report
Indian Law Report
All Pakistan Legal Decisions
Queen's Bench
Salla'l-lahhu-'alaihi wassallam
Federated Malay States Law Reports
Jernal; Hukum
Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
Journal of Malaysiaii and Comparative Law
Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
Kyshe's Reports
Leicester's Straits Law Reports.
Malayan Law Review
Malayan Cases
Malayan Law Journal
Straits Law Reports
Straits Settlements Law Reports
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